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ABSTRACT 
 
This research explores the theory and practice of trade secret law in Japan, Korea, and the 
United States from comparative, law and economics, and empirical perspectives.  Specifically, it 
examines how the imported trade secret law has developed and interacted with different legal, 
economic, technological, and sociocultural realities in the two Asian countries.  Japan and Korea 
adopted trade secret law in the early 1990s.  However, trade secret protection did not have a 
considerable impact in either Japan or Korea at this early stage of implementation because of 
several factors, including the role of local substitutes for trade secret law and defects in 
procedural law supporting the substantive trade secret law.  On the other hand, the protracted 
economic recession in Japan after the burst of the economic bubble and the Asian financial crisis 
in Korea in the late 1990s created a new business cycle in which trade secret law has been 
gaining importance in these societies.  The new business cycle has encouraged governments in 
the two Asian countries to recognize that trade secret law is an important mechanism for dealing 
with corporate control of valuable information and the management of human capital in pursuing 
continuing economic growth and protecting the stature of their countries in the international 
economy.  In recent years, accordingly, significant changes have occurred in the law regarding 
trade secrets in the two Asian countries.  However, the recent expansion of trade secret law in 
Japan and Korea has raised another legal and policy problem, which is tension between those 
who demand strong trade secret protection for employers and those who demand a Constitutional 
right for employees.  And the debates continue in Japan and Korea for optimal trade secret 
protection in these societies.  
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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
The rapid economic growth in Northeast Asian countries (China, Japan, Korea, and 
Taiwan) during the past several decades, often referred to as ―the East Asian Miracle,‖ has been 
attributed to many factors, including the role of government, a traditional system of lifelong 
employment, the forms of industrial organization, and the countries‘ respective educational 
systems.
1
  The importation and assimilation of foreign technology has also played a significant 
role in the rapid economic development of Northeast Asian countries.  In the early stages of 
industrialization in these countries, as in the United States,
2
 the importation of technology 
enabled companies that lacked indigenous expertise to attain advanced technologies at a low 
cost.
3
   
For East Asian countries in the early stages of rapid economic growth, the costs of 
intellectual property protection appeared to outweigh the benefits.
4
  For governmental 
policymakers seeking to identify the optimal technology policies to achieve rapid economic 
development, there appeared to be little incentive to adopt strong policies for the protection of 
intellectual property.
5
  These policy considerations affected the prevailing substantive laws in the 
                                                 
1
 See THE WORLD BANK, THE EAST ASIAN MIRACLE: ECONOMIC GROWTH AND PUBLIC POLICY (1993). 
2
 See DORON S. BEN-ATAR, TRADE SECRETS: INTELLECTUAL PIRACY AND THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL 
POWER (2004). 
3
 Shujiro Urata, The Impact of Imported Technologies on Japan‟s Economic Development, in THE ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT OF JAPAN AND KOREA: A PARALLEL WITH LESSONS 73-86 (1990) [hereinafter JAPAN AND KOREA]; 
Kwang Doo Kim & Sang Ho Lee, The Role of the Korean Government in Technology Import, in JAPAN AND KOREA 
87-95; ALICE H. AMSDEN, ASIA‘S NEXT GIANT: SOUTH KOREAN AND LATE INDUSTRIALIZATION (1989); 
TECHNOLOGICAL INDEPENDENCE: THE ASIAN EXPERIENCE 135-65 (Saneh Chamarik & Susantha Goonatilake eds., 
1994). 
4
 See Benard M. Hoekman et al., Transfer of Technology to Developing Countries: Unilateral and Multilateral 
Policy Options (Univ. of Colo., Research Program on Political and Economic Change, Working Paper No. 2004-
1003, May, 2004).  
5
 For an overview of the relationship between law, institutions, policies, cultures, and economic development in Asia, 
see Tom Ginsburg, Does Law Matter for Economic Development? Evidence from East Asia, 34 LAW & SOC‘Y REV. 
 2 
 
fields of patent, trademark, copyright, and trade secret law because of the strong influence of 
government intervention on economic development.
6
   
In recent years, by contrast, there has been a considerable change in the domestic 
intellectual property laws in many of the countries in Northeast Asia, including Korea, Japan, 
and China.  In particular, developments in the area of trade secret law in Japan and Korea are 
emblematic of these broader changes.   
In the absence of trade secret law, valuable information, which is often referred to as 
know-how rather than trade secrets, was not sufficiently protected under property laws, contracts, 
or torts, partly because of the relatively limited role of the courts in developing legal doctrines in 
the civil law tradition.  Nevertheless, the Japanese and Korean governments, which have played 
a significant role in economic development, had not been actively involved in strengthening the 
legal protection of trade secrets during the period of rapid economic growth, considering the 
countries‘ technological capability and beneficial institutional factors in the rapid economic 
growth, such as the lifetime employment system.  Trade secret law in the two Asian countries, 
which was modeled primarily on trade secret law in the United States, was introduced in the 
early 1990s as a part of the adoption of more robust protection for intellectual property 
essentially as a result of foreign trade pressure.  Because of the lack of local needs for the legal 
protection of trade secrets, however, the initial adoption of substantive trade secret law in Japan 
and Korea had inherent limitations in that it failed to properly protect trade secret holders 
because of defects in procedural law supporting effective legal remedies in trade secret cases.   
On the other hand, in the 1990s, the protracted economic recession in Japan after the 
                                                                                                                                                             
829 (2000).  In some circumstances, developing countries might choose to adopt strong policies for the protection of 
intellectual property so that they can induce foreign investment.  See Eva M. Gutierrez, Technology Policies (2001) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Boston University).  
6
 THE WORLD BANK, supra note 1; INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN ASIA 3 (Christopher Heath ed., 2003).  
 3 
 
burst of the economic bubble and the Asian financial crisis in Korea created a new business cycle 
in which trade secret law has been gaining importance in these societies.  In fact, this significant 
exogenous factor deriving from the economic downturns led to an increase in corporate 
restructuring and employee mobility.  In addition, the increased technological capability of these 
countries increased the risk that former employees would provide trade secrets to their new 
employers, whether in East Asia or other places, and led to another problem not traditionally 
experienced in these societies: the misappropriation of trade secrets and industrial espionage.
7
   
The changing technological and economic environments encouraged governments in the 
two Asian countries to recognize that trade secret law is an important mechanism for dealing 
with corporate control of valuable information and the management of human capital in pursuing 
continuing economic growth and protecting the stature of their countries in the international 
economy.  In recent years, accordingly, significant changes have occurred in the law in the Asian 
countries regarding trade secrets.   
The purpose of this research is to explore the theory and practice of trade secret law in 
Japan and Korea, focusing on how the imported trade secret law has developed and interacted 
with different legal, economic, technological, and sociocultural realities in the two Asian 
countries.  Trade secret law protects a wide spectrum of information, and it is closely related to 
questions of innovation policy and human capital embodied in employees; thus, the adoption of 
trade secret law may have affected the behavior of interested parties in various legal areas, 
including contract law, tort law, intellectual property law, and employment law.  In this context, 
                                                 
7
 The experience of Korea in the area of information technology is instructive.  Beginning in the 1990s, the Korean 
government decided that information technology should be the new growth engine to encourage Korean economic 
development.  As a result, Korea has experienced remarkable achievements in the field of information technology, 
including in the areas of mobile telecommunication, semiconductors, Internet-related technologies, and the like.  On 
the other hand, this rapid growth of the Korean economy, which had been focused on domestic R & D in these state-
of-the-art technologies, led to another trade secret-related problem not traditionally experienced in Korean society.  
 4 
 
trade secret law in Japan and Korea offers scholars the ideal lens through which to study how 
laws, specifically imported laws, in a given country are affected by many factors, including local 
institutions, economic situations, and cultural and social norms.  This is one of the most 
significant issues in the study of the relationship between law and society.  In fact, identifying 
these factors has theoretical and practical importance in helping us analyze the interaction 
between formal legal rules and other, less formalized legal supplements and substitutes, such as 
social norms, legal institutions, and cultural norms.   
Furthermore, it has important theoretical implications for the existing theory of legal 
transplants, in which scholars have made distinctions regarding conditions for the viability of 
legal transplants.
8
  In other words, given that most intentional legal transplants have goals that 
the relevant parties are attempting to achieve, determining the conditions for the success of legal 
transplants also has critical and practical importance for those who are attempting intentional 
legal transplants and those who are interested in the relationship between law and economic 
development, such as governments that intend to borrow foreign legal rules for certain purposes, 
                                                 
8
 Legal transplants that refer to the transfer of laws and legal institutions across borders, jurisdictions, or cultures 
appear to have been a common phenomenon around the world.  See ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN 
APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW (2d ed. 1993).  As in Western Europe, where the reception of ius commune took 
place widely among countries in the Middle Ages, most Asian countries received Western notions of law as the laws 
were already modernizing.  See MARY A. GLENDON ET AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS: TEXT, MATERIALS, 
AND CASES ON THE CIVIL AND COMMON LAW TRADITIONS 50 (2d ed. 1994).  Over time, legal transplantation has 
taken place in a variety of forms and degrees, and on different levels of a legal system, for various reasons.  Specific 
rules have been adopted, and entire legal systems have been transplanted.  Transplantation can occur voluntarily, or 
it can be forced onto foreign countries under some circumstances.  In the context of Northeast Asia, Japan 
voluntarily borrowed Western law, primarily German law and French law, after the Meiji Restoration at the end of 
the 19th century.  For a brief explanation of the modernization of law in Japanese society, see HIROSHI ODA, 
JAPANESE LAW 21-29 (2d ed. 1999).  The ―naturalized‖ Japanese laws were later transferred to other Asian countries, 
such as Korea and Taiwan, as part of Japanese colonization.  See KATHARINA PISTOR ET AL., THE ROLE OF LAW AND 
LEGAL INSTITUTIONS IN ASIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: 1960-1995, at 39 (1999).  Furthermore, recent economic 
globalization appears to facilitate legal transplants in various ways.  For instance, a globalized economy generates, 
in fields such as intellectual property law, the need for laws to be harmonized in the framework of an international 
agreement.  See KEITH E. MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (2000); 
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY (Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman eds., 
2005); THE DEVELOPMENT AGENDA: GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (Neil Netanel 
ed., 2008). 
 5 
 
or development agencies that seek to change legal rules and institutions via transnational legal 
transfer.
9
  In particular, in light of the importance of the Northeast Asian experience with 
economic development, trade secret law in Japan and Korea offers a profitable opportunity to 
conduct a detailed case study in which we can capture the role of the state, the role of substitutes 
(formal or informal alternatives), and the role of enforcement mechanisms, all of which have 
been thought to have particular importance in the context of Northeast Asian economic 
development.   
Although some research has looked at the social context of intellectual property law in 
Asian countries, no studies have examined the application of imported legal texts on trade secret 
protection in the social context of the two Asian countries, even though almost two decades have 
passed since trade secret law was adopted.  By focusing on the adoption of trade secret law and 
recent changes in the law, and their impact on the main interested parties in the field, this 
dissertation seeks to answer the following questions: What accounts for the recent adoption of 
and changes in the laws governing trade secrets in these two countries?  How have these laws 
operated in practice?  How have these laws affected corporations interested in protecting 
intellectual property?  How have such laws affected employees interested in freedom of 
movement?  And how have such laws affected governmental actors interested in protecting the 
stature of their countries in the international economy?   
An effective study of the theory and practice of trade secret law in the two Asian 
countries requires not only a comparative approach, but also an interdisciplinary approach. 
                                                 
9
 In fact, despite the prevalence of legal transplants, there is still no agreement among scholars with respect to many 
aspects of this phenomenn, including the viability of legal transplants, the meaning of successful legal transplants, 
and the conditions for their success.  And one of the most prominent issues among them is the viability of legal 
transplants, and the distinctions scholars make regarding conditions for viability seem to arise from the assumptions 
they make about the relationship between law and society.  For a comprehensive review of these discussions among 
scholars, see David Nelken, Towards a Sociology of Legal Adaptation, in ADAPTING LEGAL CULTURES 7-54 (David 
Nelken & Johannes Feest eds., 2001).   
 6 
 
Although this research is focused on developments in Japan and Korea, it looks to the United 
States as an influential source of both legal doctrine and scholarship in the area of trade secret 
law.  Particularly influential here is academic writing in the area of law and economics, which 
provides a lens through which to examine the effects of trade secret law and what the optimal 
trade secret law should be.
 10
  The analytical tools and concepts used in economic analysis of the 
law provide sophisticated methods in comparative law that presuppose identical or different laws 
or institutions in the target countries.
11
  In particular, the importance and effectiveness of the law 
and economics perspective can be emphasized when examining the impact of legal transplants 
and environmental factors affecting behavior because a simple legal transplantation approach 
does not appear to offer satisfactory methodological tools for this purpose, especially when 
                                                 
10
 In fact, as a behavioral theory, law and economics ―has been one of the most successful innovations in the legal 
academy in the last century,‖ because it proposes a coherent theory of how people respond to incentives.  Thomas S. 
Ulen, Firmly Grounded: Economics in the Future of the Law, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 433, 434-35 (1997).  Regarding the 
development of law and economics, see James J. Heckman, The Intellectual Roots of the Law and Economics 
Movement, 15 LAW. & HIST. REV. 327 (1997).  But economic analysis of law based on the assumption of rational 
choice theory has inherent limitations in fully explaining behavioral anomalies and puzzles, so, in some cases, it 
does not allow scholars seeking optimal legal policy in a given legal field to precisely understand and predict the 
incentive effects of a law.  See Russel B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the 
Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1060-75 (2000) (examining the limitations 
of rational choice theory in legal analysis).  These internal and external criticisms have led law and economics 
scholars to turn their attention to other influential factors, such as social norms, as a useful concept for 
understanding behavior, and to seek insights from other social sciences or subfields in economics, such as 
psychology, behavioral economics, and experiment economics.  For an important contribution, see ROBERT C. 
ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991).  See also Robert C. Ellickson, Law 
and Economics Discovers Social Norms, 27 J. L. STUD. 537 (1998); Symposium, Social Norms, Social Meaning, and 
the Economic Analysis of Law, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 537 (1998); Symposium, The Legal Construction of Norms, 86 
VA. L. REV. 1577 (2000); Symposium, Norms and Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735 (2001); BEHAVIORAL 
LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass R Sunstein ed., 2000); CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES (Daniel Kahneman & Amos 
Tversky eds., 2000); Mark Kelman, Law and Behavioral Science: Conceptual Overviews, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1347 
(2002-2003); Cass R. Sunstein, What‟s Available—Social Influences and Behavioral Economics, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 
1295 (2002-2003): Symposium, The Legal Implications of Psychology: Human Behavior, Behavioral Economics, 
and the Law, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499 (1998); Symposium, Research Conference on Behavioral Law and Economics 
in the Workplace, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2002).  See also Thomas S. Ulen, The Importance and Promise of Empirical 
Studies of Law, in NEW FRONTIERS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 29 (Peter Nobel & Marina Gets eds., 2006).  For an 
overview of empirical studies of law, see ROBERT M. LAWLESS, JENNIFER K. ROBBENNOLT, AND THOMAS S. ULEN, 
EMPIRICAL METHODS IN LAW 1-32 (2010). 
11
 Edmund W. Kitch, The Intellectual Foundations of Law and Economics, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 184, 191 (1983) 
(―Law and economics provides an analytic framework that can provide unifying direction to comparative and 
historical work.‖).  See also Ron Harris, The Uses of History in Law and Economics, 4 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN 
LAW 659, 688-92 (2003) (introducing ―preliminary comparative law and economics studies.‖).  
 7 
 
different political, social, and cultural factors matter.
12
   
In recent years, the law and economics approach has emerged in a comparative vein.
13
  
The literature provides us with invaluable methodological insights for the purpose of this 
project.
14
  For example, Ugo Mattei provides an informative explanation of the causes of legal 
transplants and legal evolution from a law and economics perspective, which seems to be 
inspired by a new institutional economics perspective.  He suggests that legal transplants, 
especially selective borrowing from foreign legal systems, can best be explained ―as a movement 
toward efficiency,‖ and argues that a legal transplant happens to supply law in the competitive 
market of legal culture, where ―the most efficient legal doctrine‖ survives.15  More closely 
related to this project, he further argues that this competitive process happens among different 
sources of law in a given country.
 16
  In addition to the concept of efficiency, the criterion of ―fit‖ 
                                                 
12
 See Ralf Michaels, The Functional Method of Comparative Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE 
LAW 339 (Reinhard Zimmermann & Mathias Reimann eds., 2006). 
13
 For an edited collection of these papers, see COMPARATIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS (Gerrit De Geest & Roger Van 
de Bergh eds., 2004); see also Nuno Garoupa & Tom Ginsburg, Economic Analysis and Comparative Law (Univ. 
Illinois C. L., Illinois L & Econ. Res. Paper Series, Research Paper No. LE09-034, 2009) (providing a literature 
review of the main works in comparative law and economics); Raffaele Caterina, Comparative Law and Economics, 
in ELGAR ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 161-171 (Jan M. Smits ed., 2006) (offering a brief overview of 
comparative law and economics). 
14
 For example, Buscaglia and Ratliff claim that law and economics enables us ―to better understand the impact of 
laws and legal procedures on economic behavior in developing countries.‖  EDGARDO BUSCAGLIA & WILLIAM E. 
RATLIFF, LAW AND ECONOMICS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2000).  Kirchner suggests that a new institutional 
economics perspective in comparative law, as a methodological innovation, is needed to better understand the 
impact of analysis of a legal transplant.  Christian Kirchner, Comparative Law and Institutional Economics—Legal 
Transplants in Corporate Governance, in NEW FRONTIERS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 201-06 (Peter Nobel & Marina 
Gets eds., 2006).   
15
 Ugo Mattei, Efficiency in Legal Transplants: An Essay in Comparative Law and Economics, 14 INT‘L REV. L. 
ECON. 3, 8 (1994).  Although Mattei explains convergences in different legal systems by using both legal transplants 
and efficiency, he attributes divergences in different legal systems to indigenous legal cultures, such as legal 
parochialism and ideology.  Id. at 10-16. 
16
 He also points out that this competition may be distorted because of exogenous factors, such as ―traditional or 
cultural factors,‖ which ―may be construed as real-world transaction costs and/or patterns of path dependency that 
resist the evolution toward efficiency.‖  UGO MATTEI, COMPARATIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS 120-21 (1997) 
(―Evolution and competition are a process of selection; the winning legal rule will be one that has proved more 
powerful and useful than those supplied by other components of the law or by other legal systems.  Law is not the 
product of the will of a lawmaker, be it a legislator, a court, or whomever.  Applied law is the outcome of a 
competitive process between legal formants.  More generally, law is the synthesis both of exogenous factors—
 8 
 
with the environment of the receiving societies can be useful for identifying specific factors 
affecting the behavior of the relevant parties.
17
  This criterion seems more plausible in the 
context of Northeast Asia, where governments have played a significant role in the rapid 
economic growth of their countries for the past several decades; thus, legal transplants have often 
occurred and have been evaluated based on their ability to advance a specific purpose, such as 
economic development.  This research attempts to identify such factors in Korea and Japan as 
they relate to the adoption and use of trade secret law.  
This dissertation is divided into three main parts.  Chapters II, III, and IV analyze the 
relevant legal regimes under which trade secrets are protected in the United States, Japan, and 
Korea, focusing not only on the substantive law in these nations, but also on the three main 
interested parties in the field of trade secrets: states, entrepreneurs, and employees.  Chapter II 
explores trade secret law in the United States, which has been an important foreign legal resource 
that has affected the adoption and recent changes in trade secret law in Japan and Korea.  The 
discussion focuses on the proactive role of courts in developing legal doctrines of trade secret 
protection through the process of seeking the legal justifications of trade secret protection, and 
the use of contractual solutions in protecting valuable information in the active external labor 
market, which maintains a general employment-at-will rule.   
Chapters III and IV begin with a discussion of legal regimes, including property law, 
contract law, and tort law, relevant to trade secret protection in Japan and Korea before the 
adoption of the law, which reflects the limitations of private law in the civil law tradition.  After 
                                                                                                                                                             
determined by [the] culture, economic structure, and political system—and of endogenous elements.‖).  See also 
ERIN A. O‘HARA & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE LAW MARKET (2009) (exploring jurisdictional competition that enables 
law markets, which are ―ways that governing laws can be chosen by people and firms rather than mandated by states, 
to function efficiently.‖).  
17
 See Hideki Kanda & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Re-examining Legal Transplants: The Director‟s Fiduciary Duty in 
Japanese Corporate Law, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 887 (2003) (evaluating the success of the transplanted legal rule by 
adopting the criteria of macro-fit and micro-fit). 
 9 
 
examining the lack of legal protection of trade secrets before adoption of the law, Chapters III 
and IV look to how Japan and Korea adopted the law, and how the governments in these 
countries have adapted the law to changing domestic and international situations to achieve 
larger goals, such as economic development through further legal transplants of foreign law—
primarily the U.S. law.  The chapters also examine in detail current law governing trade secrets, 
including the subject matter, misappropriation, and legal remedies from a comparative 
perspective.  Chapters III and IV further explore how the statutory law of trade secrets affected 
the approach of Japanese and Korean courts toward the theory of postemployment contracts in 
protecting valuable information.    
Chapter V addresses the existing economic theory of trade secret law and relevant 
empirical works that support the theory in the United States, focusing on incentive theory, 
fencing costs, reverse engineering, and postemployment covenants not to compete, which enable 
us to identify local institutions or social norms as a substitute for the imported trade secret law in 
Japan and Korea.   
Chapter VI examines the practical impact of adopting trade secret protection in Korea and 
Japan, based on empirical works conducted and published in these two Asian countries.  The first 
two sections focus specifically on substitutes for trade secret law arising from different 
intellectual property policies and the business culture related to human capital before trade secret 
law was adopted in these countries.  The chapter then discusses how the role of these alternative 
solutions in addressing the legal problems associated with trade secrets have been eroding in 
recent years.  The third section begins by revealing some features of actions taken by Japanese 
and Korean firms after incidents related to the loss of proprietary information.  It then examines 
relevant factors affecting these distinguishing features, with a focus on defects in Japanese and 
 10 
 
Korean procedural law.   
Chapter VII offers a brief conclusion with implications for the theory of legal transplants.
 11 
 
CHAPTER II. TRADE SECRET LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 
Today‘s trade secret law in the United States is a result of the courts‘ response to the 
growing importance of corporate control of valuable information and the increased mobility of 
labor in modern economies.  Since the nineteenth century, which was a period of transition from 
a preindustrial to a modern industrial economy, trade secret law in the United States has 
expanded continuously, and currently, it plays a significant role in the U.S. economy.  However, 
the development of trade secret law was not an easy process.  On the one hand, scholars and 
courts have disagreed over the justification for trade secret protection, including its grounding in 
common law doctrines, including property law, contract law, and torts, which is important in 
determining the scope of trade secret protection.  On the other hand, because labor mobility has 
been considered a way of spreading information in recent years, the recent enactment of the 
Economic Espionage Act (EEA) has been criticized because of its potentially negative impact on 
innovation.   
This chapter explores trade secret law in the United States.  In the first section, it 
examines the historical development of and different theoretical justifications for trade secret law, 
which show the active role of courts in forming the law governing trade secrets in the common 
law tradition.  The second section explores the current law governing trade secrets, focusing on 
the subject matter, misappropriation of trade secrets, and legal remedies, which have been 
important foreign legal resources that have affected the adoption and development of trade secret 
law in Japan and Korea.  The third section further examines a common and important contractual 
means of protecting trade secrets by preventing employees from competing against former 
employers in the active external labor market in the United States, by maintaining a general 
employment-at-will rule.   
 12 
 
1. Development and Theoretical Justifications 
1.1. Development 
It is commonly held that American trade secret law did not develop until the middle of 
the nineteenth century.
1
  In preindustrial economies, craft knowledge was transferred under the 
artisanal system in which ―the mutual obligations [between master and apprentice] to instruct 
and to guard the secrets of the craft‖ existed during the term of employment, and there were few 
ways to legally regulate the dissemination of employees‘ knowledge after the employment 
relationship was terminated.
2
  Under these circumstances, to some extent, the artisanal system 
served as a substitute for modern trade secret law and for enforceable covenants not to compete 
because it played a role in enabling masters to enjoin revelation of secret information by 
apprentices in the absence of these legal devices.  However, the Industrial Revolution had a 
direct effect on the development of the common law of trade secrets in the mid-nineteenth 
century, based on the courts‘ response to the growing importance of corporate control of 
intellectual property and the increased mobility of labor.
3
  The case of Peabody v. Norfolk,
4
 
                                                 
1
 Currently, in most trade secret cases, defendants are former employees or competitors.  Except for apprentices and 
a few exceptional categories of workers (household servants and agents under certain circumstances) who had the 
duty of confidence, most employees could freely use their skills and the knowledge they acquired during the course 
of their employment in subsequent employment into the second half of the nineteenth century.  Catherine L. Fisk, 
Working Knowledge: Trade Secrets, Restrictive Covenants in Employment, and the Rise of Corporate Intellectual 
Property, 1800-1920, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 441, 468-83 (2001).  Indeed, for example, Du Pont in the nineteenth century 
relied primarily on ―secrecy and reputational sanctions to make it difficult for employees to take company secrets to 
competitors,‖ and they resorted to ―the law of criminal theft and an action for enticement‖ on the rare occasion in 
practice.  Id. at 468-83.  For the nature of U.S. efforts to import technology from Enropean countries during the time 
of national formation, see DORON S. BEN-ATAR, TRADE SECRETS: INTELLECTUAL PIRACY AND THE ORIGINS OF 
AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL POWER (2004). 
2
 Fisk, supra note 1, at 450.  
3
 Vickery v. Welch, 36 Mass. 523 (1837) and Taylor v. Blanchard, 95 Mass. 370 (1866) were, respectively, the first 
American judicial decisions that ―recognized a cause of action for damages for misappropriation of trade secrets‖ 
and for ―injunctive relief against actual or threatened misappropriation.‖  ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 35 (4th ed. 2006).  See Fisk, supra note 1, at  494 (―Today‘s practices 
and doctrines developed in the context of radical changes in the American law and workplace culture, which were 
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which is said to be the seminal case that crystallized the doctrine of trade secrets in the United 
States, reflects how the courts considered workplace knowledge or valuable information for a 
specific policy purpose.
5
  In that case, the plaintiff sought enforcement of a written contract 
against a former employee who left his former employment and helped a competitor build a 
factory by using knowledge of the machinery and manufacturing process invented by the 
plaintiff.  The plaintiff sued in equity for an injunction against the former employee and a 
competitor who received the information.  The Massachusetts Supreme Court enjoined the 
former employee from revealing the secrets acquired during the course of his employment.  In 
the opinion, Justice Gray stated the policy aspect of the case: ―[i]t is the policy of the law, for the 
advantage of the public, to encourage and protect invention and commercial enterprise.‖6  The 
court further opined, relying on the formalistic conception of property,
7
  
 
If a man establishes a business and makes it valuable by his skill and attention, the 
good will of that business is recognized by the law as property. . . . If [a person] 
invents or discovers, and keeps secret, a process of manufacture, whether a proper 
subject for a patent or not, he has not indeed an exclusive right to it as against the 
public, or against those who in good faith acquire knowledge of it; but he has a 
property in it, which a court of chancery will protect against one who in violation 
of contract and breach of confidence undertakes to apply it to his own use, or to 
disclose it to third persons.
8
   
 
                                                                                                                                                             
brought about by the nineteenth-century industrial revolutions.  The conflict between employee freedom and 
corporate control of intellectual property sharpened as courts realized the importance of knowledge to economic 
development and began to recognize workplace knowledge as an asset of the firm rather than an attribute of the 
employee.‖); see also MELVIN F. JAGER, TRADE SECRET LAW, § 1:4 (West 2009) (arguing that ―from the beginning of 
the development of the common law, the public policy underlying trade secret protection has been analogous to the 
policy supporting the patent laws,‖ observed in the opinion in Fowle v. Park, 131 U.S. 88 (1889)).   
4
 98 Mass. 452 (1868).   
5
 See Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of Justification, 86 CAL. L. REV. 243, 
252 (1998) [hereinafter Bone, Trade Secret Law].  
6
 98 Mass. 452, 457 (1868).   
7
 See Bone, Trade Secret Law, supra note 5, at 252 (explaining the advantages and drawbacks of the conception of 
property conceptions for justifying of trade secret law).  
8
 98 Mass. 452, 458 (1868). 
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However, throughout the nineteenth century, trade secret law was limited.
9
  The doctrine of trade 
secrets expanded and changed significantly between 1890 and 1920.  One of the reasons for the 
expansion of the doctrine of trade secrets seemed to be a change in the underpinnings of the 
doctrine of trust to property-based theory.
10
  However, despite many advantages of property-
based theory as the rationale for trade secret protection, it had difficulties in ―identifying all the 
impermissible modes of acquisition, use, or disclosure.‖ 11  This drawback of property theory led 
courts and legal scholars to find an alternative basis of liability for trade secret 
misappropriation.
12
  For example, in E.I. du Pont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland,
13
 Justice 
                                                 
9
 In fact, Fisk explains employees‘ duty to protect trade secrets in the mid-nineteenth century as follows:  
Although the employee‘s duty to guard trade secrets received its first recognition in 1868, the duty 
remained quite limited even by the last decade of the century.  The duty was grounded in express 
contract or in a traditionally confidential relationship like that of attorney and client; it did not 
arise simply from the fact of employment.  The information that the duty protected was mainly 
discrete, tangible things like recipes or drawings.  The use of contract to expand the duty beyond 
the limits of Peabody appeared nonexistent.  
Fisk, supra note 1, at 492-93. 
10
 Fisk summarizes the changes as follows:   
First, the rhetorical underpinnings of the doctrine changed perceptibly.  The early focus on breach 
of trust shifted to an increased emphasis on misappropriation of property.  Second, the earlier 
reliance on express contracts as the basis of a duty to protect trade secrets shifted to an assertion 
that the duty was an implied term in all employment.  Contracts ceased being a description of the 
actual understanding of the parties and instead became prescriptive of the proper content of every 
employment relationship.  Third, the types of knowledge that courts regarded as trade secrets 
expanded from discrete items to more inchoate know-how, and from the employer‘s own 
discoveries to improvements that had originated in the employee.  Fourth, and finally, the 
available remedies for the loss of trade secrets grew more effective with the invention of the 
inevitable disclosure doctrine.  
Id. at 494. 
11
 Bone, Trade Secret Law, supra note 5, at 258. 
12
 See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. a (1939); Bone, Trade Secret Law, supra note 5, at 259 (―[T]he 
general theory that supported common law property rights in secret information began to lose its grip, first with the 
rise of sociological jurisprudence, and then with the advent of legal realism in the early twentieth century.  A new 
positivism and commitment to instrumental reasoning replaced the natural law formalism of the late nineteenth 
century.  This change undermined the logic of the common law property theory—in particular, its claim that 
exclusivity through secrecy implied property and that property implied legal rights which protect the owner‘s 
exclusivity.‖); Adam Mossoff, What Is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 371, 416 
(2003) (―It makes sense that the authors of the First Restatement would focus on exclusion because they were 
writing in the early twentieth century, during the heyday of the new social-relations view of rights, which focused 
property scholars on the only formal, social right of property: exclusion.‖).  
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Holmes expressed this opinion about the formalistic conception of property that had been 
adopted in cases dealing with secret information:  
[t]he word ―property‖ as applied to trademarks and trade secrets is an unanalyzed 
expression of certain secondary consequences of the primary fact that the law 
makes some rudimentary requirements of good faith.  Whether the plaintiffs have 
any valuable secret or not the defendant knows the facts, whatever they are, 
through a special confidence that he accepted.  The property may be denied, but 
the confidence cannot be.  Therefore the starting point for the present matter is not 
property or due process of law, but that the defendant stood in confidential 
relations with the plaintiffs, or one of them.
14
  
 
The trade secret doctrines defined in many state cases were later refined in sections 757 
and 758 of the First Restatement of Torts in 1939, in part because of disagreement about the 
basis of the liability for trade secret misappropriations.
15
  The rule stated in the Restatement was 
that a person was liable for trade secret misappropriation if he or she disclosed or used another‘s 
trade secrets in situations in which he or she was ―restrained by a duty based on his confidential 
and contract relation with another,‖ or discovered trade secrets by improper means, or learned of 
secrets with notice of any impropriety in its communication to him or her.
16
  However, the 
Restatement did not directly define a ―trade secret‖ under sections 757 and 758; instead, the 
Restatement stated the definition of a trade secret under comment b as follows:  
[a] trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of 
information which is used in one‘s business, and which gives [one] an opportunity 
to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it. … A trade 
                                                                                                                                                             
13
 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917). 
14
 Id. 
15
 The Restatement provided the following rationale for trade secret liability: 
There is considerable discussion in judicial opinions as to the basis of liability for the disclosure or 
use of another‘s trade secrets. . . . The suggestion that one has a right to exclude others from the 
use of his trade secret because he has a right of property in the idea has been frequently advanced 
and rejected. The theory that has prevailed is that the protection is afforded only by a general duty 
of good faith and that the liability rests upon breach of this duty; that is, breach of contract, abuse 
of confidence or impropriety in the method of ascertaining the secret.  
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. a (1939).  
16
 Id. § 757.  
 16 
 
secret is a process or device for continuous use in the operation of the business. … 
The subject matter of a trade secret must be secret.
17
   
 
The definition of a trade secret adopted in the Restatement provided relatively limited 
protection because it required a trade secret to be information ―for continuous use in the 
operation of the business.‖18  Recognizing the difficulty of defining an ―exact definition of a 
trade secret,‖ the drafters provided six additional factors to determine what information qualified 
as a trade secret.
19
  Although the Restatement explained that the theoretical foundation of 
liability for a trade secret misappropriation rested on a breach of ―a general duty of good faith,‖ 
the definition of a trade secret included secrecy and its value to owners, ―which underlie the 
property rationale‖ as essential elements to qualify trade secrets for protection.20   
The widely accepted rules of trade secret law under sections 757 and 758 in the First 
Restatement of Torts could not be included when the Restatement (Second) of Torts was 
published in 1979 on the grounds that ―the fields of Unfair Competition and Trade Regulation 
were rapidly developing into independent bodies of law with diminishing reliance upon the 
traditional principles of Tort law.‖21  On the other hand, U.S. companies‘ reliance on trade secret 
                                                 
17
 Id. 
18
 Thus, ―single or ephemeral events in the conduct of business, as, for example, the amount or other terms of a 
secret bid for a contract or the salary of certain employees, or the security investments made or contemplated, or the 
date fixed for the announcement of a new policy or for bringing out a new model or the like‖ cannot be protected as 
trade secrets under the definition of the First Restatement of Torts in 1939.  Id. cmt. b.  
19
 Such factors are   
(1) the extent to which the information is known outside of his business; (2) the extent to which it 
is known by employees and others involved in his business; (3) the extent of measures taken by 
him to guard the secrecy of the information; (4) the value of the information to him and to his 
competitors; (5) the amount of effort or money expended by him in developing the information; 
(6) the ease or difficulty with which the information could be properly acquired or duplicated by 
others.  
Id. 
20
 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. b (1995).  
21
 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Division 9, Interference with Advantageous Economic Relations, Introductory 
Note (1979).  The rules of trade secrets in the First Restatement of Torts were covered under Part One of Division 
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protection increased despite the lack of a coherent doctrine for trade secret law in the 1970s.
22
  
Thus, in 1979, the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) was drafted by the Uniform Law 
Commissioners to help each state adopt a uniform state statute for the legal protection of trade 
secrets by adopting the model act.
23
  The UTSA provides unitary statutory definitions (of terms 
such as ―trade secret,‖ ―improper means,‖ and ―misappropriation‖) and remedies from ―the 
results of the better reasoned cases concerning the remedies for trade secret misappropriation.‖24  
For example, the UTSA provides a broader definition of a trade secret compared with that under 
the First Restatement of Torts.  In practice, the UTSA also contributed to providing ―a single 
statute of limitation‖ for the various theories adopted in common law, such as ―property, quasi-
contractual, and violation of fiduciary relationship theories of noncontractual liability utilized at 
common law.‖ 25  As of 2005, 46 states and the District of Columbia have adopted the UTSA.26  
However, there are many variations from state to state with respect to judicial interpretations of 
the uniform act.
27
  In 1995, the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, which adopted an 
expanded meaning of a trade secret under the UTSA, replaced the trade secret provisions of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Nine, entitled ―Interference with Business Relations.‖  
22
 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, Refs & Annos (2005) (―Notwithstanding the commercial importance of state trade 
secret law to interstate business, this law has not developed satisfactorily.‖); Comment, Theft of Trade Secrets: The 
Need for a Statutory Solution, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 378, 380-81 (1971) (―Under technological and economic pressures, 
industry continues to rely on trade secret protection despite the doubtful and confused status of both common law 
and statutory remedies.‖). 
23
 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 8 (Uniformity of Application and Construction), 14 U.L.A. 656 (2005).  In 1985, 
four sections (2(b), 3(a), 7, and 11) were amended to clarify the 1979 official text.  Id., Prefatory Note. 
24
 Id., Prefatory Note.  However, commentators pointed out the insufficient contribution of the UTSA for the 
uniformity of trade secret protection. See, e.g., Gerald J. Mossinghoff et al., The Economic Espionage Act: A New 
Federal Regime of Trade Secret Protection, 79 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC‘Y 191, 194 (1997) (―[T]rade secret 
protection granted in each state is far from uniform relative to the other states.  This often leads to the result that the 
ability to recover for theft of a trade secret becomes a choice of law or a contract interpretation question.‖).   
25
 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, Prefatory Note (2005) (―The contribution of the Uniform Act is substitution of unitary 
definitions of trade secret and trade secret misappropriation, and a single statute of limitation for the various 
property, quasi-contractual, and violation of fiduciary relationship theories of noncontractual liability utilized at 
common law.‖). 
26
 Id.  
27
 Id. 
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Restatement of Torts, and the rules described under the Restatement ―are applicable to actions 
under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act as well as to actions at common law.‖  And they are also 
compatible with the requirements of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPs) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), with which the 
United States claimed to be in compliance.
28
  
In the middle of the 1990s, the role of federal prosecution of trade secret theft began to be 
considered more important, in part because of a growing  number of industrial espionage cases 
and the associated losses,
29
 and in part because misappropriators began to use the Internet or 
computer networks to obtain trade secrets, which could fall under federal jurisdiction.
30
  But 
federal laws, including the Interstate Transportation of Stolen Property Act (ITSP)
31
 and the Wire 
Fraud and Mail Fraud Statutes,
32
 and state trade secret laws were not considered adequate for the 
federal prosecution of trade secret misappropriation in a systematic manner.
33
  In response to 
                                                 
28
 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. b (1995); see Edmund Kitch, The Expansion of Trade 
Secrecy Protection and the Mobility of Management Employees: A New Problem for the Law, 47 S.C. L. REV. 659, 
659-60 (1996) (pointing out that ―[t]he trade secret protections of the Restatement [(Third) of Unfair Competition] 
provide timely evidence that the United States is in compliance with Article 39 of the Agreement on [TRIPs]‖) 
[hereinafter Kitch, Expansion of Trade Secrecy Protection].  See also Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights, April 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1197.  
29
 For example, in February 1996, FBI Director Louis Freeh testified before joint hearings of the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and 
Government Information in support of the EEA‘s passage.  He noted that ―in [1995], the number of cases of 
economic espionage that the FBI [was] investigating doubled from 400 to 800.  Twenty-three countries [were] 
involved in those cases.‖  S. Rep. 104-359, at 7 (1996).  See also Spencer Simon, The Economic Espionage Act of 
1996, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 305, 306 (1998). 
30
 See United States v. Riggs, 739 F. Supp. 414 (N.D. Ill 1990).   
31
 See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2314-2315 (West 2009). 
32
 See id. §§ 1341 & 1343. 
33
 The ITSP was enacted to prevent ―criminals from moving stolen property across state lines in attempts to evade 
the jurisdiction of state and local law enforcement officials.‖  Therefore, for the protection of proprietary 
information, the act was not adequate.  The Wire Fraud and Mail Fraud Statutes also had limitations because they 
require the use of mail or wire, radio, or television, despite the fact that ―many trade secret thefts involve merely the 
copying of vital information and not a permanent loss of the information itself.‖  Simon, supra note 29, at 306-07; 
see also H.R. Rep. No. 104-788, at 6-7 (1996); S. Rep. 104-359, at 10-11 (1996); James H.A. Pooley et al., 
Understanding the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 5 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 177, 179-87 (1997) [hereinafter 
Pooley, EEA].  In addition, civil remedies offered by state trade secret law were said to be insufficient because of 
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these problems, the U.S. Congress enacted a federal statute, the EEA,
34
 which created new 
federal criminal offenses involving trade secret misappropriations.  The definition of trade 
secrets under the EEA
35
 is broader than that under the UTSA because it clearly includes ―all 
forms and types of financial, business, scientific, technical, economic, or engineering 
information.‖36  The EEA defines trade secret misappropriation in a new way and criminalizes 
―economic espionage‖ and ―theft of trade secrets,‖ providing for punishments consisting of a fine, 
imprisonment, or both.
37
  The EEA also applies to trade secret misappropriations occurring both 
inside and outside the United States.
38
   
Finally, with the advent of information-intensive industries, which were becoming more 
and more critical to the modern U.S. economy, trade secret protection was strengthened through 
restrictions on reverse engineering.  In the late 1970s and early 1980s, semiconductor firms 
sought legislation to protect chip layouts (or chip topographies) developed by original chip 
                                                                                                                                                             
practical difficulties as well as a lack of resources to pursue civil cases.  S. Rep. 104-359, at 11 (1996).  
34
 Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-294, 110 Stat. 3488 (codified in 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839). 
35
 18 U.S.C.A. § 1839 (3) (West 2009).  Under the EEA, the term ―trade secret‖ is defined as follows:  
[A]ll forms and types of financial, business, scientific, technical, economic, or engineering 
information, including patterns, plans, compilations, program devices, formulas, designs, 
prototypes, methods, techniques, processes, procedures, programs, or codes, whether tangible or 
intangible, and whether or how stored, compiled, or memorialized physically, electronically, 
graphically, photographically, or in writing if— 
  (A) the owner thereof has taken reasonable measures to keep such  information secret; and 
  (B) the information derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being 
generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable through proper means by, the public. 
36
 Some commentators who are favorable to the expansion of federal protection of valuable economic information 
against economic espionage and trade secret theft point out the limitations of the EEA: First, ―the EEA does not 
protect trade secrets related to services (as opposed to goods), negative know-how, or reverse engineering‖; second, 
―U.S. corporations with offices abroad are not protected under the EEA‖; third, the Act does not give civil remedies 
for victims of trade secret misappropriations.  Simon, supra note 29, at 315-16.  See also Pooley, EEA, supra note 33, 
at 200; Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Trade Secrets: How Well Should We Be Allowed To Hide Them? The Economic 
Espionage Act of 1996, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1 (1998); Geraldine Szott Moohr, The 
Problematic Role of Criminal Law in Regulating Use of Information: The Case of the Economic Espionage Act, 80 
N.C. L. REV. 853, 877-82 (2002).  
37
 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1831 & 1832 (West 2009).  See Moohr, supra note 36.  
38
 18 U.S.C.A. § 1837 (West 2009).  
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makers from reverse engineering to make market-destructive cloning chips because the 
competitive reverse engineering and copying of semiconductor chip designs became easier and 
faster, which did not enable the original chip makers to recoup their investments.
39
  In response 
to voices and pressure from the industry, the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984 (SCPA) 
was enacted to protect chip layouts developed by the original chip makers from reverse 
engineering to make market-destructive cloning chips.
40
   
Reverse engineering has also been a controversial topic in the computer programing 
industry, in which developers of computer programs relied on trade secrecy to protect the 
internal aspects of the programs (e.g., source codes [human-readable language]) by providing 
object code (machine-readable language) forms of programs in the market.
41 
 In 1976, Congress 
established the National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works to 
examine whether computer and information technologies should be incorporated into copyright 
law and was advised to amend the Copyright Act.
42 
 In light of the fact that the object codes of 
computer programs were protected under the Copyright Act, trade secret law was said to be 
                                                 
39
 Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575, 
1597 (2002).   
40
 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (2006).  For the feature of reverse engineering under the SCPA, see Lee Hsu, Reverse 
Engineering Under the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act: Complications for Standard of Infringement, 5 ALB. L.J. 
SCI. & TECH. 249 (1996).  But the Act does not prohibit reverse engineering for purposes of studying, copying 
circuit design, or using the information acquired in the course of reverse engineering for designing a new chip.  See 
17 U.S.C. § 906 (2006).   
41
 Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software Industry, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1, 16 
(2001) (explaining that courts‘ and scholars‘ discussion about reverse engineering of computer programs ―has 
primarily taken place under the aegis of trade secret and copyright laws because historically it was those laws that 
protected computer programs.‖).  See also ROBERT P. MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND 
POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 962 (2002).  Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1519-20 (9th 
Cir. 1993) (holding that computer programs are covered under Section of 102 (a) of the Copyright Act).  Section 102 
(a) of the Copyright Act provides that ―copyright protection subsists . . . in original works of authorship . . . 
which . . . can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or 
device.‖  17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).  
42
 For the justifications of applying Section 101 of the 1980 Copyright Act to computer program, see THE FINAL 
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS (CONTU) 9-13, 
available at http://digital-law-online.info/CONTU/PDF/index.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2010). 
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strengthened because decompilation or disassembly of the object code of a computer program, a 
common form of reverse engineering, would violate the copyright owner‘s exclusive rights to 
copy, reproduce, and prepare derivative works.  With the paradigm shift in the mass market for 
copyrighted works ―from the sale of physical products, such as books and videocassettes‖ to 
―mass-marketng of technically protected digital content,‖ such as music, movies, software, or 
other works, the U.S. Congress enacted the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) to 
promote the U.S. electronic commerce industry.  The DMCA also strengthened trade secret 
protection for unpatented products that had been subjected to reverse engineering in most areas 
by prohibiting circumvention of technical measures for the protection of copyrighted works.
43  
However, courts in recent cases interpreted the DMCA narrowly so as not to restrict reverse 
engineering, considering that the DMCA must be interpreted within the public purpose of 
copyright law.
44
   
 
 
1.2. Theoretical Justifications 
Patent law draws on relatively straightforward incentive theory and is regulated by a 
federal statute designating the proper economic incentive scheme by policymakers.
45
  In contrast 
                                                 
43
 See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (Codified in sections of 5, 17, 
28, and 35 U.S.C.).   
44
 See, e.g., Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Technologies, Inc., 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Lexmark Int‘l v. 
Static Control Components, 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004).  On the other hand, while reverse engineering may be 
prohibited by the use of shrink wrap and click wrap software ―licences‖ to prevent reverse engineering, this issue is 
still controversial.  See Craig Zieminski, Game for Reverse Engineering?: How the DMCA and Contracts Have 
Affected Innovation, 13 J. TECH. L. POL‘Y 289 (2008).  
45
 See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. (―To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited 
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.‖); Bonito Boats, 
Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989) (―[T]he federal patent laws have embodied a careful 
balance between the need to promote innovation and the recognition that imitation and refinement through imitation 
are both necessary to invention itself and the very lifeblood of a competitive economy.‖); Mark A. Lemley, The 
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to patent law, as suggested above, trade secret law depends on many different theoretical bases, 
developed mainly by state courts.
46
  Indeed, because of this disagreement over the justification 
for trade secret protection, courts, scholars, and commentators have offered various theories in an 
attempt to justify and unify trade secret law.
47
  These theoretical approaches can be divided into 
three groups, which seek the theoretical foundation of trade secret law in common law doctrines 
and track the sources of common law.  The first theory is that trade secrets are property rights.
48
  
As mentioned earlier, this property-based approach was articulated in the seminal case Peabody v. 
Norfolk.
49
  In addition, in a recent case, Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,
50
 Monsanto, inventor and 
seller of a chemical pesticide, sought injunctive relief from provisions of the Federal Insecticide, 
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, which required Monsanto to submit data to the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to register the product and to disclose the data publicly.  
Monsanto alleged that the data submitted to the EPA was a property protected by the Fifth 
                                                                                                                                                             
Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 311, 329 (2008) [hereinafter Lemley, 
Trade Secrets as IP Rights] (―Patents and copyrights are generally acknowledged to serve a utilitarian purpose.‖).  
Of course, there are other theories explaining the basis of patent law.  See, e.g., A. Samuel Oddi, Un-Unified 
Economic Theories of Patents—The Not-Quite-Holy Grail, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 267, 273-77 (1996) (reviewing 
the classical theories of the patent system); Adam Mossoff, Rethinking the Development of Patents: An Intellectual 
History, 1550-1800, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1255, 1257 (2001) (challenging ―the prevailing view that the ideas of the 
natural rights philosophers did not influence the early development of patent law‖). 
46
 See Charles Tait Craves, Trade Secrets As Property: Theory and Consequences, 15 J. INTELL. PROP. 39, 63 (2007) 
(―there are fifty-one different versions of trade secret law in the United States, and, thus, what a court in Washington 
says does not control what a court in Washington, D.C. might do.‖). 
47
 See, e.g., Bone, Trade Secret Law, supra note 5; Michael Risch, Why Do We Have Trade Secrets?, 11 MARQUETTE 
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1 (2007); Lemley, Trade Secrets as IP Rights, supra note 45; Graves, supra note 46.  
48
 See, e.g., Miguel Deutch, The Property Concept of Trade Secrets in Anglo-American Law: An Ongoing Debate, 31 
U.RICH. L. REV. 313, 361 (1997) (―it can be concluded that in American law the features of the right in trade secrets 
are rather close, yet not identical to those characterizing in rem rights.‖); Mossoff, supra note 12, at 418 (―If one 
conceives of ‗property‘ as arising from and constituting the rights to acquire, use and dispose of things, then it is 
logical to recognize as ‗property‘ certain information and business practices created and kept secret by its 
possessor.‖); Graves, supra note 46, at 41 (―a property conception best serves the interests of promoting employee 
mobility and the freedom to use information in the public domain.‖); see also JAGER, supra note 3, § 4-3; Chicago 
Lock Co. v. Fanberg, 676 F.2d 400, 404 (9th Cir. 1982) (―Trade secrets are protected . . . in a manner akin to private 
property, but only when they are disclosed or used through improper means.‖).   
49
 98 Mass. 452 (1868).   
50
 467 U.S. 986 (1984).  See also Phillip Morris Inc. v. Reilly, 312 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2002).   
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Amendment‘s Taking Clause.  Analogizing trade secrets to physical property, the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that ―to the extent that Monsanto has an interest in its health, safety, and 
environmental data cognizable as a trade-secret property right under Missouri law, that property 
right is protected by the Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment.‖51  The second theory 
underlying trade secret law is contractual.
52
  This theory is often presented because of the 
existence of an express contract or quasi-contract (implied-in-law contract), for example, from a 
confidential relationship, including the employer-employee relationship implicated in many trade 
secret litigations.
53
  The third theory is that the primary basis of trade secret law should be tort 
theory, deriving from a breach of confidence or other wrongful conduct.
54
  Tort theory, often be 
labeled ―duty-based theory‖ or ―unfair competition theory,‖ is said to be the most popular and 
predominant theory.
55
  It is closely related to an approach seeking the primary justifications for 
trade secret law in the ―maintenance of commercial morality.‖  The commercial morality 
approach, in which trade secret law exists to enforce morality in business, has been expressed by 
many courts and commentators.
56
  For example, in E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. 
                                                 
51
 Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002-04 (1984) (―Trade secrets have many of the characteristics of 
more tangible forms of property. A trade secret is assignable. . . .  A trade secret can form the res of a trust . . . .‖). 
52
 See, e.g., Thornton Robison, The Confidence Game: An Approach to the Law About Trade Secrets, 25 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 347 (1983).  
53
 For a discussion of the contract theory of trade secret law, see JAGER, supra note 3, § 4-1.  See Eastman Co. v. 
Reichenbach, 20 N.Y.S. 110, 115-16 (1892) (―By a careful reading of the various decisions upon this subject, it will 
be seen that some are made to depend upon a breach of an express contract between the parties, while others proceed 
upon the theory that, where a confidential relation exists between two or more parties engaged in a business venture, 
the law raises an implied contract between them that the employee will not divulge any trade secrets imparted to him 
or discovered by him in the course of his employment, and that a disclosure of such secrets, thus acquired, is a 
breach of trust and a violation of good morals, to prevent which a court of equity should intervene.‖). 
54
 See Lynn Sharp Paine, Trade Secrets and the Justification of Intellectual Property: A Comment on Hettinger, 20 
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 247, 249 (1991); James W. Hill, Trade Secrets, Unjust Enrichment, and the Classification of 
Obligations, 4 VA. J.L & TECH. 2 (1999), 4 VA. J.L. & TECH. 2 (Spring 1999) http://vjolt.student.virginia.edu 
(arguing that ―a body of trade-secret law, distinct from contract and other tort law, is justified by the principles of 
unjust enrichment‖).  
55
 Lemley, Trade Secrets as IP Rights, supra note 45, at 324-26. 
56 
See RESTATEMENT OF (FIRST) TORTS § 757 cmt. f (1939) (stating that improper means of obtaining trade secrets 
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Christopher,
57
 an industrial espionage case, the court held that ―aerial photography of plant 
construction is an improper means of obtaining another‘s trade secret‖; it addressed the policy 
grounds behind the decision, quoting from a Texas Supreme Court case that ―the undoubted 
tendency of the law has been to recognize and enforce higher standards of commercial morality 
in the business world.‖58  This theory has been expressed in the Restatement (First) of Torts, the 
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, and by many state courts.  
In addition to these common law-based approaches, several instrumental or policy-based 
approaches exist.  One popular view of courts and scholars focuses on the nature of trade secrets 
as a form of intellectual property rights.
59
  These commentators argue that trade secret law 
encourages research and innovation by securing the fruits of these endeavors to inventors and 
innovators.
60
  In the case of Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.,
61
 in which a plaintiff sought 
injunctive relief against a former employee from disclosing or using certain claimed trade secrets 
associated with a process for producing crystal, the court granted a permanent injunction, 
observing the importance of trade secret protection to ―the subsidization of research and 
development.‖62  The court further noted that   
                                                                                                                                                             
are generally ―means which fall below the generally accepted standards of commercial morality and reasonable 
conduct‖); JAGER, supra note 3, § 1:3; JAMES POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS, § 1.02 [2] (West 2009). 
57
 See, e.g., E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied 400 U.S. 
1024, rehearing denied 401 U.S. 967 (1971); Hyde Corp. v. Huffines, 158 Tex. 566, 581-582, 314 S.W.2d 763, 773 
(Tex. 1958) (―the undoubted tendency of [trade secret] law has been to recognize and enforce higher standards of 
commercial morality in the business world.‖). 
58
 Du Pont, 431 F.2d at 1015. 
59
 See, e.g., Lemley, Trade Secrets as IP Rights, supra note 45, at 329 (―Trade secrets are best understood not as 
applications or extensions of existing common law principles (warranted or unwarranted), but as IP rights.‖).  
60
 Burten v. Milton Bradley Co., 763 F.2d 461, 467 (1st Cir. 1985) (―The underlying goal of the law which protects 
trade secrets, like that which protects copyrights and patents, is to encourage the formulation and promulgation of 
ideas by ensuring that creators of ideas benefit from their creations.‖).  See JAGER, supra note 3, § 1:4; Lemley, 
Trade Secrets as IP Rights, supra note 45, at 330 (contending that trade secret laws ―provide sufficient advantage in 
terms of lead time or relative costs to minimize or eliminate the public goods problem‖).  
61
 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974).  
62
 Id. at 482.  
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certainly the patent policy of encouraging invention is not disturbed by the 
existence of another form of incentive to invention.  In this respect the two 
systems are not and never would be in conflict.  Similarly, the policy that matter 
once in the public domain must remain in the public domain is not incompatible 
with the existence of trade secret protection.
63
 
 
Commentators further argue that the law, by giving certain legal rights to the trade secret owner, 
allows the owner to disclose trade secrets for licensing to the third parties because, in the absence 
of trade secret law, the owner would not reliably license them to others; thus, trade secret 
protection plays a similar role in making society exploit useful information in a more efficient 
way.
64  
Furthermore,
 
other policy concerns, such as the encouragement of labor mobility
65
 and the 
protection of the fundamental right of privacy,
66
 can be found in judicial decisions or the 
                                                 
63
 Id. at 484. 
64
 Lemley, Trade Secrets as IP Rights, supra note 45, at 336-37; POOLEY, supra note 56, § 1.02 [4]; RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. a (1996).  In the Kewanee case, the court also pointed out the following 
view:  
Even if trade secret protection against the faithless employee were abolished, inventive and 
exploitive effort in the area of patentable subject matter that did not meet the standards of 
patentability would continue, although at a reduced level.  Alternatively with the effort that 
remained, however, would come an increase in the amount of self-help that innovative companies 
would employ.  Knowledge would be widely dispersed among the employees of those still active 
in research.  Security precautions necessarily would be increased, and salaries and fringe benefits 
of those few officers or employees who had to know the whole of the secret invention would be 
fixed in an amount thought sufficient to assure their loyalty.  Smaller companies would be placed 
at a distinct economic disadvantage, since the costs of this kind of self-help could be great, and the 
cost to the public of the use of this invention would be increased.  The innovative entrepreneur 
with limited resources would tend to confine his research efforts to himself and those few he felt 
he could trust without the ultimate assurance of legal protection against breaches of confidence.  
As a result, organized scientific and technological research could become fragmented, and society, 
as a whole, would suffer. 
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 485-86 (1974) (footnote omitted).  
65
 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 42 cmt. b (1995) (―Application of the rules protecting trade 
secrets in cases involving competition by former employees requires a careful balancing of interests.  There is a 
strong public interest in preserving the freedom of employees to market their talents and experience in order to earn 
a livelihood.‖).   
66
 See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 155 (1989) (―certain aspects of trade secret law 
operated to protect non-economic interests outside the sphere of congressional concern in the patent laws.  As the 
Court noted, ‗[A] most fundamental human right, that of privacy, is threatened when industrial espionage is 
condoned or is made profitable.‘‖) (citing Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 487 (1974)).   
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opinions of commentators.   
 
 
2. Current Trade Secret Law  
2.1.  Subject Matter  
Under the UTSA, virtually any information can be protected as a trade secret.  The act 
defines a ―trade secret‖ as   
information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, 
technique, or process, that:  
 
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being 
generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, 
other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and  
 
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to 
maintain its secrecy.
67
   
 
From the very definition of a trade secret under the UTSA, trade secret law protects a wide 
spectrum of information; both technical and nontechnical information can be protected as a trade 
secret so long as it meets certain legal requirements.
68
  In fact, most information, including 
                                                 
67
 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 537 (2005). 
68
 See Revere Transducers, Inc. v. Deere & Co., 595 N.W.2d 751, 776 (Iowa 1999) (―Business information may also 
fall within the definition of a trade secret, including such matters as maintenance of data on customer lists and needs, 
source of supplies, confidential costs, price data and figures. Trade secrets can range from customer information, to 
financial information, to information about manufacturing processes, to the composition of products.‖); Avery 
Dennison Corp. v. Kitsonas, 118 F. Supp. 2d 848, 854 (S.D. Ohio 2000) (―customer lists, pricing information, sales 
strategies and the business philosophy‖ can be entitled to trade secret protection).  Even if virtually any information 
can be entitled to trade secret protection, some information cannot be protected under trade secret law.  See 
Daktronics, Inc. v. MaAfee, 599 N.W.2d 358, 361, 1999 SD 113, 14 (S.D. 1999) (―the commonly accepted definition 
of a trade secret does not include a marketing concept or new product idea submitted by one party to another. . . .  
Therefore, simply possessing a non-novel idea or concept without more is generally, as a matter of law, insufficient 
to establish a trade secret.‖). 
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recipes,
69
 manufacturing processes
70
 or product innovations,
71
 plans or designs,
72
 and customer 
lists,
73
 can be potential trade secrets under the nonexclusive list of the categories identified in the 
act. 
There are slight differences between the Restatement of Torts, the UTSA, and the EEA, 
but they share common aspects.  First, the information in question must have ―economic 
value.‖74  To satisfy this requirement, a claimed trade secret must be sufficient to provide an 
―economic advantage over others who do not possess the information.‖75  However, the value 
does not have to be enormous; rather, it must provide ―an advantage that is more than trivial.‖76   
The UTSA, unlike the Restatement of Torts, does not require information to be 
                                                 
69
 Christopher M‘s Hand Poured Fudge v. Hennon, 699 A.2d 1272 (1997) (secret fudge recipe); Buffets, Inc. v. 
Klinke, 73 F.3d 965, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1996) (restaurant recipes). 
70
 Lamont, Corliss & Co. v. Bonnie Blend Chocolate Corp., 135 Misc. 537 (1929) (process to manufacture chocolate 
powder); C&F Packing Co. v. IBP, Inc., 224 F.3d 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (process ―for making and freezing 
precooked sausage for pizza toppings‖); Organic Chem., Inc. v. Carroll Prod., Inc., 211 U.S.P.Q. 628 (1981) 
(process ―which could be used in the commercial manufacturing of Dimethylamino Ethyl Chloride Hydrochloride 
and Diethylamino Chloride Hydrochloride‖). 
71
 Gen. Elec. Co. v. Chien-Min Sung, 843 F. Supp. 776 (D. Mass. 1994) (―equipment for manufacturing Saw Grade 
Diamond product‖); USM Corp. v. Marson Fastener Corp., 379 Mass. 90 (Mass. 1979) (―blind rivet assembly 
machine‖).  See also ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 1.09 [5] [a] (―Numerous cases found, 
despite sale or equivalent commercialization, that secrets in the product itself remain trade secrets.  Among these are 
a heavy-duty magnetic industrial ‗fishing device,‘ hybrid seed corn, ozone systems, oxygen regulators used as 
medical devices, an air conditioning duct enclosure, a complex slotted array radar antenna, a computer peripheral 
high speed acquisition module, an electronic speedometer for heavy duty trucks, . . . a special composition rubber 
rifle recoil pad and a toy gun mechanism.‖) (footnotes omitted).  
72
 Anaconda Co. v. Metric Tool & Die Co., 485 F. Supp. 410, 413 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (protecting design of a 
sophisticated profile and winding machine used to make telephone cord armor).  
73
 Courtesy Temporary Serv., Inc. v. Camacho, 222 Cal. App. 3d 1278 (1990); see Revere Transducers, Inc. v. Deere 
& Co., 595 N.W.2d 751, 776 (Iowa 1999) (―Business information may also fall within the definition of a trade secret, 
including such matters as maintenance of data on customer lists and needs, source of supplies, confidential costs, 
price data and figures. Trade secrets can range from customer information, to financial information, to information 
about manufacturing processes, to the composition of products.‖); Avery Dennison Corp. v. Kitsonas, 118 F. Supp. 
2d 848, 854 (S.D. Ohio 2000) (―customer lists, pricing information, sales strategies and the business philosophy‖ 
can be entitled to trade secret protection).
74
 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939); UNIF. TRADE 
SECRETS ACT § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 537 (2005); 18 U.S.C.A. § 1839(3) (West 2009).  
74
 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 537 (2005); 18 
U.S.C.A. § 1839(3) (West 2009).  
75
 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. e (1995).  
76
 Id.  See, e.g., Telerate Sys., Inc. v. Caro, 689 F. Supp. 221, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (―Even a slight competitive edge 
will satisfy this requirement of trade secret protection.‖).  
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continuously ―used in one‘s business.‖77  Therefore, under the provision of the UTSA, the 
potential value or negative value of information can qualify as a trade secret.
78
  In practice, 
courts in the United States consider several factors, including the value to owners or competitors, 
the costs for owners or others to develop the information, and licensing by others, to determine 
whether information meets the economic value requirement.
79
  Some courts look to the totality of 
the circumstances surrounding the information and rely on the six factors enumerated in the 
Restatement (First) of Torts.
80
   
Second, the information must not ―be generally known to, and readily ascertainable by,‖ 
others.
81
  In practice, these requirements are closely related to the ―economic value‖ requirement 
because the economic value of a trade secret can be derived from the fact that others cannot 
access the information and use it economically.
82
  Public disclosure of trade secrets results in the 
loss of trade secret status.  Accordingly, in the absence of public disclosure, the duration of trade 
secrets can be perpetual, insofar as the information meets certain legal requirements.  But even if 
the information is not known to the public, it may not be protected as a trade secret, provided 
others in the same business generally know it.
83
  On the other hand, the information does not 
                                                 
77
 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 537 (2005).  
78
 See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc‘n Serv., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1231, 1253 (N.D. Cal. 1995) 
(―the definition of trade secret does not require that there currently be competitors, only that there be actual or 
potential value from the information being secret. Thus, potential competition is sufficient.‖); Metallurgical Indus. 
Inc. v. Fourtek, Inc., 790 F.2d 1195, 1203 (5th Cir. 1986) (observing that ―[k]nowing [negative information] often 
leads automatically to knowing what to do‖); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) cmt., 14 U.L.A. 537 (2005).  
79
 See, e.g., George S. May Intern. Co. v. Int‘l Profit Assoc., 628 N.E.2d 647, 653 (1993) (―The information must be 
sufficiently secret to impart economic value to both its owner and its competitors because of its relative secrecy.‖). 
80
 See, e.g., Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Hudson, 873 F. Supp.1037, 1045 (E.D. Mich. 1994) (―In order to establish 
that they are trade secrets or information, plaintiff must satisfy the six factors.‖).  For cases concerning this 
requirement, see POOLEY, supra note 56, § 4.05. 
81
 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 537 (2005). 
82
 See
 
Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro v. Schectman, 55 Cal. App. 4th 1279, 1288, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 698, 704 (Cal. App. 1 
Dist. 1997) (―trade secrets derive their value as a form of intellectual property from the fact they are not disclosed to 
those who might be able to use them to create value properly belonging to the owner of the secret.‖). 
83 
See Mangren Research and Dev. Corp. v. Nat‘l Chem. Co., Inc., 87 F.3d 937, 942 (7th Cir. 1996) (―This 
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require absolute secrecy, but only substantial secrecy.  Thus, the holder of the information is 
permitted to disclose the information to employees in the firm, to outsiders, or both, using the 
information for his or her own business to the extent that he or she allows only key employees to 
access it and takes reasonable measures to keep it secret.
84
  In addition, for information to be 
entitled to trade secret protection, it must not be readily ascertainable by others.  If the 
information can be reverse engineered without relevant expertise or great effort, or can be found 
easily in publications, it cannot be protected as a trade secret.
85
 
Third, the act requires that, to seek legal remedies, a trade secret holder must have taken 
reasonable security measures to prevent the loss of the trade secret.
86
  In practice, this 
requirement is one of ―the most important factors in gaining trade-secret protection.‖87  The 
UTSA comment illustrates the reasonableness standard with familiar examples, such as ―advising 
employees of the existence of a trade secret, limiting access to a trade secret on a ‗need to know 
                                                                                                                                                             
requirement precludes trade secret protection for information generally known within an industry even if not to the 
public at large.‖); ILG Indus., Inc. v. Scott, 49 Ill.2d 88, 93, 273 N.E.2d 393, 396 (Ill. 1971) (―That which is of 
general knowledge within an industry cannot be a trade secret; something which is fully and completely disclosed by 
a business through its catalogs or literature disseminated throughout an industry cannot be a trade secret.‖).  
84
 See, e.g., Lasermaster Corp. v. Sentinel Imaging Inc., 931 F. Supp. 628, 635 (D. Minn. 1996) (―If, under all the 
circumstances, the employee knows or has reason to know that the owner intends or expects the information to be 
secret, confidentiality measures are sufficient.‖).  
85
 See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974) (―A trade secret law, however, does not 
offer protection against discovery by fair and honest means, such as by independent invention, accidental disclosure, 
or by so-called reverse engineering, that is by starting with the known product and working backward to divine the 
process which aided in its development or manufacture.‖).  
86
 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 537 (2005).  See also 18 U.S.C. § 1839 (1996).  For a brief history of 
this requirement, see Robert G. Bone, Trade Secrecy, Innovation, and the Requirement of Reasonable Secrecy 
Precautions 5-14 (Boston U. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 09-40, Sept. 2009) [hereinafter Bone, Reasonable 
Secrecy Precuations]. 
87
 See Enter. Leasing Co. v. Ehmke, 197 Ariz. 144, 150, 3 P.3d 1064, 1070 (1999) (―Indeed, the most important 
factor in gaining trade-secret protection is demonstrating that the owner has taken such precautions as are reasonable 
under the circumstances to preserve the secrecy of the information.‖) (citation omitted); Elizabeth A. Rowe, 
Contributory Negligence, Technology, and Trade Secrets 8 (University of Florida Legal Studies Research Paper No. 
2008-6, 2008) [hereinafter Rowe, Contributory Negligence] (―[The reasonable efforts requirement] is the most 
important factor in determining whether the plaintiff has a protectable trade secret.‖) (footnote omitted).  
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basis,‘ and controlling plant access.‖88  These imply that the reasonableness requirement does not 
require absolute secrecy for the information to have trade secret status.  However, the UTSA and 
the Restatement of Torts do not define ―reasonable efforts,‖ nor do they provide clear guidelines 
on the requirement in determining whether the information is sufficiently secret to maintain trade 
secret protection.
89
  Therefore, courts have had difficulty in drawing a clear line regarding the 
requirement and they have relied heavily on specific relevant facts by considering the general 
knowledge in the industry, the level of ascertainability by proper means, and whether the 
purported trade secret owner implemented reasonable measures under the circumstances to 
maintain secrecy.
90
  Nonetheless, as the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition explains, in 
practice, the reasonable secrecy requirement is applied based on the rationale of evidence or 
notice of the actual secrecy and value of a trade secret.
91
  In fact, some courts have emphasized 
the evidentiary aspect of this requirement,
92
 while others have focused on its notice aspects.
93
  
                                                 
88 
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 537 (2005); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939). 
89
 Richard Posner, Trade Secret Misappropriation: A Cost-Benefit Response to the Fourth Amendment Analogy, 106 
HARV. L. REV. 461, 464 (1992) [hereinafter Posner, Trade Secret Misappropriation] (―Thus, left without clear 
guiding standards, courts must make a factual determination as to whether the owner used reasonable precautions.‖).  
90
 See Lemley, Trade Secrets as IP Rights, supra note 45, at 317; Electro-Craft Co. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 
N.W.2d 890 (1983) (determining that reasonable efforts to maintain the secrecy element of trade secret law do not 
require maintenance of absolute secrecy); Tele-Count Eng‘r, Inc. v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 168 Cal. App. 3d 455 
(1985) (finding that the plaintiff failed to place a logo or a confidentiality warning on its cable counting process, 
even though the custom of the industry was to place such notice on any item considered confidential); In re 
Innovative Constr. Sys., Inc., 793 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1986) (determining that reasonable efforts to maintain the 
secrecy of a trade secret depends on the surrounding facts and circumstances in a specific business); Rockwell 
Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV. Indus., Inc. 925 F.2d 174 (1991) (determining that the assessment of a ―reasonable‖ 
precaution depends on a balancing of costs and benefits that will vary from case to case and that will require 
estimation and measurement by persons knowledgeable in the particular field of endeavor involved).  
91
 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. g (1995) (―the owner‘s precautions should be evaluated 
in light of the other available evidence relating to the value and secrecy of the information. . . . They can signal to 
employees and other recipients that a disclosure of the information by the trade secret owner is intended to be in 
confidence.‖).  Thus, it does not include the reasonable secrecy requirement under section 39.  See RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 & cmt. g (1995) (―Thus, if the value and secrecy of the information are clear, 
evidence of specific precautions taken by the trade secret owner may be unnecessary.‖).  The Restatement (First) of 
Torts also seems to take a view similar to that in the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition.  See RESTATEMENT 
(FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939) (putting ―the extent of measures taken . . . to guard the secrecy of the 
information‖ as one of six factors to be considered in determining whether the information at issue is secret). 
92
 See, e.g., Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc. 925 F.2d 174 (1991) (focusing on the evidentiary 
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2.2. Misappropriation of Trade Secrets 
The owner of a trade secret does not have an exclusive right to the use or possession of 
the information and can exercise the right only against those engaged in certain wrongful acts, 
namely ―misappropriation.‖94  The UTSA, unlike the Restatement (First) of Torts, expanded the 
scope of misappropriation of trade secrets with respect to which improper acquisitions of a trade 
secret were independently actionable.
95
  Thus, under the UTSA, three forms of wrongful acts 
exist: wrongful acquisition, use, and disclosure of trade secrets.
96
  These acts become illegal 
                                                                                                                                                             
significance of the requirement of reasonable security measures). 
93
 See, e.g., BondPro Corp. v. Siemens Power Gen., Inc., 463 F.3d 702, 709 (7th Cir. 2006) (focusing on the notice 
aspect of this requirement).  See also Bone, Reasonable Secrecy Precautions, supra note 86, at 14-20 (analyzing and 
criticizing courts‘ rationales of reasonable security measures on several grounds, including evidentiary and notice 
benefits in trade secret cases); Lemley, Trade Secrets as IP Rights, supra note 45, at 317 (―Courts have shown some 
confusion over the rationale for this requirement.  Some see in it evidence that the trade secret is valuable enough to 
bother litigating; others argue that where reasonable precautions are taken, chances are that a defendant acquired the 
trade secret wrongfully.‖).  For an overview of courts‘ approach to the reasonable efforts requirement, see Rowe, 
Contributory Negligence, supra note 87, at 8-14.  
94
 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (1985).  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 43 cmt. a (1995). 
95
 In fact, unlike the Restatement (First) of Torts § 757 in which improper acquisition of a trade secret is not 
independently actionable, the UTSA does not require proof of subsequent wrongful use or disclosure.  See 
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. f (1939) (―[I]f one uses physical force to take a secret formula from 
another‘s pocket, . . ., his conduct is wrongful and subjects him to liability apart from the rule stated in this 
Section.‖).  
96
 The definition of ―misappropriation‖ under the UTSA is as follows:  
(2) ―Misappropriation‖ means: 
(i) acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who knows or has reason to know 
that the trade secret was acquired by improper means; or  
(ii) disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express or implied consent by a 
person who  
(A) used improper means to acquire knowledge of the trade secret; or  
(B)  at the time of disclosure or use, knew or had reason to know that his 
knowledge of the trade secret was  
(I) derived from or through a person who had utilized improper means 
to acquire it;  
(II) acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain its 
secrecy or limit its use; or 
(III) derived from or through a person who owed a duty to the person 
seeking relief to maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or  
(B) before a material change of his [or her] position, knew or had reason to 
know that it was a trade secret and that knowledge of it had been acquired 
by accident or mistake.  
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when trade secrets are appropriated through improper means, or through use or disclosure in 
breach of a duty of confidence.   
 The term ―improper means‖ refers to acts that are prohibited, and this is the basis of 
liability under trade secret law.  As the UTSA and the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition 
state, because it is not possible to include every act that constitutes improper means with respect 
to trade secret misappropriation, the UTSA and the Restatement provide only a partial listing.
97
  
Thus, in general, the question of whether improper means exist in a given case usually depends 
on ―standards of commercial ethics‖ – one of the important policies behind trade secret law.98  As 
a result, ―improper means‖ include two situations: where the conduct is ―itself a tortious or 
criminal invasion of the trade secret owner‘s right,‖ or where it is not ―independently 
wrongful.‖99  The former situation includes actions that are actionable in themselves under 
common law torts or relevant statutes.  The UTSA provides some examples defining improper 
means, including ―theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to 
maintain secrecy, or espionage through electronic or other means.‖100  In addition, in certain 
circumstances, acts that are otherwise legitimate or not actionable themselves can be deemed 
                                                                                                                                                             
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2).   
97
 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 43 cmt. c (1995) (―It is not possible to formulate a 
comprehensive list of the conduct that constitutes ‗improper‘ means of acquiring a trade secret.‖); UNIF. TRADE 
SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt. (1995) (citing the Restatement (First) of Torts § 757 comment f as to the impossibility of a 
comprehensive list of the conduct misappropriating trade secrets); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. f 
(1939) (―A complete catalogue of improper means is not possible.  In general they are means which fall below the 
generally accepted standards of commercial morality and reasonable conduct.‖).  
98
 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt. (1995); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. f (1939).  See also 
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481-82 (1974) (―The maintenance of standards of commercial 
ethics and the encouragement of invention are the broadly stated policies behind trade secret law.  The necessity of 
good faith and honest, fair dealing is the very life and spirit of the commercial world.‖) (citation omitted).   
99
 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 43 cmt. c (1995).  
100
 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(1), 14 U.L.A. 529-35 (2005).  See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 43 (1995) (―‗Improper‘ means of acquiring another‘s trade secret under the rule stated in § 40 
include theft, fraud, unauthorized interception of communications, inducement of or knowing participation in a 
breach of confidence, and other means either wrongful in themselves or wrongful under the circumstances of the 
case.‖).  
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improper means under trade secret law.
101
  The case most frequently cited on their point is E.I. du 
Pont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher.
102
  In Christopher, the defendant took aerial photographs 
of a plant under construction that was designed to produce a claimed trade secret (an unpatented 
process for producing methanol).  The issue in that case was whether taking aerial photographs 
of plant construction fell within the scope of improper means under trade secret law.
103
  
Concerning this question, the court held that ―[r]egardless of whether the flight was legal or 
illegal in that sense, the espionage was an improper means of discovering Du Pont‘s trade 
secret.‖104  On the other hand, a defendant is not liable for misappropriation of trade secrets if it 
exploits ―proper means‖ to obtain trade secrets, such as independent invention105 and reverse 
engineering
106
 of publicly available items.
107
   
                                                 
101
 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. f (1939); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 43 cmt. c 
(1995); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt. (1995). 
102
 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970).   
103
 The plaintiff contended the defendants‘ actions constituted wrongful acquisition prohibited by Texas trade secret 
law, whereas the defendant argued that the defendants ―committed no ‗actionable wrong‘ in photographing the Du 
Pont facility and passing these photographs on to their client because they conducted all of their activities in public 
airspace, violated no government aviation standard, did not breach any confidential relation, and did not engage in 
any fraudulent or illegal conduct.‖  E.I. Du Pont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1014-15 (5th Cir. 
1970).   
104
 431 F.2d 1012, 1017 (5th Cir. 1970).  See  David D. Friedman, William M. Landes, & Richard A. Posner, Some 
Economics of Trade Secret Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 61, 62 (1991) [hereinafter Friedman el al., Economics of Trade 
Secret Law] (―Although the court found no trespass by the overflying aircraft, it held that the competitor had 
violated Du Pont‘s common law rights.  Given the court‘s finding that there was no trespass, the ‗rights‘ invaded 
could only have been rights to the trade secrets themselves, rather than the right to prevent trespass, conversion, 
breach of contract, or other conventional common law wrongs.‖).   
105
 See American Can Co. v. Mansukhani, 742 F.2d 314, 329 (7th Cir. 1984) (―The owner of a trade secret is not 
entitled to prevent others from using public information to replicate his product, nor may the owner prevent others 
from making similar products which are not derived from the trade secret.‖) (citation omitted). 
106
 See Angell Elevator Lock Co. v. Manning, 348 Mass. 623, 626, 205 N.E.2d 245, 248 (Mass. 1965) (―Our cases 
establish that the mere copying and sale of an unpatented product does not furnish to its original manufacturer any 
basis for injunctive relief or damages.‖); Chicago Lock Co. v. Fanberg, 676 F.2d 400, 405 (9th Cir. 1982) (―A lock 
purchaser‘s own reverse-engineering of his own lock, and subsequent publication of the serial number-key code 
correlation, is an example of the independent invention and reverse engineering expressly allowed by trade secret 
doctrine.‖).  
107
 See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (U.S. 1974) (stating that ―trade secret law, however, 
does not offer protection against discovery by fair and honest means, such as by independent invention, accidental 
disclosure, or by so-called reverse engineering‖); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 
(1989).  The comment to Section 1 of the UTSA illustrates a partial listing including ―independent invention‖ and 
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Despite the fact that a defendant may acquire trade secrets by proper means, trade secret 
misappropriations can occur in many cases in which the use or disclose of the secrets by the 
defendant breaches a duty of confidence.
108
  Clearly, an express contract – for example, through 
a nondisclosure agreement by the recipient of a trade secret – creates a duty of confidence to a 
contracting party.
109
  The duty of confidence may also be inferred from the nature of the 
relationship between the parties, such as the employer-employee relationship.
110
  In addition, the 
duty of confidence can be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the disclosure.
111
  
However, in most cases in which a duty of confidence arises by operation of law or implied-in-
fact contract, ―the circumstances must indicate that the recipient knew or had reason to know that 
the disclosure was intended as confidential‖ or ―the circumstances must justify the other party‘s 
belief that the recipient has consented to the duty of confidence.‖112  Finally, the use or disclosure 
recognized in this context generally means ―any exploitation of [a] trade secret that is likely to 
result in injury to [a] trade secret owner or enrichment to [a] defendant,‖ and a typical type of 
improper use or disclosure may be commercial exploitation of the secret.
113
   
                                                                                                                                                             
―reverse engineering‖ of publicly available items.  UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt. (1995) (―Proper means 
include: 1. Discovery by independent invention; 2. Discovery by ‗reverse engineering‘ . . .; 3. Discovery under a 
license from the owner of the trade secret; 4. Observation of the item in public use or on public display; 5. Obtaining 
the trade secret from published literature.‖).  
108
 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 41 (1995).  See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2); 
RESTATEMENT OF (FIRST) TORTS § 757(b) (1939). 
109
 See Aerospace America, Inc. v. Abatement Tech., Inc.,  38 F. Supp. 1061, 1071 (E.D. Mich. 1990) (―Confidential 
relationships may be found to exist either by virtue of an express confidentiality non-use/non-disclosure agreement 
(wherein the discloser warns the disclosee that information received by the disclosee is to be held in confidence, or, 
in appropriate circumstances, may be implied by law.‖) (citation omitted).  
110
 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 41 (1995).  But see Seatrax, Inc. v. Sonbeck Int‘l., Inc., 200 
F.3d 358, 366 (5th Cir. 2000) (denying the confidential relationship between a licensor and licensee in the absence of 
an express agreement of confidentiality); Entm‘t Research Group v. Genesis Creative Group, 122 F.3d 1211 (9th Cir. 
1997) (finding no confidential relationship between a manufacturer and a distributing firm).  
111
 See, e.g., Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1953) (prospective customer for a product design).   
112
 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 41 cmt. b (1995).   
113
 Id.  
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2.3. Legal Remedies 
2.3.1. Civil Remedies  
Trade secret law provides a variety of legal remedies for the misappropriation of a trade 
secret.  Remedies for trade secret misappropriation include, primarily, civil remedies, including 
injunctive relief and damages.
114
  In some circumstances, criminal prosecution is also available.  
These rules for legal remedies vary from state to state, even though the states have adopted the 
UTSA.   
Under the UTSA, a plaintiff is entitled to injunctive relief as an equitable remedy for 
actual or threatened misappropriation.
115
  Given the nature of trade secrets, which may lose their 
status as valuable information to the owner, and the difficulty of proving a loss from trade secret 
misappropriation, the injunctive relief remedy is a vital legal remedy that allows the plaintiff to 
be put in the position he or she would have obtained if the defendant had not misappropriated the 
trade secret; injunctive relief prevents ―additional harm‖ from further use or disclosure by a 
misappropriator, or deprives him or her of ―additional benefit,‖ such as a ―head start or other 
unfair advantage‖ from the misappropriation.116   
Courts have determined the appropriateness or scope of injunctive relief in given cases by 
considering not only both parties‘ interests, but also the interests of the public.  Subsection (2) of 
section 44 of the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition provides the primary factors to 
                                                 
114
 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §§ 2-3, 14 U.L.A. 619-42 (2005).  The statute of limitations of an action for trade 
secret misappropriation is ―3 years after the misappropriation is discovered or by the exercise of reasonable 
diligence should have been discovered.‖  Id. at 649 (2005).  See generally Felix Prandl, Damages for 
Misappropriation of Trade Secret, 22 TORT INS. L.J. 447 (1987); William F. Johnson, Remedies in Trade Secret 
Litigation, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 1004 (1978).  
115
 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 2, 14 U.L.A. 619 (2005). 
116
 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 44 cmt. c (1995).  
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consider in a trade secret case.
117
  Thus, for example, in cases in which a trade secret has 
generally become known and a defendant cannot obtain any advantages from misappropriating 
the trade secret, some courts have concluded that monetary damages would be a better remedy.
118
  
Furthermore, even in a case in which injunctive relief is more desirable, the injunction should not 
be unnecessarily restrictive of the use of information that is outside the scope of the trade 
secret.
119
  With respect to the duration of the injunctive relief, although a perpetual injunction is 
possible in many cases in which the UTSA is followed, based on the ―head start‖ theory, 
prohibiting the use or disclosure of trade secrets is limited in duration until the trade secret loses 
its secrecy or becomes available to the public, for example, through legitimate reverse 
engineering or independent development by third parties.
120
  In these cases, courts consider the 
anticompetitive effect of a perpetual injunction and the public interest in terms of fair 
competition by putting the defendant in the same position he or she would have been in absent 
                                                 
117
 The factors are as follows:  
(a) the nature of the interest to be protected; (b) the nature and extent of the appropriation; (c) the 
relative adequacy to the plaintiff of an injunction and of other remedies; (d) the relative harm 
likely to result to the legitimate interests of the defendant if an injunction is granted and to the 
legitimate interests of the plaintiff if an injunction is denied; (e) the interests of third persons and 
of the public; (f) any unreasonable delay by the plaintiff in bringing suit or otherwise asserting its 
rights; (g) any related misconduct on the part of the plaintiff; and (h) the practicability of framing 
and enforcing the injunction.   
Id. § 44(2). 
118
 RESTATEMENT OF (THIRD) UNFAIR COMPETITION § 44 cmt. c (1995). 
119
 See, e.g., Sigma Chem. Co. v. Harris, 794 F.2d 371, 375 (8th Cir. 1986) (―We believe the part of the injunction 
prohibiting disclosure of trade secrets must be limited in duration.‖).  But in some cases where a trade secret is an 
essential component of a product or process, courts have enjoined beyond the use or disclosure of the trade secret.  
See, e.g., ILG Indus., Inc. v. Scott, 273 N.E.2d 393 (1971) (not limiting the scope of an injunction to the use of a 
specific trade secret that can be an essential part in a manufacturing good, but extending it to the sale of the 
manufacturing good).  
120
 Compare Valco Cincinnati, Inc. v. N & D Machining Serv., Inc., 492 N.E.2d 814 (1986) (granting a perpetual 
punitive injunction) with Winston Research Corp. v. Minn. Min. & Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d 134 (9th Cir. 1965) 
(enjoining defendants from using or disclosing the plaintiff‘s trade secrets for two years from the date of judgment); 
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 473-74 (1974); K-2 Ski Co. v. Head Ski Co., Inc., 506 F.2d 471 
(9th Cir. 1974).  See also UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 2(1), 14 U.L.A. 619 (2005).   
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the misappropriation.
121
  In addition, in some exceptional cases in which awarding a prohibitory 
injunction against future use of a misappropriated trade secret is likely to be inequitable or 
inappropriate, the courts may require the defendant to pay a reasonable royalty to the trade secret 
owner.
122
  Courts may also order positive injunctions for ―the fruits of misappropriation to an 
aggrieved person,‖ such as the return or destruction of misappropriated information.123   
Damages are available and these can be combined with a claim for injunctive relief.  In a 
trade secret case, the general principle related to ―the recovery of compensatory damages‖ and 
the remedy of restitution in tort action are applied.
124
  To recover damages in tort cases, a 
plaintiff ―has the burden of proving that the other has invaded a legally protected interest of his, 
that he has suffered the harm and that the act of the other was a legal cause of the harm.‖125  A 
trade secret holder must thus offer evidence that a given amount of earnings has been lost, or that 
his or her expected profit has been harmed with reasonable certainty under the circumstances.
126
  
An owner of a trade secret is entitled to recover any proven actual losses resulting from the 
misappropriation (e.g., the plaintiff‘s lost profit) and is entitled to restitution of the defendant‘s 
unjust enrichment caused by the misappropriation (e.g., the defendant‘s profit on sales) ―that is 
                                                 
121
 Sigma Chem. Co. v. Harris, 794 F.2d 371, 375 (8th Cir. 1986) (―We believe the part of the injunction prohibiting 
disclosure of trade secrets must be limited in duration and, accordingly, reverse in part and remand the case to the 
district court for consideration of the time it would take a ‗legitimate competitor‘ to independently reproduce the 
information contained in the product and vendor files.‖).  
122
 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 2(b) & cmt., 14 U.L.A. 619 (2005); see also POOLEY, supra note 56, § 7.03.   
123
 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 2(c) & cmt., 14 U.L.A. 619-21 (2005).   
124
 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 45 cmt. a (1995).  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 
902 & 903 (definition of damages and compensatory damages); § 907 (nominal damages); §§ 908 & 909 (punitive 
damages); § 912 (certainty); RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 136 (1937).   
125
 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 912 cmt. a (1979).  
126
 Id. § 912.  See also POOLEY, supra note 56, § 7.03. (―Although a jury may ‗approximate‘ damages within a 
reasonable range, recovery for speculative matters is not permitted.  However, it is enough that plaintiff prove only 
the fact of damage with reasonable certainty; as in other matter of tort law, uncertainty as to the amount of damage is 
not a bar to recovery.‖).   
 38 
 
not taken into account in computing actual loss.‖127  In the event that claims for injunctive relief 
and damages are granted, the time period for the calculation of monetary damages may be 
limited to the period when the injunction is available.
128
  In some cases, the UTSA also 
authorizes the court to impose a reasonable royalty liability for the use or disclosure of trade 
secrets by the defendant.
129
  In addition, punitive damages up to twice the actual damages, which 
were not allowed in common law, may be awarded in cases of ―willful and malicious‖ 
misappropriation.
130
  In willful and malicious cases of misappropriation, Attorney‘s fees may be 
awarded to a prevailing party ―as a deterrent to specious claims of misappropriation, to specious 
efforts by a misappropriator to terminate injunctive relief, and to willful and malicious 
misappropriation.‖131  
 
2.3.2. Criminal Remedies  
Although the traditional remedy for trade secret misappropriation has focused on civil 
remedies, in certain circumstances, criminal sanctions are also available.  In fact, since the mid-
1960s, criminal law in the United States has expanded its scope to protect trade secrets as a type 
                                                 
127
 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 3(a), 14 U.L.A. 633-34 (2005).  For measures of monetary relief, see RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 45 cmts. d-g (1996).   
128
 Id. § 3 cmt., at 634 (―the injunctive relief ordinarily will preclude a monetary award for a period in which the 
injunction is effective.‖).   
129
 Id. at 633-34.  The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition illustrates three situations in which the reasonable 
royalty measure of relief to the plaintiff can be used:  
First, when the defendant has made a substantial good faith investment in the trade secret prior to 
receiving notice of the plaintiff‘s claim, . . .  Second, when the plaintiff‘s loss, although difficult to 
measure, is apparently greater than any gain acquired by the defendant, . . .  Third, in cases in 
which the defendant‘s gain from the trade secret is difficult to measure but apparently exceeds the 
plaintiff‘s loss.  
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 45 cmts. d-g (1996).   
130
 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 3(b), 14 U.L.A. 634 (2005).  In certain respects, trade secret protection was 
strengthened through the provision of punitive damages.  Indeed, many states in the United States adopted the 
provision of punitive damages.  See id. § 3(b) cmt., at 635-38. 
131
 Id. § 4 & cmt., at 642. 
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of property, primarily through the development of legislation, such as the theft of trade secret 
statutes, broadening the definition of a trade secret to include intangible forms.
132
  However, 
because of a lack of consensus regarding the scope of subject matter protected and the conduct 
prohibited under the criminal statutes, these statutes vary greatly from state to state.
133
  
Furthermore, only about one-half of the states have enacted criminal statutes related to trade 
secrets.
134
  In addition, in some cases, these statutes have only applied under limited 
circumstances, for example, by limiting the scope of subject matter to scientific and technical 
information or by not criminalizing incorporeal transfers (e.g., the use of a trade secret by 
memorization).
135
  As a result, compared with civil remedies, criminal sanctions for trade secret 
misappropriations have been said to provide trade secret holders with only limited legal 
remedies.
136
  The states‘ lack of resources seems to be another reason for state criminal law 
having only a limited impact on trade secret holders.
137
   
                                                 
132
 Eli Lederman, Criminal Liability for Breach of Confidential Commercial Information, 38 EMORY L.J. 921, 930-35 
(1989) (demonstrating a growing tendency in U.S. criminal law to protect confidential commercial information).   
133
 See id.  Merges et al. explain different effects of criminal trade secret cases on the relevant parties:  
First, criminal trade secret courtrooms are the scene of constant battles over the publication of 
information.  The real parties in interest will naturally oppose the disclosure in a public courtroom 
of the very secrets the defendant is accused of stealing.  This concern runs headlong into the 
defendant‘s constitutional right to a public trial.  Second, civil cases are generally stayed pending 
the outcome of a criminal prosecution.  Thus a criminal prosecution may actually delay injunctive 
relief—the kind of remedy a civil plaintiff is often most interested in.   
MERGES ET AL., supra note 3, at 112 (citation omitted).  
134
 JAGER, supra note 3, app. L. (explaining that 26 states have criminal statutes relating to trade secrets). 
135
 Lederman, supra note 132, at 965-66; Pooley, EEA, supra note 33, at 189 (noting that until recently the 
California criminal statute applied only to scientific or technical information).  However, it should be noted that 
recently, some states‘ criminal statues extended the scope to include business information.  Examples include the 
amendments of California and Pennsylvania in 1996 (CAL. PENAL CODE § 499c (West 2009) and 18 PA. CONS. STAT. 
§ 3930 (West 2009)) (inserting ―customer or sales information or any other privileged or confidential information‖ 
into the definition provisions).   
136
 Dratler identifies the following reasons for the ineffectiveness of criminal sanctions for trade secret 
misappropriation:  
First, because they are criminal laws, they require proof of culpability on the part of the 
misappropriator.  Second, these laws require proof of that culpability beyond a reasonable 
doubt. . . .  Third, criminal sanctions for trade secret misappropriation can be ineffective because 
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At the federal level, various legal theories can be relevant in trade secret cases.
138
  For 
example, the Interstate Transportation of Stolen Property Act
139
 and the Wire Fraud and Mail 
Fraud Statutes
140
 can be applied in cases involving the movement of stolen property across state 
lines or trade secret misappropriation by using mail, wire, radio, and the like.
141
  Nonetheless, the 
most important law concerning criminal sanctions for trade secret misappropriations can be said 
to be the EEA of 1996.
142
  The subject matter protected under the EEA seems to be broader than 
current civil law because it clearly includes ―all forms and types of financial, business, scientific, 
technical, economic, or engineering information‖ if the trade secret holder takes reasonable 
security measures to keep it, and if the trade secret has independent value from its nature of 
secrecy.
143
  The EEA further expressly protects a trade secret stored in intangible form and 
                                                                                                                                                             
they fail to cover the elusive third party. . . .  [Fourth,] criminal sanctions for trade secret 
misappropriation have a practical disadvantage.  Criminal liability may not deter the use or 
disclosure of a trade secret, particularly if the secret is of great competitive value. . . .  Finally, 
criminal prosecution often cannot stop a competitor‘s use of the misappropriated secret to the 
rightful owner‘s continuing disadvantage or provide compensation for that use.  Yet that continued 
use may ruin the trade secret owner‘s business.  
Jay Dratler, Jr., Trade Secrets in the United States and Japan: A Comparison and Prognosis, 14 YALE J. 
INT‘L L. 68, 87-89 (1989).   
137
 Pooley, EEA, supra note 33, at 186. 
138
 Mark L. Krotoski, Economic Espionage and Trade Secrets, 57 U.S. ATTORNEY‘S BULL. 2, 18-22 (Nov. 2009) 
(summarizing possible alternative charges in addition to trade secret charges).  
139
 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2314-2315 (West 2009).   
140
 Id. §§ 1341 & 1343. 
141
 See Chapter II. 1.1. 
142
 18 U.S.C. A. §§ 1831-1839 (West 2009). 
143
 Under the EEA, the term ―trade secret‖ is defined as follows:  
[A]ll forms and types of financial, business, scientific, technical, economic, or engineering 
information, including patterns, plans, compilations, program devices, formulas, designs, 
prototypes, methods, techniques, processes, procedures, programs, or codes, whether tangible or 
intangible, and whether or how stored, compiled, or memorialized physically, electronically, 
graphically, photographically, or in writing if— 
  (A) the owner thereof has taken reasonable measures to keep such information secret; and 
  (B) the information derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being  
generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable through proper means by, the public. 
18 U.S.C.A. § 1839(3) (West 2009).  See also Moohr, supra note 36, at 877-79. 
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memorized by a misappropriator.
144
  In addition, under the EEA, as in the UTSA, the alleged 
information must meet the three requirements to qualify as a trade secret: (1) independent 
economic value, (2) secrecy, and (3) reasonable security measures to protect it.
145
   
The EEA criminalizes acts of misappropriation as serious crimes under sections 1831(a) 
and 1832(a), entitled, ―Economic Espionage‖ and ―Theft of Trade Secrets,‖ respectively.  
Conduct prohibited under these sections can be divided into three groups.  The first group, 
provided under section 1831(a), primarily criminalizes acquisition of a trade secret by improper 
means.  The range of improper means listed under subsection (1) of the section seems to be 
broader than under state civil law because it criminalizes unauthorized appropriation or taking of 
a secret that may not be subject to liability for trade secret misappropriation in civil cases.
146
  The 
second group considers, under subsection (2), ―almost any unauthorized interference‖ with trade 
secrets a crime, regardless of whether a confidential relationship or any inherent unlawfulness 
exists, including ―unauthorized copying, duplicating, drawing, photographing, downloading, 
uploading, and other uses of the information.‖147  The third group, which is provided under 
subsection (3), prohibits the acquisition of a trade secret with knowledge that the trade secret has 
                                                 
144
 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1839(3) (West 2009); United States v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189, 196 (3d Cir. 1998) (―There are, 
though, several critical differences which serve to broaden the EEA‘s scope.  First, and most importantly, the EEA 
protects a wider variety of technological and intangible information than current civil laws.  Trade secrets are no 
longer restricted to formulas, patterns, and compilations, but now include programs and codes, ‗whether tangible or 
intangible, and whether or how stored.‘‖).  
145
 Among these requirements, the secrecy requirement has been especially criticized by commentators because it 
requires the information not to be generally known ―to the public,‖ unlike the UTSA, which requires it not to be 
generally known to ―other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use,‖ who are interpreted 
as persons within a specific industry.  See, e.g., Moohr, supra note 36, at 877-82.  Furthermore, in criminal cases, the 
vagueness of the definition of trade secret has been raised as a ground for concern based on adequate motive to 
potential wrongdoers.  See, e.g., United States v. Hsu, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1659 (1999).   
146
 18 U.S.C.A § 1831(a)(1) & § 1832(a)(1) (West 2009) (―steals, or without authorization appropriates, takes, 
carries away, or by fraud, artifice, or deception obtains a trade secret . . .‖).  See also Pooley, EEA, supra note 33, at 
186 (illustrating such conduct, providing that ―observing a competitor‘s property from across the street‖). 
147
 Moohr, supra note 36, at 882.  18 U.S.C.A § 1831(a)(2) & 1832(a)(2) (West 2009) (―without authorization copies, 
duplicates, sketches, draws, photographs, downloads, uploads, alters, destroys, photocopies, replicates, transmits, 
delivers, sends, mails, communicates, or conveys a trade secret . . . .‖).   
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been ―stolen or appropriated, obtained, or converted without authorization.‖148  The EEA also 
criminalizes the inchoate offenses of attempt and conspiracy to misappropriate a trade secret.
149
   
Although the two sections share almost the same conduct provisions and require that a 
defendant knowingly committed trade secret misappropriation, they have different culpability 
requirements and different severities of punishments.  Section 1831, which applies to economic 
espionage, requires only that a person intended or knew that a trade secret theft would benefit a 
foreign government, instrumentality, or foreign agent.
150
  On the other hand, under Section 1832, 
prosecutors must prove that a defendant intended to convert a trade secret to ―the economic 
benefit of anyone other than the owner‖ and intended or knew that the offense would injure the 
owner of the trade secret.
151  
This is different from civil law in that it does not require a 
defendant‘s knowledge or intention of potential economic loss to a plaintiff.152   
With respect to penalties, compared with Section 1832, Section 1831 exacts greater 
penalties for foreign economic espionage, providing for a term of up to 15 years in prison and 
fines of up to $500,000 for individuals, and fines of up to $10 million for any organization 
violating the provision.
153
  Under Section 1831, organizational criminal liability is set at a 
maximum of ten years.  Although it imputes a maximum fine of $5 million for organizations, it 
does not specify fines for individuals violating the provision under the EEA.
154
  In addition to the 
                                                 
148
 18 U.S.C.A. § 1831(a)(3) & § 1832(a)(3) (West 2009) (―receives, buys, or possesses a trade secret, knowing the 
same to have been stolen or appropriated, obtained, or converted without authorization . . . .‖).   
149
 Id. § 1831(a)(4) & (a)(5), § 1832(a)(4) & (a)(5).  
150
 Id. § 1831(a). 
151
 Id. § 1832(a).  
152
 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40 (1995).   
153
 18 U.S.C.A. § 1831(a) & (b) (West 2009). 
154
 Id. § 1832(a) & (b).  As to the unspecified fines for the individual, it is implied that ―the general maximum fine 
for felonies ($250,000) should apply.‖  Pooley, EEA, supra note 33, at 201.  See 142 CONG. REC. S12213 (daily ed. 
Oct. 2, 1996) (―In the original Senate version of this measure, we included a provision allowing courts to impose 
fines of up to twice the value of  the trade secret that was stolen.  This specific provision was eliminated because it 
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above penalties, Section 1834 provides for forfeiture of a defendant‘s property relating to trade 
secret misappropriation, and these forfeitures are governed by the Comprehensive Drug Abuse 
Prevention and Control Act of 1970.
155
   
The Attorney General can commence civil proceedings to enjoin further trade secret 
misappropriation during the criminal EEA investigation.
156
  However, this does not mean that 
―other persons and entities may not also seek injunctive relief that may be available in other civil 
actions (using state law tort or contract claims) to prevent the further misuse of a trade secret.‖157  
Finally, the EEA has very broad jurisdictional power that reaches not only across the United 
States, but also outside the United Sates in cases in which the offender is a U.S. citizen or 
permanent resident alien or an organization organized in the United States, and in which any ―act 
in furtherance of the offense was committed in the United States.‖158  Thus, in certain 
circumstances, the EEA may expand its territorial scope to conduct that has ―no other connection 
between the misappropriation and the United States.‖159  
                                                                                                                                                             
was unnecessary in light of 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d).  We have not used the specific exemption available under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3571(e).  We, therefore, fully expect that courts will take full advantage of the provision in 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d) 
allowing for fines of up to twice the gain or loss resulting from the theft of trade secrets and that courts will opt for 
the larger of the fines available under 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d) or the fine provisions of this statute.‖).  See also 18 
U.S.C.A § 3571(b)(3) & (d) (West 2009) (providing for fines for a felony up to $250,000 for individuals, and ―fines 
of up to twice the gain or loss resulting from the offense‖). 
155
 The court is required to order the forfeiture of ―any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds the 
person obtained, directly or indirectly,‖ from trade secret misappropriation.  18 U.S.C.A. § 1834(a)(1) (West 2009).  
The court, with discretion, also can order forfeiture of ―any of the person‘s or organization‘s property used, or 
intended to be used, in any manner or part, to facilitate the commission of such violation.‖  Id. § 1834(a)(2).  See 21 
U.S.C.A. § 853 (West 2009).   
156
 18 U.S.C.A. § 1836 (a) (West 2009).   
157
 H. Rep. No. 788, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1996).  See 21 U.S.C.A. § 1838 (West 2009) (―This chapter shall not 
be construed to preempt or displace any other remedies, whether civil or criminal, provided by United States Federal, 
State, commonwealth, possession, or territory law for the misappropriation of a trade secret or to affect the otherwise 
lawful disclosure of information by any Government employees under section 552 of title 5 (commonly know as the 
Freedom of Information Act).‖).   
158
 18 U.S.C.A. § 1837 (West 2009).   
159
 Pooley, EEA, supra note 33, at 186, 204 (1997). 
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3. Law of Postemployment Contracts  
In addition to trade secret law, contractual measures to protect trade secrets are very 
common as a supplement for trade secret law in the United States.  They include various forms 
of agreements, such as confidentiality agreements, nondisclosure agreements, and 
noncompetition agreements by employees.  Among them, this section focuses on 
postemployment covenants not to compete because enforceable covenants not to compete have a 
high risk of directly restricting employees‘ rights, labor mobility, and free competition.160 
It is very common for employers to disclose trade secrets or other sensitive information to 
employees for the efficient operation of a business.
161
  As a rule, under agency law, an employee 
owes a duty of loyalty to the employer for the duration of an employment relationship, including 
a duty not to compete with the employer and a duty not to disclose confidential information to 
others.
162
  A breach of the duty of loyalty subjects the employee to liability for unauthorized use 
or disclosure of a trade secret, regardless of the existence of a trade secret as defined under trade 
secret law.
163
  However, many trade secret cases arise when employees depart to establish their 
own businesses in competition with former employers or when they change positions to work for 
other competitors.   
                                                 
160
 In addition, in the area of the law of postemployment covenants not to compete, there is a great discrepancy in 
laws of covenants not to compete among states, and the effect of different laws of covenants not to compete on 
regional innovation has been controversial.   
161
 See ASIS FOUNDATION, TRENDS IN PROPRIETARY INFORMATION LOSS SURVEY REPORT 26 (Sep. 2002) (―The 
‗insider‘ threat problem is perceived to be the most serious.‖); ASIS FOUNDATION, TRENDS IN PROPRIETARY 
INFORMATION LOSS SURVEY REPORT 29 (Aug. 2007) (―The deliberate actions of current and former employees 
continue to be a primary threat to proprietary information.‖).  
162
 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.04 (―Throughout the duration of an agency relationship, an agent has a 
duty to refrain from competing with the principal and from taking action on behalf of or otherwise assisting the 
principal‘s competitors.‖) & § 8.05 (―An agent has a duty (1) not to use property of the principal for the agent‘s own 
purposes or those of a third party; and (2) not to use or communicate confidential information of the principal for the 
agent‘s own purposes or those of a third party.‖) (2006).  See Benjamin Aaron & Matthew Finkin, The Law of 
Employee Loyalty in the United States, 20 COMP. LAB. L. & POL‘Y J. 321 (1999).  
163
 See Nucor Corp. v. Tennessee Forging Steel Serv., Inc., 476 F.2d 386 (8th Cir. 1973).  
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In cases involving the unauthorized use or disclosure of trade secrets by employees after 
the termination of an employment relationship, as we have seen earlier, trade secret law plays a 
central role in prohibiting the former employee from using or disclosing trade secrets acquired in 
the course of the employment in breach of confidence when the employer proves the existence 
and ownership of the trade secrets.
164
  In addition to protection under trade secret law, employers 
can use nondisclosure agreements as a contractual tool to prohibit former employees from using 
or disclosing trade secrets after their employment is terminated.  This form of contract is one of 
the core measures protecting trade secrets, along with trade secret law for employers, and is 
―perhaps the least controversial.‖165  Furthermore, such contracts may function as a way of 
showing reasonable efforts by trade secret owners to maintain secrecy, as required under trade 
secret law.
166
  But trade secret law and nondisclosure agreements focus mainly on legally 
protectable trade secrets,
167
 and difficulties exist in enforcing them ―because proving disclosure 
against a defendant is difficult and usually entails the public revelation of the confidential 
information.‖168  These difficulties in gaining legal remedies place a burden on the employer, 
                                                 
164
 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 42 (1995).  For an overview of allocation of ownership 
between employers and employees, see id. § 42 cmt. e; Robert P. Merges, The Law and Economics of Employee 
Inventions, 13 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 1, 4-10 (1999). 
165
 POOLEY, supra note 56, § 8.02.  For example, Jager notes that ―[s]urvey [evidence] show[s] that a confidentiality 
agreement or clause is included in virtually all employment agreements used by major corporations,‖ citing two 
surveys: Employee Patent & Secrecy Agreements, Studies in Personnel Policy No. 199 (Nat‘l Ind. Conference Bd. 
1965) (86 companies surveyed); and Special Project, Commonality in Employers‟ Contract and Invention 
Assignment Policies (Hartford Graduate Center 1984) (46 companies surveyed).  JAGER, supra note 3, § 13:3 (West 
2009).  
166
 See Liebert Corp. v. Mazur, 827 N.E.2d 909, 923 (Ill. App. 2005) (―In all of the cases relied on by plaintiffs 
where the courts found the trade secrets met the ‗reasonable steps‘ test, there was evidence the plaintiffs advised 
their employees, verbally or in writing, about the information‘s confidentiality.‖) (emphasis added).   
167
 See POOLEY, supra note 56, § 8.02. 
168
 Eric A. Posner, Alexander Triantis, & George G. Trinantis, Investing in Human Capital: The Efficiency of 
Covenants Not to Compete 24-25 (U. Chi. Law & Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 137, 2004) (―[State trade secret 
law and contracts prohibiting disclosure of confidential information] are difficult to enforce because proving 
disclosure against a defendant is difficult and usually entails the public revelation of the confidential information.  A 
CNC [covenant not co cmpete] may police trade secret theft more effectively.  The change in a worker‘s 
employment is easy to verify and enforcement does not require the disclosure of confidential information.  Moreover, 
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who wants to protect as much valuable information from being disclosed to others as effectively 
as possible, including trade secrets, customer information, and goodwill.  In some cases, even 
absent proof of trade secret misappropriation or enforceable postemployment covenants not to 
compete, courts have enjoined former employees from working for competitors when it would be 
difficult for the employee not to rely on or use the trade secrets he or she previously obtained 
from the former employer.  The doctrine applied in such cases is referred to as the ―doctrine of 
inevitable disclosure.‖169  However, the doctrine has been rejected by many other courts and has 
been criticized by legal scholars with a concern that the application of the doctrine ―creates an 
after-the-fact covenant not to compete restricting employee mobility.‖170   
Thus, individually negotiated agreements between employers and employees preventing 
competition by former employees may supplement trade secret law by protecting an extended 
scope of information, including trade secrets and information not technically protectable as trade 
secrets.
171
  A covenant not to compete can be referred to as an ―agreement, ancillary to an 
employment contract, not to compete with the employer after termination of employment‖ and 
                                                                                                                                                             
by preventing the worker from moving to another employer, the firm can invoke internal sanctions to discipline 
disclosure or sale of sensitive information.  The contribution of CNCs in this context is valuable . . . .‖).   
169
 See PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262 (7th Cir. 1995) (enjoining the defendant‘s employment for six 
months based on the inevitable disclosure to a new employer); Novell Inc. v. Timpanogos Research Group, 46 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1197 (D. Utah 1998) (injunction based on the doctrine of inevitable disclosure).  See generally Brandy L. 
Treadway, An Overview of Individual States‟ Application of Inevitable Disclosure: Concrete Doctrine or Equitable 
Tool? 55 SMU L. REV. 621 (2002); Rebecca J. Berkun, The Dangers of the Doctrine of Inevitable Disclosure in 
Pennsylvania, U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 157, 161-66 (2003); Elizabeth A. Rowe, When Trade Secrets Become 
Shackles: Fairness and the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine, 7 TUL. J. TECH. INTELL. PROP. 167, 171-80 (2005).  
170
 See, e.g., Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co., 101 Cal. App. 4th 1443, 1447 (Cal. App. 4. Dist. 2002).  See also Ronald J. 
Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants 
Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 622-26 (1999) [hereinafter Gilson, Silicon Valley] (contending that the the 
doctrine of inevitable disclosure in California should be adopted cautiously); Adam Gill, The Inevitable Disclosure 
Doctrine: Inequitable Results Are Threatened but Not Inevitable, 24 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 403, 417-22 
(2003). 
171
 Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 653 (1960) (―[P]ostemployemnt 
restraints may in some cases legitimately extend protection somewhat beyond the special circumstances [the 
traditional customer list and trade secret doctrines] encompass, particularly in the area of customer relations.‖).  See 
also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 42 cmt. g (1995).  
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―may be found in a covenant in the actual contract of employment or in a separate contract for 
which the supporting consideration is at least in part the continuing employment.‖172  Through 
enforceable covenants not to compete, employers attempt to prohibit a former employee with 
workplace knowledge from working for other competitors in a new position or from beginning 
his or her own business for a certain period after the employment relationship has ended.
173
  In 
fact, in employment practice in the United States, postemployment covenants not to compete that 
impose additional restrictions on competition by former employees have been common and seem 
to have been an effective way to protect valuable information employers have derived from their 
investment in human capital.
174
   
However, the law of covenants not to compete has been debated because of conflicting 
interests between employers and employees.
175
  On the one hand, enforceable covenants not to 
compete may protect the proprietary information of employers.  On the other hand, the 
enforcement of covenants not to compete may result in enjoining former employees from 
pursuing their livelihood, and may have an anticompetitive effect.
176
  Thus, in principle, state 
                                                 
172
 Blake, supra note 171, at 625 &  n.1.  
173
 Id. at 626.   
174
 See Mark J. Garmaise, Ties That Truly Bind: Noncompetition Agreements, Executive Compensation, and Firm 
Investment, J. LAW ECON. ORGAN. 1, 3 (Nov. 2009) (noting that ―recent empirical research shows that ―70.2% of 
firms use [covenants not to compete] with their top executives.‖), available  at 
http://jleo.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/full/ewp033v1?maxtoshow=&HITS=10&hits=10&RESULTFORMAT=&f
ulltext=ties+that+truly+bind&searchid=1&FIRSTINDEX=0&resourcetype=HWCIT; Norman D. Bishara, 
Covenants Not to Compete in a Knowledge Economy: Balancing Innovation from Employee Mobility Against Legal 
Protection for Human Capital Investment, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 287, 289 (2006) (―While there is little 
empirical research on the use of noncompetes, there are indications that such agreements are increasingly common 
and as a result this sort of post-employment restriction will influence the decisions of employers and employees.‖) 
(footnote omitted); Peter J. Whitmore, A Statistical Analysis of Noncompetition Clauses in Employment Contracts, 
15 J. CORP. L. 483, 489 (―noncompetition covenants continue to be used with ever-increasing frequency.‖).  
175
 See POOLEY, supra note 56, § 8.04 (―The field is alive with controversy.‖); Blake, supra note 171. 
176
 See, e.g., Kaumagraph Co. v. Stampagraph Co., 197 A.D. 66, 76, 188 N.Y.S. 678, 685 (N.Y.A.D. 1 Dept. 1921) 
(―Contracts by employees, unreasonably limiting their right to pursue their trade or occupation in the future, are held 
to violate public policy, because the employees‘ means for procuring a livelihood for themselves and family are 
thereby diminished.  They are deprived of the power of usefulness, and the public is deprived of the benefit of the 
exercise by them of their knowledge and skill.‖).  
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courts in the United States governing the law of covenants not to compete have struggled to 
balance conflicting interests between an employer‘s legitimate interests in protecting their 
intellectual assets based on freedom of contract and an employee‘s right to free movement of 
labor or to compete after termination of the employment relationship.
177
  Courts have also 
considered the possible anticompetitive effect of the law regarding covenants not to compete 
from the perspective of public policy.
178
   
The current law regarding covenants not to compete (which have been governed under 
state law) varies from state to state and focuses on the facts in each case.
179
  On the one hand, 
some states have expressed hostility toward such agreements.  For example, Section 16600 of 
California‘s Business and Professions Code renders most covenants not to compete contained in 
employment agreements void.
180
  Indeed, in a recent California Supreme Court case, the Court 
reaffirmed the policy consideration underlying section 16600.
181
  On the other hand, most states 
in the United States that adopt statutory provisions or that follow the common law in this area 
currently enforce covenants not to compete on the basis of a relatively strict ―reasonable 
                                                 
177
 See Maureen B. Callahan, Comment, Post-employment Restraint Agreements: A Reassessment, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 
703 (1985). 
178
 For a critical assessment of the modern judicial approach on covenants not to compete, see id. 712-27. 
179
 See generally Brian M. Malsberger et al., Covenants Not to Compete: A State-by-State Survey (6th ed., 2008). 
180
 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 2009) (―Except as provided in this chapter, every contract by which 
anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is to that extent void.‖).  
For exceptional situations, see CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 16601-16602.5 (West 2009) (sale of goodwill of 
business, partnership, and a limited liability company).  Because of the hostility to covenants not to compete, the 
effect of the law in California has been examined and compared to other states‘ laws by many commentators and 
scholars in various fields.  See, e.g., ALAN HYDE, WORKING IN SILICON VALLEY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 
OF A HIGH-VELOCITY LABOR MARKET (2003); Gilson, Silicon Valley, supra note 170, at 599 (examining different 
effects of the law in Masachusetts and California); ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND 
COMPETITION IN SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 128 (1994) (examining different effects of the corporate culture in 
Masachusetts and California on regional innovation).  
181
 Edwards v. Arthur Andersen, 44 Cal.4th 937, 949-50, 189 P.3d 285, 291-92 (2008) (noting that ―section 16600 
represents a strong public policy of the state which should not be diluted by judicial fiat,‖ quoting Scott v. Snelling 
and Snelling, Inc., 732 F. Supp. 1034, 1042 (N.D. Cal. 1990)).  
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standard.‖182  The rule of reason under the law of covenants not to compete is rooted in and has 
developed under a part of common law, namely, ―restraints of trades,‖ under English common 
law.
183
  The modern law of covenants also seems to have developed along with the doctrinal 
development of trade secret protection in the United States.
184
  The rapid expansion of trade 
secret doctrine in the late 1800s and early 1900s reflected the reality that courts, which were 
compelled to reconcile conflicting interests between employers and employees in the era, 
changed their views regarding the ownership of workplace knowledge in the course of the 
change in industrial structure.
185  
This development led courts to recognize more legitimate uses 
of covenants not to compete in restricting employees‘ use of workplace knowledge.186   
In states that have adopted the reasonableness standard, covenants not to compete 
between an employer and an employee, in writing or verbally, can be enforceable if they are 
                                                 
182
 Section 188 of Restatement (Second) of Contracts states the rule of reason as follows:  
(1) A promise to refrain from competition that imposes a restraint that is ancillary to an otherwise 
valid transaction or relationship is unreasonably in restraint of trade if 
(a) the restraint is greater than is needed to protect the promisee‘s legitimate interest, or 
(b) the promisee‘s need is outweighed by the hardship to the promisor and the likely 
injury to the public. 
(2) Promises imposing restraints that are ancillary to a valid transaction or relationship include the 
following: 
. . . 
(b) a promise by an employee or other agent not to compete with his employer or other 
principal. . . . 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 & cmt. g (1981).   
183
 For a general overview of the development of common law of a restraint of trade, see Michel J. Trebilcock, The 
Common Law of Restraint of Trade: A Legal and Economic Analysis 1-53 (1986).  See also Blake, supra note 171, at 
629-46 (explaining the development of the rule of reason, quoting several cases including Michel v. Reynolds, 
(1711) 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Q.B.) based on changing economic circumstances concerning the guilds and labor 
shortage in England).   
184
 See Fisk, supra note 1, at 534-35 (―The invention of the trade secret doctrine in the mid-nineteenth century 
enabled employers to enjoin revelation of secret information by current or former employees.  At the same time, 
courts expanded the permissible uses of post-employment covenants not to compete so as to prevent dissemination 
of knowledge.‖). 
185
 See id. at 494. 
186
 Fisk noted that ―[t]he concept of an implied contract [developed under trade secret law between 1890 and 1920] 
facilitated and legitimized the expansion of the trade secret doctrine, from a relatively limited obligation to guard a 
particular and highly confidential piece of information or to convey a secret recipe along with the sale of a business, 
into a general employee duty to protect all confidential employment information.‖  Id. at 498.   
 50 
 
supported by sufficient consideration and are reasonable.
187
  If a covenant was entered into at the 
outset of the employment relationship, the employment becomes the consideration for the 
covenant.
188
  However, with respect to the sufficiency of continued employment as a 
consideration for postemployment covenants not to compete that were entered into after 
employment commenced, the courts are in disagreement.
189
  In some cases, continuing 
employment is not a sufficient consideration to support a covenant not to compete that is entered 
into after the inception of employment.
190
  In deciding on the reasonableness of a covenant 
between an employer and an employee, a court may consider the two parties‘ respective interests 
as well as public policy.
191
  The duration, geographical area, and type of employment in 
covenants not to compete are also generally considered in deciding on the reasonableness of a 
given covenant.
192
  Because of inconsistency in courts‘ decisions in terms of these factors, in 
practice, the current law on covenants not to compete does not seem to provide adequate 
                                                 
187
 See Freiburger v. J-U-B Eng‘r., Inc., 141 Idaho 415, 419, 111 P.3d 100, 104 (2005) (―In order to be enforceable, 
a covenant not to compete must be ancillary to a lawful contract supported by adequate consideration, and consistent 
with public policy.‖); Comprehensive Tech. Int‘l v. Software Artisans, 3 F.3d 730, 738 (4th Cir. 1993).  
188
 See, e.g., Modern Laundry & Dry Cleaning Co. v. Farrer, 370 Pa. Super. 288, 536 A.2d 409 (1988); Reddy v. 
Cmty. Health Found. of Man, 171 W. Va. 368, 298 S.E.2d 906 (1982). 
189
 See McGough v. Nalco Co., 420 F. Supp.2d 556, 571-73 (2006) (examining courts‘ conflicting approaches 
regarding consideration for covenants not to compete).  
190
 See, e.g., Access Organics, Inc. v. Hernandez, 175 P.3d 899 (2008); see also JAGER, supra note 3, § 13:5. 
191
 See, e.g., Comprehensive Tech. Int‘l v. Software Artisans, 3 F.3d 730, 738 (4th Cir. 1993). 
Virginia has established a three-part test for assessing the reasonableness of restrictive 
employment covenants.  Under the test, the court must ask the following questions: 
(1) Is the restraint, from the standpoint of the employer, reasonable in the sense that it is no greater 
than is necessary to protect the employer in some legitimate business interest? 
(2) From the standpoint of the employee, is the restraint reasonable in the sense that it is not 
unduly harsh and oppressive in curtailing his legitimate efforts to earn a livelihood? 
(3) Is the restraint reasonable from the standpoint of a sound public policy?  
192
 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.774a (―An employer may obtain from an employee an agreement or covenant 
which protects an employer‘s reasonable competitive business interests and expressly prohibits an employee from 
engaging in employment or a line of business after termination of employment if the agreement or covenant is 
reasonable as to its duration, geographical area, and the type of employment or line of business.‖).  See also Harlan 
Blake, supra note 171, at 674-81. 
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certainty and predictability regarding the enforceability of a given covenant to both parties and a 
relevant third party, such as a competitor of the employer.
193
  In fact, the discrepancies among 
covenants not to compete from state to state and courts‘ factually based adjudication have been 
criticized for their ―lack of uniformity‖ and ―unpredictability.‖194   
As we have seen, even states adopting the rule of reason through statutes or common law 
appear to construe the reasonableness of covenants not to compete differently, and it is extremely 
difficult to capture this complex decisional framework.  Thus, alternatively, the following section 
looks briefly at the law of covenants not to compete in Massachusetts, which is said to be 
―generally representative of the approach taken toward postemployment covenants not to 
compete by the great majority of states‖ in the United States.195  Massachusetts does not have 
statutory provisions directly governing postemployment covenants not to compete, but rather has 
followed the rule of reason developed in common law precedents to evaluate the enforceability 
of covenants not to compete.
196
  Massachusetts courts closely examine the following 
requirements for reasonableness: if the covenant ―(1) is necessary to protect the legitimate 
business interests of the employer, (2) is supported by consideration, (3) is reasonably limited in 
                                                 
193
 See Mark A. Glick, Darren Bush & Jonathan Q. Hafen, The Law and Economics of Post-employment Covenants: 
A Unified Framework, 11 GEO. MASON L. REV. 357, 371 (2002) (―The courts‘ inconsistent analysis under this fact-
specific nature of this inquiry has led to frustration for drafters and observers alike.‖).   
194
 See, e.g., Id. at 358 n.2; Bishara, supra note 174, at 297.  Bishara also notes that in part because of the problem, 
the American Law Institute seems to refine the law of covenants not to compete into the Restatement (Third) of 
Employment, which is an ongoing project.  For the current status of the project, see the ALI webpage of the 
Restatement of Employment, http://www.ali.org (last visited Oct. 24, 2010).  But see Kenneth Glenn Dau-Schmidt, 
A Conference on the American Law Institute‟s Proposed Restatement of Employment Law, 13 EMP. RIGHTS & EMP. 
POL‘Y J. 1(2009) (criticizing the project of the Restatement of Employment Law). 
195
 Gilson, Silicon Valley, supra note 170, at 603.  It should be noted that a bill attempting to change the policy of 
noncompetition agreement was introduced in Massachusetts in 2009.  See H. 1794, 186th Gen. Court of the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts (Mass. 2009); Fact Sheet on Massachusetts House Bill 1794: An Act to Prohibit 
Restrictive Employment Covenants, http://prohibitrestrictiveemploymentcovenants.net (last visited Oct 24, 2010).  
196
 See Packaging Indus. Group v. Cheney, 380 Mass. 609 (1980); Christine M. O‘Malley, Note, Covenants Not to 
Compete in the Massachusetts Hi-Tech Industry: Assessing the Need for a Legislative Solution, 79 B.U. L. REV. 
1215, 1218-27 (1999). 
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all circumstances, including time and space, and (4) is otherwise consonant with public 
policy.‖197  The legitimate business interests of employers include trade secrets, confidential 
information, and goodwill.
198
  Thus, if employers fail to demonstrate, in a given case, that these 
legitimately protectable employer interests are involved, the covenants become unenforceable.
199
  
In the same context, employers may not prevent employees‘ ―general skill or knowledge 
acquired during the course of the employment‖ from being used by these covenants.200   
As in other contracts, covenants not to compete must be supported by consideration for 
their enforcement.
201
  Regarding the issue of whether continued employment after the 
commencement of employment is sufficient consideration for enforceable covenants against 
postemployment competition, Massachusetts courts have held that continued employment alone 
provides sufficient consideration for such covenants.
202
  In determining whether restriction 
                                                 
197
 IKON Office Solutions, Inc. v. Belanger, 59 F.Supp.2d. 125, 128 (D. Mass. 1999).   
198
 Kroeger v. Stop & Shop Co., Inc., 13 Mass. App. Ct. 310, 316, 432 N.E.2d 566, 570 (1982) (―Those interests of 
an employer which are entitled to protection are trade secrets, confidential data and goodwill.‖) (citation omitted).  
See, e.g, Analogic Corp. v. Data Translation, Inc., 371 Mass. 643, 358 N.E.2d 804 (Mass. 1976) (trade secrets); 
Novelty Bias Binding Co. v. Shevrin, 342 Mass. 714, 175 N.E.2d 374 (1961) (confidential information); New 
England Canteen Serv., Inc. v. Ashley, 372 Mass. 671, 363 N.E.2d 526 (Mass. 1977) (goodwill); Sherman v. 
Pfefferkorn, 241 Mass. 468, 135 N.E. 568 (1922) (goodwill).  Goodwill is referred to ―as the employer‘s positive 
reputation in the eyes of its customers or potential customers.  Goodwill is generated by repeat business with 
existing customers or by referrals to potential customers.‖  Bowne, Inc. v. Levine, 7 Mass. L. Rep. 685, at 7 (Mass. 
Super. Ct. 1997).  As to customer goodwill during employment, most courts in Massachusettes appear to have held 
that employers have goodwill.  See, e.g., Am. Stop Loss Ins. Brokerage Servs. v. Prince, 12 Mass. L. Rep. 650, at 7 
(Mass. Super. Ct. 2001).   
199
 See, e.g., Lajoie Investigations v. Griffin, 5 Mass. L. Rep. 246 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1996) (denying a preliminary 
injunction against the defendant investigator from engaging in works as a private investigator because the plaintiff 
failed to demonstrate legistimate business interests, including trade secrets, confidential business information, or 
goodwill involved).   
200
 Abramson v. Blackman, 340 Mass. 714, 716, 166 N.E.2d 729, 730 (Mass.1960) (―[An employer] may not 
prevent the employee from using the skill and general knowledge acquired or improved through his employment.‖) 
(citation omitted); Junker v. Plummer, 320 Mass. 76, 79, 67 N.E.2d 667, 669 (Mass.1946).  
201
 See IKON Office Solutions, Inc. v. Belanger, 59 F. Supp.2d. 125, 128 (D. Mass. 1999).   
202
 See, e.g., Economy Grocery Stores Corp. v. McMenanty, 290 Mass. 549, 552 (1935); Sherman v. Pfefferkorn, 
241 Mass. 468, 473 (1922).  But in recent years, with respect to this issue, a federal magistrate judge showed a 
contrary opinon in IKON Office Solutions, Inc. v. Belanger, 59 F. Supp.2d 125 (D. Mass. 1999), concluding ―the 
courts now appear to refuse to enforce non-competition and non-solicitation agreements when the only purported 
consideration is the employee‘s continued employment.‖  Id. at 131.  Nonetheless, it appears that continued 
employment is sufficient consideration for the enforcement of such covenants in Massachusetts.  See EMC Corp. v. 
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against postemployment competition is reasonable in an agreement, the courts in Massachusetts 
have considered ―the nature of the plaintiff‘s business and the character of the employment, the 
situation of the parties, the necessity of the restriction for the employer‘s protection and the 
employee‘s right to work and earn a living.‖203  Although one to three years appears to be the 
reasonable restriction period that most courts have approved,
204
 some courts seem to have 
considered how the business interests will lose value, and they have held that even the one-year 
duration is too long when considering the nature of Internet business, in which business practices 
change rapidly.
205
  With regard to geographic limitation, courts have enforced such a covenant 
―as long as it restricts a former employee from doing business in an area in which the company 
itself conducts business.‖206  Finally, public interest can be raised as a defense, but ―[t]he precise 
contours of this ‗public interest‘ defense are … somewhat ill-defined.‖207 
 
 
4. Summary 
The emergence of trade secret law in the United States reflects the reality that corporate 
control of valuable information has grown in importance and labor mobility has increased in the 
nineteenth century.  Over the years, trade secret protection in the United States has expanded, for 
                                                                                                                                                             
Donatelli, 25 Mass. L. Rep. 399 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2009) (―[Cases such as IKON] do not abolish the doctrine that 
continued employment alone may suffice to support such covenants.‖).  
203
 Richmond Bros., Inc. v. Westinghouse Broad. Co. Inc., 357 Mass. 106, 110 (1970).  
204
 See IKON Office Solutions, Inc. v. Belanger, 59 F. Supp. 2d 125, 129 (D. Mass. 1999) (reviewing relevant cases 
in Massachusettes).   
205
 See, e.g., EarthWeb, Inc. v. Schlack, 71 F. Supp. 2d 299, 313 (1999) (holding that one year is too long in the 
Internet business). 
206
 Marcam Corp. v. Orchard, 885 F. Supp. 294, 299 (D. Mass. 1995) (covering the United States).   
207
 Laurence H. Reece, III., Employee Noncompetition Agreements: Recent Develpments and Trends, 88 MASS. L. R., 
http://www.massbar.org/for-attorneys/publications/massachusetts-law-review/2003/v88-n1/employee-
noncompetition-agreements-recent-developments (last visited Oct. 24, 2010).  
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example, by broadening the meaning of the term ―trade secret,‖ expanding the scope of the 
misappropriation of trade secrets, and strengthening federal criminal sanctions against trade 
secret misappropriations and economic espionage.  Furthermore, in some industrial fields, 
specifically in the field of information technology, trade secret protection has been strengthened 
through restrictions on reverse engineering.  The recent expansion of trade secret law can also be 
seen as a response by courts and the U.S. government to recent socioeconomic changes in which 
contemporary firms‘ reliance on trade secret protection has increased rapidly in the information 
age and the number of industrial espionage cases and the losses associated with these cases have 
grown.  However, this recent expansion of trade secret law, especially the enactment of the EEA, 
has been criticized based on concerns over its negative impact on labor mobility, free 
competition, and innovation.   
Despite the continuing expansion of trade secret law, courts in the United States have 
made efforts to reconcile the conflicting interests of relevant parties and the public, for example, 
by assessing the eligibility of certain information for trade secret protection or limiting the 
duration of injunctive relief.  Nevertheless, in part because of the slippery definition of a trade 
secret and in part because of a primarily state law-based approach, trade secret law in the United 
States has lacked uniformity among the fifty states.  Likewise, state courts governing the law of 
restrictive covenants not to compete in employment have struggled to balance conflicts between 
employers‘ legitimate interests and employees‘ right to free movement of labor from the 
perspective of public policy, but the law varies from state to state. 
On the other hand, trade secret protection has become increasingly important in the trade 
policy of the U.S. government in the global economy.  Moreover, the U.S. trade policy affected 
the formation of the provisions of TRIPs, and as shown in Chapters III and IV, the trade policy of 
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the U.S. government strongly affected the initial adoption of trade secret law in Japan and Korea.  
In addition, recent developments in trade secret law in the United States have strongly affected 
recent significant changes in trade secret law in Japan and Korea, mainly through legislation 
supported by government policy decisions.  The following two chapters explore how Japan and 
Korea adopted the law, and how the governments in these countries have adapted the law to 
changing domestic and international situations to achieve larger goals, such as economic 
development.   
 
 
 56 
 
CHAPTER III. TRADE SECRET LAW IN JAPAN 
Before the adoption of trade secret law, Japanese law, including property law, contract 
law, and tort law, did not provide sufficient legal remedies for trade secret misappropriations, in 
part because of the inherent limitations of the role of courts in developing legal doctrines in the 
civil law tradition.  Nevertheless, during the period of rapid economic growth, the legal 
protection of trade secrets appears to have been considered an unnecessary legal device for the 
Japanese economy, in which firm-level technology learning based on advanced foreign 
technology was needed and the preestablished practice of lifetime employment played a 
significant role in protecting valuable information.   
As the international regime focusing on trade-related aspects of intellectual property 
rights emerged, however, the deficiencies in trade secret protection in Japan began to be 
criticized by foreign governments.  This trade pressure led the Japanese government to adopt a 
statutory law of trade secrets in the early 1990s primarily modeled on the U.S. law.  The adopted 
substantive law of trade secrets was extrinsically motivated to avoid foreign retaliation; thus, the 
law was not considered sufficient for trade secret protection in several respects, and it reflects the 
position of the Japanese government in dealing with information valuable to the Japanese 
economy at that time.  However, the Japanese government changed its position regarding the 
legal protection of trade secrets during the economic downturns beginning in the 1990s.  In fact, 
this exogenous economic factor led the Japanese government to strengthen trade secret 
protection beginning in the early 2000s.  The recent legal reforms also reflect the importance of 
trade secret law in the new economic situation in Japan.  On the other hand, the adoption and 
expansion of trade secret protection created another tension in the relationship between legal 
remedies for trade secret misappropriations and the ability of former employees to use their 
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knowledge and skills in Japanese society.   
This chapter begins with the history and recent developments of trade secret law in Japan, 
exploring how the importance of the legal protection of trade secrets has changed in the Japanese 
economy.  The second section examines how trade secret law in Japan has operated in practice.  
The third section looks at how the statutory law of trade secrets affected the approach of 
Japanese courts toward the theory of postemployment contracts in protecting valuable 
information.    
 
 
1. History and Development 
1.1. Background 
Currently, trade secret law is codified as a part of the Unfair Competition Prevention Act 
in Japan (hereafter, ―Japanese UCPA‖).1  The Act was originally adopted in 1934 to fulfill 
member states‘ obligations under The Hague amendment to the Paris Convention for the 
Protection of Industrial Property,
2
 in which all member states were to take measures against 
unfair competition.
3
  Although the 1934 Japanese UCPA enumerated three types of acts of unfair 
                                                 
1
 Fusei kyōsō bōshihō [Unfair Competition Prevention Act], Law No. 47 of 1993 (as amended by Law No. 55 of 
2006) (Japan) [hereinafter 2006 Japanese UCPA].  
2
 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, March 20, 1883, 25 Stat. 1372, 161 Consol. T.S. 409, 
amended July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 306.  
3
 See NAOKUNI CHINO, EIGYŌ HIMITSU HOGOHŌ [THE LAW OF TRADE SECRETS] 214-15 (2007) (Japan).  Prior to the 
adoption of the 1934 Japanese UCPA, two bills were drafted: the 1911 bill following the 1909 German Act Against 
Unfair Competition (Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb) and the 1925 bill for implementing the Hague 
amendments to the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property.  But these draft bills were not able to 
be enacted in part because of concerns about the lack of Japanese industrial competitiveness in the world economy.  
KEIZAI SANGYŌSHŌ CHITEKI ZAISAN SEISAKUSHITSU [MINISTRY OF ECONOMY, INDUSTRY, COMMERCE], FUSEI 
KYŌSŌ BŌSHIHŌ [UNFAIR COMPETITION PREVENTION ACT] 3-6 (2007) (Japan) [hereinafter METI, UNFAIR 
COMPETITION PREVENTION ACT] (Japan).  However, Japan needed to enact a law against unfair competition to 
participate in the London Revision Conference of 1934.  Accordingly, Japan enacted the law just before the London 
Conference was held.  Id. 3-6; Christopher Heath, Unfair Competition Law, in HISTORY OF LAW IN JAPAN SINCE 
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competition that allowed plaintiffs to receive civil remedies, including damages and injunctive 
relief, and provided for criminal sanctions for the use of official symbols and flags of foreign 
countries, the Act required ―any plaintiff and prosecutor to prove that the offence/infringement 
was deliberate.‖4  As a result, the Act in fact was not a sufficient legal measure against unfair 
competition, but rather has been said to be the enactment of a necessary law to avoid foreign 
trade sanctions.
5
  Another important feature of the 1934 Japanese UCPA is that the Act did not 
include any provisions regarding trade secret protection, in part because of ―the relatively 
underdeveloped nature of industry in Japan at that time.‖6  In addition, unlike the German law on 
unfair competition of 1909, which allegedly had a strong influence on the enactment of the 1934 
Japanese UCPA as a model law, the Japanese UCPA of 1934 did not include a general provision 
governing unfair competition that would have covered trade secret misappropriations under the 
                                                                                                                                                             
1868 487-88 (Wilhelm Röhl ed., 2005) [hereinafter Heath, Unfair Competition Law].   
4
 Heath, Unfair Competition Law, supra note 3, at 488.  See Fusei Kyōsō bōshiō [Unfair Competition Prevention 
Act], Law No. 14 of 1934 (Japan). 
5
 See Junich Eguchi, History of Amendments to the Unfair Competition Prevention Act of Japan—From a 
Developing Country to a Developed Country, 41 OSAKA U. L. REV. 1, 1-6 (1994), available at http://ir.library.osaka-
u.ac.jp/metadb/up/LIBOULRK01/oulr041-001.pdf (last visited Oct. 01, 2010); Heath, Unfair Competition Law, 
supra note 3, at 488 (―the Act was not meant to be applied, but was rather meant to suggest that the minimal 
requirements of the Paris Convention had been complied with.‖) (footnote omitted).  
6
 Holly Emrick Svetz, Note, Japan‟s New Trade Secret Law: We Asked For It—Now What Have We Got?, 26 GEO. 
WASH. J. INT‘L L. & ECON. 413, 420 (1992).  Soga also points out the Japanese economic situation in the 1930s, in 
which the adoption of trade secret law was not supported:  
[I]t is not difficult to understand the Japanese position in the 1930s.  The provision of injunctive 
remedies might have harmed the developing Japanese national economy.  For example, such 
injunctive remedies prevent those who acquire a trade secret by unlawful means from developing 
technology and improving products on the basis of the unlawfully acquired trade secret.  Due to 
the nature of injunctive remedies, moreover, all investment toward the development of technology 
by someone who unlawfully acquires a trade secret would be fruitless.  On the other hand, 
monetary damages might result in a positive outcome.  The holder of trade secrets receives money 
in exchange for his loss, which can be used for his next investment.  The misuser of the trade 
secret does not lose his investment and can continue to develop the technology.  As a consequence, 
the provision of only monetary damages worked better for the Japanese national economy at that 
time than the provision of both injunctive relief and monetary damages.  
KAZUMASA SOGA, THE LEGAL PROTECTION OF TRADE SECRETS IN JAPAN: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF ENGLISH AND 
GERMAN 26 (2003) (footnote omitted).  
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Act.
7
   
Thus, companies seeking to protect valuable information, which was usually referred to 
as ―know-how‖ rather than trade secrets, had access to general laws, including the nation‘s laws 
under the Civil Code and Penal Code.
8
  However, for civil remedies, they had to rely on laws of 
contracts or torts in the Japanese Civil Code because the Civil Code did not consider intangible 
items as property.
9
  In fact, contract law played a role to some extent in protecting employers‘ 
interests in preventing the loss of valuable information through the use or disclosure by a 
contracting party, such as former employees or licensees.  Foseco Japan Ltd.
 10
 may be a leading 
case that showed the role of contract law in protecting employees‘ interests in the absence of 
trade secret law in Japan.  The case involved two former employees who had worked in the 
employer‘s R & D division, which dealt with the firm‘s technical secrets, and had signed 
nondisclosure agreements and noncompetition agreements that were to last for two years after 
the termination of employment.  The employees departed the company and began working for a 
competing firm.  The Nara District Court held in favor of the plaintiff, concluding that the 
restriction by the contract between the parties was reasonable, and awarded the employer 
provisional injunctive relief.
11
  However, contract law had inherent limitations in protecting 
                                                 
7
 SOGA, supra note 6, at 20-21 (footnote omitted). 
8
 See CHINO, supra note 3, at 134-43 (explaining the use of the terms ―know-how,‖ ―proprietary information,‖ 
―corporate secrets,‖ and ―trade secret‖ in Japan); Jay Dratler, Jr., Trade Secrets in the United States and Japan: A 
Comparison and Prognosis, 14 YALE J. INT‘L L. 68, 99 n.127 (1989) (―in the past they have preferred the term 
―know-how,‖ especially when referring to trade secret licenses of a technological nature.‖).  In this dissertation, I 
primarily use the term ―trade secret‖ as a general term including the meaning of ―know-how.‖  
9
 See Minpō [Civil Code], Law No. 89 of 1896, art. 85 (Japan) (―The term ‗Things‘ as used in this Code shall mean 
tangible things.‖); CHINO, supra note 3, at 38-47 (explaining the concept of ―thing‖ under the Japanese Civil Code).  
For a brief history and property law of the Japanese Civil Code, see HIROSHI ODA, JAPANESE LAW 114-35 & 164-79 
(3d ed. 2009). 
10
 Nara District Court of Japan, Judgment of Oct. 23, 1970, Case No. Shōwa 45 (Yo) 37.  See also Tokyo District 
Court of Japan, Judgment of Mar. 10, 1987, Case No. Shōwa 57 (Wa) 11489. 
11
 Nara District Court of Japan, Judgment of Oct. 23, 1970, Case No. Shōwa 45 (Yo) 37. 
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employers‘ valuable information, including trade secrets, where there was no underlying 
contractual relationship between the parties.  In other words, it did not provide legal relief 
against a third party who had obtained the information from a contracting party, such as an 
employee or a licensee.
12
   
Article 709 (damages in torts) of the Japanese Civil Code, a general provision of the law 
of torts, was another possible way in which the holder of trade secrets could seek legal remedies, 
especially against a third party.
13
  Article 709 is an abstract and broad provision that, to some 
degree, can give judges discretion to resolve a new legal problem based on the article, such as 
legal protection of trade secrets, by stipulating that ―[a] person who has intentionally or 
negligently infringed any right of others shall be liable to compensate any damages resulting in 
consequence.‖14  However, Article 709 also had limitations regarding sufficient support of the 
legal protection of trade secrets or know-how.  First, trade secrets (or know-how) were not fully 
recognized as a ―right‖ protected under tort law in Japan.15  Second, although in many trade 
secret cases, injunctive relief would have been the most powerful and appropriate shield to 
prevent the use or disclosure of trade secrets by misappropriators, Japanese tort law did not 
provide injunctive relief because of the lack of a provision allowing injunctive relief in the 
Japanese Civil Code.
16
   
                                                 
12
 See CHIKASHI NAGANO, TAIJI SUNADA, AND YŌHEI HARIMA, EIGYŌ HIMITSU TO KYŌGYŌ HISHI GIMU NO HŌMU 
[LAW AND PRACTICE OF TRADE SECRETS AND DUTY OF NONCOMPETITION] 3 (2008) (Japan). 
13
 For a brief explanation of the law of tort in Japan, see ODA, supra note 9, at 180-200.  
14
 Minpō [Civil Code], Law No. 89 of 1896, art. 709 (emphasis added), translated in JAPANESE LAW TRANSLATION 
DATABASE SYSTEM BY MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp (last visited Oct. 24, 2010).   
15
 See Dratler, supra note 8, at 104-08 (introducing scholarly arguments on whether Article 709 covers trade secrets 
as one of the rights protected under the provision in Japan); John Lyon & Teruo Doi, Know-How and Trade Secrets 
in the United States and Japan, in PATENT AND KNOW-HOW LICENSING IN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 44 (Teruo 
Doi &Warren L. Shattuck eds., 1977) (arguing that know-how infringement should be recovered according to the 
―liberal theory‖ in which ―if the injured party can prove that he has an inviolable interest and this was injured by an 
illegal act, he can recover.‖).  
16
 See SOGA, supra note 6, at 21-30. 
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With respect to the defects of Japanese tort law, which resulted in weak trade secret 
protection in Japan under the Civil Code, Deutsche Werft A.G. v. Chūetsu-Waukesha Yūgen 
Kaisha
17
 by the High Court of Tokyo, is informative.  The claimant, a German company (Werft 
A.G.), granted an American company (Waukesha Bearings Corp.) a know-how license for the 
manufacture and sale of oil-lubricated stern tube sealing for propeller shafts for ships in the 
United States and Canada, and the agreement required the American company to keep the know-
how secret.  However, the American company entered into a joint venture agreement with a 
Japanese company (Chūetsu Metal Works, Ltd.).  Each company contributed 45% of the capital 
to the respondent company (Chūetsu-Waukesha Yūgen Kaisha), and the respondent company 
manufactured and sold the oil-lubricated stern tube sealing in Japan.  The claimant filed an action 
for provisional injunction against the respondent.  The District Court of Tokyo denied the 
petition, and the claimant appealed to the Tokyo High Court.  In the appeal, the claimant argued 
that the respondent company was ―an alter ego of Waukesha [Bearings Corporation] under the 
veil of a separate corporate personality.  Since Waukesha and the respondent company jointly 
performed a tortious act, it must be considered that the claimant company has the right to enjoin 
such act against the respondent company in the same manner as against Waukesha 
Corporation.‖18  However, the Court dismissed the appeal.  The court first looked at the legal 
status of know-how under Japanese tort law.  Although it recognized the proprietary value of 
know-how, it did not admit it as a ―legal right‖ under tort law.  The court recognized the 
respondent as a third party despite the fact that the capital of the respondent company was 
substantially contributed by a contracting party (45% by Waukesha Bearings Corp.) to the know-
how license.  It further examined whether the claimant was allowed to seek injunctive relief for 
                                                 
17
 Tokyo High Court of Japan, Decision of Sep. 5, 1966, Case No. Shōwa 41 (Ra) 381.  
18
 Id., translated in Lyon & Doi, supra note 15, at 43.  
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misappropriations of know-how against a third party under tort law in Japan.  With respect to this 
issue, the court did not grant injunctive relief because there was no specific provision for this in 
the Japanese Civil Code at that time.
19
   
Criminal sanctions for intentional misappropriation of trade secrets were also possible 
legal remedies for the misappropriation of trade secrets under limited circumstances.  Although 
the adoption of criminal sanctions for leakage of corporate secrets was discussed in the 1960s 
and 1970s, when a bill amending the Japanese Penal Code was drafted, the provisions were not 
adopted because of criticism arguing that the adoption would restrict employees‘ freedom to 
choose an occupation, freedom of the press, or whistle-blowing from the inside.
20
  Therefore, 
larceny,
21
 embezzlement,
22
 and breach of trust
23
 under the Japanese Penal Code were the main 
                                                 
19
 The Tokyo High Court reasoned as follows:  
[n]o matter how know-how is to be considered under the law, know-how has property value and 
yet it has not been recognized as a legal right.  Under the know-how contract (technological 
assistance contract), the other contracting party, the licensee (as to the know-how), owes the duty 
of not disclosing the know-how that it obtains under the contract outside the scope limited by the 
contract, and such a duty is a contractual obligation.  The obligor (not the respondent in this 
petition) which has revealed the know-how to outsiders in violation of the contract is clearly liable 
to pay damages under contract law.  But if a third person who is informed of the said know-how 
by the obligor or obtains the knowledge of it accidentally and engages in manufacturing by using 
the know-how, it is proper to construe that the claimant is not entitled to an injunction, since there 
is not a specific provision under the present statutes.  Although know-how has property value, it 
cannot be considered, at the present moment, that the law recognizes the effect of a right (whether 
it is an incorporeal right or a right of obligation) which is enforceable against a third party.  
Protection of know-how can only be achieved by the effort of the owner to maintain it as an 
industrial secret and prevent disclosure to others.  The respondent Chūetsu-Waukesha Yūgen 
Kaisha has the obligor as one of its members, and the latter is a party to the aforementioned 
contract (contributing 45 percent of the capital), and two of the directors were appointed by the 
obligor company.  But the respondent is a third person in a legal sense with regard to the said 
contract, as admitted by the appellant.  Hence, even if it is admissible that the respondent has 
committed an illegal act by assisting the obligor company in the nonperformance of the latter‘s 
duty, the cause for a temporary injunction in the instant petition is not clearly stated. 
Tokyo High Court of Japan, Decision of Sep. 5, 1966, Case No. Shōwa 41 (Ra) 381, translated in Lyon & Doi, 
supra note 15, at 43-44. 
20
 METI, UNFAIR COMPETITION PREVENTION ACT, supra note 3, at 62. 
21
 Keihō [Penal Code], Law No. 45 of 1907, art. 235 (Japan) (―A person who steals the property of another shall be 
guilty of the crime of theft and be punished with penal servitude for not more than ten years.‖).  See, e.g., Tokyo 
District Court of Japan, Judgment of June 26, 1965, Case No. Shōwa 39 (Kei Wa) 1038 (convicting an employee of 
larceny for copying his company‘s secret information and supplying the information-bearing documents to a private 
investigator that was hired by a competitor); Tokyo District Court of Japan, Judgment of Feb. 14, 1980, Case No. 
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provisions applied to trade secret-related cases.
24
  Nonetheless, criminal law in Japan was not 
considered to provide sufficient relief in cases of trade secret misappropriation, in part because 
the relevant provisions under the Japanese Penal Code, such as larceny or embezzlement, did not 
cover intangible property, the category to which trade secrets typically belong,
25
 and in part 
because ―[these provisions] involve sanctions against individuals, not against the firms for which 
they worked.‖26   
 
 
1.2. Adoption of Trade Secret Law 
Even though the absence of trade secret law did not provide sufficient legal protection of 
Japanese companies‘ interests in protecting trade secrets or know-how, it had not been stated that 
the Japanese economy needed to have stronger trade secret protection because of sociocultural 
factors surrounding the lifetime employment system in Japan, such as ―individual loyalty to the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Shōwa 54 (Kei Wa) 3598 (convicting the defendant of larceny for taking a document including secret information on 
members).   
22
 See, e.g., Kobe District Court of Japan, Judgment of Mar 27, 1981, Case No. Shōwa 42 (Wa) 1573; Shōwa 42 
(Wa) 1622; Shōwa (Wa) 1503; Shōwa (Wa) 1677; Shōwa 42 (Wa) 1589 (convicting a high-level engineer of 
embezzlement for taking confidential documents and selling them to a competitor, and convicting two brokers and 
the competitor‘s employees of purchasing stolen property).  See Keihō [Penal Code], Law No. 45 of 1907, arts. 252 
(embezzlement); 253 (Embezzlement in the Pursuit of Social Activities) (Japan). 
23 
See Keihō [Penal Code], Law No. 45 of 1907, art. 247 (Breach of Trust) (Japan) (―When a person who is in charge 
of the affairs of another, for the purpose of promoting his/her own interest or the interest of a third party, or inflicting 
damage on another, commits an act in breach of legal duty and causes financial loss to another, imprisonment with 
work for not more than 5 years or a fine of not more than 500,000 yen shall be imposed.‖).  
24
 For a detailed discussion of the limitations and theoretical problems with respect to the effective protection of 
trade secrets under criminal law in Japan, see SOGA, supra note 6, at 117-43. 
25 
Kazuko Matsuo, Recent Amendment to the Unfair Competition Prevention Law for the Protection of Trade Secrets, 
9 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 78, 80 (1991).   
26
 Dratler, supra note 8, at 104.  Dratler also contends that ―[a]s in the United States, these criminal sanctions have 
practical disadvantages, such as the requirement of proof of criminal culpability and dependence on the 
prosecutorial machinery of the state.‖  Id.  
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group,‖ disapproval of employee mobility, and ―personal reputation.‖27  However, since the mid-
1980s, the Japanese industrial structure has changed rapidly from a labor-intensive industry to 
industries increasingly using state-of-the-art technology; thus, Japan has become a licensor of 
state-of-the-art technology.
28
  In addition, as some scholars have contended, as the tradition of 
lifetime employment began to disappear, employers began to recognize the importance of 
protecting valuable secret information from departing employees.
29
  Nonetheless, in practice, 
Japanese companies did not seem to be very concerned about trade secret misappropriation or to 
suffer from the defects in the law protecting trade secrets.  Indeed, as late as 1989, despite the 
defects in such laws, only 6% of Japanese companies surveyed reported problems with trade 
secret protection.
30
  In addition, only a small percentage (6%) of these companies imposed ―some 
kind of obligation on the competition for their employees.‖31 
By contrast, the insufficiency of trade secret protection in Japan might have made foreign 
companies fear that once they entered into the Japanese market, they would lose their trade 
secrets because of the lack of legal trade secret protection in Japan.
32
  A report published by the 
U.S. government in the late 1980s is illustrative.  In 1988, the United States International Trade 
Commission report, which was based on survey data from 431 responding U.S. companies, 
                                                 
27
 See, e.g., id. at 110-12 (―much industrial and cultural forces in Japan may have combined to discourage 
misappropriation of trade secrets in the past.‖).   
28
 Id. at 115. 
29
 See, e.g., SOGA, supra note 6, at 2. 
30
 Nakoshi summarizes the results of survey research regarding trade secrets among Japanese companies conducted 
by the Institute of Intellectual Property between October and November in 1989 in Japan.  According to the survey, 
only 6% of the 604 responding Japanese companies experienced ―some troubles regarding trade secrets.‖  In 
addition, the survey reported that ―[c]ompanies imposing some kind of obligation on the competition for their 
employees account for about 6%.‖  Hideo Nakoshi, New Japanese Trade Secret Act, 75 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. 
SOCIETY 631, 633 (1993). 
31
 Id. 
32
 Dratler, supra note 8, at 70 n.7 (summarizing the U.S. government‘s concerns about the technology leakage from 
U.S. companies in Japan). 
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investigated the inadequate foreign protection of intellectual property and its impact on U.S. 
industry and trade.
33
  The report revealed that the importance of trade secrets in intellectual 
property-dependent sales by U.S. companies was increasing, specifically ―in the most rapidly 
advancing technological areas where the product lifecycles are shorter than the time necessary to 
obtain and enforce a patent‖ and in the areas where ―patent protection may not be reliable,‖ such 
as for chemicals.
34
  Regarding deficiencies in the protection of trade secrets, the report identified 
Japan as one of the most often reported countries, along with Mexico, Brazil, Taiwan, Korea, and 
China.
35
  It further indicated that Japan did not have adequate preliminary or final injunctive 
remedies and criminal penalties.
36
   
The weakness of trade secret protection in Japan seems to have affected the trade policies 
                                                 
33
 Foreign Protection of Intellectual Property Rights and the Effect on U.S. Industry and Trade (USITC Pub. 2065, 
Investigation No. 332-245, Feb. 1988), available at 1988 ITC LEXIS 21.  The report was prepared at the request of 
the U.S. Trade Representative pursuant to section 332 (g) of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. § 1332 (g)) following 
the President direction.  The report mainly provided the following information: (1) ―various measures of the 
economic effects of inadequate foreign protection of intellectual property‖; (2) ―the relative importance of different 
types of rights,‖ including ―copyrights, patents, trademarks, trade secrets, semiconductor mask works, and 
proprietary technical data‖; (3) ―the deficiencies, including those involving enforcement and remedies and the losses 
attributable to various countries.‖  ―The data presented were developed through the use of a questionnaire sent to 
736 U.S. companies, including all of the Fortune 500, appropriate members of the American Business Conference, 
and smaller firms concentrated in industries known to depend on royalties or sales of goods protected by intellectual 
property.‖  Id. at 4.   
34
 Id. at 31-36.  The following table shows ―the importance of each type of intellectual property as weighted by the 
affected sales in 1986.‖   
Degree of 
importance 
Copyright Patent Trademark 
Trade 
secret 
Mask work 
Proprietary 
technical data 
Very great 18 42 64 43 2 32 
Great 2 2 19 26 5 19 
Moderate 21 27 13 24 23 21 
Slight 55 6 4 6 34 23 
None 4 1  1 36 5 
Id. at 35. 
35
 Id. at 10 & tbl. G-10 at 221  This report also summarized that ―[n]o protection against third parties was the most 
commonly cited deficiency‖ and that ―[s]low enforcement and inadequate civil and criminal penalties were the most 
often reported remedy/enforcement deficiencies.‖  Id. at 3-10. 
36 The report indicated that the inadequacies of remedy in Japan included ―no preliminary or final injunctive relief,‖ 
―lack of exclusion of imports,‖ ―lack or compulsory process and/or discovery,‖ ―inadequate criminal penalties,‖ 
―unreasonably slow enforcement process,‖ ―enforcement officials discriminate against foreigners,‖ ―court decision 
biased or political.‖  Id. at 50-52.  
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of foreign governments intending to protect their own businesses in the Japanese market, which 
was becoming increasingly attractive and important in the global economy, by asking for the 
level of trade secret protection in Japan to be strengthened.  In particular, as the biggest exporter 
of technology, the United States was suffering from a trade deficit with Japan for U.S. goods, and 
it played a substantial role in requesting Japan to adopt sufficient legal protection of trade secrets 
under which U.S. companies could be protected.
37
  On the one hand, through bilateral 
negotiations, the U.S. government directly demanded that the Japanese government take 
substantial measures to enhance its legal protection of trade secrets.
38
  On the other hand, the U.S. 
government indirectly placed pressure on Japan by enacting the Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness Act of 1988
39
 as a new unilateral retaliation measure against foreign countries 
for unfair trade practices, including intellectual property issues, that could burden or restrict U.S. 
commerce.
40
  In addition, U.S. industry influenced the U.S. government‘s unilateral and 
                                                 
37
 See generally Svetz, supra note 6, at 421-25. 
38
 At a meeting held in Washington between March 7 and 11 in 1988, the United States asked Japan to adopt rules 
protecting trade secrets similar to those in the United States.  In response to the request by the U.S., ―the Japanese 
government made a guarded statement, saying that it wants to leave responsibility for protection of business rights to 
the private sector because such rights are too complicated for the government to handle.‖  U.S. Requests Trade 
Secrets, Business Rights Protection, NIKKEI WKLY. (Tokyo), Mar. 26, 1988, at 14.  The United States requested 
Japan to strengthen trade secret protection in a similar way in two subsequent talks with Japan held in August in 
1988 and March in 1989.  Japan-U.S. Intellectual Property Meet Slated, JIJI PRESS TICKER SERVICE, Feb. 28, 1989.    
39
 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (codified as amended at 
several sections of 19 U.S.C.) (1988).   
40
 Section § 1101 b (10) of the 1988 Trade Acts states that ―[t]he principal negotiating objectives of the United States 
regarding intellectual property are  (A) to seek the enactment and effective enforcement by foreign countries of laws 
which (i) recognize and adequately protect intellectual property, including copyrights, patents, trademarks, 
semiconductor chip layout designs, and trade secrets, . . . .‖  1988 Trade Act, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1101, 102 Stat. 
1107, 1123 (1988) (codified at 19 U.S.C. 2901).  The 1988 Trade Act authorized the United States Trade 
Representative (USTR) to impose various trade sanctions against foreign countries in case the U.S. rights under a 
trade agreement were denied or a foreign country‘s act, policy, or practice was unjustifiable and restricted U.S. 
commerce.  1988 Trade Act, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1301, 102 Stat. 1107, 1164 (1988) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 
2411).  In addition, the Act, commonly referred as ―Super 301,‖ required the USTR to report to Congress annually, 
identifying and listing priority foreign countries that ―have the most onerous or egregious acts, policies, or practices 
that (i) deny adequate and effective intellectual property rights, or (ii) deny fair and equitable market access to 
United States persons that rely upon intellectual property protection.‖  1988 Trade Act, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1303, 
102 Stat. 1107, 1179-80 (1988) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2242).  The ―Super 301‖ was said to be ―designed 
specifically as a tool to use against the Japanese trade surplus with the United States.‖  In fact, the USTR identified 
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multilateral efforts to protect intellectual property as a top priority in U.S. policy toward 
international trade by lobbying Japanese and European industries to ―gain support for the 
inclusion of intellectual property on the negotiating agenda in the Uruguay Round of multilateral 
trade negotiations.‖41  In part because of the efforts of U.S. industry in a multilateral way, the 
United States included trade secret protection in Article 31 of the draft agreement on the Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT),
 42
  which was under discussion at that time, even though the Japanese 
government did not want to do so.
43
  The general definition of trade secrets can be found in 
                                                                                                                                                             
Japan as one of the priority countries in 1989.  Elizabeth K. King, The Omnibus Trade Bill of 1988: “Super 301” 
and Its Effects on the Multilateral Trade System under GATT, 12 U. PA. J. INT‘L BUS. L. 245, 255-59 (1991).   
41
 See Charles S. Levy, Towards an Intellectual Property Agreement in the GATT: A Trilateral Initiative by U.S., 
Japanese and European Business Groups, in UNITED STATES/JAPAN COMMERCIAL LAW & TRADE 89 (Valerie 
Kusuda-Smick ed. 1990).  On March, 1988, three major industry groups from the United States, Japan, and Europe 
published their position on the GATT framework agreement on intellectual property.  See Intellectual Property 
Committee, the Japan Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren), & the Union of Industrial and Employers‘ 
Confederations of Europe (UNICE), BASIC FRAMEWORK OF GATT PROVISIONS AND UNITED STATES BUSINESS 
COMMUNITIES (1988).   
42
 See Draft Agreement on the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, GATT Doc. No. 
MTN.GNG/NG11/W/70, art. 31, at 13 (May 11, 1990) (communication from the United States), available at 
http://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/92100144.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2010).   
43
 Odano explains the Japanese government position regarding trade secret protection on TRIP negotiations as 
follows:  
Although the United States is strongly demanding the protection of trade secrets, such a concept 
does not exist in Japan‘s legal system.  Moreover, this concept is not clear in the United States due, 
in part, to the regulation of trade secrets by state rather then federal law.  Japan, however, has not 
included trade secrets in its proposal; however it would be erroneous to conclude that trade secrets 
as defined by the United States are not protected in Japan.  The civil and criminal laws afford 
protection in many cases. . . .  Consensus on the definition of a particular right must precede 
various countries‘ agreement to its protection.  
Nobutake Odano, GATT Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIP) Negotiations and the 
Japanese Government Position, in UNITED STATES/JAPAN COMMERCIAL LAW & TRADE 117-18 (V. Kusuda-Smick ed. 
1990).  Indeed, proposals made by Japan did not mention trade secrets as one type of intellectual property rights that 
are to be protected.  See Suggestion by Japan for Achieving the Negotiating Objectives, GATT Doc. No. 
MTN.GNG/NG11/W/17 at 3 (Nov. 23, 1987), available at 
http://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/92030131.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2010) (―Patent, trademarks, 
designs, copyright, and semiconductor integrated circuit layout right shall be the right to be protected.  Concerning 
objects to be protected in the new frontiers of technology, deliberate study shall be made on them with an aim to 
having an appropriate way of protecting each object in accordance with its nature.‖); Submission by Japan 
(Addendum), GATT Doc. No. MTN.GNG/NG11/W/17/Add.1 (Sep. 23, 1988), available at 
http://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/92060004.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2010).   
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Section 7 (Protection of Undisclosed Information) of the World Trade Organization Agreement 
on TRIPs.
44
  This Agreement obligates member states to protect undisclosed information that 
―(a) is secret in the sense that it is not generally known among or readily accessible to persons 
within the circles that normally deal with the kind of information in question; (b) has commercial 
value because it is secret; and (c) has been subject to reasonable steps under the circumstances to 
keep it secret.‖45  Under the TRIPs Agreement, the above information is protected against 
unauthorized disclosure, acquisition, or use by others contrary to ―honest commercial practices.‖  
In this provision, ―honest commercial practices‖ generally include breaches of contract, breaches 
of confidence, and industrial espionage.
46
  In Japan, therefore, one can say that trade secret 
protection began to be considered mainly because of trade pressure from foreign countries, and 
pressure from the United States appeared to be the primary factor influencing the Japanese 
government to adopt a statutory system of trade secret protection.   
For these reasons, late in 1988, the Japanese government began preparing to strengthen 
the legal protection of trade secrets in Japan.
47
  The government organized the Proprietary 
Information Committee with representatives from various fields, including scholars, legal 
practitioners, and industry, within the Industrial Structure Council (an advisory body) of the 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) in October 1989.
48
  The committee not only 
examined relevant laws in Japan and foreign countries, but also sought opinions from relevant 
entities, including Japanese business organizations and foreign entities such as the American 
                                                 
44
 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1197. 
45
 TRIPs art. 39.   
46
 Id. at 13.  
47
 To cope with the U.S. demand for the stronger protection of intellectual property rights, the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI) established a division to handle intellectual property issues and asked the 
Japan Industrial Policy Research Institute to do preliminary research on relevant issues including trade secrets.  MITI 
to Address Property Rights Issues, NIKKEI WKLY. (Tokyo), Nov. 5, 1988, at 14, available at 1988 WLNR 405473.  
48
 Matsuo, supra note 25, at 79.  
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Chamber of Commerce in Japan.
49
  The committee also considered the impact of the amendment 
on the Japanese economy and tried to develop a theory of trade secret protection in conformity 
with relevant laws, such as the Civil Code, copyright law, and patent law.
50
  After completing the 
committee work for about five months, in March 1990, the committee published a report entitled 
―A Desirable Form of the Remedial System against Acts of Unfair Competition Regarding 
Proprietary Information,‖ which advised the Japanese government to amend the existing law, the 
Japanese UCPA.
51
  The report pointed out that the lack of trade secret law in Japan, which 
provided only damage relief, was considered an insufficient legal remedy in cases of trade secret 
misappropriation, and the adoption of the law was strategically important for Japan, in part 
because Japan had to cope with the international situation, in which the Uruguay Round of 
multilateral trade talks under the GATT required trade secret protection, in part because the 
importance of valuable information was increasing in the information-intensive economy.  It also 
noted that the increasing mobility in the labor market would result in a greater possibility that 
                                                 
49
 MITI INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE COUNCIL, PROPRIETARY INFORMATION COMMITTEE, ZAISANTEKIJŌHO NI KANSURU 
FUSEIKYŌSŌKŌI NI TSUITE NO KYŪSAISEIDO NO ARIKATA NI TSUITE [A Desirable Form of the Remedial System 
against Acts of Unfair Competition regarding Proprietary Information] (Mar. 16, 1990) [hereinafter MITI COUNCIL, 
1990 REPORT], in TSŪSHO SANGYŌSHŌ CHITEKI ZAISAN SEISAKUSHITSU [MINISTRY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND 
INDUSTRY], EIGYŌHIMITSU [TRADE SECRETS] 167-69 & 206-17 (1990) (Japan) [hereinafter MITI, 1990 TRADE 
SECRETS] (examining relevant laws in the U.S., the United Kingdom, West Germany, and France).  150 entities were 
asked to give their opinions to the committee.  These included ―Keidanren (the Federation of Economic 
Organizations), the Japan Federation of Bar Associations, the Japan Federation of Trade Unions, the Japan Patent 
Association, and other Japanese business organizations, as well as the American Chamber of Commerce in Japan.‖  
Matsuo, supra note 25, at 79. 
50
 MITI COUNCIL, 1990 REPORT, supra note 49, at 157.  Matsuo, who was one of the members of the committee, 
explains the considerations and discussion in the committee concerning the amendment as follows:  
Careful consideration was given to the need not to harm small- to-medium sized enterprises 
(which have not developed advanced business methods to protect valuable trade secrets), not to 
unreasonably hinder employees in changing jobs (which was becoming more frequent in Japan 
recently), and not to obstruct the sharing and trading of business information in such a high-
technology society.  
Matsuo, supra note 25, at 79-81. 
51
 See MITI COUNCIL, 1990 REPORT, supra note 49, at 157-98.  
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proprietary information would be revealed when employees left for competitors.
52
  Following the 
committee‘s suggestions, the MITI prepared a bill, and the Cabinet introduced the bill to the 
National Diet of Japan on May 24, 1990, during the 118th session.  The Japanese Diet passed the 
bill after heated debate.
53
  
The amendment of the Japanese UCPA in 1990 had three principal features.  First, the 
amendment created the legal concept of a trade secret within the preexisting regime of unfair 
competition law, which is regarded as a sort of special tort law.
54
  The Japanese UCPA required 
three elements for the legal protection of trade secrets: it provides that an ―eigyōhimitsu (trade 
secret)‖ under this act is ―[1] technical or business information useful for commercial activities 
such as manufacturing or marketing methods, [2] that is administered as a secret, and [3] that is 
not publicly known.‖55  Among these requirements, in particular, the requirement of secrecy was 
problematic during the preparation of the bill because of ―the ambiguity of the term.‖56  After 
long discussions and comparative research on this requirement, the Japanese government 
appeared to focus on the evidentiary and notice aspects of this requirement, similar to some 
courts in the United States.
57
  Hence, this requirement seems to have been intended to have 
                                                 
52
 Id. at 162-63; see also Panel Calls for Bolstering Law to Protect Trade Secrets, JAPAN ECON. NEWSWIRE BY 
KYODO NEWS SERVICE, Mar. 16, 1990, available at Lexis ALLNEWS database.   
53
 Fusei kyōsō bōshihō [Unfair Competition Prevention Act], Law No. 14 of 1934 (as amended by Law No. 66 of 
1990 (promulgated on June 29, 1990)) (Japan) [hereinafter 1990 Japanese UCPA].  The bill was passed on June 14, 
1990, by the House of Representatives and on June 22, 1990, by the House of Councillors.  The Act became 
effective June 15, 1991.  For a detailed discussion of both houses of the Diet, see Index Database to Japanese Laws 
(http://hourei.ndl.go.jp).  
54
 In this context, the basis of trade secret law is tort theory, which seeks its justification from maintenance of 
commercial or industrial morality.  See MITI, 1990 TRADE SECRETS, supra note 49, at 30-35.  
55
 1990 Japanese UCPA, art. 1, para. 3.  
56
 According to Matsuo, some argued that ―if the requirement were strictly interpreted, only huge American 
enterprises with experience in maintaining trade secrets would be able to obtain [them], and they would attack 
Japanese companies, many of which still have not developed a well-organized system of maintaining their valuable 
trade information in secrecy.‖  Matsuo, supra note 25, at 82-83. 
57
 Matsuo further explained that ―it was agreed that this requirement means that . . . a trade secret is maintained in a 
way which includes some means, visual or otherwise, of giving clear notice of the secret nature of the information to 
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similarities to the requirement of ―reasonable‖ security measures under the Uniform Trade 
Secrets Act (UTSA).
58
  Second, the amendment defined six types of trade secret 
misappropriations.
59
  During the preparation of the draft bill, some argued that the Japanese 
UCPA should adopt a general provision defining trade secret misappropriations, following 
paragraph 2 of Article 10bis of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, 
which is a general provision for effective protection against unfair competition.
60
  However, it 
seems that the drafter placed emphasis on economic stability, based on the reality of Japanese 
society at that time.  The MITI explained that allowing injunctive relief for misappropriation that 
was not clearly defined might slow economic activities in Japan, in part because there had not 
been many cases dealing with trade secret misappropriation and in part because, unlike damages 
for trade secret misappropriation, injunctive relief might result in aggressive intervention in free 
economic activities between private parties in the market.
61
  Third, the amended statute provided 
for injunctive relief as one of the civil remedies that was not available in cases of 
misappropriation of trade secrets before the adoption of the Act.
62
  In connection with injunctive 
relief, the trade secret holder could also ask the court to compel affirmative acts by the 
                                                                                                                                                             
persons who have access to the trade secret.‖  Id.  See, e.g., Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc. 925 
F.2d 174 (1991) (focusing on the evidentiary significance of the requirement of reasonable security measures); 
BondPro Corp. v. Siemens Power Gen., Inc., 463 F.3d 702, 709 (7th cir. 2006) (focusing on the notice aspect of this 
requirement).  
58
 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §1 (4), 14 U.L.A. 537 (2005). 
59
 1990 Japanese UCPA, art. 1, para. 3 (i)-(vi). 
60
 CHINO, supra note 3, at 173.  See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (as amended on 
September 28, 1979), art. 10bis, para. 2. (―Any act of competition contrary to honest practices in industrial or 
commercial matters constitutes an act of unfair competition.‖), 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/trtdocs_wo020.html#P213_35515.   
61
 MITI COUNCIL, 1990 REPORT, supra note 49, at 71; CHINO, supra note 3, at 173. 
62
 1990 Japanese UCPA, art. 1, para. 3.  Damage remedies and others are also available under art. 1 bis, para. (1), (3), 
and (4).  But ―no specific provisions were prepared for calculating damages, although a lawyer‘s group had 
requested that at least the same effect of the provision as in the Trademark Law or the Patent Law be adopted.‖  
Matsuo, supra note 25, 93-94.  
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misappropriator, such as destruction of the fruits of the misappropriation.
63
  However, the law did 
not provide for criminal sanctions for trade secret misappropriation.  
The amendment of the Japanese UCPA dramatically enhanced the legal protection of 
trade secrets in Japan.  Moreover, the amendment process allowed Japan to have an opportunity 
not only to carefully examine the legal status of trade secrets in Japan compared with advanced 
foreign countries, but also to look carefully at Japanese industry, which had more incentive to 
rely on trade secret protection because of its technological competitiveness in the world market 
compared with the previous stage of development.  As a result, the trade secret law included the 
―trade secret‖ as a formal legal concept under Japanese law and provided for legal remedies for 
third-party liability and injunctive relief, which had been unavailable before the adoption of the 
law.  Through this amendment, the Japanese government ostensibly satisfied the demands of the 
United States that it take substantial measures to strengthen trade secret protection in Japan.  The 
amendment also enabled the Japanese government to signal to the other countries participating in 
the Uruguay Round that Japan, as one of the developed countries, now had an established 
international norm adequate for protecting trade secrets.   
Nonetheless, as one Japanese commentator stated, ―Japan [had] a machine for the 
protection of trade secrets, but [it did] not have sufficient oil to run it.‖64  Indeed, the amended 
Japanese UCPA did not appear to provide sufficient civil remedies for the legal protection of 
trade secrets.  Unlike civil procedural law in the United States, the amended Japanese UCPA has 
been criticized by Japanese commentators and scholars as well as by foreign commentators for 
its lack of sufficient procedural measures for preserving trade secrets during litigation, such as in 
                                                 
63
 1990 Japanese UCPA, art. 1, para. 4.   
64
 Matsuo, supra note 25, at 94. 
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camera hearings and sealing the records of the action, which are available in the United States.
65
  
Furthermore, the lack of measures under the Japanese Code of Civil Procedure to preserve trade 
secrets in litigation appears to have affected the formation of Article 42 of the TRIPs and to be 
justified under the Article.
66
  Miyakoshi Kikou Ltd. v. Guurudo Inc.
67
 is illustrative of the limited 
rights of a trade secret holder under the Japanese Code of Civil Procedure.  In this case, the 
plaintiff, a Japanese company, brought a lawsuit against the defendant, a U.S. company, asking 
the court to confirm that no liability existed for trade secret misappropriation.  One issue in the 
case was whether the proceedings for a case involving alleged trade secrets could be conducted 
in such a way as to preserve the secrecy of the trade secrets, because despite a request by the 
court, the U.S. company had not specified the alleged trade secrets in the proceedings.  Because 
of the failure to specify and prove the alleged trade secrets, the court ruled in favor of the 
Japanese company.
68
  This case clearly showed how the amended Japanese UCPA was 
incomplete in protecting the interests of trade secret holders.   
 
 
1.3. Development 
In 1990, the Japanese UCPA adopted mainly a substantive trade secret law.  However, 
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 See, e.g., SOGA, supra note 6, at 172-99; Svetz, supra note 6, at 445-47.  In fact, according to Matsuo, the 
Japanese government may have expected the result of the lack of sufficient measures in preserving the secrecy of 
trade secrets in litigation.  Matsuo, supra note 25, at 94-95 (―Careful deliberation and discussion have been focused 
on measures to protect trade secrets during the course of litigation.  It would be practically impossible to even 
impinge on the fundamental principal that trials be public.‖).   
66
 Article 42 states that ―[civil judicial procedure] shall provide a means to identify and protect confidential 
information, unless this would be contrary to existing constitutional requirements.‖  TRIPs, art. 42 .  See 
CHRISTOPHER HEATH, THE SYSTEM OF UNFAIR COMPETITION PREVENTION IN JAPAN 234 (2001) (noting that Article 
42 as ―a concession made particularly with Japan in mind,‖ citing T. Sibuya, Eigyōhimitsu no hogo [Protection of 
Trade Secrets], 45-2 HŌSŌ JIHŌ 353 (1993)) [hereinafter HEATH, UNFAIR COMPETITION PREVENTION IN JAPAN]. 
67
 Tokyo District Court of Japan, Judgment of Sep. 24, 1991, Case No. Shōwa 60 (Wa) 15593.  
68
 Id.  See also Osaka District Court of Japan, Judgment of July 12, 1973, Case No. Shōwa 47 (Ra) 516.   
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scholars criticized its lack of support from procedural law and argued that criminal sanctions 
should be adopted because of the inefficient civil remedy for providing sufficient trade secret 
protection to holders of trade secrets.
69
  In part because of the defects of the procedural 
mechanism, given only the minimal number of trade secret cases reported up to 1997, it did not 
appear to have a significant impact on Japanese trade secret holders in the early stages of 
implementation.
70
  Although some Japanese scholars had urged that the procedural defects of 
trade secret protection described above be improved, the Japanese government did not change 
them until early in 2000.
71
   
The position of the Japanese government regarding trade secret protection began 
changing as the Japanese socioeconomic environment began changing during the 1990s.  In 
particular, the experience of the ―lost decade,‖ a term used to describe the protracted economic 
recession in Japan after the burst of the economic bubble, seems to have resulted in a reshaped 
perception of intellectual property by the Japanese government.
72
  In fact, Japan experienced a 
halt in economic expansion during the period of the lost decade.
73
  It seemed harder for Japan to 
                                                 
69
 See, e.g., SOGA, supra note 6, at 157-71. 
70
 I have examined the number of cases involving ―営業秘密 (Eigyōhimitsu; trade secrets)‖ as a keyword in the 
Westlaw Japan (http://www.westlawjapan.com) database.  I have found the following number of cases:   
 
Year 
Total 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 
No. of 
cases 1 1 3 5 6 8 9 18 18 18 19 30 28 27 33 22 35 37 18 336 
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 Although the Japanese UCPA was completely revised in 1993, the provisions regarding trade secret protection 
were not changed.   
72
 See Ruth Taplin, Roots of the IP Drive and Economic Globalization, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NEW 
GLOBAL JAPANESE ECONOMY 1-16 (2009). 
73
 For an overview of the Japanese economic situation in the 1990s, see Kazuo Sato, ―From Fast to Last: The 
Japanese Economy in the 1990s,‖ 13 J. ASIAN ECON. 213, 216-29 (2002) (explaining the Japanese economy in the 
1990s focusing on the GDP gap, private consumption, business fixed investments and savings, government, trade, 
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stay competitive with the rise in the world economy of other Asian countries, such as China, 
Korea, and Taiwan, with low labor costs and high-level technology in traditional industrial 
areas.
74
  In addition, the Japanese (manufacturing) industry began facing unintended leakages of 
technology abroad: according to one scholar,―Japan has emerged as one of the most important 
sources of [Foreign Direct Investment] in this period as Japanese corporations were forced to 
move production abroad in order to stay competitive in the face of rising wages and an 
appreciating yen.‖ 75  This change in the economic situation led Japan to realize the limits of its 
traditional Japanese economic model, which can be referred to as a ―catch-up model,‖ under 
which Japan experienced its miraculous economic success in the postwar period based on the 
importation and assimilation of foreign technology.
76
  This recognition urged the Japanese 
government to find a new solution to the bad economic situation.
77
  Learning from the example 
of the U.S. intellectual property policies, including the ―pro-patent policy‖ in the 1980s, which 
aimed at strengthening the international competitiveness of U.S. industry, Japan began to 
recognize the importance of intellectual property as a new growth engine to revitalize the 
Japanese economy.
78
  Beginning with Prime Minster Junichiro Koizumi‘s declaration of a pro-
                                                                                                                                                             
and the financial system).   
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it examined legal and institutional problems in promoting the creation, protection, and exploitation of intellectual 
property in Japan.  The final report, which included specific policy recommendations, was published in June 2002.  
For an overview of intellectual property policy changes in Japan, see Hisamitsu Arai, Intellectual Property Strategy 
in Japan, 1 INT‘L J. INTELL. PROP. L. ECON. & MGMT 5 (2005).  
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intellectual property policy in February 2002, the Japanese government established the Strategic 
Council on Intellectual Property under the Office of the Prime Minister in March and announced 
the Intellectual Property Policy Outline, which provided ―basic directions‖ focusing on the 
intellectual property cycle, including creation, protection, and exploitation, and a ―specific action 
plan‖ for creating an intellectual property-based nation in July of the same year.79  The 
Intellectual Property Basic Act proposed in the Guidelines was enacted in November 2002 to 
implement the measures in the Guidelines.
80
  Based on the Basic Act, in the subsequent year, the 
Intellectual Property Strategy Headquarters, which consisted of the Prime Minister (chair), all 
cabinet members, and other experts from the private sector, was established in March, and this 
group was in charge of developing the Intellectual Property Strategic Program on a yearly basis 
and supporting the implementation of the program.
81
  Thereafter, in July, the first Strategic 
Program was published.
82
   
Strengthening trade secret protection was recognized as one of the important parts of the 
new Japanese intellectual property policy.  Indeed, ―reinforcement of trade secret protection,‖ 
which aimed at reaching a level similar to that in the United States and Europe, was listed among 
                                                                                                                                                             
Patent policy, see Institute of Intellectual Property, U.S. Pro-Patent Policy: A Review of the Last 20 Years, IIP 
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 Chiteki Zaisan Kihonhō [Intellectual Property Basic Act], Law No. 122 of 2002.  An English version of the Act is 
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 Id. arts. 24-33.   
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the strategic protection measures under the basic directions.
83
  For this, on the one hand, 
recognizing the increasing significance of trade secrets in the Japanese industry, the Outline 
pointed out that it was necessary to improve civil remedies and introduce criminal sanctions for 
trade secret misappropriation by amending the Japanese UCPA.
84
  It made the Ministry of 
Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) carry out relevant tasks in 2003, and it asked that the 
possible effect of the amendment on labor mobility be taken into consideration.
85
  In addition, it 
made the Judicial Reform Headquarters, the Ministry of Justice, and the METI carry out the 
necessary measures to protect trade secrets in litigation by the 2005 fiscal year.
86
  On the other 
hand, the Outline required that by 2002, the METI publicized reference guidelines that would 
help Japanese companies formulate a management strategy to prevent unintended leakage of 
their technology overseas.
87
   
Based on the Guideline and subsequent Intellectual Property Strategy Programs, the 
Japanese legislature adopted important amendments regarding trade secret protection in 2003, 
2005, 2006, and 2009.  As the Outline stated, the 2003 amendment focused on the adoption of 
new criminal sanctions for trade secret misappropriation and the enhancement of civil remedies.  
It appeared that Japanese companies were also in favor of amending the Japanese UCPA in that 
direction.  In fact, a survey conducted in November 2001 by the Japan Intellectual Property 
Association and the Association of Corporate Legal Departments revealed that more than 60% of 
the responding companies said the current civil remedies were insufficient.  Various reasons were 
                                                 
83
 STRAGEGIC COUNCIL, IP POLICY OUTLINE, supra note 79, at 11.  
84
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85
 Id. at 32. 
86
 METI, INDUSTRIAL COMPETITIVENESS & IP REPORT, supra note 74, at 30 (2002); STRAGEGIC COUNCIL, IP POLICY 
OUTLINE, supra note 79, at 27.  
87
 STRAGEGIC COUNCIL, IP POLICY OUTLINE, supra note 79, at 36. 
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given for the insufficiency of civil remedies, with two of them being the ―difficulty of proving 
trade secret misappropriation‖ and the ―difficulty of proving the amount of damages.‖88  The 
survey also unveiled that approximately 80% of the responding companies were in favor of the 
adoption of criminal sanctions, especially under restricted situations in which illegality of the 
conduct was high.
89
  The 2003 amendment criminalized some types of trade secret 
misappropriations, which could be divided into two groups: (1) acquiring, using, or disclosing a 
trade secret by violating the control of a trade secret holder by unlawful means (deceit, assault, 
intimidation, theft, etc.) for the purpose of unfair competition;
90
 and (2) officers‘ or employees‘ 
using or disclosing a trade secret disclosed by its holder at the outside for the purpose of unfair 
competition.
91
  On the other hand, because of concerns over restricting the freedom of employees 
to choose an occupation or discouraging labor mobility, the amendment did not criminalize an 
act by a former employee of using or disclosing a trade secret if it did not involve unlawful 
acquisition.
92
  In addition to the adoption of criminal provisions, based on concerns expressed by 
the Japanese industry, the 2003 amendment improved procedural measures for effective civil 
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remedies.
93
   
In 2004, the Japanese government took dramatic measures that enabled the relevant 
parties to guard against the disclosure of trade secrets during the litigation process through the 
Act of a Partial Amendment of the Court Organization Act.
94
  The amended measures included 
provisions for protective order,
95
 required notice to a party regarding a request for inspection of 
case records,
96
 and included provisions for in camera examination of the parties.
97
  In subsequent 
years, Japan has amended the Japanese UCPA, focusing on the enhancement of criminal 
sanctions.  The 2005 amendment imposed additional criminal penalties against a person taking a 
trade secret out of Japan and using or disclosing it for the purpose of unfair competition, to 
prevent the leakage of Japanese technology abroad.
98
  The Japanese UCPA further criminalized 
the use or disclosure of a trade secret by a former officer or employee who offered to disclose a 
trade secret in breach of a duty of confidence or who received a request to use or disclose it 
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while in office, which was not criminalized under the 2003amendment.
99
  To ensure the deterrent 
effect of the criminal sanctions under the Japanese UCPA, the 2006 amendment further enhanced 
the punishment for trade secret misappropriations from five to ten years, after considering penal 
provisions in other intellectual property laws and the Penal Code.
100
  Finally, in 2009, the 
Japanese UCPA enlarged the subjective requirement of criminal sanctions
101
 and the scope of 
acts subject to criminal sanctions by criminalizing an act of fraudulent taking of a trade secret by 
a person to whom the trade secret had been disclosed.
102
   
 
 
2. Current Trade Secret Law in Japan  
2.1. Subject Matter 
Under the Japanese UCPA, as in the United States, for information to be protected as a 
trade secret, the information must meet three requirements.  The Japanese UCPA protects 
virtually all information when the information is ―useful for commercial activities,‖ ―kept in 
secret,‖ and ―not publicly known.‖103  However, each requirement is an abstract legal concept, 
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which was not familiar to holders of trade secrets and lawyers in the Japanese society.  Thus, the 
courts have played a role in limiting the scope of the subject matter protected under trade secret 
law in Japan.
104
   
In practice, regarding the subject matter protected under the Japanese UCPA, the 
Japanese courts seem to have a similar approach regarding the requirements of ―usefulness‖ and 
―not being publicly known,‖ compared with the approach of U.S. courts toward ―economic 
value‖ and ―not being generally known.‖105  With respect to the requirement of ―usefulness for 
commercial activities,‖ the courts in Japan determine whether this exists in a given case by 
considering the generally accepted notion in society.
106
  To satisfy this requirement, the 
information does not have to be used in the operation of a business, but the information should 
be helpful for the trade secret owner to save relevant costs or improve the operation of the 
business by use of the trade secret.
107
  In this sense, if so-called ―negative‖ information, such as 
data from a failed experiment, enables a holder of trade secrets to save relevant costs for new 
research by avoiding unnecessary investment, the information may be protected as a trade 
                                                                                                                                                             
The term ―trade secret‖ as used in this Act means technical or business information useful for 
commercial activities such as manufacturing or marketing methods that is kept secret and that is 
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 See Tokyo District Court of Japan, Judgment of Feb. 14, 2002, Case No. Heisei 12 (Wa) 9499 (explaining that the 
purpose of the Japanese trade secret law is not to protect all information kept in secret but to legally protect the 
information to the extent that it has social significance and necessity).   
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 Tokyo District Court of Japan, Judgment of Feb. 14, 2002, Case No. Heisei 12 (Wa) 9499; METI, UNFAIR 
COMPETITION PREVENTION ACT, supra note 3, at 35-36. 
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secret.
108
  The usefulness of information claimed as a trade secret is determined not by a 
subjective evaluation by the trade secret holder, but from an objective perspective.
109
  Japanese 
courts, however, do not seem to require ―strict proof [of] the economic value of the 
information.‖110  Instead, the requirement seems to have a primary role in limiting the protectable 
scope of subject matter under the law.
111
  Thus, if information claimed as a trade secret falls 
within the scope of antisocial conduct, such as scandalous information, information regarding tax 
evasion, or information regarding a pollutant, it cannot form the basis for a trade secret claim 
under the Japanese UCPA.  For example, in the Cost Estimation System for Public Works 
Projects case, involving information illegally acquired by the plaintiff, the Tokyo District Court 
rejected the plaintiff‘s claim that the information was useful for commercial activities under the 
Japanese UCPA because the information in this case hurt the public interest concerning fair 
competition between contractors and proper budgetary operations of a regional government, and 
the purpose of the Japanese trade secret law is not to protect all information kept in secret, but to 
legally protect the information to the extent that it has social significance and necessity.
112
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The requirement of ―not being publicly known‖ is also interpreted in a similar way under 
trade secret law in the United States.  The requirement can be met ―when information cannot be 
generally acquired except under the control of a trade secret holder‖;113 thus, information that is 
readily ascertainable by others or on the published books cannot be protected under the Japanese 
UCPA.
114
  Although the information is disclosed to others, the information does not lose its status 
as a trade secret, provided the others owe a duty of confidence not to disclose it.  This is because 
it requires substantial secrecy, and it can be said that the information in the above case is under 
the control of the holder.
115
  Even if the information is kept in secrecy by a third party who 
developed the same information by accident, the information does not become publicly known 
because the information cannot be generally acquired by others.
116
  Moreover, general 
knowledge within the industry is the scope of the publicity to be examined by the courts; thus, 
information generally known within the industry cannot be a trade secret even if the information 
is disclosed to the public at large.
117
  As in the United States, even if the information can be 
reverse engineered by a third party, it can be protected as a trade secret when the reverse 
engineering requires the third party to spend a considerable amount of money and relevant 
expertise and great effort are needed.
118
  With respect to a determination of whether the 
information is publicly known, the courts adjudicated it at the time of the trade secret 
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misappropriation in cases in which damage relief is sought and at the time of the close of the oral 
proceedings in cases in which injunctive relief is sought.
119
   
By contrast, security requirements under the Japanese UCPA appear to be interpreted 
more strictly than those under the U.S. law, which requires reasonableness under a given 
circumstance.  As in the United States, this secrecy criterion of the Japanese UCPA has been 
critical and is the most frequently disputed for information to qualify as a trade secret.
120
  To 
meet the secrecy requirement, a trade secret holder must prove that the holder administered the 
information objectively in secrecy from employees or outsiders.  Thus, only the holder‘s 
subjective intention to keep the information in secrecy does not satisfy this requirement.
121
  More 
specifically, the courts in Japan consider mainly two factors: whether the information is disclosed 
only to a limited number of persons, and whether the person who has access to the information 
objectively recognizes it as secret.  Indeed, in the case of Acoma Medical Industry Inc.,
122
 the 
Tokyo District Court found that the plaintiff had to take security measures that limited access to 
the information and that enabled employees or third parties to recognize that the information was 
administered as a secret.
123
  In addition to these two factors, the courts in Japan further consider 
any relevant factors, including the nature of the information, the size of the firm, and persons 
who have access to the information.
124
  However, in part because of the strictness of the secrecy 
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 Chaen, supra note 111, at 40-41.  See also Tokyo District Court of Japan, Judgment of March 6, 2003, Case No. 
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requirement, the secrecy element claims in trade secret cases were denied in thirty-five out of 
forty-nine cases that examined the element up to 2005.
125
  On the other hand, the Japanese 
government, recognizing the lack of security management in Japanese companies, has made 
efforts to improve the management of trade secrets in Japanese industry by publishing 
guidelines.
126
   
 
 
2.2. Misappropriation of Trade Secrets 
The Japanese UCPA provides six types of trade secret misappropriation, defined as acts 
of unfair competition; this approach is similar to that of the UTSA.
127
  These can be categorized 
into the following two groups, depending on how a given trade secret is acquired: (1) where the 
trade secret was acquired wrongfully; or (2) where the trade secret was lawfully acquired by an 
original recipient and misappropriated by using or disclosing it later.  More specifically, trade 
secret misappropriation under the first group can be divided into two types.  First, the Act 
imposes liability for the acquisition of a trade secret by ―wrongful means,‖ such as theft, fraud, 
duress, or subsequent use or disclosure of the trade secret acquired wrongfully, including 
                                                                                                                                                             
Heisei 15 (Wa) 14794; Nagoya District Court of Japan, Judgment of Nov. 17, 1999, Case No. Heisei 10 (Wa) 3311.  
125
 KEIZAI SANGYŌSHŌ [MINISTRY OF ECONOMY, INDUSTRY, COMMERCE], EIGYŌHIMITSU KANRISHISHIN 
[GUIDELINES FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF TRADE SECRETS] 7 (Oct. 12, 2005), 
http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/economy/chizai/chiteki/pdf/18rev-tsguideline.pdf (last visited Sep. 15, 2010) (Japan).   
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 In January 2003, the METI compiled and published the first edition of the guidelines with comments on trade 
secret law under the Japanese UCPA to improve Japanese companies‘ efforts to manage trade secrets.  In addition to 
the guidelines for Japanese companies, the METI published ―Guidelines for Drafting a Trade Secret Management 
Protocol at Universities‖ in April 2004.  In October 2005, the revised version of the guidelines was published. On 
the other hand, in March 2003, the METI also published ―Guidelines for Prevention of Technology Leakage‖ for the 
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See KEIZAI SANGYŌSHŌ [MINISTRY OF ECONOMY, INDUSTRY, COMMERCE], GIJUTSU YŪSHUTSU BŌSHI SHISHIN 
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 2006 Japanese UCPA, supra note 1, art. 2, paras. 4-9. 
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disclosing it in confidence to others.
128
  ―Acquisition‖ under the paragraph could include a case 
in which a person acquires a trade secret by memorizing it.
129
  Use of the trade secret may be 
presumed when the defendant spent less time to develop the same or similar products that 
embodied the trade secret compared with the original holder of the trade secret because it is 
difficult for the plaintiff to prove the defendant‘s use of it.130  
Second, the Act subjects an actor to liability if the actor acquires a trade secret with 
knowledge, or without knowledge due to gross negligence, that the trade secret was acquired by 
wrongful means at the time of acquisition.
131
  The actor is subject to liability for subsequent use 
or disclosure of the trade secret acquired.
132
  The Act also subjects an actor to liability in cases in 
which the actor uses or discloses a trade secret acquired if he or she knows, or does not know due 
to gross negligence, that the trade secret has been acquired by wrongful means after the actor has 
acquired it.
133
  Like ―has reason to know‖ under the Section 1 (2) (i) of the UTSA, the subjective 
requirement of ―gross negligence‖ under these paragraphs can be satisfied not only in cases in 
which the actor, based on his or her duty required in ordinary trade, would easily have learned 
that the trade secret was acquired by wrongful means, but also in cases in which the actor did not 
know because of reckless disregard of his or her duty; thus, the requirement is said to be quite 
similar to ―has reason to know‖ under the UTSA. 134 
The second group involves a situation in which a trade secret holder legitimately 
discloses to a recipient, and the relationship or a contract between the parties creates a duty of 
                                                 
128
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129
 CHINO, supra note 3, at 176. 
130
 Osaka District Court of Japan, Judgment of Dec. 22, 2003, Case No. Heisei 5 (Wa) 8314.  
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 2006 Japanese UCPA, supra note 1, art. 2, para. 5. 
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133
 2006 Japanese UCPA, supra note 1, art. 2, para. 6. 
134
 See CHINO, supra note 3, at 181. 
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confidence.  First, if a legitimate recipient of a trade secret, such as an employee, subcontractor, 
or licensee, who owes a duty of confidence arising from a relationship or contract between a 
trade secret holder and the party above, uses or discloses the trade secret for the purpose of unfair 
competition or otherwise gaining unfair profit or causing harm to the original holder of a trade 
secret, he or she is subject to liability for appropriation of the trade secret.
135
  This paragraph 
prohibits the use or disclosure of a trade secret in violation of a duty of confidence.  A duty of 
confidence arises from the relationship between an employee and employer during employment 
and continues after the termination of the employment.
136
  But unlike the UTSA and the 
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition in the United States, under this paragraph the 
Japanese UCPA requires an actor to have a subjective requirement of ―unfair competition,‖ 
―gaining unfair profit,‖ or ―causing harm‖ for imposing liability.  In most cases, use or disclosure 
of a trade secret involving commercial exploitation by the above actor in violation of a duty of 
confidence may fall within the scope of these subjective requirements, in part because these 
requirements that meet the doctrine of good faith and fair dealing (shingi seijitsu), which is one 
of the most important and broadly applied principles under the Japanese Civil Code, are 
violated.
137
  By contrast, for example, the disclosure of an employer‘s trade secret for purposes 
other than these, such as external whistle blowing, reporting the misconduct of an organization, 
or violating the law, may not be subject to liability under trade secret law.  Although the privilege 
                                                 
135
 2006 Japanese UCPA, supra note 1, art. 2, para. 7. 
136
 See, e.g., Sapporo District Court of Japan, Decision of July 8, 1994, Case No. Heisei 6 (Mo) 725 (granting a 
preliminary injunction against a former employee who used a trade secret acquired during employment for a 
competing firm).   
137
 Article 1 of the Civil Code provides as follows. 
(1) Private rights must conform to the public welfare.  (2) The exercise of rights and performance 
of duties must be done in good faith.  (3) No abuse of rights is permitted.  
Minpō [Civil Code], Law No. 89 of 1896, art. 1, translated in JAPANESE LAW TRANSLATION DATABASE SYSTEM BY 
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp (last visited Jan. 28, 2010). 
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to disclose another‘s trade secret is recognized in the United States, the subjective requirements 
stipulated under the UCPA seem to show clearly that Japanese lawmakers do not want to restrict 
the freedom of expression or another significant public interest because of the adoption of trade 
secret law in Japan.
138
  However, in reality, no substantial difference seems to arise from the 
subjective requirements between the two countries.  Second, an actor is subject to liability for 
acquisition of a trade secret with knowledge, or without knowledge due to gross negligence, of 
the fact that the trade secret has been disclosed in violation of a duty of confidence at the time of 
acquisition.
139
  The actor is also subject to subsequent use or disclosure.
140
  In addition, an actor 
is liable in a case in which the actor uses or discloses a trade secret acquired if he or she knows, 
or does not know due to gross negligence, that the trade secret has been disclosed in violation of 
a duty of confidence after the acquisition.
141
  These two paragraphs intend to prohibit a third 
party, such as a competing firm, from obtaining, using, or disclosing the trade secret of a former 
employer by a former employee who is in violation of the duty of confidence.  On the other hand, 
the Japanese UCPA excludes the application of these provisions to ensure the safety of the 
transaction by protecting the position of bona fide acquirer of a trade secret.
142
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 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40 cmt. c (1995) (―The existence of a privilege to disclose 
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2.3. Legal Remedies  
2.3.1. Civil Remedies 
The adoption of substantive law in 1990 enabled a trade secret holder to seek injunctive 
relief as well as damages.
 143
  In addition, to protect a trade secret holder‘s interest effectively, 
some provisions have recently been adopted to improve the procedural aspects of civil trade 
secret cases.  The following discussion looks at current civil remedies under the Japanese UCPA, 
comparing with the remedies under trade secret law in the United States.   
Like the UTSA, Article 3 (1) of the Japanese UCPA allows a trade secret holder to seek 
injunctive relief by suspending or preventing actual or threatened trade secret misappropriation 
that may give injury to the trade secret holder‘s business interests through further use or 
disclosure of the trade secret.
144
  Upon seeking the above injunctive relief, the plaintiff can also 
ask the court to order affirmative acts, such as ―destruction of the articles that constituted the act 
of infringement, [or] removal of the equipment used for the act of infringement.‖145  With respect 
to injunctive relief in a trade secret case, the ―appropriateness and scope‖ of injunctive relief and 
the ―duration‖ of injunctive relief may be problematic issues that must be determined by the 
courts because an inappropriate injunction may unduly interfere with legitimate competition by 
the defendant.  As in the United States, Japanese courts have also determined trade secret cases 
                                                 
143
 Between 1990 and 2005, roughly 100 civil cases were brought under the Japanese UCPA.  Chaen, supra note 111, 
at 37.  See also, supra note 70 (listing the number of trade secret-related cases from the Westlaw Japan database).  
The cases appear to be developing at an increasing (although modest) rate.  According to the Ministry of Economy, 
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by considering this aspect.  For example, in a case involving a staff list acquired wrongfully by a 
former employee establishing a competing staffing firm,
146
 the Tokyo District Court denied the 
injunctive relief of the further use of an alleged trade secret, opining that at the time of the 
judgment, the staff list had substantially lost its usefulness, which is required for trade secret 
protection, considering the reality in the staffing industry, in which the usual employment period 
is short and in which many job seekers register with various staffing firms.  In addition, in some 
cases, for effective injunctive relief, the Japanese courts seem to prohibit beyond the scope of the 
very trade secret.  For example, in the Men‟s Wig case,147 the Osaka district court enjoined a 
defendant, a competing firm manufacturing men‘s wigs providing a related service, not only 
from using the trade secret, a customer list, but also from providing a relevant future service, 
reasoning that if the defendant could provide a future service, the defendant could benefit from 
the former use of the trade secret.
148
  However, regarding the duration of injunctive relief, there 
do not seem to have been cases directly mentioning this issue.
149
  The right to seek injunctive 
relief is extinguished by prescription if a trade secret holder does not exercise the right within 
three years of the time the holder became aware of such fact and of the misappropriator, or when 
ten years has elapsed from the time the misappropriation commenced.
150
   
In lieu of or in addition to injunctive relief, damages for trade secret misappropriation are 
also available under Article 4 of the Japanese UCPA.
151
  As in the United States, although the 
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provision, as a special rule, states the rule as applicable to cases relating to acts of unfair 
competition, the general rules of tort law (Article 710 et seq.) governing monetary relief apply in 
trade secret cases.
152
  As in an ordinary tort case, to seek damage relief in a trade secret case, a 
holder must prove (1) a defendant‘s intention or negligence; (2) that a defendant misappropriated 
the trade secret of another; (3) that damage was sustained by the holder; and (4) a causal 
relationship between the defendant‘s act and the holder‘s damage.  Unlike in the United States, 
punitive damages are not possible because Japanese tort law does not have a function in 
punishing egregious conduct and deterring the recurrence of possible future tortious conduct.
153
  
Pecuniary damages are divided into actual loss and expected loss, and under some circumstances, 
nonpecuniary damages may be awarded.
154
   
A trade secret holder must prove the amount of damage.  In reality, however, it is not easy 
for a plaintiff to prove and calculate the damage or loss in trade secret cases, and in part because 
of this difficulty, trade secret holders have had difficulty recovering damages resulting from trade 
secret misappropriations. 
155
  Under the Japanese UCPA, as in other areas of intellectual property 
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 However, unlike the United States, with respect to the issue of whether the general rules regarding the restitution 
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law, such as patent law and trademark law, a trade secret holder can enjoy various supporting 
devices for measuring monetary relief under the Act.
156
  First, in cases in which technical 
information matters as a trade secret and a misappropriator has no or little monetary gain, the 
quantity of articles sold or transferred multiplied by the amount of profit per unit of the articles 
that the trade secret holder could have sold in the absence of the misappropriation can be deemed 
the amount of damage suffered by the holder.
157
  Second, in cases in which a plaintiff proves that 
a defendant‘s profit was earned through the misappropriation, the amount of profit is presumed 
to be the amount of damages.
158
  Third, a plaintiff can seek damages calculated based on a 
reasonable royalty for the defendant‘s use of the trade secret.159  Fourth, in cases in which 
proving the amount of damages is extremely difficult, a court may award the plaintiff a 
reasonable royalty for the defendant‘s use of the trade secret.160  The right to seek damages is 
extinguished when the right to seek injunctive relief due to the above prescription rules 
expires.
161
  Finally, one special device in civil remedies for trade secret misappropriation in 
Japan, which shows an aspect of the Japanese legal culture, is that the Japanese UCPA authorizes 
a court to order necessary measures for restoring the business reputation of the trade secret 
holder injured, in lieu of or in addition to monetary damages.
162
  One common type of civil 
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measure is to request a misappropriator to publish an apology for the misappropriation in the 
newspaper, because ―an apology is regarded as a very severe penalty in Japanese culture.‖163   
 
 
2.3.2. Criminal Remedies  
The Japanese UCPA criminalizes relatively limited types of trade secret misappropriation 
under Article 21 of the Japanese UCPA compared with the Economic Espionage Act (EEA).  
Under the criminal trade secret provisions, the scope of subject matter was not expanded; thus, 
the scope of subject matter is the same as that under civil law.
164
  These provisions can be 
grouped into three categories.  The first group criminalizes the use or disclosure of a trade secret 
acquired by ―an act of fraud or others‖ or ―an act of violating control obligations‖ for the purpose 
of unfair competition.
165
  The criminal provisions limit the scope of acts of misappropriation by 
specifying and clarifying ―an act of fraud or others‖ or ―an act of violating control obligations‖ 
for criminal charges.  According to legislative history, this was intended to clarify the scope of 
criminal offenses under the Japanese UCPA.
166
  In addition, the Act does not criminalize all 
wrongful acquisition, but only that acquisition of a trade secret ―through an act of acquisition of 
or reproduction of a medium containing the trade secret under the control of a holder‖ for the 
purpose of using or disclosing a trade secret in the manner above, considering the high risks of 
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infringing on legal interests by such acts.
167
  The second group criminalizes an act of taking 
possession, using, or disclosing a trade secret by an offender to whom the trade secret has been 
legitimately disclosed.  This group can be further divided into three types of acts of 
misappropriation.  First, as a corresponding crime of embezzlement in the Japanese Penal Code, 
the Act prohibits the person, for the purpose of unfair competition, from using or disclosing the 
trade secret after ―taking possession of or making a document or a data storage medium 
containing the trade secret, [by taking possession of a medium or reproducing information 
contained in a medium a trade secret under the control of the holder,] through an act of fraud or 
others or an act violating control obligations, or through embezzlement or other acts of breaching 
the duty to keep safe custody of the medium containing the trade secret.‖168  Second, as a 
corresponding crime of breach of trust in the Japanese Penal Code, the Act criminalizes acts of 
using or disclosing trade secrets by current officers
169
 or employees in breach of the duty of 
confidence for the purpose of unfair competition.
170
  Third, in principle, a former officer or 
employee is not subject to criminal trade secret liability.
171
  Thus, the Act criminalizes only the 
acts of using or disclosing trade secrets by former officers or former employees who offer to 
disclose trade secrets in breach of confidence or who receive a request to use or disclose them 
while in office.
172
  The third group prohibits the use or disclosure by a second acquirer to whom 
trade secrets have been disclosed by an offender violating paragraph one or paragraphs three to 
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 95 
 
five.
173
   
Regarding the culpability requirement, the Japanese UCPA requires only the ―purpose of 
unfair competition,‖ which means the purpose of allowing himself or herself, or other specific 
competitors, to gain a competitive advantage.
174
  The METI explains that such examples include 
cases in which (1) a misappropriator uses a trade secret acquired for his or her own business; (2) 
a misappropriator directly or indirectly discloses the trade secret to a specific competitor, 
knowing that the trade secret is used by the competitor; or (3) a misappropriator discloses the 
trade secret to the public to allow a specific competitor to gain a competitive advantage over the 
original holder of the trade secret.
175
  Although this culpability requirement appears to be similar 
to that under the general criminal trade secret statute under Section 1832 of the EEA, requiring 
prosecutors to prove that a defendant intends to convert a trade secret to ―the economic benefit of 
anyone other than the owner‖ and intends or knows that the offense will injure the owner of the 
trade secret,‖176  this requirement was established with the intent of protecting freedom of the 
press or whistle-blowing from the inside.
177
  The Act provides for a term of up to ten years, fines 
up to 10 million yen, or both.
178
  The jurisdiction of the criminal provisions can reach outside 
Japan.
179
  But unlike the EEA in the United States, the Japanese UCPA limits its application and 
requires at least some connection between the misappropriation and Japan by adding some 
requirements that the ―trade secret … had been kept within Japan at the time of an act of fraud or 
others, or the act of violating control obligations, or at [the time] the trade secret was disclosed 
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by its holder.‖180  In addition to criminal trade secret provisions, prosecutors can rely on 
alternative legal theory under the Japanese Penal Code.
181
  The Japanese UCPA does not allow 
prosecutors to prosecute without a complaint by a victim, to prevent unintended disclosure of the 
holder‘s trade secret through criminal proceedings.182 
 
 
3. Law of Postemployment Contracts in Japan  
Under the Japanese employment tradition, work rules, in which employers establish 
unilateral conditions, have primarily regulated the employment relationship, which was based on 
collective human resources management.
183
  Similarly, under these employment practices, 
executing covenants not to compete, as a form of agreement individually negotiated between an 
employer and an employee, had not been common practice in Japanese employment 
relationships.
184
  However, as mentioned earlier in Foseco Japan Ltd.,
185  
even before the 
adoption of the Japanese UCPA, courts in Japan had enforced postemployment covenants not to 
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 97 
 
compete involving confidential information, such as technical secrets, when the covenants were 
reasonable.
186
  The adoption of trade secret law in the early 1990s appears to have affected the 
approach of courts toward the theory regarding postemployment restrictions in Japan.  
Nevertheless, the issue of postemployment restrictions is still controversial in this society, as 
seen by the recent failure of efforts for statutory regulation of the issue under the Japanese Labor 
Contracts Law, which codified and clarified common principles established in relevant 
precedents in responding to an increasing number of labor disputes.
187
  This section explores the 
development of law in Japan regarding postemployment restrictions on the ability of employees 
to compete with former employers. 
As in the United States, it has been recognized that employees in Japan owe a duty of 
confidence and a duty of noncompetition, as ancillary duties of the employment contract, under 
the concept of a duty of loyalty (seijitsu gimu) during an employment relationship.
188
  If an 
employee violates such duties, an employer may resort to disciplinary measures stipulated in the 
work rules, including disciplinary dismissal, normal dismissal, or legal remedies, which include 
injunctive relief or damages.
189
  By contrast, there have been disagreements among scholars with 
                                                 
186
 As for the question of the validity of an explicit agreement not to compete after employment is terminated, the 
court in Foseco Japan opined that the reasonableness should be scrutinized based on several factors, including the 
duration of the restriction, the geographical limitation, the types of business subject to the restriction, and the 
existence of compensation.  Nara District Court of Japan, Judgment of Oct. 23, 1970, Case No. Shōwa 45 (Yo) 37.   
187
 Initially, the new Japanese labor contracts law was intended to include provisions relating to employees‘ 
noncompetition and confidentiality duties.  However, these relevant provisions were not included in the final bill 
prepared by the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare in part because of difficulties in regulating these cases with 
diverse factual bases.  For a brief overview of the new Japanese Labor Contracts Law, see Lawrence Carter et al., 
New Japanese Labor Law, at http://www.dlapiper.com/files/Publication/802dddb9-07d9-42a8-a423-
2e49c19bb6b0/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/0d8507d2-bfb1-457d-af93-
3116e6be5038/New_Japanese_Labor_Law.pdf (last visited April 14, 2010).  See also Mitsui Masanobu, 
Rodōkeiyakuhōno seiteito sono igi [The Enactment of Labor Contract Law and Its Significance], 32 
HIROSHIMAHŌGAKU [HIROSHIMA LAW JOURNAL] 142 (2008) (Japan).  
188
 Araki, Employee Loyalty, supra note 184, at 268.   
189
 Araki notes that ―displinary actions including disciplinary dismissals, normal dismissals, and/or a reduction, or 
forfeiture of severance pay, are more common measures.‖  Id. at 274. 
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regard to the question of whether the duty of confidence remains after the termination of the 
employment relationship.  Scholars have recognized the duty of confidence when there are 
explicit agreements or specific provisions in the work rules governing the issue and when they 
are reasonable and not against public policy.
190
  A more problematic issue to Japanese society 
arises when there are no explicit agreements or such provisions related to the duty of confidence 
because, in employment practice, ―there is usually no such explicit provision on post-
employment confidentiality.‖191  However, scholars have expressed different views on the issue, 
and this debate was not resolved until the adoption of the trade secret law in 1990.
192
   
On the other hand, courts and scholars have looked strictly and critically at the duty of 
noncompetition after the termination of the employment relationship.  Accordingly, they have 
agreed that there is no duty of noncompetition in the absence of an explicit agreement or a 
provision in the work rules.
193
  In such cases, employees are able to work freely for competitors 
or to establish their own businesses.  As Araki noted, the general consideration of the court in 
Foseco Japan, was that an employer and an employee with a postemployment covenant not to 
                                                 
190
 SUGENO, supra note 183, at 79.  As to whether work rules can be concrete terms and conditions in employment 
contracts, Japanese Supreme Court held that as far as terms and conditions under work rule clauses are reasonable, 
they are able to become the contents of employment contracts even in the absence of an explicit agreement.  See 
Supreme Court of Japan, Judgment of Nov. 28, 1991, Case No. Shōwa 61 (O) 840.  On the other hand, Article 89 of 
the Labor Standards Act, which provided for employers to be responsible for drawing up and notifying employees of 
work rules, did not require employers to cover matters with regard to postemployment restraints. In practice, it 
seems that there have been few explicit provisions with respect to postemployment restraints, including the issues of 
confidentiality and noncompetition in work rules.  Thus, in many cases, Japanese courts and legal scholars have 
discussed employees‘ postemployment restraint issues under the concept of the duty of loyalty, which includes the 
duty of confidentiality, the duty not to compete, and other duties, as ancillary duties derived from employment 
contracts, in interpreting implicit terms and conditions in work rule clauses or contracts.  Araki, Employee Loyalty, 
supra note 184, at 270-73 (1999).  
191
 Araki, Employee Loyalty, supra note 183, at, 273. 
192
 Sugeno summarizes the debate as follows: 
Some argue that the duty to keep business secrets that is incidental to the labor contract also ends 
and is dissolved when the labor relationship ends.  The view that the duty to guard secrets may 
continue pursuant to the duty-of-good faith principle has been opposed.  
SUGENO, supra note 183, at 79 (citation omitted).   
193
 Araki, Employee Loyalty, supra note 184, at 274-75. 
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compete often had unequal bargaining power.
194
  They also found that the covenant would 
restrain the employee‘s Constitutional right to freely choose his or her occupation, would restrain 
him or her from competing with a former employer after the termination of employment, and 
would hinder fair competition.
195
   
The adoption of trade secret law in 1990 changed the framework of law regarding 
postemployment restrictions on employees because the law imposed additional statutory 
obligations on employees in cases involving trade secrets, apart from the ancillary duties derived 
from the employment contract.  As mentioned earlier, if the legitimate recipient of a trade secret, 
such as an employee, subcontractor, or licensee who owes a duty of confidence arising from a 
relationship or a contract between a trade secret holder and the party above, uses or discloses the 
trade secret for the purpose of unfair competition or otherwise gaining unfair profit or causing 
harm to the original holder of a trade secret, he or she is subject to liability for appropriating the 
trade secret, regardless of the existence of an agreement between the two parties.
 196
  Therefore, 
as far as trade secrets are concerned and these subjective requirements are met, employees owe a 
duty of confidence during or after employment, even in the absence of agreements with their 
employers.
197
  The Japanese UCPA played a role in resolving the issue of whether the duty of 
confidence existed after the termination of employment in the absence of express contracts by 
extending the scope of employees‘ duty of confidence.  By contrast, the Japanese courts have 
                                                 
194
 Araki, Employee Loyalty, supra note 184, at 275.  Nara District Court of Japan, Judgment of Oct. 23, 1970, Case 
No. Shōwa 45 (Yo) 37.   
195
 District Court of Japan, Judgment of Oct. 23, 1970, Case No. Shōwa 45 (Yo) 37.  Article 22 of the Japanese 
Constitution states that ―[e]very person shall have freedom to choose and change his residence and to choose his 
occupation to the extent that it does not interfere with the public welfare.‖  Kenpō [the Constitution], art. 22 (Japan), 
translated in JAPANESE LAW TRANSLATION DATABASE SYSTEM BY MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, 
http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp.   
196
 See 2006 Japanese UCPA, supra note 1, art. 2, para. 7. 
197
 See id. art. 2, para. 7.   
 100 
 
limited the scope of the duty of confidence when information other than trade secrets is involved 
in nondisclosure agreements so that this form of agreement may also restrict the right of an 
employee to freely choose his or her occupation.
198
  Accordingly, with respect to confidential 
information not qualifying as a trade secret, the prevailing view does not appear to recognize this 
duty in the absence of an agreement, arguing that ―the ancillary duty of employment should be 
terminated at the end of the contract.‖199   
On the contrary, a duty of noncompetition after termination of the employment 
relationship has been highly controversial.  One of the most controversial issues is whether the 
Japanese UCPA can be directly applied to enjoin a former employee from working in a job that 
would inevitably result in the use or disclosure of trade secrets acquired during employment by 
extending the scope of the duty of noncompetition ancillary to the employment relationship.
200
  
Tokyo Legal Mind
201
 may be a crucial case that gave rise to the debate.
202
  In this case, the court 
examined the duty of confidence and the duty of noncompetition owed by an employee under the 
new framework of the trade secret law.  The court first reaffirmed that, under the Constitutional 
                                                 
198
 Shinpei Ishida, Eigyōhimitsu hogo to taishokugo no kyōgōkisei (1); Americani okeru hukahiteki kaijiron no keisei 
to tenkai wo humaete [The Protection of Trade Secrets and Duties of Noncompetes after Employment (1)], 58 
DOSHISHA L. REV. 1941, 1972-74 (2006) (Japan).  
199
 Araki, Employee Loyalty, supra note 184, at 273. 
200
 For in-depth research on the issue in Japan compared to the application of the doctrine of inevitable disclosure in 
the United States, see Ishida, supra note 197; Shinpei Ishida, Eigyōhimitsu hogo to taishokugo no kyōgōkisei (1); 
Americani okeru hukahiteki kaijiron no keisei to tenkai wo humaete [The Protection of Trade Secrets and Duties of 
Noncompetes after Employment (2)], 58 DOSHISHA L. REV. 2227 (2006); Shinpei Ishida, Eigyōhimitsu hogo to 
taishokugo no kyōgōkisei (1); Americani okeru hukahiteki kaijiron no keisei to tenkai wo humaete [The Protection of 
Trade Secrets and Duties of Noncompetes after Employment (3)], 58 DOSHISHA L. REV. 2551 (2007). 
201
 Tokyo District Court of Japan, Decision of Oct. 16, 1995, Case No. Heisei 7 (Yo) 3587.  The case involves the 
plaintiff Tokyo Legal Mind, various exam preparatory schools, which sought a provisional injunction against the 
defendants, a former auditor who also had served as instructor and a former chief executive officer, from enjoining 
the operation of a competing preparatory school established by the defendants after termination of their work, based 
on provisions in the work rules for employees, provisions in the work rules for officers, and separate covenants not 
to compete prohibiting the defendants from working for competitors or establishing their own business in 
competition with the plaintiff. 
202
 Id.   
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right of an employee to freely choose his or her occupation, in principle, there was no duty of 
noncompetition as an ancillary duty of noncompetition after the termination of the employment 
relationship.  However, the court recognized the duty of noncompetition on two different legal 
bases.  First, the court recognized that the duty of noncompetition for securing the duty of 
confidence arises under the Japanese UCPA regardless of the existence of an express agreement 
under some limited circumstances in which an employee would inevitably use a former 
employer‘s trade secrets to engage in competing acts with the former employer.203  Second, the 
court also recognized the duty of competition arising from an express agreement between the 
parties.
204
  The court further differentiated the requirements for the validity of the duty of 
noncompetition.  On the one hand, in cases in which the duty of noncompetition exists under the 
trade secret law in the absence of an express agreement between the parties, the scope of the 
restraint must be reasonable, considering the duration of the restriction, the geographical scope, 
and the acts prohibited.  When the restriction is excessive for the purpose of securing a duty of 
confidence, it violates public policy and is invalid.
205
  On the other hand, the court stated that in 
cases in which the duty of noncompetition arises out of an express agreement, for the agreement 
to be valid, compensation is required because the restrictions on the employee are imposed to 
secure an employer‘s interests.206  This bifurcated approach on the legal basis of the duty of 
noncompetition after the termination of the employment relationship has been criticized by a 
majority of Japanese scholars in the field of labor and employment law.  They argue that 
injunctive relief under the Japanese UCPA is only available against the use or disclosure of trade 
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 Id. 
204
 Id. 
205
 Id. 
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 Id. 
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secrets by a misappropriator for the purpose of unfair competition or otherwise gaining an unfair 
profit or causing harm to the original holder of a trade secret because the legislative intent does 
not hinder the employee‘s Constitutional right to choose his or her occupation.207  In addition, the 
view against the existence of the duty of noncompetition under the statutory trade secret law 
explains that the duty of noncompetition should be recognized as being as limited as possible 
because allowing injunctive remedies conflicts with the right of an employee to freely choose his 
or her occupation, and balancing conflicting interests between employers and employees can be 
achieved through injunctive relief against the use or disclosure of trade secrets under the 
Japanese UCPA and through separate nondisclosure agreements.
208
  Apart from the bifurcated 
approach in Tokyo Legal Mind, the majority of courts also appear to share a view similar to that 
of scholars on postemployment restrictions.  In other words, the prevailing view of academics 
and the courts in Japan does not seem to prohibit employees from competition after termination 
of the employment relationship in the absence of express agreements.
209
   
In cases in which a covenant not to compete exists as an explicit agreement, like courts in 
the United States, the courts in Japan have struggled to balance conflicting interests between 
employers and employees, and have also considered public interests (the threat of monopoly and 
the effects on consumers in general).
210
  If an agreement appears unreasonable, it is considered 
an agreement against public policy, and thus is treated as void because, unlike its counterparts in 
the United States, the courts in Japan do not have the authority to apply the ―blue pencil rule,‖ in 
which a court may strike parts of a noncompetition agreement to make the covenant 
                                                 
207
 See, e.g., Tsuchida Michio, Rōdōsijyōno ryūdōwo meguru hōritsumondai [Legal Problems in Labor Market 
Flexibility], 1040 JURISUTO [JURIST] 53 (1994).   
208
 Id.; Hajime Wada, Taishokugono kyōgyōhishigimuto sasiseikyōno kahi [Postemployment Duty of 
Noncompetition and Injunctive Relief], 1408 RŌDŌHŌRITSUJYUNBŌ [LABOR LAW REPORT] 50 (May 1997).  
209
 See JIN, supra note 149, at 159-61.  
210
 Nara District Court of Japan, Judgment of Oct. 23, 1970, Case No. Shōwa 45 (Yo) 37.   
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reasonable.
211
  In determining reasonableness, the Japanese courts consider several factors, 
including the duration of the restriction, the geographical limitations, the types of businesses 
subject to the restriction, and the existence of compensation.
212
  However, as in the United States, 
the courts in Japan have shown a lack of consistency in reaching determinations.
213
  In particular, 
compensation (daishō shochi) for covenants not to compete has been debated.214  On the one 
hand, the courts do not seem to consider compensation as a requirement for a noncompetition 
agreement.  For example, the court in Tokyo Legal Mind stated that compensation is required 
only in cases in which the duty of noncompetition arises out of an express agreement.
215
  On the 
other hand, the prevailing view of scholars is that compensation is an essential requirement for a 
noncompetition agreement to be valid.
216
  One scholar noted that the intent behind the scholars‘ 
view favoring compensation as a requirement for a noncompetition agreement to be valid is to 
make trade secret law and the duty of nondisclosure play a more significant role in protecting 
trade secrets, rather than the duty of noncompetition, which should be recognized in strictly 
limited circumstances.
217
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 Minpō [Civil Code], Law No. 89 of 1896, art. 90 (―A juristic act with any purpose which is against public policy 
is void.‖).  Araki, Employee Loyalty, supra note 184, at 274 n.26 [―Though a constitutional provision does not have 
a direct effect on contracts between private persons, the freedom to choose one‘s occupation constitutes public 
policy (Civil Code Art. 90) and a private person‘s contract contrary to public policy is held null and void.‖];  Id. at 
280 n.48 (―In Japan, the power of the courts is confined to adjudication of the validity or invalidity of the agreement 
and is restricted from rewriting the content of the agreement.‖). 
212
 Nara District Court of Japan, Judgment of Oct. 23, 1970, Case No. Shōwa 45 (Yo) 37; Tokyo District Court of 
Japan, Judgment of Dec. 18, 2000, Case No. Heisei 8 (Wa) 613.  
213
 Ogawa, supra note 184, at 364. 
214
 JIN, supra note 149, at 159-60; Ogawa defines compensation as ―monetary payment made in exchange for the 
future restraints on freedom of competition, but it is not necessarily a bargained-for exchange or an inducement to a 
contract.‖  Ogawa, supra note 184, at 365. 
215
 Tokyo District Court of Japan, Decision of Oct. 16, 1995, Case No. Heisei 7 (Yo) 3587.   
216
 For the academics view of compensation, see Ogawa, supra note 184, at 365-66. 
217
 JIN, supra note 149, at 159.  Jin noted a recent case denying the validity of a noncompetition agreement, 
reasoning if a holder can protect trade secrets through a nondisclosure agreement under certain circumstances, it is 
not necessary to restrict an employee‘s movement to another firm.  See Osaka District Court of Japan, Judgment of 
Jan. 22, 2003, Case No. Heisei 13 (Wa) 11749.  Jin argues that the case shows the court‘s intent in favor of trade 
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4. Summary 
In the early 1990s, the Japanese government adopted a trade secret law that lacked 
sufficient procedural law, essentially in an effort to avoid foreign trade retaliation.  Accordingly, 
the impact of the law on Japanese society was not profound in the early stage of implementation.  
However, since the early 2000s, the Japanese government has strengthened trade secret 
protection based on its recognition of the importance of trade secret protection to the Japanese 
economy in the new business cycle, for example, by improving procedural measures, expanding 
the scope of trade secret misappropriations, and adopting new criminal sanctions for trade secret 
misappropriations.   
On the other hand, despite the continuing expansion of trade secret protection through 
criminal law, the Japanese government has endeavored not to overextend trade secret holders‘ 
rights by limiting the scope of criminal sanctions against former employees.  Furthermore, the 
government has refrained from becoming excessively involved in the litigation of trade secret 
cases by limiting the prosecutorial discretion to file charges against a suspect, and by not 
criminalizing attempts and conspiracy.  Likewise, in part because of the abstract legal concept of 
a trade secret and in part because of a lack of relevant precedents, the courts in Japan have had a 
role in reconciling conflicting interests between parties since the trade secret law was adopted.  
The courts, in fact, have limited the scope of the subject matter protected under trade secret law, 
specifically by interpreting the secrecy requirement and the scope of injunctive relief strictly.   
The adoption of trade secret law has also affected the framework of law regarding 
postemployment restrictions on employees.  As a result, as far as trade secrets are concerned, as 
long as the relevant subject requirements are met, an employee owes a duty of confidence in the 
                                                                                                                                                             
secrets and the duty of confidence for protecting trade secrets.  
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absence of a separate agreement with an employer.  However, in the absence of express 
agreements, the majority of courts in Japan prohibit employees from competition after their 
employment relationship has terminated.  In addition, with respect to covenants not to compete, 
the Japanese courts have adopted a strict reasonableness standard, as have most states in the 
United States, but the role of the courts in developing the law of covenants not to compete is 
relatively limited compared with its counterparts in the United States because of the courts‘ lack 
of discretion in rewriting the contents of the covenants.  
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CHAPTER IV. TRADE SECRET LAW IN KOREA 
During the period of rapid economic growth, the Korean economy had relied heavily on 
the importation, imitation, and assimilation of foreign technologies, specifically from the United 
States and Japan.  Thus, despite the lack of sufficient legal protection of trade secrets, the cost of 
strong legal protection for valuable information appeared to outweigh the benefits of the 
protection.  As in Japan, however, as the international regime focusing on trade-related aspects of 
intellectual property rights emerged and technology importation began to decrease under the 
influence of insufficient protection of intellectual property rights, the Korean government 
strategically adopted the substantive law of trade secrets in 1991 for the purpose of coping with 
the changes in the external economic environment.   
As Korea‘s technological capability reached the global level in some areas, such as in 
information technology and shipbuilding, the number of industrial espionage cases, and the 
estimated loss from these cases, increased sharply in the late 1990s.  The Korean government has 
been active in strengthening trade secret law, looking to the law governing trade secrets in the 
United States.  On the other hand, debate continues in Korea regarding the optimal trade secret 
protection in Korean society, with tension arising between those who demand strong trade secret 
protection for employers and those who demand a Constitutional right for employees.   
The first section of this chapter explores the history and recent developments of the law 
of trade secrets.  It reveals how the Korean government has adapted the law to changing 
domestic and international situations to achieve economic development.  The second section 
examines current trade secret law in Korea from a comparative perspective.  The third section 
looks at how the framework of the law of postemployment restraints was affected by the 
adoption of the statutory trade secret law.   
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1. History and Development 
1.1. Background 
As in Japan, current trade secret law in Korea is codified in one part of the Unfair 
Competition Prevention and Trade Secret Protection Act (hereafter, the ―Korean UCPA‖).1  
However, the history of the Korean UCPA is somewhat different from that of the Japanese 
UCPA.  In the modern context, the first law governing unfair competition in Korea was 
promulgated under the title of the Chosun Unfair Competition Prevention Ordinance by the 
Japanese Governor General of Chosun
2
 on December 28, 1934, during the period of Japanese 
rule in the Korean peninsula.
3
  Because of the political situation at that time, the role of the 
ordinance was to confirm that the Japanese UCPA
4
 governing unfair competition was directly 
implemented in Chosun.
5
  After Japanese rule ended in Korea, the U.S. military government 
ruled in South Korea for approximately three years, from 1945 to 1948.
6
  It issued an ordinance 
providing that all laws, including regulations, ordinances, and notices issued by the Korean or 
                                                 
1
 Pujŏng kyŏngjaeng pangji mit yŏngŏp pimil pohoe kwanhan pŏmnyul [Unfair Competition Prevention and Trade 
Secret Protection Act], Law No. 9537, 2009 (S. Korea) [hereinafter 2009 Korean UCPA].  
2
 The title of ―Chosun‖ is derived from the ―Chosun Dynasty,‖ which lasted from 1392 to 1910 in the Korean 
peninsula.  The term ―Chosun‖ had been used to refer to Korea until the end of Japanese rule in Korea in 1945, 
upon defeat of the Japanese in World War II.   
3
 Chosŏn Pujŏng kyŏngjaeng pangji ryŏng [Chosun Unfair Competition Prevention Order], Chosŏn ch‗ongdokpu 
jeryŏng [The Japanese Government General of Chosun Order], No. 24 (1934).  It took effect on January 1, 1934.   
4
 See Fusei Kyōsō bōshiō [Unfair Competition Prevention Act], Law No. 14 of 1934 (Japan).   
5
 It included only two sentences: ―Unfair competition prevention is governed by the [Japanese] law of Unfair 
Competition Prevention.  But relevant Ministries in the law are replaced by the Japanese Governor of Chosun.‖  
Chosun Bujeoung gyeongjaeng bangi ryong [Chosun Unfair Competition Prevention Order], Chosŏn ch‗ongdokpu 
jeryŏng [The Japanese Government General of Chosun Order] No. 24 (1934).  For an overview of the legal system 
in Korea under Japanese rule, see Edward J. Baker, Establishment of a Legal System under Japanese Rule, in 
INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEM OF KOREA 185-212 (Sang Hyun Song ed., 1983) [hereinafter 
INTRODUCTION TO KOREAN LAW].  
6
 The period of the U.S. occupation and rule in South Korea began on September 8, 1945, and ended on August 15, 
1948, following World War II.  For an overview of the U.S. rule in South Korea, see Channing Liem, United States 
Rule in Korea, 18 FAR EASTERN SURVEY 77 (1949); Pyong Choon Hahm, Korea‟s Initial Encounter with the 
Western Law 1910-1948 A.D., in KOREAN JURISPRUDENCE, POLITICS AND CULTURE 144-51 (1986).   
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Japanese government during the period of Japanese rule continue in force unless repealed or 
modified by the U.S. military government.
7
  Although the U.S. military government enacted the 
Patent Act covering inventions, utility models, and designs, and enacted the Trademark Act by 
ordinances of the military government in 1946, it did not engage in the separate enactment of 
laws relating to copyright protection and unfair competition.
8
  Thus, the law relating to these 
areas was continued in force even after the end of the Japanese rule in Korea.
9
  The ordinance 
concerning unfair competition was repealed by the Korean UCPA, which was enacted in 1961 as 
a part of the modernization measures of Korean law in general.
10
  The Act did not contain a 
general clause on unfair competition.  Rather, it included only ten articles that mainly provided 
civil remedies, including injunctive relief and damages, for six forms of unfair competition.
11
  
Accordingly, as in Japan, there was no statutory protection directly governing the 
misappropriation of trade secrets in Korea until 1991.  
Because there was no legal concept of ―yŏngŏp pimil [trade secret]‖ and no general 
provision governing unfair competition, it was difficult for Korean lawyers and holders of 
valuable information to rely on the Korean UCPA when seeking legal remedies in cases 
involving the misappropriation of valuable information.  Absent such legal protections as general 
laws, the Civil Code and Penal Code in Korea were in a position to play alternative roles in 
                                                 
7
 Ijŏnpŏmnyŏng ǔi hyoryŏk e kwanhan kŏn [Regarding the effects of previous laws, etc.], U.S. Military 
Government Ordinance No. 21, 1945, art. 1 (effective on Nov. 3, 1945) (S. Korea).   
8
 T‗ǔkhŏpŏp [Patent Act], U.S. Military Government Ordinance No. 91, 1946 (S. Korea).  However, a 
commentator states that ―the modern intellectual property law system was introduced around the 1960s.  For 
example, the Patent Act was enacted in 1961; the Trademark Act in 1963; Copyright Act in 1957.‖  Son-Guk Kim, 
Recent Trends in Korean Intellectual Property Law System, in RECENT TRANSFORMATIONS IN KOREAN LAW AND 
SOCIETY (Dae-Kyu Yoon ed. 2000) (hereinafter, Kim, Korean Intellectual Property).   
9
 Because Japan amended the Japanese UCPA in 1939, the amended Japanese UCPA was in force until 1961.  
10
 Pujŏng kyŏngjaeng pangjipŏp [Unfair Competition Prevention Act], Law No. 911, 1961. 
11
 Id. arts. 2-3. 
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providing legal remedies to holders of valuable information.
12
  However, valuable information 
was not considered property under the Korean Civil Code unless it was created by laws or 
customary laws,
13
 and holders of the information had to resort to general contract law
14
 and tort 
law
15
 under the Korean Civil Code.
16
  Nevertheless, protections available under contract law and 
tort law did not provide sufficient legal remedies to holders of the information because the 
Korean Civil Code had the same limitations as its counterparts under the Japanese Civil Code.
17
  
On the one hand, contract law could not provide legal remedies to holders in cases in which there 
was no contractual relationship.  On the other hand, although the general provisions of tort law 
did not require ―infringement of a right‖ for tort liability, unlike the general provisions governing 
tort law in Japan, injunctive relief was not recognized as a legal remedy for tort liability, as in 
Japan.
18
  In part because of the lack of civil remedies, individual criminal provisions, such as 
                                                 
12
 Valuable information had been referred to generally as ―know-how‖ rather than trade secrets.  UI-CHANG 
HWANG & KWANG-YEON HWANG, PUJŎNG KYŎNGJAENG PANGJI MIT YŎNGŎP PIMIL POHOPŎP [UNFAIR COMPETITION 
PREVENTION AND TRADE SECRET PROTECTION LAW] 120 (4th ed. 2006) (S. Korea).  
13
 A recent Korean case that examined whether the right to publicity is a protectable exclusive right similar to a 
property right under the Korean Civil Code illustrates the issue well.  The case involved the plaintiff, the James 
Dean Foundation, having the right to publicity over James Dean, seeking injunctive relief against the defendant, 
arguing that the defendant infringed on the right to publicity over James Dean by using his signature and name on 
products of the defendant.  The court held that, under the Korean law that adopted the Civil Law system, it is hard 
to recognize the right to publicity without a basis in statutory laws, international treaties, or customary laws.  Seoul 
High Court of Korea, Judgment of April 16, 2002, Case No. 2000na42061.   
14
 See Minpŏp [Civil Code], Law No. 8720, art. 390 (2007) (S. Korea) (―If an obligor fails to effect performance in 
accordance with the tenor and purpose of the obligation, the obligee may claim damages.‖).  
15
 See id. art. 750 (―Any person who causes losses to or inflicts injuries on another person by an unlawful act, 
willfully or negligently, shall be bound to make compensation for damages arising therefrom.‖). 
16
 However, it seems that no case had dealt directly with the issue under contract law or tort law before the 
adoption of trade secret law in Korea.  Chung also noted that there had been no tort case involving trade secret 
misappropriation before the adoption of trade secret law.  See Ho-Yeol Chung, Yŏngŏppimil poho wa baramjik han 
kyŏngjaengpŏp che‟ge [Trade Secret Protection and Desirable Competition Law System], 6 PŎPGWASAHEOI [LAW 
AND SOCIETY] 124, 140 n.7 (1992) (S. Korea).   
17
 The Korean Civil Code that took effect in 1960 consists of five books: ―general principles,‖ ―law of property,‖ 
―law of obligations,‖ ―law of family,‖ and ―law of succession.‖  Although the first three books of the Code are 
―comprehensive revisions of the same parts of the old Code (the Japanese Civil Code),‖ and, in some parts, they 
are closer to the German Civil Code than the Japanese Civil Code, the Korean Civil Code and the Japanese Civil 
Code share many similarities.  See INTRODUCTION TO KOREAN LAW, supra note 5, at 382-84.  
18
 See Chapter III.  
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larceny,
19
 embezzlement, or breach of trust,
20
 seem to have played a more significant role in the 
holder protecting valuable information.
21
  Nevertheless, criminal sanctions against trade secret 
misappropriation had inherent limitations because, as in Japan, for example, the Korean Penal 
Code did not recognize intangible items, such as computer files, as property.
22
   
The lack of legal remedies mentioned above might have seemed problematic from the 
point of view of holders of valuable information.  However, before the adoption of trade secret 
law, strengthening the rights of holders of valuable information did not seem to have received 
much support in Korean society.  The efforts to amend the Korean Penal Code to include crimes 
involving trade secret misappropriation, which ended in failure, are informative.  The Korean 
government started the process of amending the Penal Code beginning in 1985.  During the 
process, a ―Special Committee on the Amendment of the Penal Code‖ considered establishing 
―corporate secret leakage by officers and employees‖ and ―spying out technical or business 
secrets‖ as crimes.  However, the crimes proposed were dropped at the modification stage of the 
amendment for the reasons that strong legal protection of technical and business information 
would not be appropriate in light of the Korean situation, in which Korean corporations needed 
to adopt foreign technology and business techniques, and it would have restricted the right of 
                                                 
19
 Supreme Court of Korea, Judgment of Sep. 23, 1986, Case No. 86do1205 (convicting a former employee of 
larceny who took documents that included valuable information).  See Hyŏngpŏp [Penal Code], Law No. 7623, 
2005, art. 329 (S. Korea) (―A person who steals another‘s property shall be punished by imprisonment for not more 
than six years or by a fine not exceeding ten million won.‖). 
20
 Gwangju District Court of Korea, Judgment of Mar. 21, 1984, Case No. 83godan2371 (convicting a former 
employee of an occupational breach of trust for taking confidential technical information with the intent to supply 
the document to a competitor).  See Hyŏngpŏp [Penal Code], Law No. 7623, arts. 355 (Embezzlement and Breach 
of Trust) & 356 (Occupational Embezzlement, Occupational Breach of Trust) (2005) (S. Korea).  
21
 Munhwan Kim, Yŏngŏp pimilŭi pŏpjŏk poho [Legal Protection of Trade Secrets], 1 CHICHŎK CHAESANKWŎN 
YŎN‘GU [INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REVIEW] 84 (1991) (S. Korea).  
22 
Seoul District Court of Korea, Judgment of July 18, 2001, Case No. 2001no942 (holding that a computer file 
does not fall into the scope of subject matter under the crime of larceny because it is not a ―thing‖ protected under 
the provision).  See Tae-Yeong Ha, Han‟guk hyŏngpŏp e issŏsŏ “chaemul kwannyŏm” ǔi nonjaengsa [Discussion 
on ―the Concept of Property‖ in criminal law in Korea], 5 PIGYOHYŎNGSAPŎP YŎN‘GU [COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL 
LAW REVIEW] 279 (2003) (S. Korea).   
 111 
 
employees to freely choose their occupations.
23
   
 
 
1.2. Adoption of Trade Secret Law 
In 1991, the Korean UCPA was amended to include provisions governing trade secret 
protection.
24
  As seen above, Japan adopted trade secret law in 1990 primarily because of trade 
pressure from the United States.  In Korea, however, the law was adopted not only for external 
reasons, but also for internal reasons.  On the one hand, external reasons may have existed, 
including trade pressure and a unilateral change in the intellectual property system in the World 
Trade Organization system.  Although Korea has had intellectual property statutes, including 
patent law, copyright law, and trademark law, as one Korean commentator noted, ―there ha[d] 
been no widespread understanding or recognition of intellectual property until the 1980s.‖25  
However, the situation in Korea has changed and the issues regarding intellectual property have 
been receiving much more attention than ever before since the mid-1980s.
26
  The roots of these 
changes were trade pressure from foreign countries and the emerging unilateral system in the 
area of intellectual property in the world economy.
27
  In 1985, as a part of efforts to reduce the 
U.S. trade deficit, the United States began investigating the adequacy of Korean laws for the 
                                                 
23
 Jae Bong Kim, Yŏngŏp pimil ŭi yŏngsapŏpjŏk poho bangan [The Criminal Protection for Trade Secrets], 14 
HYŎNGSAJŎNGCH‗AEK [CRIMINOLOGY] 169, 183-84 (2002), citing MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE 
AMENDMENT OF THE PENAL CODE (1989).  The adoption of criminal sanctions against the misappropriation of 
trade secrets in the Korean UCPA that was being discussed at that time also influenced the amendment of the Penal 
Code.  As a result, criminal remedies were adopted under the Korean UCPA in 1991.   
24
 Pujŏng kyŏngjaeng pangjipŏp [Unfair Competition Prevention Act], Law No. 4478, 1991 (effective on Dec. 15, 
1992) (S. Korea) [hereinafter 1991 Korean UCPA]. 
25
 Kim, Korean Intellectual Property, supra note 8, at 241. 
26
 See SANG JO JONG, CHICHŎKCHAESANKWŎNPŎP [INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW] 18 (2004) (S. Korea) 
[hereinafter JONG, IP LAW]. 
27
 See id. at 56; Kim, Korean Intellectual Property, supra note 8, at 260 n.2. 
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protection of intellectual property rights under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.
28
  After 
initiating the investigation, on July 21, 1986, the United States and Korea reached an agreement 
on the amendment of intellectual property laws in Korea.
29
  The investigation focused on patent 
law, copyright law, and trademark law; thus, the agreement included provisions for Korea 
primarily to amend the existing laws and to improve the enforcement of those laws by the 
Korean government.
30
  By contrast, strengthening trade secret protection was not explicitly stated 
in the agreement.  Rather, a Memorandum of Understanding between Korea and the United 
States, which listed in detail the measures to be taken by the Korean government, merely stated 
that ―[Korea] also will ensure adequate protection of proprietary data‖ as a way of strengthening 
the enforcement of relevant laws.
31
  Given the context under the Memorandum and the situation 
surrounding the agreement, it does not appear that the U.S. government asked for the law to be 
adopted in Korea at that time in a manner that requested the Korean government to amend patent 
                                                 
28
 The United States Trade Representatives stated the following:  
Korea‘s laws appear to deny effective protection for U.S. intellectual property.  For example, Korea‘s 
patent law does not cover certain types of products.  In other cases, protection is limited to processes only.  
Copyright protection is virtually non-existent for works of U.S. authors.  U.S. industry has expressed 
concern that these practices have inhibited U.S. sales and investment in Korea.  USTR is therefore 
initiating an investigation concerning the adequacy of Korea‘s laws and their effect on U.S. trade. 
Korea Intellectual Property, 50 Fed. Reg. 45, 883-01 (Off. U.S. Trade. Rep. 1985) (investigation initiation).  For an 
overview and relevant cases on Japan and Korea of section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, see Patricia I. Hansen, 
Note, Defining Unreasonableness in International Trade: Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 96 YALE L. J. 1122 
(1987).  
29
 Memorandum for the United States Trade Representative, 51 Fed. Reg. 29445 (Presidential Memorandum, Aug. 
14, 1986) (termination of the investigation).  
30
 In the Memorandum, the Korean government agreed to take the following measures:  
Introduce for enactment by July 1, 1987, comprehensive copyright laws explicitly covering computer 
software; accede to the Universal Copyright convention and Geneva Phonograms Convention by October 
1987; introduce amendments to its patent law to extend product patent protection for chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals and for new uses of these products; adhere to the Budapest Treaty and extend patent 
protection to new microorganisms; and remove requirements for technology inducement and exportation 
previously applied to trademarked goods and remove restrictions on royalty terms in trademark licenses.  
Id.  
31
 United States of America and Republic of Korea, Record of Understanding on Intellectual Property Rights (with 
related letter), 2231 U.N.T.S. 308, 310 (2004), available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/unts/144078_158780/2/9/11269.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2010).   
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law, copyright law, and trademark law within time limits.  Nonetheless, the U.S. government was 
concerned about deficiencies in trade secret protection in Korea, including no trade secret 
protection against third parties, inadequate civil remedies, and inadequate criminal penalties, 
which could result in an unintended loss of trade secrets from U.S. companies.
32
  It is difficult to 
deny the possibility that, given this situation, Korea wanted to avoid possible trade retaliation by 
the U.S. government.  In fact, a review report on the amendment of the Korean UCPA prepared 
by the Korean National Assembly pointed out that Korea should implement a measure 
strengthening trade secret protection as enumerated the 1986 agreement between Korea and the 
United States.
33
  In addition, to avoid possible future trade conflicts caused by the lack of trade 
secret protection, the Korea government needed to adopt minimum levels of legal protection of 
trade secrets, as required under the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPs)
34
 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),
35
 which was under 
discussion at that time.
36
   
                                                 
32
 Korea was identified as one of the countries with deficiencies in the protection of trade secrets, along with 
Mexico, Brazil, Taiwan, China, and Japan, in the report by the U.S. International Trade Commission.  The report 
pointed out that Korea had the following problems concerning trade secret protection: no protection against third 
parties; no preliminary or final injunctive relief; lack of seizure and impoundment remedies; lack of exclusion of 
imports; lack of compulsory process and/or discovery; inadequate civil remedies; inadequate criminal penalties; 
unreasonably slow enforcement process; enforcement officials discriminating against foreigners; court decisions 
biased or political.  Foreign Protection of Intellectual Property Rights and the Effect on U.S. Industry and Trade 50 
(USITC Pub. 2065, Investigation No. 332-245, Feb. 1988), available at 1988 ITC LEXIS 21.   
33
 See Sangongwiwonhoe hoeǔirok [Minutes of Commerce and Industry Committee Meeting regarding the 
Amendment of the Korean Unfair Competition Prevention Act] (National Assembly of Korea, Nov. 21, 1991) (S. 
Korea), available at http://likms.assembly.go.kr/kms_data/record/data1/156/156ka0008b.PDF#page=1 (last visited 
Feb. 24, 2010) [hereinafter Minutes].   
34
 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1197.  As Article 
3 of TRIPs indicated, the agreement seeks to remove the economic tension arising from differences in the extent of 
protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights among member countries and to encourage technological 
advances and innovation.  TRIPs, art. 3.  
35
 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 (as amended).  
36
 See Minutes, supra note 33; Sang-Hyun Song & Seong-Ki Kim, The Impact of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 
on Intellectual Property Laws in Korea, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 118, 129-30 (1994) (―The trade secret law could 
not have been enacted in such a timely manner in Korea without the international recognition of trade secrets as a 
kind of IPR which was crystallized in the draft TRIPS provisions.‖).  
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On the other hand, the Korean government seemed to have considered the adoption of 
trade secret law as having a sort of announcement effect to induce technology transfer and direct 
investment from foreign countries.  Since the early stage of industrialization in the 1960s, Korea 
had relied on foreign technologies, and two of the largest technology suppliers, especially 
through licensing, had been Japan and the United States.
37
  In the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
however, technology transfer through licensing decreased sharply.
38
  One of the reasons for the 
decrease in technology transfer from foreign countries with advanced technologies was said to be 
the lack of intellectual property laws protecting the technology transferred after licensing was 
terminated.
39
  In this context, it seems plausible that Japan‘s adoption of trade secret law in 1990 
affected the Korean government, which wanted to adopt trade secret law to attract more foreign 
technology, especially from Japan and the United States.  Indeed, the intent of the Korean 
government was apparent in the legislative purpose of the trade secret law as well.  The proposed 
amendment to the Korean UCPA in 1991 pointed out one of the necessities of the amendment as 
follows:   
Korea has been recognized as a free rider regarding the use of know-how among 
foreign advanced countries.  For this reason, there have been many cases in which 
the advanced countries have avoided supplying new technologies and know-how.  
Now, in light of the stage of our industrial economy, it seems difficult to use these 
technologies without paying fair compensation.  Thus, it is necessary to protect 
trade secrets, which may enable Korea to gain trust and promote technology 
transfer from foreign countries.
40
 
                                                 
37
 For example, in Korea, 8,069 technology transfers through licensing were undertaken between 1962 and 1992.  
Japan undertook 50.1% (4,045 cases) of them and ranked first.  CHEONSEOK IM, CH‗OEGǓN URINARA ǓI ILBON 
KISUL TOIP HYŎNHWANG KWA CHŎNGCH‗AEK PANGHYANG [RECENT TRENDS IN TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER OF KOREA 
FROM JAPAN] 27 (Korea Institute for International Economy Policy, 1993) (S. Korea).  For an overview of 
technology imports in Korea until 1990, see Kwang Doo Kim & Sang Ho Lee, The Role of the Korean 
Government in Technology Import, in THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF JAPAN AND KOREA (Chung H. Lee & Ippei 
Yamazawa eds., 1990).  
38
 Korea‘s inward technology transfer decreased from 738 cases in 1989 to 533 cases in 1992.  IM, supra note 37, at 
27.  
39
 IM, supra note 37, at 74; Minutes, supra note 33, at 28. 
40
 Minutes, supra note 33, at 28. 
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For these internal and external reasons, the Korean government began preparing to adopt trade 
secret law.  In August 1988, the Korean Intellectual Property Office (KIPO) formed a research 
team that collected and analyzed foreign laws regarding trade secret protection.
41
  Between 1989 
and 1990, the KIPO held seminars in which trade secret laws in West Germany, Switzerland, the 
United States, and Japan were examined, and it concluded that the new trade secret law should 
be incorporated into the Korean UCPA.
42
  In June 1991, a public hearing was held to hear 
comments on the proposed amendment by the KIPO.  In the hearing, the following issues were 
raised and debated: possible conflicts between patent protection and trade secret protection; 
possible restrictions on the right of employees to freely choose their occupations; the necessity of 
statutes of limitation with a shorter time period; the preservation of secrecy in litigation; and 
concerns regarding criminal sanctions against former employees.
43
  Some of these issues, such as 
comments regarding statutes of limitation and criminal sanctions against former employees, were 
reflected in the final bill.  On July 4, 1991, a notice regarding the amendment was placed in the 
Official Gazette.  During the period for public comment, some comments were submitted by 
several entities, such as the Korea Electronics Association, Gold Star (currently LG), the Korea 
Invention Promotion Association, and Korea IBM.  Interestingly, Korean companies, including 
the Korea Electronics Association and Gold Star, pointed out possible negative effects of the law 
on Korean industry because, under the law, Korean companies could be required to enter into 
unfair agreements when they adopted advanced know-how from foreign countries.
44
  On the 
                                                 
41
 Youngcheol Chung, Yŏngŏppimilpŏp jejŏng ǔi munje [Problems in the Enactment of Trade Secret Law], 9 
SANGSAPŎPYŎN‘GU [COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW] 289 (1991) (S. Korea) [hereinafter Chung, Enactment of Trade 
Secret Law] (introducing legislative history of the 1991 amendment of the Korean UCPA). 
42
 Id. at 289. 
43
 Id. 
44
 Id.  On the other hand, Hwang noted the survey results by the Korean Chamber of Commerce and Industry and 
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other hand, Korea IBM, a multinational company in Korea, argued that the law should extend the 
definition of a trade secret, the scope of trade secret misappropriations, and criminal penalties.
45
  
The U.S. government also submitted comments in nonpaper form in which it raised questions 
regarding the requirement for independent economic value in the definition of a trade secret and 
subjective requirements (intent or gross negligence) for trade secret misappropriation.
46
  The 
Korean government introduced the final bill to the Korean National Assembly on October 11, 
1991, and the Korean National Assembly passed the bill without much debate; the bill was 
promulgated on December 31, 1991.
47
   
The 1991 Korean UCPA adopted the definition of a trade secret, which included six types 
of trade secret misappropriation and legal remedies, including injunctive relief and damages for 
trade secret misappropriation.  The Korean trade secret law enacted in 1991 seems to have been 
affected in part by the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) in the United States and substantially 
affected by the Japanese UCPA.  The subject matter of trade secret protection under the Korean 
UCPA is ―any technical or business information useful for any production and sales methods and 
other business activities, which is not known to the public, has an independent economic value, 
and has been maintained in secret by considerable efforts.‖48  The definition of a trade secret 
seems to be have been affected by the UTSA because provisions in the definition expressly 
include an ―independent economic value‖ requirement, unlike that under the Japanese UCPA.49  
                                                                                                                                                             
the Federation of Korean Information Industries, which indicated 93.6 and 89.3% of the Korean companies 
surveyed acknowledged the need for adoption of a trade secret law.  Uichang Hwang, Yŏngŏp pimil poho ippŏpan 
ch„ukcho haesŏl [Explanation of Trade Secret Law Bill], 172 KIGYESANŎP [ENGINEERING INDUSTRIES] 44 (1991).  
45
 Chung, Enactment of Trade Secret Law, supra note 41, at 289. 
46
 Id. at 292. 
47
 1991 Koran UCPA, supra note 24. 
48
 1991 Koran UCPA, supra note 24, art. 2, para. 2. 
49
 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (4), 14 U.L.A. 537 (2005).  
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On the other hand, as Korean scholars and commentators have also noted, other provisions, such 
as the types of trade secret misappropriation, injunctive relief, and damages, are very similar to 
their counterparts under the Japanese UCPA.
50
  The Korean UCPA did not include a general 
provision governing unfair competition.  Instead, it provided six types of trade secret 
misappropriation almost identical to those under the Japanese UCPA.
51
  Like the Japanese UCPA, 
these can be divided mainly into two groups, depending on how the trade secrets are acquired.  
According to the legislative record, it seems that the Korean government wanted to protect 
domestic companies that had a relatively inferior level of technology compared with companies 
in foreign countries with advanced technology.
52
  In other words, it appears to have been 
intended to prevent foreign companies‘ abuse of suits involving trade secrets by restricting the 
types of trade secret misappropriation.  The Korean UCPA also provided legal remedies, 
including injunctive relief and damages for trade secret misappropriation, and these legal 
remedies were said to be special rules for tortious acts.
53
  The primary difference in trade secret 
law between Korea and Japan was that the 1991 Korean UCPA provided criminal sanctions 
against current officers and employees who leaked technology information qualifying as a trade 
secret with the purpose of gaining unfair profit or causing harm to a trade secret holder.
54
  This 
criminal penalty was adopted based on consideration of the Korean people‘s traditional attitude 
toward litigation, in which they preferred to rely on criminal sanctions rather than civil 
                                                 
50
 SANGJO JONG & JUNSEOK PARK, YŎNGŎPPIMIL ǓI SAPŎPJŎK POHO E KWANHAN PIGYOPŎPJŎK YŎN‘GU 
[COMPARATIVE STUDY ON JUDICIAL PROTECTION OF TRADE SECRETS] (Seoul National University Center for Law 
and Technology, 2009) (S. Korea). 
51
 1991 Korean UCPA, supra note 24, art. 2, para. 3.  
52
 Minutes, supra note 33, at 28. 
53
 1991 Korean UCPA, supra note 24, arts. 4-5. 
54
 1991 Korean UCPA, supra note 24, art. 18, para. 1, item 3. 
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remedies.
55
  In addition to similarities in the contents of trade secret law, the Korean UCPA also 
had inherent limitations in properly protecting trade secret holders because of its lack of 
procedural measures allowing the trade secret to be preserved in secret during litigation under the 
Korean Constitution.
56
   
 
 
1.3. Development  
Although the statutory protection of trade secrets has been available since December 
1992, only a small number of trade secret cases were brought to trial in the early stages of 
implementing the law.
57
  In part because of the lack of a strong impact on Korean industry, the 
trade secret law enacted in 1991 remained unchanged until 1998.  Trade secret law in Korea 
began to be strengthened dramatically in 1998.  Indeed, since then, the law has been amended 
several times to enlarge the scope of trade secret protection under the Act and to enhance 
punishments for trade secret misappropriations.  The primary cause for enhancing trade secret 
law in Korea was a 1998 industrial espionage case involving trade secrets relating to 
semiconductor technology by Samsung Electronics Co., the world‘s largest memory-chip maker, 
                                                 
55
 Chung, Enactment of Trade Secret Law, supra note 41, at 296. 
56
 As examined below, as in Japan, Article 109 of the Korean Constitution provides for the principle of an open 
trial.  Hŏnpŏp [Constitution of the Republic of Korea], art. 109 (S. Korea) (―Trials and decisions of the courts are 
open to the public: Provided, that when there is a danger that such trials may undermine the national security or 
disturb public safety and order, or be harmful to public morals, trials may be closed to the public by court 
decision.‖).  Pursuant to the Article of the Constitution, the Court Organization Act reaffirmed the principle of 
opening of the trial to the public.  See  Pŏpwon jojikpŏp [Court Organization Act], Law No. 4300, 1990, art. 57, 
para. 1 (S. Korea) (―The hearing and ruling of a trial shall be open to the public.  However, if a public hearing is 
perceived to potentially harm national security, public order, or social morality, it may be decided to close the trial 
to the public.‖).  
57
 I examined trade secret cases on the legal information site of the Korean Supreme Court.  Although the site does 
not include all cases published in Korea, I found only seven cases involving trade secrets until 1997.  See Legal 
Information Site of the Korean Supreme Court, http://glaw.scourt.go.kr/jbsonw/jbson.do (last visited Feb. 27, 
2010).   
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and LG Electronics Co., which triggered a series of amendments.  In February 1998, Korean 
prosecutors announced that they had arrested 16 people on charges of stealing and selling secret 
technology information for manufacturing 64-megabit dynamic random-access memory 
(DRAM) chips produced by the Korean manufacturers, which were the largest memory chips 
then in mass production.  The 16 people, former and current employees of Samsung and LG, had 
sold the technology, which was acquired in a wrongful manner, to Nanya Technology Corp. 
(NTC), a Taiwanese semiconductor manufacturer.
58
  The semiconductor industry in Korea began 
as a strategic industry in the early 1980s with the support of the Korean government.
59
  Since 
then, it has developed rapidly as a core industry supporting the export-oriented economy of 
Korea.  After experiencing a learning stage of the relevant technology, the Korean semiconductor 
industry pursued its counterparts in the United States and Japan in the global market.  In the mid-
1990s, Samsung developed 64-megabit DRAMs and expected this new semiconductor to 
improve exports.
60
  Thus, this industrial espionage case related to high-level technology with an 
international competitive advantage provided a strong incentive for the Korean government to 
                                                 
58
 See Chip Technology Leaked to Taiwan, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 3, 1998, at A5, available at 1998 WLNR 
1500558; Taiwan Firm Denied Charges of Industrial Espionage, CEN. NEWS AGENCY (Taiwan), Feb. 3, 1998, 
available at 1998 WLNR 4477116 (―Seoul prosecution officials said that Kim Hyong-ik, a former Samsung 
researcher, set up Korea Semiconductor Technology Co. (KSTC) in Seoul in 1997 and has received monthly 
payments of US$100,000 from NTC in exchange for technology it has stolen from Samsung and LG.‖).  
59
 For an overview of the Korean semiconductor industry from the 1980s to 1990s, see MICHAEL PECHT ET AL., 
THE KOREAN ELECTRONICS INDUSTRY 29-44 (1997); S. Ran Kim, The Korean system of Innovation and the 
Semiconductor Industry: A Governance Perspective, 7 INDUS. CORP. CHANGE 275 (1998).  
60
 Michael Pecht et al. states:  
In 1994, Samsung, LG and Hyundai were in the global top-10 list of memory suppliers.  A major factor in 
this considerable success is that Korean manufacturers have successfully implemented more efficient 
mass production techniques, thus allowing for more competitive unit pricing. . . . The Korean 
semiconductor industry captured nearly one-quarter of the world market in 1994, and specifically, Korea‘s 
share of the DRAM market increased from 10% in 1993 to a 1994 value of 29%. . . . In 1996, forecasts 
for Korean semiconductor exports have been revised downward several times due to a glut and 
plummeting prices for 16 Mbit DRAMs ($30 to $11).  In response, the industry has pushed ahead with 
early transition to 64 Mbit DRAMs and higher-value-added memory chips.   
PECHT ET AL., supra note 59, at 11.  
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strengthen the relevant laws.   
The Korean government‘s anxiety about foreign economic espionage led to amendments 
to the Korean UCPA in 1998.
61
  As a result, the 1998 amendments focused on adopting measures 
to protect critical indigenous technologies with a competitive advantage in the global market.  
First, in the 1998 amendment, the Korean government showed that trade secret protection was 
important to the Korean economy by adding the phrase ―trade secret protection‖ in the title of the 
Korean UCPA.
62
  Second, as in Japan, the amendment adopted some provisions relieving the 
plaintiff‘s burden of proof regarding the amount of damages in trade secret cases.  These 
provisions included a provision that presumed the amount of damages based on the amount of 
profit gained by the defendants and a provision that allowed the plaintiffs to seek damages based 
on a reasonable royalty.
63
  Third, the amendment enlarged the scope of employees who were 
subject to criminal liability for trade secret misappropriation by including former employees.
64
  
With respect to foreign economic espionage, as in the Economic Espionage Act (EEA) in the 
United States, the amendment exacted greater penalties for trade secret misappropriation in cases 
in which the use of trade secrets occurred abroad, by providing a term of up to seven years in 
prison, 1 billion Korean won (about $1 million), or both.
65
   
                                                 
61
 See SANŎPCHAWŎN WIWŎNHOE [COMMITTEE OF COMMERCE, INDUSTRY, AND ENERGY], PUJŎNG KYŎNGJAENG 
PANGIPŎP CHUNG KAEJŎNG PŎPRYULAN GŎMTO POKOSŎ [REVIEW REPORT OF THE AMENDMENT BILL OF THE UNFAIR 
COMPETITION PREVENTION ACT] (Nov. 1998) (stating the need to address the increasing number of industrial 
espionage cases as the primary legislative purpose of the amendment).  
62
 The Korean UCPA changed its title to ―the Unfair Competition Prevention and Trade Secret Protection Act.‖  See 
Pujŏng kyŏngjaeng pangji mit yŏngŏp pimil pohoe kwanhan pŏmnyul [Unfair Competition Prevention and Trade 
Secret Protection Act], Law No. 5621, 1998, art. 14 bis. (effective on Jan. 1, 1999) (S. Korea) [hereinafter 1998 
Korean UCPA]. 
63
 Id. art. 14 bis.  
64
 Id. art. 18, para. 2.  
65
 Id. art. 18, para. 1.  COMMITTEE OF COMMERCE, INDUSTRY, AND ENERGY OF THE KOREAN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, 
PUJŎNGKYŎNGJAENG PANJIPŎPRYULAN SIMSA POGOSŎ [REVIEW REPORT ON THE AMENDMENT OF UNFAIR 
COMPETITION PREVENTION ACT] 4 (Dec. 1998) (S. Korea). 
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The Korean government further amended the Korean UCPA in 2001, 2004, and 2009 to 
strengthen trade secret protection.  However, except for the 2001 amendment, which provided 
additional provisions relieving the plaintiff‘s burden of proof for the amount of damages awarded 
in damage relief, the other amendments focused on strengthening criminal sanctions.
66
  The 2004 
amendment expanded the scope of subject matter by adding business information to the category 
of material protected as a trade secret under criminal sanctions; the amendment also expanded 
the scope of persons subject to criminal liability by making ―any person‖ liable for 
misappropriation of trade secrets, broadening the statute‘s scope beyond current and former 
employees or officers.
67
  Further, the 2004 amendment criminalized attempts to, preparation to, 
and conspiracy to misappropriate a trade secret, and removed a provision that prohibited 
punishment for trade secret misappropriation without a complaint from a plaintiff.
68
  It also 
imposed criminal liability on legal persons for trade secret misappropriations by a representative 
or an agent, employee, or other person employed by a legal person.
69
  The 2009 amendment 
criminalized the acquisition of a trade secret, knowing that the trade secret would be used 
abroad.
70
  The Korean government and proponents of sterner measures looked to the United 
States‘ passage of the EEA in 1996 to support similar measures in Korea.71  
                                                 
66
 See Pujŏng kyŏngjaeng pangji mit yŏngŏp pimil pohoe kwanhan pŏmnyul [Unfair Competition Prevention and 
Trade Secret Protection Act], Law No. 6421, 2001, art. 14, paras. 2 & 5. (S. Korea) [hereinafter 2001 Korean 
UCPA].  
67
 Pujŏng kyŏngjaeng pangji mit yŏngŏp pimil pohoe kwanhan pŏmnyul [Unfair Competition Prevention and 
Trade Secret Protection Act], Law No. 7095, 2004, art. 18, paras. 1 & 2. (S. Korea) [hereinafter 2004 Korean 
UCPA].  
68
 Id. art. 18 bis. & ter. 
69
 Id. art. 19. 
70
 2009 Korean UCPA, supra note 1, art. 18, para. 1. 
71
 See KUKHOE SANŎP CHAWŎN WIWŎNHOE [THE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, INDUSTRY, AND ENERGY OF THE 
KOREAN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY], PUJŎNG KYŎNJAENG BANGJI MIT YŎNGŎP PIMIL POHOE GWANHAN PŎPNYUL JUNG 
KAEJŎNG PŎPNYULAN SIMSAPOGOSŎ [THE EXAMINING REPORT FOR BILL OF THE AMENDMENT OF THE UNFAIR 
COMPETITION PREVENTION AND TRADE SECRET PROTECTION ACT] (Dec. 2003) (S. Korea). 
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However, there have been some criticisms of the amendments that enlarged the scope of 
trade secret protection and increased the applicable punishments.  Critics, especially scientists, 
engineers, and employers of medium-sized enterprises, have maintained that the amendments 
could restrict employees‘ right to choose employment, which is protected under the Korean 
Constitution.  This, in turn, would potentially harm small- to medium-sized companies, which 
might rely on the skill and expertise previously acquired by employees at large companies, to 
develop their own technologies.
72
  The tension between the enhancement of punishments to deter 
industrial espionage and protection of the Constitutional right to choose one‘s occupation is 
illustrated in recent efforts in the Korean legislature to adopt a measure criminalizing industrial 
espionage while keeping the management of critical technology under the control of the Korean 
government.
73
  The Korean government has been concerned with the increasing incidents of theft 
of proprietary information and the potential loss from these incidents.  These cases of industrial 
espionage, especially technology leakage to foreign countries, appear to have threatened the 
Korean economy because of their focus on the development of high-technology industries, such 
as information technology and biotechnology.  Indeed, in September of 2004, the Ministry of 
Commerce, Industry, and Energy, in an interagency meeting, stated that 51 foreign industrial 
espionage cases related to technology leakage to foreign countries had been identified by the 
National Intelligence Service between 1998 and 2004, and that the potential losses could total 
approximately $4 billion.
74
  The Ministry further indicated that information technologies, such as 
technologies related to the mobile phone and the plasma display panel, were top targets for 
                                                 
72
 See, e.g., Kwon-Chul Shin, Kŭllojaŭi kyŏngŏp kŭmji ŭimu [Employee‘s Duty of Noncompetition], 18 
NODONGPŎP YŎN‘GU [LABOR LAW STUDIES] 264 (2005) (S. Korea). 
73
 See Seoul to Regulate Technology Outflow, THE KOREA HERALD, Sep. 20, 2004.  
74
 SANŎP CHAWŎN PU [MINISTRY OF COMMERCE, INDUSTRY, AND ENERGY], KISULYUCH‗UL PANGJI DAECHAEK 
[PREVENTION OF TECHNOLOGY LEAKAGE] (Sep. 18, 2004) (S. Korea) [hereinafter MOCIE, 2004 TECHNOLOGY 
LEAKAGE].  See also Industrial Spying Cost W4.4 trial. Since 98, THE KOREA HERALD, Sep. 1, 2004. 
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foreign industrial espionage, and they concluded that in response to the growing problem of 
foreign industrial espionage, additional legislative measures should be taken.
75
  Likewise, large 
enterprises with state-of-the-art technologies and relevant governmental agencies in charge of 
dealing with industrial espionage cases emphasized the need for a new law effectively protecting 
critical national technologies, and these arguments became more persuasive in Korean society in 
light of several high-profile cases of industrial espionage.
76
  In contrast, scientists and civil rights 
advocates opposed the bill based on the possibility of excessive restraint on employees‘ right to 
choose employment and ambiguities about the scope of the subject matter protected under the 
proposed law.
77
   
Despite these criticisms, Korea eventually enacted the Industrial Technology Leak 
Prevention and Protection Support Act (hereafter, the ―ITPA‖).78  Unlike the Korean UCPA, the 
ITPA limits its protected subject matter to ―industrial technology,‖ which does not include 
business information, but can be broadened by authorities with the discretion to designate it.
79
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 MOCIE, 2004 TECHNOLOGY LEAKAGE, supra note 74.  It further indicated that information technologies, such as 
mobile phone-related technologies and PDP, were top targets for foreign industrial espionage.  
76
 See IT Industry Threatened by Espionage, THE KOREA HERALD, June 3, 2004.  The arguments of proponents 
regarding the enactment of this act seem to be similar to those of the U.S. Congress concerning the enactment of 
the EEA.  Dreyfuss explains that even if there were some laws protecting proprietary information and secret 
information before the enactment of the EEA, the U.S. Congress did not think that they were adequate.  Moreover, 
she explains that the Congress ―found that companies often fail[ed] to avail themselves of their civil remedies due 
to the cost of pursuing legal action and the possibility that the defendant [would] be found judgment proof. . . . 
Congress also spoke of a need for legislation that is comprehensive, meaning protection that transcends state and 
national borders.‖ (citation omitted).  Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Trade Secrets: How Well Should We Be Allowed 
to Hide Them? The Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1, 6-7 (1998).  
77
 For example, the Association of Scientists and Engineers of Korea expressed concerns about the bill.  Although 
the bill was originally introduced to the Korean National Assembly on November 2004, the Assembly eventually 
passed the bill in September 2006.   
78
 Sanŏp kisul ŭi yuch‗ul pangji mit poho e kwanhan pŏpnyul [Industrial Technology Leak Prevention and 
Protection Support Act], Law No. 8062, 2006 (S. Korea) [hereinafter 2006 ITPA].  The Act came into effect on April 
28, 2007.   
79
 To be protected under this act, the three principal requirements for trade secrets—not generally known to the 
public, independent economic value, and considerable efforts to keep the secret—are not necessary.  Sanŏp kisul ŭi 
yuch‗ul pangji mit poho e kwanhan pŏpnyul [Industrial Technology Leak Prevention and Protection Support Act], 
Law. No 9368, 2009, art. 34, para. 1 & art. 36., para. 5 (S. Korea) [hereinafter 2009 ITPA]. 
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The Korean government explained that, unlike the Korean UCPA, the primary goal of the ITPA 
is to prevent illegal leaks of industrial technologies to parties at home as well as abroad, and to 
support preventive activities in protecting industrial technologies.
80
  Thus, the Act focuses on the 
administrative management of industrial technology with international competitiveness by 
creating the Committee on Industrial Technology Protection under the Prime Minister.  The ITPA 
also controls the free export of technologies designated as national critical technologies.
81
  
Nevertheless, the Act also provides strong criminal punishment for leaking industrial 
technologies, and it has been criticized for possible restrictions on labor mobility and the right of 
employees to choose their occupation. 
 
 
2. Current Trade Secret Law in Korea  
2.1. Subject Matter 
As mentioned briefly above, the Korean UCPA appears to have been affected by the 
definition of a trade secret under the UTSA in the United States.  Accordingly, the requirements 
under the substantive law to qualify for trade secret protection are almost identical to those under 
the UTSA, and these requirements can be said to be very similar to those under the Japanese 
UCPA as well.  In addition, although Korea has accumulated fewer cases determining the 
definition of a trade secret under the Korean UCPA compared with the United States and Japan, 
                                                 
80
 To achieve this goal, the act establishes a national framework to protect domestic industrial technologies by 
creating ―the Committee on Industrial Technology Protection‖ under the Prime Minister.  Id. art. 7.  
81
 When an entity (or institution) develops national critical technologies with government R & D funds, and intends 
to export by sale or transfer of technology to a foreign country, the entity must obtain the approval of the Minister 
of Commerce, Industry, and Energy.  In the case of an entity that holds and manages national critical technologies 
and intends to export them, the entity must report to the Minister of Commerce, Industry, and Energy in advance.  
Id. art. 11, para. 1.  
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the courts‘ approach to the scope of the subject matter under the Korean UCPA does not appear 
to be very different from its counterparts in the United States and Japan.
82
  Like its counterparts 
in these two countries, the Korean UCPA provides three requirements for information to qualify 
as a trade secret.
83
   
First, information must have ―independent economic value.‖  The Korean Supreme Court 
held that ―information has independent economic value when the information provides 
competitive advantages over competitors or when considerable efforts or costs are necessary to 
acquire or develop the information.‖84  The Court further held that ―in cases in which the 
information falls into the scope of the above occasions, even if the information does not reach 
the final stage in which it can be used for business operations, the information has not actually 
helped the third party, or anyone with prototypes who can learn the information through 
experiment, these facts do not hinder the information from being protected as a trade secret.‖85  
Given the context of the judgment of the Court, negative or potential information satisfies this 
requirement.
86
  In addition, the requirement seems to play a role in limiting protectable subject 
matter.  Thus, as in Japan, information that harms honest commercial practices, such as 
information relating to tax evasion and pollutants, cannot be protected under the Korean UCPA.   
Second, the information must not be generally known.  The Supreme Court of Korea held 
that information meets the requirement ―when it is not readily ascertainable to acquire the 
                                                 
82
 This may be in part because of the influence of Korean scholars and commentators who have introduced the U.S. 
cases and Japanese cases in the area of trade secret law in the courts. 
83
 2009 Korean UCPA, art. 18, para. 1. 
84
 Supreme Court of Korea, Judgment of July 9, 2009, Case No. 2009do250; Supreme Court of Korea, Judgment of 
Feb. 15, 2008, Case No. 2005do6223; Supreme Court of Korea, Judgment of July 9, 2009, Case No. 2006do7916; 
Supreme Court of Korea, Judgment of Dec. 23, 1996, Case No. 96da16605. 
85
 Supreme Court of Korea, Judgment of Feb. 15, 2008, Case No. 2005do6223.  
86
 Most Korean legal scholars also agree that negative information meets the requirement of independent economic 
value because a person who acquires the negative information can save his or her efforts or costs without the same 
failure in the process of development.  See JONG & PARK, supra note 50, at 50. 
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information except by the owner of the trade secret because it is not generally known to the 
public.‖87  The criterion used for determining the requirement of secrecy is that it be in the same 
industry in which the information is exploited.
88
  Thus, if the information is disclosed in a patent 
or contained in published materials, it does not qualify as a trade secret under the Korean 
UCPA.
89
  In addition, in cases in which an idea has not been used in Korea, if it is generally 
known to or used by people who can gain economic value from it in foreign countries, it is not a 
secret qualifying for protection as a trade secret.
90
  However, if a technology holder has kept a 
technology imported from a foreign country secret after improving the technology, it is 
protectable as a trade secret.
91
  Nevertheless, the requirement of secrecy ―does not mean absolute 
secrecy.‖92  Accordingly, even though the information may be known by some people, if the 
information remains secret from others, it may fall into the scope of a trade secret protected 
under trade secret law.
93
  With respect to the theoretical possibility of others ascertaining the 
information through proper means, the Supreme Court of Korea held that the theoretical 
possibility of reverse engineering the trade secret from semiconductors containing the 
information sold by competitors does not necessarily preclude protection as a trade secret.
94
   
Third, the trade secret holder must make considerable effort to keep it in secrecy.  
Although the Korean UCPA stipulates that efforts to keep trade secrets in secrecy be 
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 Supreme Court of Korea, Judgment of Sep. 23, 2004, Case No. 2002da60610.   
88
 See Supreme Court of Korea, Judgment of July 10, 2008, Case No. 2006do8278.   
89
 Supreme Court of Korea, Judgment of Sep. 23, 2004, Case No. 2002da60610.   
90
 Seoul District Court of Korea, Judgment of Feb. 14, Case No. 96gahap7170.   
91
 Supreme Court of Korea, Judgment of Nov. 26, 1996, Case No. 96da31574; Seoul District Court of Korea, 
Decision of March 27, 1995, Case No. 94kahap12987.   
92
 Seoul High Court of Korea, Judgment of Feb. 28, 1996, Case No. 95da14420.   
93
 Id.   
94
 Supreme Court of Korea, Judgment of March 12, 1999, Case No. 98do4704 (Samsung semiconductor case)  
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―considerable (sangdanghan),‖ the requirement seems to have a meaning identical to 
―reasonable‖ under the UTSA in the United States.  In practice, the courts‘ approach to this 
requirement seems to be similar to that of the courts in Japan.  Indeed, the Supreme Court of 
Korea held that the requirement of keeping it secret through considerable effort is satisfied in a 
situation in which, from an objective point of view, it is possible to know that the information 
has been kept and maintained in secrecy.
95
  The Court illustrated measures for keeping and 
maintaining secrecy, such as ―marking or notifying [others of] the existence of a [trade] secret, 
limiting access to a trade secret, or imposing a duty of confidence on a person who has access to 
the information.‖96  But from the fact-intensive nature of the inquiry into the existence of 
―considerable efforts,‖ as in the United States and Japan, Korean courts seem to consider several 
factors and circumstances, thereby seeking a balance between the economic value of the alleged 
trade secret and the costs of keeping the information secret.
97
   
 
 
2.2. Misappropriation of Trade Secrets  
The Korean UCPA provides for six types of trade secret misappropriation.
98
  As 
mentioned briefly above, the words and contents of these are almost identical to those under the 
Japanese UCPA.  As in the Japanese UCPA, these can be divided into two groups, depending on 
the method of acquiring the trade secrets: (1) where trade secrets are acquired by improper 
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 Supreme Court of Korea, Judgment of July 10, 2008, Case No. 2008do3435. 
96
 Id.  
97
 Supreme Court of Korea, Judgment of Jan. 24, 2003, Case No. 2001do4331.  
98
 2009 Korean UCPA, supra note 1, art. 2, para. 3. 
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means,
99
 and (2) where trade secrets are legitimately acquired by an original recipient.
100
  In the 
first group, the Korean UCPA subjects an actor to liability in a case in which he or she acquires 
trade secrets by improper means, or subsequently uses or discloses the trade secrets acquired by 
improper means.  As to ―improper means,‖ the Korean Supreme Court takes an approach similar 
to that of the 5th Circuit Court and the UTSA in the United States.
101
  The Supreme Court of 
Korea held that ―‗improper means‘ include not only conducts that are actionable under the 
Korean Penal Code, such as theft, deception, and coercion, but also all conducts and means 
against the good custom and order of society in light of ideals of sound order of trade and fair 
competition, such as breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to keep secrecy.‖102  In a similar 
context, the Court made it clear that a trade secret claim can be established either by the physical 
taking of documents, drawings, pictures, or recording tapes or by memorizing it.
103
  Thus, 
memorization may not be a defense to a trade secret claim.  The disclosure includes cases in 
which a wrongful acquirer discloses the trade secret to specific persons in confidence, such as 
licensing or selling it to others.
104
  Furthermore, the Act subjects an actor to liability when he or 
she acquires trade secrets, or uses or discloses them with the knowledge that improper 
acquisition of the trade secret has occurred or when the lack of such knowledge was caused by 
gross negligence.
105
  An actor is also subject to liability in cases in which, after he or she acquires 
the trade secret, the actor uses or discloses the trade secret with knowledge, or without 
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 Id. art. 2, para. 3, items 1-3 (S. Korea).  
100
 Id. art. 2, para. 3, items 4-6 (S. Korea).  
101
 See E.I. DuPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970).  
102
 Supreme Court of Korea, Judgment of Dec. 23, 1996, Case No. 96da16605.  
103
 Supreme Court of Korea, Judgment of June 9, 1998, Case No.1998da1928.   
104
 2009 Korean UCPA, supra note 1, art. 2, para. 3, item 1. 
105
 Id. art. 2, para. 3, item 2. 
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knowledge due to gross negligence, regarding its improper acquisition.
106
  The subjective 
requirement of ―gross negligence‖ can be interpreted in a similar way as ―gross negligence‖ 
under the Japanese UCPA and ―has reason to know‖ under the UTSA.107   
The second group intends to prohibit a legitimate recipient to whom a trade secret has 
been disclosed from using or disclosing the trade secret in violation of a duty of confidence.
108
  
To be liable under the provision, three requirements are necessary: (1) an actor owes a duty of 
confidence, (2) the actor has the intent to obtain improper benefits or to damage the owner of the 
trade secret, and (3) the actor uses or discloses the trade secret.  In general, it has been 
recognized that a duty of confidence arises when a statute expressly imposes the obligation not to 
use or disclose a trade secret, when there is a separate contract between relevant parties, or when 
there is a trust relationship between a trade secret holder and a recipient.
109
  In particular, 
regarding the duty of confidence arising from the employment relationship, the Korean Supreme 
Court held that the duty of confidence to maintain the trade secret in secrecy arises from an 
express agreement in which the recipient has explicitly agreed to bear the duty of confidence, or 
from a trust relationship in which the recipient has implicitly consented to the duty of confidence.  
The Court further recognized the duty of confidence that arises during the employment 
relationship or even after termination of the employment relationship.
110
  Thus, even in the 
absence of an enforceable contract, the duty of confidence owed by the employee continues after 
the employment relationship is terminated.  On the other hand, the courts in Korea have 
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 Id. art. 2, para. 3, item 3. 
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 See Fusei kyōsō bōshihō [Unfair Competition Prevention Act], Law No. 47 of 1993 (as amended by Law No. 55 
of 2006), art. 2, paras. 5-6 (Japan); UNI. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (1985).  
108
 2009 Korean UCPA, art. 2, para. 3, item 4 (―using or disclosing trade secrets to obtain improper benefits or to 
damage the owner of the trade secrets while under a contractual or other duty to maintain secrecy of the trade 
secrets.‖). 
109
 JONG & PARK, supra note 50, at 71.  
110
 Supreme Court of Korea, Judgment of Dec. 23, 1996, Case No. 96da16605. 
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struggled to balance the interests of former employees and employers in cases involving 
competition.
111
  As in Japan, the Act also subjects an actor who has acquired trade secrets, or 
who uses or discloses them with knowledge of the disclosure by the legitimate recipient, or 
without knowledge due to gross negligence, to liability in breach of the duty of confidence.
112
  
Finally, an actor is subject to liability in cases in which, after the actor acquires the trade secrets, 
he or she uses or discloses them with knowledge of the disclosure by the legitimate recipient, or 
without knowledge, in breach of the duty of confidence.
113
   
 
 
2.3. Legal Remedies  
The Korean UCPA provides civil and criminal remedies for trade secret misappropriation.  
Scholars have noted that in practice, as in other areas of intellectual property law, a preliminary 
injunction, in which the plaintiff can seek a legal remedy quickly, and a criminal complaint, 
which places mental pressure on defendants, have been useful and effective means of legal 
remedies, among others.  However, in recent years, trade secret cases dealt with by the Korean 
Supreme Court have almost all been criminal cases.  Korean legal scholars suggest this may be 
because many cases involving trade secret misappropriation have been concluded in the lower 
courts, which deal with preliminary injunctions.
114
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 See Supreme Court of Korea, Judgment of July 16, 2003, Case No. 2002 ma 4380.  
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 2009 Korean UCPA, art. 2, para. 3, item 5. 
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 JONG & PARK, supra note 50, at 73 n.204.   
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2.3.1.  Civil Remedies  
For civil remedies, the Korean UCPA provides injunctive and damage remedies.
115
  
Under Article 10 of the Korean UCPA, a trade secret holder who is injured or threatened by a 
trade secret misappropriation can seek a court prohibitive or preventive order against a trade 
secret misappropriator.
116
  The ―trade secret holder‖ includes not only the original developer of 
the trade secret, as well as a holder who acquired the trade secret by reverse engineering, but also 
anyone having or using the trade secret based on justifiable legal rights, such as a grantee and a 
licensee.
117
  In Korea, the appropriateness and scope of injunctive relief have also been debated.  
With respect to the appropriateness of injunctive relief, scholars have argued that to seek 
injunctive relief, the trade secret must be kept in secrecy by the end of the oral proceedings.  
Thus, if the trade secret has generally become known to the public before the end of the oral 
proceedings, for example, through patent prosecution, injunctive relief would not be 
appropriate.
118
  In addition to the secrecy of the information, to seek injunctive relief, a plaintiff 
must prove ―actual or threatened misappropriation.‖  Regarding the term ―threatened‖ 
misappropriation, the court in Korea states that ―the mere possibility of infringement is not 
sufficient to support injunctive relief, rather, high probability of infringement is necessary.‖119  
The court further states, regarding the plaintiff‘s burden of proof, that if it is proven that the 
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 In Korea, injunctive relief seems to be a more efficient remedy compared with damages, because it takes longer 
to get the final result for the latter remedy.  Id. at 73.   
116
 2009 Korean UCPA, supra note 1, art. 10. 
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 See Seoul High Court of Korea, Judgment of Feb. 28, 1996, Case No. 95da14420 (recognizing a plaintiff who 
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 Seoul High Court of Korea, Judgment of Feb. 28, 1996, Case No. 95da14420.  
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defendant has acquired the trade secret by improper means, it can be presumed that the use or 
disclosure by the misappropriator threatens the right of the trade secret holder, based on the 
premise that the status of trade secrecy is lost upon public disclosure, and maintaining developed 
or acquired trade secrets in secrecy is critical for survival in the business world, which is very 
competitive.
120
   
In recent years, the duration of injunctive relief has been hotly debated among legal 
scholars and commentators.
121
  The Supreme Court of Korea adopted the ―head start‖ or ―lead 
time‖ theory, in which injunctive relief continues only until defendants or others could have 
acquired the trade secret by proper means, such as reverse engineering or independent discovery.  
The Court made it clear that   
the purpose of injunctive relief for trade secret misappropriation is to prevent the 
misappropriator from unjustly benefiting from a head start or lead time advantage 
that is attributable to the misappropriation and to put the holder of the trade secret 
in the position that he would have been in the absence of such misappropriation.  
Thus, injunction should be limited to a specific period within the time period in 
which injunctive relief can achieve this purpose, reflecting the time the 
misappropriator or other fair competitors could have acquired the trade secret by 
proper means such as reverse engineering in light of the rapid development of 
technology, and personal and physical facilities.
122   
 
The Court further explained that a perpetual injunction would be a punitive injunction 
and would undermine the public interest in promoting fair competition and making employees 
use their knowledge and capabilities.
123
  Thus, as in the UTSA, the Korean Supreme Court has 
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 Scholars‘ debates focus on the effect of an injunctive order with a specific time limitation.  In other words, the 
issue is whether the trade secret cannot be protected under trade secret law after lapse of the period of injunction 
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tried to balance conflicting interests between the parties, considering the public interest in 
promoting vigorous competition and in ensuring the Constitutional right of employees to choose 
their occupation.
124
  The right to injunctive relief expires if the trade secret holder does not 
exercise it within three years of the date of actual knowledge that the business interests of the 
holder were damaged or were threatened to be damaged by a misappropriator and of the actual 
knowledge of the identity of the misappropriator.  The right expires if ten years has elapsed after 
the date on which the trade secret misappropriation first occurred.
125
  In addition to injunctive 
relief, the plaintiff may request the destruction of articles that constituted the trade secret 
misappropriation, removal of the equipment used for the misappropriation, or other measures for 
suspension or prevention of the misappropriation.
126
   
Damages are also available when a person‘s intentional or negligent trade secret 
misappropriation causes damages to another person‘s business interests.127  Unlike patent law, 
which has a provision recognizing the presumption of the infringer‘s negligence, the general 
rules relating to tort liability under the provisions of the Korean Civil Code (Article 750 et seq.) 
govern monetary relief for trade secret misappropriation.
128
  Under the Korean Civil Code, a 
trade secret holder must prove (1) the intention or negligence of an alleged misappropriator, (2) 
the existence of trade secret misappropriation (fault), (3) damages to the plaintiff‘s business 
interests, and (4) a causal relationship between the trade secret misappropriation and damages to 
                                                 
124
 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 2, 14 U.L.A. 619 (2005).  
125
 2009 Korean UCPA, supra note 1, art. 14. 
126
 2009 Korean UCPA, supra note 1, art. 10, para. 2.  See Supreme Court of Korea, Judgment of Dec. 23, 1996, 
Case No. 96da16605 (ordering a defendant to return to a plaintiff a note on which the defendant had written down 
the plaintiff‘s trade secret).   
127
 2009 Korean UCPA, supra note 1, art. 11. 
128
 See Minpŏp [Civil Code], Law No. 8720, 2007, arts. 750 et seq. (S. Korea); T‗ǔkhŏpŏp [Patent Act], Law No. 
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the holder.  In practice, however, once the existence of trade secret misappropriation has been 
proven, fault on the part of the alleged misappropriator can be presumed; thus, the alleged 
misappropriator must prove that he or she was not at fault in many cases.
129
 
As in Japan, tort law in Korea does not recognize punitive damages or exemplary 
damages with a deterrent effect.
130
  Thus, damage relief focuses on compensatory damages for 
the defendant‘s actual or expected loss, and additional damages for emotional distress may be 
awarded in limited situations.
131
  To relieve the plaintiff‘s burden of proof for damage relief, as in 
other areas of intellectual property law, the Korean UCPA provides some special devices for 
measuring the scope of damages.  First, when a trade secret holder claims compensatory 
damages for trade secret misappropriation, damages may be calculated as ―the amount of goods 
transferred‖ multiplied by ―the amount of profit per unit that the person whose business interests 
have been infringed could have been able to sell it for had the infringement not taken place.‖132  
However, the compensation may not exceed the amount of the estimated profit per unit 
multiplied by the number of articles that the holder of trade secrets could have produced 
subtracted by the number of units actually sold.  If the holder was unable to sell the product for 
reasons other than trade secret misappropriation, a sum calculated according to the number of 
articles subject to these reasons must be deducted.
133
  Second, the profits gained by the 
misappropriator through the trade secret misappropriation are presumed to be the amount of 
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damages suffered by the holder whose business interests were infringed.
134
  Third, the holder 
may claim as damages the amount of money that the holder would normally be entitled to 
receive for using trade secrets that were the object of the trade secret misappropriation.
135
  Fourth, 
in the third case, if the amount of actual damages caused by the trade secret misappropriation 
exceeds a reasonable royalty, the excess amount may also be claimed as compensation for 
damages.
136
  Finally, although the court recognizes the damages suffered by the holder, if it is 
extremely difficult for the holder to provide relevant facts to prove the amount of damage, the 
court may determine the reasonable amount as damages based on the relevant evidence and the 
parties‘ arguments.137  Because the Korean UCPA does not provide a statute of limitations 
provision regarding damages, the rule in tort law governs the statute of limitations.
138
  As in 
Japan, the Korean UCPA also includes a provision that authorizes the court to issue an order for 
restoring the business reputation of the holder of the trade secrets.  However, the defendant‘s 
apology in the newspaper is no longer available in Korea because the Constitutional Court of 
Korea, in a 1991 case involving a court-ordered notice of apology based on Article 764 of the 
Korean Civil Code, held that an order for the defendant to publish an apology for her wrongful 
acts in the newspaper was unconstitutional.
139
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2.3.2. Criminal Remedies 
Under Korean criminal law, at least three possible criminal remedies exist.  Above all, a 
trade secret misappropriator may be liable for crimes such as larceny or breach of trust in the 
Korean Penal Code.  However, as briefly mentioned earlier, criminal remedies under the Korean 
Penal Code have some inherent limitations in providing sufficient legal remedies for the trade 
secret holder.
140
  In addition to the Korean Penal Code, the Korean UCPA and the ITPA provide 
criminal sanctions for trade secret misappropriation, which have become an important issue for 
scientists, engineers, and human rights activists in Korea.  The expansion of criminal punishment 
for trade secret misappropriation has become the target of much criticism by legal scholars.
141
   
Under the Korean UCPA, the subject matter criminally protected is the same as that under 
the civil law.  The contour of the criminal remedies seems similar to that under the EEA in the 
United States.
142
  Articles 18 (1) and (2) of the Korean UCPA have almost identical language, 
with different culpability requirements and different severities of punishments.  Article 18 (2) of 
the Act provides that any person who acquires or uses a trade secret useful to a company or who 
discloses it to a third party for the purpose of obtaining improper benefits or damaging the 
company is liable to imprisonment with labor for a term of up to five years or to fines exceeding 
twice the pecuniary profit, not to exceed ten times the profit, or both.
143
  On the other hand, 
Article 18 (1) of the Act, which focuses on foreign economic espionage, requires additional 
                                                 
140
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 For example, Jong and Park criticize the continuing expansion of criminal sanctions against trade secret 
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culpability requirements for criminal sanctions for trade secret misappropriation.  Thus, under 
this paragraph, any person who acquires, uses, or discloses trade secrets for the purpose of 
obtaining improper benefits or damaging the company in foreign countries, or with knowledge 
that the trade secret will be used in foreign countries, is subject to criminal liability for a term of 
up to ten years or fines exceeding twice the pecuniary profit, not to exceed ten times the profit, or 
both.
144
  The Korean UCPA punishes attempts, preparation, and conspiracy.
145
  Unlike the 
Japanese UCPA, under the current law, prosecutors can prosecute a trade secret misappropriator 
without a complaint by a victim.  In addition, when a representative of a legal entity or an agent, 
or an employee of any other servant of a legal or natural person, commits this criminal conduct 
with regard to the business of the legal or natural person, not only is the offender liable, but also 
the legal or natural person is liable to the fine prescribed in Article 18.
146
  However, this 
provision does not apply when the legal or natural person has engaged in reasonable care and 
supervision with regard to the business to prevent trade secret misappropriations by the offender.   
Under the ITPA, stronger criminal penalties are available.  This primarily protects 
industrial technology and criminalizes the acquisition of industrial technology by improper 
means, use, or disclosure.
147
  The term ―industrial technology‖ is defined as technology 
designated, notified, or announced by the Ministry of Knowledge Economy as enhancing 
industrial competitiveness, considering the quality and international competitiveness of a given 
technology.
148
  In addition, the ITPA imposes a duty of confidentiality on officers or employees, 
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including professors, researchers, and students of entities that have the industrial technology, and 
criminalizes the breach of their duty.
149
  In other words, anyone who works for entities with 
industrial technology that can be designated based on somewhat vague and abstract standards 
may be criminally liable under the law.
150
  The Act seems likely to be applied first in cases 
involving the industrial technology designated under the law, regardless of the fact that the 
technology qualifies as a trade secret under the Korean UCPA.
151
 
 
 
3. Law of Postemployment Contracts in Korea 
As in Japan, it has generally been accepted that a current employee in Korea is subject to 
a general duty of loyalty, which is an ancillary duty derived from the employment contract.
152
  It 
                                                                                                                                                             
(a) Original technology, developed within this country, being equal or superior to one in a developed 
country and being able to be commercialized; 
(b) Technology that can reduce the cost of an existing product or notably improve the quality of an 
existing product;  
(c) Technology with a large technical and economic ripple effect that can contribute to the advancement of 
national technology and the enhancement of national competitiveness;  
(d) Technology applying the technologies described between (a) and (c).  
Id. art. 2, para. 1. 
149
 The crime can be punished by up to five years in prison, or the defendant can be required to pay a fine of up to 
50 thousand won (about $50,000), or both.  2009 ITPA, supra note 79, art. 34, para. 1 & art. 36., para. 5. 
150
 The Act has been criticized for the vague and abstract definition of industrial technology and core industrial 
technology by legal commentators and scholars.  In fact, the term ―national core technology‖ is defined as 
industrial technology, whose leakage to parties abroad could threaten national security and the development of a 
national economy having high technical or economic value in domestic and foreign markets and growth potential 
in related fields.  See, e.g., Seung Kyoon Kye, Sanŏp kisul ǔi yuch‟ul panji mit poho e kwanhan pŏpryul unyong si 
yesang toenǔn myŏt kaji mujechōm  [Some Critique on the Technology Leak Prevention and Industrial Technology 
Protection and Support Act], 23 SANŎPCHAESANGWŎN [INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY] 63 (2007).   
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 See Seong-Ho Lee, Kǔlloja e taehan kyŏngŏp kǔmji yakchŏng ǔi hyoryŏk kwa chŏnjik kǔmji kachŏbun ǔi hyoryŏk 
yŏbu [Effects of Covenants Not to Compete and Injunctive Relief], 62 JŎSǓTISǓ [JUSTICE] 84, 86 (2001) (S. Korea) 
[hereinafter Lee, Covenants Not to Compete]; YUSEONG KIM, NODONGPŎP I [LABOR LAW I] 343 (2005) (S. Korea) 
(explaining employees‘ ancillary duties) [hereinafter KIM, LABOR LAW].  
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is also generally accepted that the duty of loyalty includes a duty not to use or disclose to others 
confidential information acquired through employment and a duty not to compete with the 
former employer.
153
  Thus, if a current employee breaches these duties during the employment 
relationship, liability may be imposed without regard to the existence of a specific agreement 
with an employer.  However, scholars and courts have shown somewhat different opinions on 
these duties after the employment relationship is terminated.  With respect to whether an 
employee owes a duty of confidence derived from the duty of loyalty after the employment ends, 
some scholars argue that the duty continues to exist after the employment relationship is 
terminated, even in the absence of a specific confidential agreement.
154
  By contrast, others assert 
that a former employee does not remain subject to the ancillary duty in breach of a duty of 
confidence in the absence of specific legal bases, such as a separate agreement, because duties 
based on the employment contract are extinguished once the employment has ended.
155
  In such 
cases, the confidential agreement between the employee and the employer is enforceable if 
covenants in the agreement are reasonable, but the reasonableness of the agreement does not 
seem to be assessed in a strict way compared with the reasonableness of covenants not to 
compete.
156
  Accordingly, several factors, such as the scope of restraints (e.g., time or area 
restrictions) and the existence of compensation, may not be assessed strictly to verify that 
employee confidentiality agreements are valid.
157
  On the other hand, according to the prevailing 
view of scholars and commentators, without a valid covenant not to compete, a former employee 
                                                 
153
 See Supreme Court of Korea, Judgment of Nov. 26, 1996, Case No. 96da31574; Shin, supra note 72, at 235; 
Dhal-Hugh Lee, Kǔlloja ǔi pimil yujiǔimuwa yŏngŏppimil [Employee‘s Duty of Confidence and Trade Secrets], 11 
CHUNGANG PŎPHAK [CHUNGANG LAW REVIEW] 411, 414 (Aug. 2009) (S. Korea) [hereinafter Lee, Employee Duty].   
154
 See, e.g., Lee, Covenants Not to Compete, supra note 152, at 88; HYUNGBAE KIM, GUNROGIJUNPŎP [LABOR 
STANDARD LAW] 140 (2001).  
155
 See, e.g., Lee, Employee Duty, supra note 153, at 414. 
156
 Id. at 416. 
157
 Id.   
 140 
 
does not owe a duty of noncompetition derived from the employment contract because, unlike a 
nondisclosure agreement, covenants not to compete may directly restrict the Constitutional right 
of the employee to choose his or her occupation freely and engage in work.
158
  Thus, the former 
employee may compete with the former employer and may use knowledge or experience 
acquired in the course of the employment in competition with the employer.   
The law of postemployment restraints, which are based on the ancillary duties an 
employee derived from the employment contract, changed after trade secret law was adopted in 
1991 because the Korean UCPA may have been another statutory legal basis imposing duties on 
the employee in cases involving trade secrets after the employment relationship had terminated.  
In fact, most scholars agree that under the Korean UCPA, an employee has a duty to maintain 
trade secrets in confidence after the employment relationship is terminated.  Some argue that this 
is because the Korean UCPA recognizes injunctive relief and damages as legal remedies for 
tortious acts that infringe trade secrets that are intangible property or intellectual property.
159
  As 
observed before, the Supreme Court of Korea also recognizes this duty, stating 
an employee owes a duty of confidence after the termination of the employment 
relationship even in the absence of an explicit agreement to the extent that it is 
reasonable under the principle of good faith as far as it does not restrain freedom 
to choose an occupation guaranteed by the Constitution if the trade secret was 
offered based on a special relationship with mutual trust.
160
 
 
 
On the other hand, as in Japan, the issue regarding the duty of noncompetition or 
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covenants not to compete after the termination of an employment relationship has been 
controversial among scholars, and the courts have shown a lack of consistency in their 
precedents.  Primarily in this area, scholars and courts have debated and examined two important 
issues: (1) whether the Korean UCPA can be a legal basis for injunctive relief that restricts the 
ability of a former employee to compete with a former employer in the absence of a separate 
covenant not to compete; and (2) which factors should be examined to assess the reasonableness 
of covenants not to compete.  
With respect to the first issue, the injunction provision of the Korean UCPA provides that 
a trade secret holder who is injured or threatened by a trade secret misappropriation can seek a 
court prohibition or preventive order against a trade secret misappropriator.
 161
  In this case, the 
holder can also request the destruction of goods and the removal of facilities used in the 
misappropriation, or any other measures necessary to prohibit or prevent the misappropriation.
162
  
However, the provision does not indicate whether a former employer may enjoin a former 
employee from working for a competitor without having the employee sign a covenant not to 
compete.  Accordingly, the issue has become a hot topic among legal scholars and commentators.  
On the one hand, some scholars have argued that a former employee‘s duty of noncompetition 
may be established on the basis of an explicit agreement; thus, the former employer may not 
resort to the injunction provision of the Korean UCPA when the employer wants to seek an 
injunction to prohibit the former employee from working in a job in which the trade secrets 
acquired by the employee would be used or disclosed in the absence of an explicit agreement.
163
  
On the other hand, scholars argue that even if a former employee did not owe a duty of 
                                                 
161
 2009 Korean UCPA, supra note 1, art. 10. 
162
 Id.  
163
 See Lee, Covenants Not to Compete, supra note 152, at 88. 
 142 
 
nondisclosure, the employee has a duty not to misappropriate trade secrets within a reasonable 
scope of duration and geography without regard to the employment relationship before or 
after.
164
   
Likewise, until recently, the lower courts in Korea have shown inconsistencies in relevant 
precedents.  In some cases, the courts have found that a former employer could seek an 
injunction to prohibit a former employee from engaging in work in a specific position in which 
the trade secret would be used or disclosed when it would be impossible to protect the trade 
secret unless the former employee was prohibited from working for a competitor.
165
  On the 
contrary, some lower courts have found that the injunction provision cannot be a positive law for 
an injunction to prohibit a former employee from working for a competitor.
166
  In 2003, the 
Supreme Court of Korea ended the debate on the issue, stating that a former employer could seek 
an injunction to prevent a former employee from working in a specific position in which a trade 
secret would be used in or disclosed to a competing firm.
167
  In that case, Samsung Electronics 
Co. and Pantech Co. Ltd. were competitors in the mobile handset business, and the defendant 
was an R & D team leader with Samsung Electronics Co. who left to take a CEO position with 
Pantech Co. Ltd.  The lower court held that ―where a specific covenant not to compete between 
the parties is not recognized, given that claim of prohibition of an employee‘s changing a job 
inevitably restricts the employee‘s freedom to choose his or her occupation under the 
Constitution, in principle, it is not allowed to seek an injunction to prohibit the employee from 
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working for a competitor based solely on section 1 of Article 10 of the Korean UCPA.‖168  
However, the Supreme Court recognized the possible application of the Korean UCPA in issuing 
an injunction under limited circumstances, stating that  
where it would be impossible to protect a trade secret of the plaintiff unless the 
former employee were prohibited from engaging in the trade secret-related work 
in the new firm, it may be available to prohibit the former employee from 
engaging in the trade secret-related work in the new firm as a necessary measure 
to prohibit or prevent the trade secret misappropriation on the basis of paragraph 1 
of Article of 10 of the Korean UCPA.
169
   
 
This was the first Korean Supreme Court case that recognized the Korean UCPA as a legal basis 
for an injunction to prohibit a former worker from engaging in specific work in a competing firm 
in which the trade secret of the former employer would be used or disclosed.  Interestingly, a 
closer examination of the case shows how the Court struggled to balance conflicting interests 
between the employer, as a trade secret holder, and the employee, as one who has the 
Constitutional right to choose his or her occupation and engage in work.  In fact, the intent of the 
court does not seem to be to prohibit a former employee from working for a competitor, but to 
prohibit him or her from working in a specific position in which a trade secret acquired by the 
former employee in the course of employment in a firm would inevitably be used or disclosed in 
a competing firm.  In this context, we may assume that the court tried to avoid severe and direct 
restriction of the employee‘s Constitutional right to freedom of occupation by limiting the scope 
of the application of the Korean UCPA to an injunction against the former employee only to the 
extent of trade secret-related work in the new firm.  Nevertheless, in this case, the court did not 
explain in detail any limited or exceptional circumstances.  In addition, even if, after the decision, 
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the possible application of the Korean UCPA in seeking an injunction against the former 
employee in the absence of a separate covenant not to compete was followed by lower courts, in 
these cases, there was no clear explanation of the circumstances.
170
  As a result, this issue 
deriving from the Court‘s statement has led scholars to question what the limited circumstances 
are, and it has triggered another problem in the law of postemployment restraints in Korea, 
which should be resolved by the accumulation of relevant decisions by the courts.
171
 
With respect to the second issue, courts in Korea have adopted a reasonableness approach 
to determine the validity of postemployment covenants not to compete.  In other words, a 
postemployment covenant not to compete is valid if it is reasonable in view of the circumstances 
of the case.
172
  To examine the validity and enforceability of the covenant, the courts in Korea, 
like their counterparts in the United States and Japan, have principally considered three aspects.  
As mentioned before, under the Korean Constitution, the rights of the freedom to choose an 
occupation and to engage in work must be protected.  Accordingly, in cases involving 
postemployment covenants not to compete that would directly restrain these rights, the primary 
role of the courts seems to be to protect the employee, who often has unequal bargaining power, 
from having undue hardship imposed through the agreement.
173
  In addition, the courts in Korea 
have considered the interests of employers in protecting valuable information.
174
  Finally, within 
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Korean constitutional theory, the Constitutional right of the freedom to choose an occupation has 
only had an indirect effect on private contracts, and the right is protected through Article 103 of 
the Korean Civil Code, which is a general provision governing the validity of a private 
contract.
175
  Thus, public policies (―good morals and other social order‖ or ―restraint of free 
competition‖) are also one aspect of the courts‘ consideration.176   
The reasonableness of a postemployment covenant has been examined based on several 
factors: ―the existence of protectable employer interests, a former employee‘s position in a 
former employer‘s firm, durational and geographical scope of the restraint, field of work, the 
existence of compensation offered to an employee, reasons for termination of the employment 
relationship, public interests, and so on.‖177  However, the courts have shown inconsistency and 
unpredictability in examining these factors in relevant precedents.  For example, with regard to 
the scope of an employer‘s protectable interests, which may be the central problem of 
postemployment covenants not to compete, the courts have been in disagreement.  Under the 
Korean UCPA, most courts have confined a trade secret to a protectable interest, but in the case 
of the lower courts, the protection of an employer‘s protectable interests has extended somewhat 
beyond the scope of trade secrets under the Korean UCPA.
178
  Until recently, the question of 
whether severance should be applied to an unreasonable postemployment covenant not to 
compete (e.g., regarding duration or geographical scope) has also been debated.
179
  However, the 
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Supreme Court of Korea, in a recent decision, recognized the court‘s authority to reduce the 
duration of the restraining covenant.
180
  Finally, with respect to the issue of whether 
compensation (daesang) is required for covenants not to compete to be valid or enforceable, 
although legal scholars and commentators have expressed disagreement on this point,
 181
 the 
courts in Korea have not looked at this factor as one of the requirements for a covenant not to 
compete to be valid.
182
  
 
 
4. Summary 
In 1991, trade secret law was adopted in Korea based on a strategic judgment regarding 
economic and trade policy in response to trade pressures from foreign countries.  After its 
adoption, in response to grave concern about espionage cases that could undermine the 
international competitiveness of Korean industries, the Korean government began to strengthen 
trade secret protection in the late 1990s.  However, conflict between corporate control of 
valuable information and employee freedom has now emerged and has sharpened in Korean 
society in recent years.  For example, the Korean government took a more active role in deterring 
trade secret-related cases than did the Japanese government because the Korean UCPA not only 
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criminalized attempts to, preparation to, and conspiracy to misappropriate trade secrets, but also 
provided prosecutors with the discretion to decide whether to file charges against perpetrators 
without a victim‘s complaint.  Furthermore, the newly enacted 2006 ITPA provided 
administrative authorities with broad discretion to designate industrial technology that was the 
subject matter for criminal sanctions under the ITPA, and it imposed a duty of confidentiality on 
workers for entities with the designated industry technologies that were subject to criminal 
liability in breach of the duty of confidentiality.   
In addition, even though the courts in Korea, like those in the United States and Japan, 
have also endeavored to prevent the excessive expansion of a trade secret holder‘s rights by 
limiting the subject matter protectable under the Korean UCPA and limiting the duration of 
injunctive relief, the approach of the courts appears to have been more in favor of employers in 
the area of laws governing restrictive postemployment covenants.  In fact, although the courts in 
Korea have adopted a relatively strict reasonableness standard in assessing the validity of 
covenants not to compete, they have not only recognized their authority to sever or reduce the 
duration of the covenants so as to permit partial enforcement, but have also extended the 
applicability of trade secret law as a legal basis for an injunction to prohibit a former employee 
from engaging in specific work in a competing firm in which the former employer‘s trade secret 
would be used or disclosed.  These sterner measures by the government and courts to deter 
industrial espionage and trade secret misappropriations have been criticized by opponents based 
on concerns about the possibility of excessive restraint on a former employee‘s Constitutional 
right to choose employment and to work and earn a living.   
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CHAPTER V. ECONOMIC THEORY OF TRADE SECRET LAW 
1. Law and Economics of Trade Secret Protection from a Comparative Perspective 
Trade secret law in Japan and Korea was adopted in these countries for strategic reasons 
that were mainly influenced by extrinsic motivation.  As a result, the initial impact of the 
imported law on the behavior of the relevant parties in these countries did not seem to be 
profound.  As observed earlier, however, as socioeconomic circumstances have changed since the 
recent economic downturns, trade secret law in the two Asian countries has been dramatically 
strengthened, based primarily on internal motivation.  This raises two questions: What is the 
practical impact of the initial adoption and recent development of trade secret law on relevant 
parties, such as firms?  and How can the impact on the relevant parties‘ incentives be explained 
in a sophisticated way?   
However, it is widely accepted that an imported law often has different effects on the 
behavior of the relevant parties in the receiving legal system because the receiving country‘s 
political, social, and economic structures are not homogeneous with those of the donor country.
1
  
Thus, in certain circumstances, an endogenous alternative in the receiving country, such as an 
existing local institution or social norm, as a substitute for the imported legal rule may fit better 
and be more efficient in the context of the receiving country.  Given the above fact, as noted 
earlier, the analytical tools and concepts used in the economic analysis of law provide more 
sophisticated methods in comparative law, which presupposes different laws or institutions in 
donor and receiving states that allow us to capture the endemic incentive structures surrounding 
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 See David Nelken, Towards a Sociology of Legal Adaptation, in ADAPTING LEGAL CULTURES 35-70 (David Nelken 
& Johannes Feest eds., 2001).   
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the imported law in the receiving states.
2
  Accordingly, to investigate the answers to these 
questions, this chapter discusses the existing economic theory of trade secret law and relevant 
empirical works that support the theory in the United States.   
The issue of trade secret protection is closely related to questions of innovation policy 
and human capital embodied in employees.  This chapter examines the existing economic theory 
of trade secret law, focusing on incentive theory, the fencing cost, reverse engineering, and 
postemployment covenants not compete.  The functional analysis used here in economic analysis 
of trade secret law in the United States enables us to identify local substitutes for trade secret law 
and restrictive postemployment covenants in the two Asian countries before trade secret law was 
adopted in the early 1990s.  Further, it plays a role in explaining the incentive structures of 
relevant parties, which appear to have changed in recent years since the economic downturns in 
the two countries.  In addition, it helps us assess the current role of these substitutes in the 
context of trade secret protection in these countries based on recent empirical works, which 
would be a significant consideration for a normative standard for evaluating trade secret law and 
relevant policy.  
 
 
2. Law and Economics of Trade Secrets  
2.1. Incentive Theory  
As has been established, trade secret law does not confer an absolute exclusive right 
because it allows competitors to appropriate a given qualified trade secret through reverse 
engineering or independent discovery.  In addition, to protect the information under trade secret 
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law, the owner must take reasonable security precautions.  These characteristics of the law may 
distinguish trade secret law not only from property law but also from other intellectual property 
laws, such as patent law.  Despite the differences between trade secret law and other forms of 
intellectual property rights, scholars who focus on incentive theories suggest that trade secrets 
share some critical features with intellectual property rights, although their views are still 
controversial to some extent.
3
   
Like other forms of intellectual property laws, trade secret law is said to provide ―a 
means of internalizing the benefits of innovation.‖4  There are three primary economic arguments 
on incentive theories for trade secret law.  The first is that the law promotes incentives to invent 
and create valuable information.
5
  For example, Kitch argues that trade secret law provides firms 
with incentives to invest in trade secrets, which have a low depreciation rate and are thus 
―especially subject to the risk of theft.‖6  Friedman, Landes, and Posner also focus on the 
                                                 
3
 See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Patent Law, in THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 294-333(2003) [hereinafter LANDES & POSNER, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE] (―The 
standard rationale of patent law is that it is an efficient method of enabling the benefits of research and development 
to be internalized, thus promoting innovation and technological progress.‖).  
4
 David D. Friedman, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Some Economics of Trade Secret Law, 5 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 61, 64 (1991) [hereinafter Friedman et al., Economics of Trade Secret Law]. 
5
 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 311, 
329-32 (2008) [hereinafter Lemley, Trade Secrets as IP Rights] (arguing ―the additional incentive provided by trade 
secret law is important for innovation,‖ noting that trade secret law has a broader scope of subject matter than patent 
law); Friedman et al., Economics of Trade Secret Law, supra note 4, at 71 (―the law of trade secrets may have 
surprising efficiency properties that would reward further research.‖); MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE COMMON LAW 
OF RESTRAINT OF TRADE: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 120-25 (1986); Edmund W. Kitch, The Law and 
Economics of Rights in Valuable Information, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 683 (1980) [hereinafter Kitch, Valuable 
Information].  But see Michael Risch, Why Do We Have Trade Secrets?, 11 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 26-28 
(2007) [hereinafter Risch, Why Trade Secrets] (―creating incentives to innovate is a very minor justification of trade 
secret law.‖); Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of Justification, 86 CAL. L. REV. 
243, 262-70 (1998) [hereinafter Bone, Trade Secret Law] (analyzing and criticizing the incentive-based argument for 
trade secret law).  See also Michael Risch, Trade Secret Law and Information Development Incentives, in THE LAW 
AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Katherine J. 
Strandburg, eds., 2010). 
6
 Kitch, Valuable Information, supra note 5, at 714.  In his welfare analysis, Kitch seems to ground his argument, 
which relates to the incentive effect of the law, on the difference between the characteristics of information goods 
and markets and those of traditional, tangible goods.  He explains (1) ―information is self-protecting‖; (2) ―firm 
organization substitutes for contract‖; and (3) ―markets transmit information.‖  Id. at 708-23. 
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incentive effect of trade secret law and suggest that ―the law of trade secrets may have surprising 
efficiency properties that would reward further research.‖7  They point to countries such as Japan, 
Germany, and the United Kingdom that have weaker trade secret laws and suggest that these 
countries ―generate higher information costs compared to the corresponding practices of 
American firms.‖8  Similarly, Lemley argues that ―[trade secret law] gives the developer of new 
and valuable information the right to restrict others from using it, and therefore the prospect of 
deriving supracompetitive profits from information.‖9  He also noted the reasoning in Kewanee 
Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp,
10
 in which the court recognized the effect of state trade secret law on 
incentives to invent.
11
   
With respect to the incentive effect in trade secret law, Friedman, Landes, and Posner 
focus particularly on features of the state trade secret protection regime, complementary to the 
federal patent regime, and suggest that ―trade secret law supplements the patent system‖ because 
―patent law cannot be tailored finely enough to cover every case.‖ 12  They argue that under some 
circumstances and for particular types of inventions, trade secret protection may provide firms 
with more incentive than patent protection.  They also suggest three categories of invention in 
which inventors have an incentive to opt for trade secret protection: (1) when the cost of patent 
                                                 
7
 Friedman et al., Economics of Trade Secret Law, supra note 4, at 71. 
8
 Id.  
9
 Lemley, Trade Secrets as IP Rights, supra note 5, at 330. 
10
 416 U.S. 470, 484-85 (1974).  
11
 Lemley, Trade Secrets as IP Rights, supra note 5, at 330.  As to whether patent law preempts state trade secret law, 
the court recognized the role of state trade secret law to ―encourage invention in areas where patent law does not 
reach, and . . . prompt the independent innovator to proceed with the discovery and exploitation of this invention‖ by 
holding that ―the patent policy of encouraging invention is not disturbed by the existence of another form of 
incentive [such as trade secret protection] to invention.  416 U.S. 470, 484-85 (1974).   
12
 Friedman et al., Economics of Trade Secret Law, supra note 4, at 64.  Lemley also notes this feature of trade secret 
protection as a complement to patent law and suggests that ―[trade secret law] need merely provide sufficient 
advantage in terms of lead time or relative costs to minimize or eliminate the public goods problem.‖  Lemley, Trade 
Secrets as IP Rights, supra note 5, at 329-32.   
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protection is high compared with the value of the information at stake, (2) when keeping 
information secret is more valuable than disclosing the information in exchange for patent-
monopoly rights limited to a specific protection period, and (3) when the invention is not 
patentable.
13
  In fact, in terms of the cost-effectiveness of trade secret protection, some empirical 
works have examined U.S. firms‘ strategic choice of trade secret protection.  Lerner sought to 
learn ―how firms choose between various forms of intellectual property protection‖ by 
examining the patterns of litigation among 530 manufacturing firms based in Massachusetts that 
had litigated in the federal and state judicial systems.
14
  He focused on ―firm size, research 
intensity, and access to capital,‖ and found that ―cases involving informal protection—through 
the mechanism of trade secrecy rather than patents, trademarks or copyrights—are commonplace, 
figuring in 43% of the intellectual property disputes,‖ and that ―intellectual property cases 
litigated by smaller firms disproportionately involve trade secrecy.‖15  The findings of Cordes, 
                                                 
13
 Friedman et al., Economics of Trade Secret Law, supra note 4, at 62-66.  While Bone criticizes the above 
argument, especially (2) and (3) on the grounds that ―[the argument] exaggerates the benefits of trade secret law and 
underestimates the costs,‖ and thus ―it is not clear that trade secret law promotes creation incentives to the extent 
necessary to justify its additional costs,‖ he recognized the effect of trade secret law in enhancing incentives in two 
situations: (1) ―intermediate research results‖ and (2) ―nontechnological information.‖  Bone, Trade Secret Law, 
supra note 5, at 262-72. 
14
 Josh Lerner, The Choice of Intellectual Property Protection: Evidence from Civil Litigation 1 (Harv. Bus. Sch., 
Unpublished Working Paper, 2001). 
15 
 Id.  Indeed, in the United States, trade secret protection appears to be a more useful mechanism for SMEs with 
limited research intensity and limited access to capital for protecting their technological innovations.  In practice, 
however, the firms‘ choice between patent protection and trade secret protection is a complex process; thus, the 
reasons for SMEs‘ propensity for trade secret protection may vary across industries.  See Welsey M. Cohen et al., 
Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not) 
(NBER Working Paper, 2000); Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Choice Between Patent Protection and Trade Secret 
Protection: A Legal and Business Decision, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC‘Y 371 (2002).  For example, firms 
with a limited capability to enforce intellectual property rights may not patent their patentable inventions, but keep 
them secret because they are concerned that ―disclosure through patenting or voluntary disclosure will provide 
competitors with usable information.‖  James J. Anton & Dennis A. Yao, Little Patents and Big Secrets: Managing 
Intellectual Property, 35 RAND J. ECON. 1, 1 (2004); see also Ignatius Horstmann et al., Patents as Information 
Transfer Mechanisms: To Patent or (Maybe) Not to Patent, 93 J. POL. ECON. 837, 839 (1985) (predicting that ―the 
propensity to patent will be lower the more profitable (ex ante) a competing product is expected to be . . . if 
patenting directly reveals information that raises profits for the competitor, the equilibrium propensity to patent is 
reduced.  This seems to be what is meant by ‗trade secrecy.‘‖).  However, this is also the case concerning the cost-
effective aspects of trade secret protection, to which financially weaker firms would be sensitive. 
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Hertzfeld, and Vonortas also support the cost-effectiveness of trade secret protection.  They 
examined small high-technology firms in the United States and found that patent protection was 
less important than informal means of intellectual property protection, such as trade secrets and 
lead time, and that one of the primary reasons for not relying on patents was the cost of patents.
16
   
The second economic argument on incentives in trade secret law is that trade secret law, 
by providing legal protection, creates incentives not to invest expenditures wastefully on self-
help.  Courts and scholars supporting this view argue that trade secret owners would invest 
expenditures wastefully on precautionary measures and countermeasures in an extremely costly 
manner in the absence of trade secret law, which would increase the social cost as well as the 
private cost.
17
  In fact, Lemley provides two pieces of empirical evidence (guilds in the Middle 
                                                 
16
 JOSEPH. J. CORDES, HENRY R. HERTZFELD & NICHOLAS S. VONORTAS, A SURVEY OF HIGH TECHNOLOGY FIRMS 
55-59 (U.S. Small Business Administration, February 1999) (―lead time dominated all other means of intellectual 
property protection in terms of respondents rating it as important or very important.  Keeping trade secrets was rated 
a very close second for protecting product innovations and, even more, process innovations. . . . The most important 
limitations of patent protection were reported to be . . . High enforcement costs (74%)  Competitors can legally 
invest around most patents (72%)  Portfolio of patents is too expensive to maintain (61%)  Rapid changes in 
technology limit patent protection (57%)‖).  Indeed, the costs of patents have been said to be one of the greatest 
barriers to SMEs‘ resorting to patent protection: 
In budgeting the costs relating to the acquisition of IP rights, companies need to take into 
consideration not only the official fees (including application fees, publication fees and 
maintenance fees) but also the costs relating to legal advice and translation costs whenever the 
applicant intends to apply for protection abroad.  Overall, the costs of protection may be perceived 
by many SMEs as exceeding the potential benefits to be obtained from protection, particularly 
considering that a significant part of the costs may be incurred before the product has reached the 
market and that lenders, investors or government programs rarely provide financial support for the 
protection of IP rights. 
OECD, NETWORKS, PARTNERSHIPS, CLUSTERS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: OPPORTUNITIES AND 
CHALLENGES FOR INNOVATIVE SMES IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 45 (2004), 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/6/10/31919244.pdf (last visited July 5, 2009). 
17
 See, e.g., E.I. DuPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1016 (5th Cir. 1970) (―To require DuPont 
to put a roof over the unfinished plant to guard its secret would impose an enormous expense to prevent nothing 
more than a school boy‘s trick.‖); Friedman et al., Economics of Trade Secret Law, supra note 4, at 68-69 (―Denial 
of legal protection might induce firms in Du Pont‘s position to invest heavily on roofing over construction sites; and 
the competitors expended real resources on hiring an airplane and pilot to steal Du Pont‘s trade secret.  Holding the 
defendant liable induces him not to spend real resources on the airplane and pilot and eliminates Du Pont‘s incentive 
to spend excessively on roofing.‖); Richard Posner, Note, Trade Secret Misappropriation: A Cost-Benefit Response 
to the Fourth Amendment Analogy, 106 HARV. L. REV. 461, 476 (1992) [hereinafter Posner, Trade Secret 
Misappropriation]; Risch, Why Trade Secrets, supra note 5, at 26 (2007) (―the primary benefit of trade secret law is 
the decrease in both the amount spent on protection secrets and the amount spent by those who seek to learn them.‖); 
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Ages, Mexico, and Brazil without strong legal protection for secrets) ―that overinvestment in 
secrecy is a real problem in the absence of trade secret protection‖; thus, disclosure of 
information is inefficiently hindered.
18
 
The third argument, which is closely related to the second, is that trade secret law 
provides incentives to diffuse the knowledge embodied in inventions and innovations.  Scholars 
in favor of this view argue that regardless of the nature of the trade secrets for which secrecy is 
required under trade secret law, trade secret law actually encourages disclosure or use of 
information and facilitates an exchange of value through licensing, and thus provides the benefit 
of these innovations to the public.
19
  Regarding what makes this possible, Lemley suggests ways 
in which the disclosure of information occurs and the reasons it occurs.  He explains that ―[t]rade 
secret law developed as a substitute for the physical and contractual restrictions those companies 
would otherwise impose in an effort to prevent a competitor from acquiring their information.‖20  
According to Lemley, trade secret law serves to resolve a paradoxical situation (referred to as 
―Arrow‘s information paradox‖) in which, in the absence of special legal protection, a developer 
of valuable information has difficulty selling his or her information in the open market, because 
to sell the information, he or she must reveal it to a potential buyer who wants to evaluate the 
information, but the information will lose the status of secrecy through such a revelation.
21  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Lemley, Trade Secrets as IP Rights, supra note 5, at 334. 
18
 Lemley, Trade Secrets as IP Rights, supra note 5, at 334-35. 
19
 Id. at 332-37.  See also Steven N. S. Cheung, Property Rights in Trade Secrets, 20 ECON. INQUIRY 40, 44 (1982) 
(―Without legal protection, it would become impossible to delineate and enforce exactly what right the buyer or 
licensee is getting, since after the transaction either party has the capability to reveal the secret to someone else.‖).  
But see Bone, Trade Secret Law, supra note 5, at 272-81 (criticizing a theory of creating incentive effect of trade 
secret law on transfer information, arguing the theory ―ignores enforcement costs and underestimates the transaction 
costs of licensing‖). 
20
 Lemley, Trade Secrets as IP Rights, supra note 5, at 334. 
21
 Id. at 332-37.  For Arrow‘s Information Paradox, see Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of 
Resources for Invention 9-10 (RAND Corporation, RAND paper P-1856-RC, 1959), available at 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/P1856/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2010).  But Kitch points out the ―low depreciation rate‖ 
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2.2. Reasonable Security Precautions and Fencing Cost 
Trade secret protection requires those seeking to assert it to incur several costs arising 
from the very nature of trade secrets.  Under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, in addition to the 
requirement of secrecy-in-fact, trade secret law further requires the holder of a trade secret to 
make reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy and to demonstrate those efforts in trade secret 
cases.
22
  This security requirement can also be said to be one of the unique features of trade 
secret protection, which may limit the rights of trade secret holders, compared with other 
property rights and intellectual property rights.
23
  Because it seems clear that trade secret holders 
may rely less on trade secret protection when too high a fencing cost is required, two questions 
arise:
24
  Why does trade secret law require the owner of trade secrets to incur a further fencing 
cost to maintain secrecy in a situation in which trade secret law provides formal legal protection 
of valuable secret information?  In other words, what is the role of or justification for this 
unusual requirement in the area of trade secret law?  and Given the role (or economic arguments) 
of trade secret law in innovation, what level of reasonable secrecy effort would optimize the 
regime of trade secret protection?   
Law and economics scholars have suggested some possible answers to these questions.  
Kitch argues that the reasonable security precaution requirement is in place to provide an 
                                                                                                                                                             
of information protected under trade secret law, explaining why trade secret protection is offered.  Kitch, Valuable 
Information, supra note 5, at 714.  But See Cheung, supra note 18, at 44-47 (examining the defects of trade secret 
protection regarding ―(1) obstruction of the spread of new ideas which could otherwise be put to use through 
contractual agreements; and (2) the dissipation of economic rents‖). 
22
 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §1 (4), 14 U.L.A. 537 (2005). 
23
 Usually, property rights provide legal remedies regardless of the owner‘s self-help measures against infringements.  
Likewise, patent law and copyright law do not require holders of these rights to take reasonable measures against 
infringements. 
24
 Rockwell Graphic System, Inc. v. Dev Industries, 925 F.2d 174, 180 (7th Cir. 1991) (―If trade secrets are protected 
only if their owners take extravagant, productivity-impairing measures to maintain their secrecy, the incentive to 
invest resources in discovering more efficient methods of production will be reduced, and with it the amount of 
invention.‖). 
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evidential effect for the existence of trade secrets in trade secret cases by giving notice to others, 
including employees.
25
  In fact, with respect to courts‘ approach on the reasonable security 
precaution, he looks closely at E.I. DuPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher
26
and seeks the 
justification for this requirement from the policy consideration in which trade secret law should 
not frustrate ―the law‘s policy of free movement.‖  He further argues that a trade secret owner‘s 
―overt protection,‖ as required by the law, could assist in balancing conflicting interests between 
an employer and an employee. 
27
  He argues, based on this recognition, that the reasonable 
security precaution requirement can be achieved when there is ―a reasonable probability that the 
secrets are in fact secret‖ and a notice related to trade secrets is given to employees.28   
Friedman et al. suggest that the fencing cost ―should be roughly proportional to the value 
of the secret to prospective appropriators, and hence should be low when the secret is of modest 
value.‖29  Judge Posner, in turn, argues that, as a ―guiding principle,‖ the court should adopt 
―cost-benefit‖ analysis, and that the ―marginal cost of those measures [should] equal [the] 
marginal expected economic loss in the event of misappropriation, that is, the value of the trade 
                                                 
25
 Kitch, Valuable Information, supra note 5, at 698-99.  See also Posner, Trade Secret Misappropriation, supra note 
17, at 473 n.75 (―Security precautions serve to identify proprietary trade secrets, which, unlike tangibles or patents, 
do not have clearly delineated content or ownership.  The evidentiary value of security precautions partially explains 
why the law requires the trade secret owner to protect himself but does not impose similar requirements on other 
property owners.‖).  But see Robert G. Bone, Trade Secrecy, Innovation, and the Requirement of Reasonable Secrecy 
Precautions 16-17 (Boston U. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 09-40, Sept. 2009) (arguing that the ―RSP 
requirement must be justified by something other than its evidentiary and notice benefits.‖). 
26
 431 F.2d 1012, 1016 (5th Cir. 1970). 
27
 Kitch, Valuable Information, supra note 5, at 699. 
28
 Id. 698-99 (explaining that courts require trade secret owners to invest in sufficient measures so that ―there is a 
reasonable probability that the secrets are in fact secret,‖ or ―the employees know that confidentiality is claimed for 
the information involved, and so that the employer is not free to claim later that some information acquired by the 
employee is secret even though he was not notified of it at the time.‖).  See also Note, The Law of Trade Secrets: 
Toward a More Efficient Approach, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1269, 1296 (2004) (―Imposing liability without regard to the 
actions of a victim, without concern for reasonable precautions, allows the innovator to avoid the inefficient and 
potentially costly undertaking of providing such precautions. . . . Requiring an innovator to take reasonable 
precautions to insure the secrecy of her idea is inefficient.‖) (footnote omitted). 
29
 Friedman et al., Economics of Trade Secret Law, supra note 4, at 63. 
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secret to the owner multiplied by the decrease in the risk that the secret will be discovered by a 
competitor brought about by taking additional precautions.‖30  He further argues that a trade 
secret owner ―will only be required to invest in such measures until the judicial remedy, with all 
of its concomitant social costs, becomes the cheaper means of protection.‖31   
 
 
2.3. Reverse Engineering 
Unlike the holder of patent protection, which allows a patent holder to sue anyone who 
infringes the patent, regardless of the means undertaken by the infringer, the owner of a trade 
secret is allowed to secure a legal remedy only against a party engaged in misappropriation, 
which means improperly acquiring, disclosing, or using trade secrets.  Generally, reverse 
engineering does not fall into the scope of ―improper means‖ under trade secret law.  As we have 
seen, the right to reverse engineer is well-perceived legal doctrine among courts and legal 
scholars.
32
 
Likewise, law and economics scholars have supported reverse engineering as a suitable 
                                                 
30
 Posner, Trade Secret Misappropriation, supra note 17, at 473. 
31
 Id. at 474.  With respect to the benefits of the cost-benefit analysis, Posner also argues that  
[t]his cost-benefit framework not only has logical appeal, but also would reduce deadweight loss, 
encourage invention, and facilitate implementation of trade secret protection policies by firms. . . .  
[T]his cost-benefit framework, unlike the Fourth Amendment analogy, also avoids the risk that 
society will overprotect trade secrets by conflating causes of action designed to protect personal 
privacy with those designed to protect intellectual property. . . .  Finally, this framework accounts 
for differences among firms. 
Id. at 476-78. 
32
 See Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 
1575, 1583 (2002) (explaining that ―the legal right to reverse-engineer a trade secret is so well-established that 
courts and commentators have rarely perceived a need to explain the rationale for this doctrine.‖). 
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way to improve social welfare.
33
  From an economic perspective, scholars further argue that 
reverse engineering is permissible and desirable because it is more efficient from a social 
standpoint.  Friedman et al., drawing an analogy between international law on espionage and 
trade secret law, argue that the social costs of forbidding reverse engineering of competitors‘ 
commercial secrets are higher than the social benefits of information sharing between firms 
through reverse engineering.
34
  They note the difference between private costs—the trade secret 
owner‘s ―expected loss from losing its trade secret and the costs of preventing the loss‖—and 
social costs incurred by trade secret owners and argue that ―reverse engineering will often 
generate knowledge about the product being reverse engineered that will make it possible to 
improve on it.‖35  In this way, current trade secret law provides incentives for a potential injurer 
(a competitors to a trade secret owner) to choose reverse engineering over theft, a choice that 
may lead to investment or innovation.
36
  Law and economics scholars also note that if reverse 
engineering were prohibited in trade secret law, a trade secret owner would have ―a [de facto] 
perpetual patent law,‖ and this would be in conflict with patent policy, which intends to grant a 
limited monopoly in exchange for disclosure of the patented information.  In addition, restricting 
reverse engineering has anticompetitive effects and may impede further innovation.
37
  The latter 
view was explicitly expressed in commentators‘ response to the adoption of the Economic 
Espionage Act (EEA) of 1996.
38
  Scholars have criticized the EEA‘s lack of clarity on whether 
                                                 
33
 See, e.g., Friedman et al., Economics of Trade Secret Law, supra note 4, at 71. 
34
 Id. at 67. (―In the case of reverse engineering, then, the social cost-benefit calculus appears to favor denial of legal 
protection.‖). 
35
 Id. at 70. 
36
 Id. at 66-71. 
37
 See, e.g., Id.; Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 32. 
38
 See, e.g., James H.A. Pooley et al., Understanding the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 5 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 
177, 200 (1997); Spencer Simon, The Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 305, 315-16 
(1998); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Trade Secrets: How Well Should We Be Allowed to Hide Them? The Economic 
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reverse engineering can be raised as a defense under the regime of the Act,
39
 a point on which the 
current trade secret law is much clearer.  Scholars who criticize the EEA argue that the absence 
of a reverse-engineering defense, which has been allowed in the traditional regime of trade secret 
law, may stifle innovation.  For example, Dreyfuss contends that in part because ―the EEA allows 
developers to hide their trade secrets more effectively than before,‖ and in part because the 
EEA‘s policy on reverse engineering discourages spillover use and increases ―deadweight loss,‖ 
the EEA should be ―carefully construed‖ such that the Act does not ―allow people to hide secrets 
in ways that will make it impossible for others to hear, or learn, or know.‖40 
Samuelson and Schotchmer have assessed the social welfare effects of the rules 
governing reverse engineering in different industrial contexts, including that of traditional 
manufacturing and three information-based industries, and take as a premise that the different 
economic effects of reverse engineering depend on ―a number of factors, including the purpose 
for which it is undertaken, the industrial context within which it occurs, how much it costs, how 
long it takes, whether licensing is a viable alternative, and how the reverse engineer uses 
information learned in the reverse engineering process.‖ 41   For the traditional manufacturing 
industry, their conclusion is analogous to the traditional view of law and economics scholars.  
They argue that the rule allowing reverse engineering is economically sound because it not only 
protects an innovator to some desirable degree because of ―the costliness of reverse engineering 
[or] lead time due to difficulties of reverse engineering, [or both],‖42 but at the same time has ―a 
                                                                                                                                                             
Espionage Act of 1996, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1, 31-42 (1998); Craig L. Uhrich, The 
Economic Espionage Act—Reverse Engineering and the Intellectual Property Public Policy, 7 MICH. TELECOM. & L. 
REV. 147, 169-76 (2001). 
39
 See Uhrich, supra note 40, at 169-76. 
40
 Dreyfuss, supra note 40, at 32-44. 
41
 Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 32, at 1585. 
42
 Id. at 1582. 
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salutary effect on price competition and on the dissemination of know-how that can lead to new 
and improved products.‖43  Further, they argue that technological advances could change ―the 
economic calculus of reverse engineering rules‖ by illustrating legal rules regulating reverse 
engineering in the semiconductor chip industry,
44
 the computer software industry,
45
 and markets 
where digital content is technically protected,
46
 as well as by assessing the economic effects of 
the rules in these areas.
47
  They conclude that policymakers should contemplate ―the specific 
characteristics of the industry, a specific threat to that industry, and the economic effects of the 
restriction‖ when they intend to place restrictions on reverse engineering in an industry.48  
 
 
2.4. Postemployment Covenants Not to Compete  
As we have seen, legal issues concerning covenants not to compete may be a way to 
balance conflicting interests between employers, who seek the legal protection of their 
                                                 
43
 Id. at 1590.  To assess the social welfare effects of the rule allowing reverse engineering in the traditional 
manufacturing sector, they relied on the four criteria: (1) ―incentives to innovate,‖ (2) ―incentives to engage in 
follow-on innovation,‖ (3) ―prices,‖ and (4) ―socially wasteful expenditure of resources.‖  Id. at 1588. 
44
 The authors argue that the enactment of the SCPA increases the ―incentives to invest in innovative chip design‖ 
and ―incentives to invest in follow-on innovation.‖  In addition, they argue that prices will be increased to some 
degree to enable innovators to recoup their costs, including socially wasteful costs, which, to some extent, can be 
avoidable by licensing.  Id. at 1604-05. 
45
 Id. at 1613-26 (arguing that the rule allowing reverse engineering for the purpose of interoperability is 
economically good). 
46
 Id. at 1637-49 (arguing that the DMCA‘s ―anticircumvention rules go further than necessary to accomplish the 
goal of protecting digital content, causing collateral harm that could be avoided.  In particular, the rules may unduly 
impinge on fair and other noninfringing uses of digital content, on competition within the content industry, on 
competition in the market for technical measures, and on encryption and computer security research.‖). 
47
 Id. at 1595-49. 
48
 Id. at 1663.  In addition to the simplest way for regulating reverse engineering policy (i.e., making it legal or 
illegal), they suggest ―five more nuanced‖ policy considerations: ―[1] regulating a particular means of reverse 
engineering, [2] establishing a breadth requirement for subsequent products, [3] using purpose- and necessity-based 
requirements for judging the legitimacy of reverse engineering, [4] regulating reverse engineering tools, [5] 
restricting publication of information discovered by a reverse engineer.‖ (footnote omitted).  Id. at 1652-59.  
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investments in human capital, and employees, who lack bargaining power as they pursue their 
livelihood.
49
  In addition, a policy consideration regarding the potential anticompetitive effect 
has been often taken into account in deciding reasonableness.
50
  The law and economics 
perspective, however, has primarily focused on ex ante incentives to invest in human capital and 
ex post effects of labor mobility on covenants not to compete.
51
 
On the one hand, scholars have focused on employers‘ incentive to invest in human 
capital at efficient levels.
52
  Rubin and Shedd, drawing on Becker‘s model of general and specific 
human capital,
 53
 explains that if covenants not to compete were not enforceable, firms‘ incentive 
to invest in human capital would be reduced because workers with an increased marginal product 
of their human capital have an incentive to violate the contract and move to a more highly valued 
use.
54
  In addition, they observe that in such cases, firms would spend their resources 
                                                 
49
 See Mark A. Glick, Darren Bush & Jonathan Q. Hafen, The Law and Economics of Post-employment Covenants: 
A Unified Framework, 11 GEO. MASON L. REV. 357 (2002).  See, e.g.,
 
Comprehensive Technologies Int‘l, Inc. v. 
Software Artisans, Inc., 3 F.3d 730, 739-40 (4th Cir. 1993).
 
50
 See Chapter II. 3. 
51
 See Eric A. Posner et al., Investing in Human Capital: The Efficiency of Covenants Not to Compete 1-2 (Univ. of 
Va., John M. Olin Program in Law and Econ. Working Paper No. 11, 2004) [hereinafter Posner et al., Human 
Capital]. 
52
 See, e.g., Maureen B. Callahan, Comment, Post-employment Restraint Agreements: A Reassessment, 52 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 703, 727 (1985); TREBILCOCK, supra note 5, at 119-54; Friedman et al., Economics of Trade Secret Law, supra 
note 4, at 67; Paul H. Rubin & Peter Shedd, Human Capital and Covenants Not to Compete, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 93, 
97 (1981); Gillian Lester, Restrictive Covenants, Employee Training, and the Limits of Transaction-Cost Analysis, 
76 IND. L. J. 49, 71-76 (2001). 
53
 See GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL (3d ed. 1993).  With respect to on-the-job training, Becker distinguishes 
―general training‖ from ―specific training.‖  He explains the conceptual differences as follows:  
General training is useful in many firms besides those providing it; for example, a machinist 
trained in the army finds his skills of value in steel and aircraft firms, and a doctor trained 
(interned) at one hospital finds his skills useful at other hospitals. . . . Training that increases 
productivity more in firms providing it will be called specific training.  Completely specific 
training can be defined as training that has no effect on the productivity of trainees that would be 
useful in other firms. 
Id. at 33-40. 
54
 Rubin & Shedd, supra note 52, at 97.  However, with regard to Becker‘s original model of human capital, Rubin 
and Shedd explain as follows:  
In the model of human capital proposed by Gary Becker, there is no need for covenants ancillary 
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inefficiently as they seek to protect valuable information.
55
  Thus, they argue that ―[covenants not 
to compete] are needed to lead to efficient levels of investment in training when the person 
receiving training is unable to pay for the human capital by accepting reduced wages [such as 
some types of training involving trade secrets].‖56  Similarly, Callahan, who has analyzed and 
criticized modern judicial rationales (i.e. the ―restraint-of-trade rationale,‖ the ―employee-
protection rationale,‖ and the ―loss-to-society rationale‖) that courts have adopted in cases of 
covenants not to compete,
57
 also focuses on the positive effect of covenants not compete on 
employers‘ incentives to invest in ―confidential business information‖ and ―investment in 
training.‖58  Some law and economics scholars who appear to consider mainly the incentives for 
employers to invest in human capital have offered suggestions regarding to what extent 
covenants not to compete should be enforced in relevant cases.  For example, Glick, Bush, and 
Hafen have analyzed covenants not to compete that are based on a standard law and economics 
analysis of contract law.  They argue that ―[post-employment] covenants not to compete should 
not be enforced only when some type of market failure occurs,‖ and explain that these types of 
                                                                                                                                                             
to labor contracts banning employees from competing with employers after termination of 
employment.  If human capital is general, workers will pay for training and employers will be 
indifferent to the future use of this capital.  If training is specific the training will be useful only in 
the firm providing the training and so workers will be unable to use this training elsewhere.   
Id. at 109. 
55
 Id. at 97.  Friedman, Landes, and Posner also point out the effect of nonenforceability of covenants not to compete 
as follows:  
If the law refuse to enforce contracts in which employees promise not to spill the employers‘ trade 
secrets, employers may be led to reorganize their businesses in inefficient forms—perhaps by 
splitting up tasks among more employees so that each knows less, or by bringing in family 
members (even though they may be less competent) as employees, counting on them to be loyal 
out of altruism or because the family setting often enables effective, informal retaliation against 
the disloyal; for members of a family are in an ongoing relationship, unlike the employer and an 
unrelated former employee. 
Friedman et al., Economics of Trade Secret Law, supra note 4, at 67. 
56
 Rubin & Shedd, supra note 52, at 99. 
57
 For the analyses of these rationales, see Callahan, supra note 52, at 712-25. 
58
 Id. at 727. 
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failures are ―(a) imperfect (including asymmetric) information; (b) constrained choice; and (c) 
externalities.‖ 59..Posner, Triantis, and Triantis maintain that ―the courts should expand the 
recognized interests to include both specific and general training‖; they further argue that 
covenants not to compete could be ―a new and relatively simple solution to the dual 
optimization‖ of ―ex post performance outcomes [with regard to labor mobility] and ex ante 
investment [with regard to human capital].‖60   
On the other hand, as the economy has become more and more knowledge-based and the 
value of human capital has become a more important determinant of innovation in the 
economy,
61
 other scholars have turned their attention to the positive effect of knowledge 
diffusion on innovations resulting from labor mobility.
62
  For example, Saxenian‘s comparative 
                                                 
59
 Glick et al., supra note 49.  They further argue that  
Under the first two types, the effects are limited to the parties to the contract; under the third types, 
the impact is on the public.  For the first two types, standard contract defenses are indicated.  For 
the third type, restraint of trade and the rule-of-reason as originally applied in common law and 
implemented in the Sherman Act is the relevant approach.  While the latter has seldom been 
applied to post-employment covenants until now, the rising importance of high-technology 
industries and the concomitant emphasis on innovation make this approach increasingly attractive 
and relevant for assessing the appropriateness of post-employment covenants not to compete. 
Id. at 418. 
60
 Posner et al., Human Capital, supra note 51, at 24-26. 
We found that, in each of the cases of no-renegotiation and costless renegotiation, CNCs may 
yield performance and investment incentives that are superior to those produced by the contract 
remedies of specific performance and liquidated damages (including zero damages).  We also 
showed that, if renegotiation is costless, the parties have contracting incentives to draft CNCs with 
inefficiently broad scope that causes overinvestment.  Given the plausibility of the assumption that 
renegotiation costs among workers and employers in the same industry are low, these two results 
provide support for cautious enforcement of CNCs. 
Id. at 24.  
61
 See Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, 
and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 585 (1999) [hereinafter Gilson, Silicon Valley] (―Tacit 
information associated with an employer‘s technology is embedded in the human capital of its employees.‖). 
62
 See, e.g., Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625, 627 (1960) 
(―postemployment restraints reduce both the economic mobility of employees and their personal freedom to follow 
their own interests.  These restraints also diminish competition by intimidating potential competitors and by slowing 
down the dissemination of ideas, processes and methods.‖); Kitch, Valuable Information, supra note 5, at 686 
(contending that the strict enforcement of covenants not to compete does little to serve social welfare); ANNALEE 
SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND COMPETITION IN SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 128 (1994); 
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research on the influence of the local institutional and business culture on different economic 
achievements in the Silicon Valley and Route 128 region seems to have inspired further research 
focused on the policy effect of covenants not to compete.
63
  In fact, she notes that one of the 
main reasons California‘s Silicon Valley achieved greater economic success and technological 
progress compared with the Route 128 belt outside Boston, Massachusetts, involves the 
comparatively free flow of employees‘ information, knowledge, and skills among firms in the 
region, due to relatively less importance in employment contracts on the disclosure of such 
valuable information to contracting parties.
64
  Saxenian concludes that policymakers should 
consider the relationship between the flow of information and innovation when they establish 
policies to boost a regional economy.
65
 
In recent years, legal scholars have focused particularly on the relationship between the 
legal policy of covenants not to compete and innovation resulting from positive knowledge 
spillover between firms in regions with high labor mobility.  For example, Gilson has examined 
the role of the law of covenants not to compete in high-technology industrial districts by 
                                                                                                                                                             
Edmund Kitch, The Expansion of Trade Secrecy Protection and the Mobility of Management Employees: A New 
Problem for the Law, 47 S.C. L. REV. 659 (1996) (discussing the probability of restraint of new class employee‘s 
mobility due to the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition expanding trade secret protection); Gilson, Silicon 
Valley, supra note 61; ALAN HYDE, WORKING IN SILICON VALLEY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS OF A HIGH-
VELOCITY LABOR MARKET (2003). 
63
 SAXENIAN, supra note 62.  For example, Saxenian analyzes business organizations in the two regions and explains 
that ―Route 128‘s technology firms remained stable, formal, and centralized organizations compared with the 
loosely linked confederations of engineering teams in emerging Silicon Valley.‖  Id. at 78. 
64
 Sexenian states:   
This decentralized and fluid environment accelerated the diffusion of technological capabilities 
and know-how within the region.  Departing employees were typically required to sign 
nondisclosure statements that prevented them from revealing company secrets; however, much of 
the useful knowledge in the industry grew out of the experience of developing technology.  When 
engineers moved between companies, they took with them the knowledge, skills, and experience 
acquired at their previous jobs.  Id. at 37.  While nondisclosure agreements and contracts were 
normally signed in these alliances, few believed that they really mattered, especially in an 
environment of high employee turnover like that in Silicon Valley.  Id. at 149. 
65
 Id. at 161-68. 
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comparing the laws in California‘s Silicon Valley and Massachusetts‘s Route 128 region.  In his 
comparison, he notes the importance of ―informal transfer of tacit knowledge‖ for ―technological 
externalities‖ as a key factor that facilitates Silicon Valley‘s continued success in the second-
stage agglomeration economy.
66
  He then focuses on the influence of different legal 
infrastructures in the two regions and concludes that the difference in laws regulating 
postemployment covenants not to compete generates ―an initial condition‖ that could lead to 
different employment patterns, different patterns of industrial organization, and different 
business cultures in the two regions that Saxenian identifies.
67
  In addition, he offers some 
cautionary notes.  One is that the use of the inevitable disclosure doctrine in California may 
―pose a serious threat to the interemployer spillover of proprietary tacit knowledge that allows 
Silicon Valley to reset its product cycle repeatedly.‖68  The final cautionary note he provides is 
that policymakers should consider the business culture and industrial organization in a given area 
when they want to adopt a California-like legal infrastructure to affect positive knowledge 
spillover.
69
  Hyde, in comparing trade secret law and the law of covenants not to compete in the 
Silicon Valley and Route 128 areas, acknowledges the plausibility that a legal policy banning 
covenants not to compete may facilitate labor mobility in a given area, and contends that the 
                                                 
66
 Gilson, Silicon Valley, supra note 61, at 580-94 (―The second-stage agglomeration economy results from 
intercompany, intradistrict knowledge spillovers that cause the entire district to function as an innovation laboratory.  
These spillovers result from the pattern of extreme employee mobility characteristic of Silicon Valley and absent in 
Route 128.‖).  Gilson uses the term of ―tacit knowledge‖ as ―the skill or expertise, as opposed to easily codifiable 
information, that employees acquire through experience.‖  Id. at 577 n.10. 
67
 Gilson states that Massachusetts law, which allows reasonable post-employment covenants not to compete to be 
enforced, ―encourage[s] an employee to stay in her current job,‖ and ―[t]he resulting dynamic would favor long-term 
career patterns, vertical integration, and ultimately, internal rather than districtwide innovation.  The initial 
condition—a legal infrastructure that impedes employee mobility—generates a complementary business culture and 
institutions that, once established, support a self-enforcing equilibrium.‖  Likewise, he explains that California law, 
which bans covenants not to compete, leads employees to ―adopt a different strategy, one of cooperation and 
competition, that generated a dynamic process leading to Silicon Valley‘s characteristic employee career pattern, 
lack of vertical integration, knowledge spillovers, and business culture.‖  Id. at 603- 09. 
68
 Id. at 626. 
69
 Id. at 627-29. 
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increased labor mobility plays a significant role in diffusing the knowledge embodied in human 
capital among firms in a ―high-velocity‖ labor market.70  Similarly, Landes and Posner state that 
―the unenforceability of employee covenants not to compete‖ creates an ―informal pooling of 
knowledge,‖ and that this is more desirable from an efficiency standpoint than ―the greater 
internalization of [a] new technological idea,‖ citing the results of Saxenian‘s research and 
explaining the high cost of ―negotiation and enforcement of licenses for the use of valuable 
confidential information.‖71  The above economic arguments are supported by recent empirical 
research that has examined the relationship between the enforceability of covenants not to 
compete and labor mobility.
72
 
                                                 
70
 HYDE, supra note 62.  Hyde further notes trade secret law as one of other factors affecting the success of Silicon 
Valley. 
71
 LANDES & POSNER, Economic Structure, supra note 1, at 365-66. 
72
 See, e.g., Matt Marx, Deborah Strumsky, & Lee Fleming, Mobility Skills, and the Michigan Non-compete 
Experiment, 55 MGMT. SCI. 875 (2009) (examining Michigan‘s inadvertent reversal of covenants not to compete 
enforcement and its effect, and finding the enforcement of covenants not to compete reduced labor mobility); Mark J. 
Garmaise, Ties that Truly Bind: Noncompetition Agreements, Executive Compensation, and Firm Investment, J. LAW 
ECON. ORGAN. 1 (Nov. 2009), available  at 
http://jleo.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/full/ewp033v1?maxtoshow=&HITS=10&hits=10&RESULTFORMAT=&f
ulltext=ties+that+truly+bind&searchid=1&FIRSTINDEX=0&resourcetype=HWCIT.  Garmaise also analyzes the 
effect of covenants not to compete by using ―time-series and cross-sectional variation in noncompetition 
enforceability across the states of the United States.‖  He finds that ―enforceability strongly reduces executive 
mobility, particularly decreasing the likelihood that a firm will experience a within-industry managerial transfer 
(either in or out).‖  Id. at 3. 
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CHAPTER VI. IMPACT OF TRADE SECRET LAW IN JAPAN AND KOREA 
This chapter examines the practical impact of trade secret law and relevant factors in the 
areas of companies‘ strategic choice of intellectual property, the role of covenants not to compete, 
and the role of the legal system in supporting the implementation of trade secret law.  For this 
purpose, the first two sections of this chapter focus specifically on substitutes for trade secret law 
arising from different intellectual property policies and the business culture relating to human 
capital before trade secret law was adopted in these countries.  After identifying these substitutes, 
the chapter then discusses, based on the economic theories of trade secret law examined in the 
previous chapter, how the role of these alternative solutions in addressing the legal problems 
associated with trade secrets has been eroding in recent years.   
The first section looks at Japanese and Korean firms‘ reliance on trade secret protection, 
which shows that despite the weak impact of the law in the first stage of implementation, in 
recent years, trade secret protection has become a significant way Japanese and Korean firms 
protect their valuable information.  It further explores the role of and changes in second-tier 
patent protection (i.e., utility models) as substitutes for trade secret protection and their 
somewhat different stories in the two countries in recent years.  The second section examines the 
increasing tendency for Japanese and Korean firms to rely on postemployment contractual 
measures to protect themselves from unintended loss of valuable information and human capital.  
It further examines how the traditional lifetime employment system, as one of the main factors 
affecting firms‘ increasing reliance contractual measures to protect valuable information, had 
played a significant role in substituting for postemployment covenants not to compete, and how 
the role of informal mechanisms that had supported the practice of lifetime employment have 
decreased substantially since the recent economic crises in Japan and Korea.  The third section 
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explores the role of the legal system in supporting the implementation of trade secret law.  It 
begins with some features of actions taken by Japanese and Korean firms after incidents relating 
to the loss of proprietary information.  The remaining part of the section examines relevant 
factors affecting these distinguishing features, with a focus on defects in procedural law in Japan 
and Korea.  
 
 
1. The Choice of Intellectual Property Protection in Enterprises in Japan and Korea 
1.1. Use of Trade Secrets by Firms in Japan and Korea 
In the United States, the doctrine of trade secret protection has developed based on 
courts‘ recognition of the importance of corporate control over valuable information, and trade 
secrets are currently said to have a significant role in providing firms with the incentive to 
protect their inventions and innovations.  Indeed, several empirical works have shown that U.S. 
firms rely more on secrecy as a primary means of protecting their innovations than on the patent 
regime.
1
  As observed earlier, however, the adoption of trade secret law in the early 1990s in 
Japan and Korea was not aimed primarily at the efficient legal protection of domestic innovators.  
In part because of this background, trade secret law does not appear to have had a profound 
impact on domestic firms‘ strategic choice of intellectual property mechanisms to protect their 
innovations.  For example, comparative survey research conducted by Cohen et al. in 1994, four 
                                                 
1
 See, e.g., Wesley M. Cohen et al., Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. 
Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not) (Nat‘l Bureau of Econ. Res. Working Paper, No. 7552, 2000) [hereinafter 
Cohel et al., Intellectual Assets]; Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and 
Development, 1987 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 783, 794-95 (1987).  See also Foreign Protection of 
Intellectual Property Rights and the Effect on U.S. Industry and Trade 35 (USITC Pub. 2065, Investigation No. 332-
245, Feb. 1988), available at 1988 ITC LEXIS 21.   
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years after the adoption of trade secret law in Japan, revealed differences between the United 
States and Japan in the effectiveness of appropriability mechanisms used.
2
  The research 
demonstrated that U.S. firms did not report patent protection as one of the most important ways 
they appropriate returns from their innovations; rather, the authors concluded that ―secrecy is 
more central to the appropriability strategies of U.S. firms‖ in the manufacturing sector.3  In fact, 
for product innovation, U.S. firms relied on lead time (51.8%) and secrecy (51.4%), followed by 
patents (35.7%).  For process innovation, the firms preferred secrecy to patents, with secrecy 
(52.7%) being the preferred mechanism, followed by lead time (38.0%) and patents (23.9%).
4
  
By contrast, the study revealed that Japanese firms preferred patents to trade secrecy for 
protecting their product innovations, with lead time (40.7%) being the preferred strategy, 
followed by patents (37.8%) and secrecy (25.6%).  On the other hand, for protecting process 
innovations, Japanese firms preferred secrecy to patents, although the difference was slight.  
Japanese firms relied on secrecy (28.9%) and lead time (28.2%), followed by patents (24.8%).
5
  
The results implied that trade secret protection was not central to the appropriability strategies of 
Japanese firms, despite the fact that about three years had passed since the law had been 
implemented in Japan.  In particular, Japanese firms showed a trend of preferring patent 
protection to secrecy for product innovation.  
Trade secret law in Japan and Korea, however, has undergone many changes in the two 
                                                 
2
 Wesley M. Cohen et al., R&D Spillovers, Patents and the Incentive to Innovate in Japan and the United States, 31 
RES. POL‘Y 1349 (2002) [hereinafter Cohen et al., R&D Spillover]. 
3
 Id. at 1352-55.  The question on the survey asked respondent companies ―to estimate the percent of their product 
and process innovations for which patents, secrecy, and complementary manufacturing sales and service, and 
complementary manufacturing facilities and know-how were ‗effective‘ in protecting the ‗competitive advantage‘ 
from those innovations,‖ and ―[t]he response categories were 0–10%, 11–40%, 41–60%, 61–90%, and 91–100%.‖  
Id. at 1353.  
4
 Id. at 1354 fig.3. 
5
 Id.  
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decades since its adoption and is in the midst of changes even at this point.
6
  In addition, a series 
of subsequent changes strengthening the law in Japan and Korea since its adoption have been 
motivated by internal factors based on a change in innovation policy aiming at providing 
domestic innovators with a greater incentive to invest in valuable information.
7
  This raises the 
issue of the practical impact on Japanese and Korean firms of adopting trade secret laws, and in 
recent years, how Japanese and Korean firms have come to rely on trade secret protection.  
Two surveys conducted in the early and mid-2000s, the Japanese National Innovation 
Survey 2003 (J-NIS 2003)
8
 and the Korean Innovation Survey (KIS 2005),
9
 which examined the 
innovation-related activities of Japanese and Korean firms, revealed the strong impact of trade 
secret law on firms in the two countries.  Presented in Table 1 are results of the J-NIS 2003 and 
the KIS 2005 showing how respondents evaluated the effectiveness or importance of different 
appropriability mechanisms.
10
  The table provides the percentages of product and process 
                                                 
6
 For example, as observed earlier, the Japanese UCPA was amended in 2009 to enlarge the subjective requirement 
of criminal sanctions and the scope of acts subject to criminal sanctions by criminalizing an act of fraudulent taking 
of a trade secret by a person to whom the trade secret had been disclosed.  The amended Japanese UCPA will 
become effective on Oct. 29, 2010.  See Fusei kyōsō bōshihō [Unfair Competition Prevention Act], Law No. 47 of 
1993 (as amended by Law No. 30 of 2009).  Currently, the Korean government is also considering improving the 
procedural aspects to support the substantive law of trade secrets. 
7
 See Chapter III and IV. 
8
 NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY, ZENKOKU INOBESHON CHŌSA TOUKEI HŌKOKU 
[STATISTICS ON INNOVATION IN JAPAN: REPORT ON THE JAPANESE NATIONAL INNOVATION SURVEY 2003] (Dec. 2004) 
(Japan) [hereinafter JIS-2003]. 
9
 SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY INSTITUTE, 2005 NYŎNDO HAN‘KUK ŬI KISUL HYŎKSIN CHOSA [REPORT ON THE 
KOREAN INNOVATION SURVEY 2005: MANUFACTURING SECTOR] (Dec. 2005) (Korea) [hereinafter KIS 2005].  The 
Korean Innovation Survey is a nationally representative study of innovation activities in Korean enterprises and is 
approved by the Korean National Statistical Office under the Statistical Act of Korea.  The data are collected on a 
three-year basis.  The KIS 2005 covered the observation from the beginning of 2002 to the end of 2004.  To measure 
the importance of appropriability mechanisms, the survey asked responding firms to evaluate the importance of 
intellectual property rights that they had used.  Id. at 603.   
10
 In the J-NIS 2003, the respondents was asked to evaluate about how much the available mechanisms were 
effective in ensuring a profit from innovation activities during the period from 1999 to 2001.  In the question, 
respondents were asked to give a rating of high, medium, or low depending on the importance of each mechanism.  
JIS-2003, supra note 8, at 1[en]-14.  In the KIS 2005, to measure the importance of appropriability mechanisms, the 
survey asked responding firms to evaluate the importance of intellectual property rights that they had used.  In the 
question, respondents were asked to evaluate each method on a 1-to-5 scale ranging from 1 (least important) to 5 
(most important).  KIS 2005, supra note 9, at 603.  It should be noted that the J-NIS 2003 and the KIS 2005 are 
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innovations for which each appropriability mechanism was judged to be ―highly effective‖ on the 
JIS-2003 and was judged to be either ―very important‖ or ―important‖ on the KIS 2005.   
 
TABLE 1 
EFFECTIVENESS OF PATENTS AND TRADE SECRECY IN THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR 
 
Country Innovation type Size 
Patents, 
% 
Secrecy, 
% 
Lead time 
advantage, % 
Complexity of 
design, % Source 
Japan 
Product innovation 
Large 40 40 23 14 
J-NIS 
2003 
Medium 21 23 17 8 
Small 17 28 21 12 
Total 21 28 20 11 
Process innovation 
Large 25 38 21 12 
Medium 12 19 18 7 
Small 7 18 20 7 
Total 11 21 19 8 
Korea 
Product innovation 
Large 56 40 28 9 
KIS 
2005 
Medium 35 28 27 4 
Small 35 23 48 27 
Total 36 26 29 6 
Process innovation 
Large 28 33 30 7 
Medium 13 18 15 2 
Small 14 13 15 4 
Total 14 16 16 3 
 
The results of the J-NIS 2003 show that Japanese firms‘ reliance on trade secrets to 
protect the competitive advantage gained from their innovations has increased dramatically 
compared with the results of the study by Cohen et al. in 1994.  For both product and process 
                                                                                                                                                             
surveys on innovation activities by Korean and Japanese enterprises.  The surveys are based on the Oslo Manual, 
which gives methodological ―guidelines for collecting and interpreting innovation data.‖  Thus, these ensure 
comparability across countries.  See OECD, OSLO MANUAL: GUIDELINES FOR COLLECTING AND INTERPRETING 
INNOVATION DATA (3rd ed. 2005).   
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innovation, Japanese firms reported that secrecy was the most effective mechanism for protecting 
their inventions and innovations.  In fact, for process innovation, Japanese firms reported that 
trade secret protection (21%) was almost twice as effective as patent protection (11%).  In 
particular, for product innovation, Japanese firms‘ reliance on trade secret protection has 
increased remarkably (patent, 21% vs. secrecy, 28%).  In other words, the J-NIS 2003 
demonstrated that secrecy has become a central mechanism in Japanese firms‘ strategy of 
appropriating rent for their innovations.   
Trade secret law has also had a relatively strong impact on Korean firms‘ strategic choice of 
appropriability mechanisms.  For process innovation, Korean firms appear to prefer secrecy 
(16%) to patent protection (14%), a pattern similar to that of Japanese firms for process 
innovation.  For product innovation, however, patent protection (patent, 36% vs. secrecy, 26%) is 
more likely to be a central mechanism in Korean firms‘ strategy of appropriating rent for their 
product innovations.  In short, the J-NIS 2003 showed a pattern in Japanese firms‘ strategic 
choice of intellectual property rights or appropriability mechanisms similar to that of U.S. firms.  
On the other hand, the KIS 2005 demonstrated that Korean firms‘ strategic choice for product 
innovation was somewhat different from the choices of U.S. and Japanese firms; the KIS 2005 
results appeared to show a response similar to that of Japanese firms reported by Cohen et al. in 
1994.  In this context, the adoption of trade secret law appears to have had a stronger impact on 
the manufacturing sector in Japan than in Korea, especially for protecting firms‘ product 
innovations and inventions.     
In general, firms use a variety of mechanisms, including informal mechanisms (e.g., lead 
time or trade secrets) and formal mechanisms (e.g., patents) to protect their inventions and 
innovations.  The strategies used by firms to protect their innovations through intellectual 
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property rights are determined by various factors, such as the nature of the innovation and ―the 
nature of intensity of competition within an industry.‖11  This may also be the case for trade 
secret protection by firms.  As observed in economic theories of trade secret law, firms‘ reliance 
on trade secret protection is different from their reliance on patent protection because of the 
supplementary nature and broader scope of trade secret protection.  Indeed, the J-NIS 2003 and 
KIS 2005 demonstrated that the nature of the innovation was closely related to firms‘ use of trade 
secrets and revealed that trade secrecy was more suited to process innovations (see Table 1) 
because maintaining secrecy is likely to be easier and more desirable for process innovations.
12
  
This is also consistent with empirical work conducted in the United States.
13
   
In addition, firms‘ strategies for trade secret protection may be affected by rule making 
regarding reverse engineering.  In fact, as observed, the advent of information-intensive 
industries, such as the semiconductor, computer program, and electronic commerce industries in 
the United States, led to changes in rule making with respect to reverse engineering, in which 
reverse engineering was restricted to some degree in industries that traditionally permitted 
competitors to reverse engineer, make, and sell identical or nearly identical products.
14
  In this 
context, trade secret protection was strengthened through restrictions on reverse engineering.
15
  
                                                 
11
 In fact, firms‘ strategies regarding the use of intellectual property are affected by various factors, such as ―the 
technology itself,‖ ―the complexity of the product,‖ ―the nature of the innovation,‖ ―the nature of the production 
process,‖ ―the nature of intensity of competition within an industry,‖ and so on.  Cohel et al., Intellectual Assets, 
supra note 1, at 8 n.18.  
12
 Levin et al., supra note 1, at 794-95. 
13
 See, e.g., id. (―For new processes . . . patents were generally rated the least effective of the mechanisms of 
appropriation. . . .  Secrecy . . . was still considered more effective than patents in protecting processes. . . .  Patents 
for products were typically considered more effective than those for processes, and secrecy was considered less 
effective in protecting products than processes.‖), available at http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/cp/p07a/p0714.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 29, 2010).   
14
 See Chapter II. 1.1. 
15
 See Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse Engineering, 111 YALE L. J. 
1575, 1583 (2002).   
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Japanese and Korean firms in these industries also enjoyed the enhanced trade secret protection 
provided by the relevant legislation, as in the United States.
16
  In the industrial sectors, in which 
the life cycle of new technologies is generally short, the J-NIS 2003 and the KIS 2005 
demonstrated that the effectiveness or importance of trade secrecy in protecting firms‘ 
innovations was higher.
17
  In particular, it is very interesting that Korean firms in these sectors 
reported that trade secret protection was the most important measure in protecting product 
innovation, a response different from that in other industrial sectors, where the importance of 
                                                 
16
 Japan enacted the Semiconductor Chip Layout Protection Act, and amended the Copyright Act to include 
provisions regarding computer program protection, and to incorporate provisions on reverse engineering of 
technically protected digital contents.  See Handōtaisyūsekikairono kairohaichini kansuru hōritsu [Semiconductor 
Chip Layout Protection Act], Law No. 43 of 1985.  For an overview of copyright protection of semiconductors in 
Japan, see Kanji Ishizumi, Copyright Protection of Computer Programs and Semiconductors in Japan, 2 SOFTWARE 
L. J. 305 (1988); Judith J Welch & Wayne L. Anderson, Copyright Protection of Computer software in Japan, 11 
COMPUTER J. L. 287 (1991) (―reverse engineering is generally a permissible or encouraged method of development 
in an industry.  However, the Copyright Law does not specifically provide for this to be authorized use.  If the law is 
literally interpreted, it would prohibit such reproduction and adaptation.‖); Chosakukenhō [Copyright Act], Law No. 
48 of 1970, art 120-2 (Japan) (―A person with respect to whom any of the following items applies shall be 
punishable by imprisonment with work for a term not more than three years or by a fine of not more than three 
million Yen, or by both: (i) a person who either: [(a)] [(A)] transfers to the public the ownership of, or rents to the 
public, [(B)] manufactures, imports or possesses for transfer of ownership or rental to the public, or [(C)] offers for 
use by the public, a device the sole function of which is to circumvent technological protection measures (including 
a set of parts [of such a device] capable of being easily assembled) or reproductions of a computer program the sole 
function of which is to circumvent technological protection measures, or [(b)] transmits to the public, or makes 
transmittable, the aforementioned computer program.‖).  Korea also enacted ―the Semiconductor Chip Layout 
Protection Act,‖ ―the Computer Program Protection Act,‖ and the Copyright Act, which included measures similar to 
those under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act to prohibit circumvention of technical measures for the protection 
of copyrighted works.  See Pandoch‗e chipchŏk hoero ǔi paech‗i sŏlgye e kwanhan pŏpryul [Semiconductor Chip 
Layout Protection Act] , Law No. 4526, 1992 (S. Korea); K‗om‗pyut‗ŏ p‗ǔrogǔraem pohopŏp [Computer Program 
Protection Act], Law No. 3920, 1986 (S. Korea).  The Computer Program Protection Act was repealed by Law. No. 
9625, 2009, and the relevant provisions were incorporated into the Copyright Act; Chŏjakkwŏnpŏp [Copyright Act], 
Law 6881, 2003, art. 92, para. 2. (S. Korea) (―(2) Any act of providing, producing, importing, transferring, lending, 
or interactively transmitting technologies, services, products, devices, or significant parts thereof for the primary 
purpose of neutralizing technological protection measures for copyrights or other rights protected pursuant to this 
Act such as elimination, modification or bypassing thereof without legitimate rights shall be deemed infringement of 
copyrights or other rights protected in accordance with this Act.‖).   
17
 Raw data from the J-NIS 2002 and the KIS 2005 are summarized in the following table, which represents the 
effectiveness of appropriability mechanisms.  
 
Country Industrial sector 
Product innovation, % Process innovation, % 
Patents Secrecy Patents Secrecy 
Japan 
Computers, electronic parts 
and devices 
19 60 10 28 
Korea 
Computers and office 
machinery 
22 30 1 1 
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patent protection was higher than the importance of trade secret protection.
18
  Indeed, the major 
emphasis of Japanese and Korean technology policies has currently shifted from imitation to 
original innovation.  As mentioned earlier, industrial technology in Japan and Korea has reached 
a ―technological frontier,‖ and the environment of national and international competition—in 
which trade secret protection with a lower cost could offer firms in these industries a competitive 
advantage more quickly—is greater than before.19  Accordingly, the results of the J-NIS 2003 
and KIS 2005 imply that trade secret protection has had a significant role in protecting product 
innovation as well as process innovation in these information-intensive industries, which have 
been emphasized for continued economic growth in the two Asian countries.  
Economic theory and empirical works in the United States also suggest that trade secret 
protection is a more effective mechanism for SMEs with limited research intensity and access to 
capital for protection of their technological innovations.
20
  The results of the J-NIS 2003 and KIS 
2005 correlated with firm size, however, are not consistent with the theory and findings of 
empirical works in the United States, which demonstrate that, like patent protection, trade secret 
protection is a more useful or important mechanism for large-sized firms in Japan and Korea 
(Table 1).  This may suggest that the incentive theory on the cost-effectiveness of trade secret 
protection does not directly apply to Japanese and Korean SMEs.   
 
 
1.2. Role of Utility Models as a Partial Substitute for Trade Secret Protection 
As presented in Table 1, the J-NIS 2003 and KIS 2005 showed a difference in Japanese 
                                                 
18
 Id.  
19
 See Chapters III & IV. 
20
 See Chapter V. 2.1. Incentive Theory.   
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and Korean firms‘ rates of reliance on trade secret protection in cases in which they protected 
their product innovations.  What factors affected the difference between the countries?  A variety 
of factors may have affected the difference, including patent law, trade secret law, technological 
capability, and industrial characteristics.  From a comparative law perspective on intellectual 
property law, however, a great difference has been observed in the law and policy regarding 
utility models, which are referred to as a second-tier patent system, in Japan and Korea in recent 
years.  This section briefly examines the role of utility models as substitutes for trade secret 
protection and the changes in utility models in these two Asian countries.   
It is generally accepted that the importation and assimilation of foreign technology has 
played a crucial role in the rapid economic development of Japan and Korea.
21
  The role of 
patent law in these countries, in being conducive to licensing and cross-licensing of patents and 
in promoting the diffusion of innovations and inventions in the process of assimilating a foreign 
technology, has also been examined and emphasized.
22
  For example, Ordover noted that ―[t]he 
Japanese patent system, combined with weak trade secret law, is designed to induce innovators to 
disclose strategic information sooner than does the American system.‖23  Under patent law in 
Japan and Korea, utility models also played a significant role until recently in supplementing the 
standard patent system.  This raises the question of the economic function of utility models and 
                                                 
21
 See, e.g., ALICE H. AMSDEN, ASIA‘S NEXT GIANT: SOUTH KOREAN AND LATE INDUSTRIALIZATION (1989); 
TECHNOLOGICAL INDEPENDENCE: THE ASIAN EXPERIENCE 135-65 (Saneh Chamarik & Susantha Goonatilake eds., 
1994); KongRae Lee, Technological Learning and Entries of User Firms for Capital Goods in Korea, in 
TECHNOLOGY, LEARNING AND INNOVATION: EXPERIENCES OF NEWLY INDUSTRIALIZING ECONOMIES (Linsu Kim & 
Richard R. Nelson eds., 2000).  
22
 See, e.g., Janusz A. Ordover, A Patent System for Both Diffusion and Exclusion, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 43 (1991); 
Takanobu Nakajima & Koichi Hamada, Issues on Japan‟s Intellectual Product, 18 MANAGERIAL & DECISION 
ECONOMICS 141, 145-46 (1997); Keith E. Maskus & Christine McDaniel, Impacts of the Japanese Patent System on 
Productivity Growth, 11 JAPAN & WORLD ECON. 557 (1999); Nagesh Kumar, Intellectual Property Rights, 
Technology and Economic Developments: Experience of Asian Countries 23-25 (Comm‘n on Intell. Prop. Rts., 
Study Paper No. 1b, 2002).  
23
 Ordover, supra note 22, at  45. 
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how the utility model system worked as a substitute for trade secret protection.  
Japan and Korea enacted utility model laws and implemented a utility model system.  
Japan enacted the first utility model law in 1905 to ―protect ever-increasing new technical ideas 
put forward by Japanese people which were not fully qualified for patent protection,‖ and the law 
was influenced by the German law.
24
  Before 1959, the utility model law and patent law were 
able to provide legal protection for the same invention.
25
  Since 1959, the new Japanese Utility 
Model Act has had a role separate from that of the Japanese Patent Act.
 26
  Korea adopted its first 
utility model system in 1909, during the period of Japanese rule of the Korean peninsula.
27
  The 
Korean government enacted the new Korean Utility Model Act in 1961, modeled after the 
Japanese Utility Model Act of 1959.
28
  Even though both patent law and utility model law 
offered legal protection for the creation of technical ideas using the rules of nature, the scope of 
protection available under utility model law was different from that under patent law in several 
respects.
29
  The greatest difference was the subject of protection, because utility model law 
protected only practical devices that related to the shape or structure of an article or a 
combination of articles; thus, process innovations (e.g., a method) could not become the subject 
of registration in a utility model.
30
  If the relevant process was completed successfully, an 
                                                 
24
 Doi explains the background of the adoption of the utility model system in Japan as follows:  
In the early 20th century, Japan was far behind the industrialized countries of the western world in 
the progress of technology, and hence, there was a keen need to protect small inventions of 
Japanese nationals, which regular patents were available for inventors of industrialized countries. 
TERUO DOI, THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW OF JAPAN 68 (1980).   
25
 In addition, ―[t]he novelty requirement was limited to Japan.‖  Chrisropher Heath, Japan, in INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW IN ASIA (Christopher Heath ed. 2003).  
26
 Jitsuyōshinanhō [Utility Model Act], Law No. 123 of 1959 (Japan).  
27
 See SUNHEE YOON, CHIJŎK CHAESANKWŎNPŎP [INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW] 182 (8th ed. 2006) (S. Korea).  
28
 See Silyongsinanpŏp [Utility Model Act], Law No. 952, 1961 (S. Korea).  
29
 For an overview of the Japanese Utility Model Act of 1959, see DOI, supra note 24, at 68-85. 
30
 See id. at 69; T‗ǔkhŏpŏp [Patent Act], Act No9381, 2009, art. 2. (S. Korea).   
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inventor could gain the right to exclude others from making, selling, or using the product, as 
under patent protection.
31
   
As a generic term, a utility model system refers to ―a second-tier patent system, offering a 
cheap, no-examination protection regime for technical inventions which would not usually fulfill 
the strict patentability criteria.‖32  The theoretical rationale for a utility model of intellectual 
property protection is that ―most social welfare-enhancing inventions are cumulative in nature 
and that a great deal of them are sub-patentable in the sense that the novelty and inventive step 
requirements are too high for the patent system to accommodate them.‖33  The utility model 
system is also said to be a better intellectual property institution for firms in developing countries 
that import large amounts of foreign intellectual property, in the forms of goods and services, and 
that need to adapt these goods and services through reverse engineering for local innovation.
34
  
Furthermore, a utility model system helps SMEs that would otherwise have difficulty accessing 
standard patent systems because of their limited financial capabilities.
35
   
Because of the features and functions of utility model protection, utility models in Japan 
                                                 
31
 DOI, supra note 24, at 76-77; Siryong sinan pŏp [Utility Model Act], Law No. 9371, 2009, art. 23 (―The owner of 
a utility model right has an exclusive right to work the registered utility.‖) (S. Korea).  
32
 Uma Suthersanen, Utility Models and Innovation in Developing Countries 1 (UNCTAD-ICTSD Project on IPRs 
and Sustainable Dev., Issue Paper No. 13, 2006).   
33
 GRAHAM DUTFIELD & UMA SUTHERSANEN. GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 178 (2008); Suthersanen, 
supra note 32, at 1-9. 
34
 Suthersanen, supra note 32, at 6-9.  
35
 In 2001, Australia adopted an ―Innovation Patent‖ system, which is a form of utility model system.  The primary 
purpose of the system was ―to stimulate innovation among small to medium business and local industry.‖  The 
Innovation Patent, http://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/patents/what_innovation.shtml (last visited July 2, 2009).  See also 
Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive Approximating the Legal Arrangements for the Protection 
of Inventions by Utility Model, at 12, COM (97) 691 final (Dec. 12, 1997) (―Cost is also a decisive factor in the case 
of inventions the commercial success of which is uncertain.  This is especially true in the case of SMEs, which tend 
not to have enough information on markets to be able to gauge the sales prospects of new products, whereas big 
companies can make use of tried and tested planning and forecasting machinery to help them limit the risk of 
failure.‖).  For these reasons, about 60 countries currently operate under the utility model system.  See WIPO, Where 
Can Utility Models Be Acquired?, http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/ip_business/utility_models/where.htm (last visited 
Mar. 29, 2010).  On the other hand, some scholars deny the cost-effective aspect of utility model systems.  See, e.g., 
Mark D. Janis, Second Tier Patent Protection, 40 HARV. INT‘L L.J. 151, 178-88 (1999) (arguing that enforcement 
costs and attorney fees present obstacles to utility model systems). 
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and Korea appear to have been partial substitutes for trade secret protection that supplemented 
the standard patent system, especially in cases in which the cost of patent protection was high 
compared with the value of the information at stake or when the invention was subpatentable.
36
  
As Reichman observed of the general function of the utility model system in Japan and Korea, 
the system seemed as though it ―did not unduly discourage competition from building on an 
innovator‘s contributions‖ and ―permitted an improver to capture the economic value of this 
improvement‖ during the process of learning to acquire, use, and improve foreign technologies.37  
The utility model system has enabled Japan and Korea, as well as other East Asian countries, 
such as Taiwan, to facilitate firm-level technological learning.
38
  In other words, it has provided a 
more favorable legal environment for Japanese and Korean firms seeking to protect a 
subpatentable or incremental innovation through reverse engineering or duplicative imitation of a 
foreign technology.
39
  Furthermore, utility model protection in Japan and Korea played a 
significant role in diffusing new technologies into the economies of the two countries by virtue 
of the utility model procedures, such as ―pre-grant disclosure, single-claim requirement, first-to-
file, and lengthy pendency periods.‖40 
As the Japanese and Korean economies have grown and the levels of technology in 
products have increased, utility models have become less attractive mechanisms than patent 
                                                 
36
 See Chapter Chapter V. 2-1.  In a separate unpublished paper, I statistically examined the relationship between 
firms‘ preference for trade secret protection and firms‘ preference for utility model protection based on raw data 
from the KIS 2005.  The results showed the two means were negatively associated.   
37
 Jerome. H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2432, 
2458-59 (1994).  
38
 Kumar, supra note 22, at 23-25. 
39
 Indeed, statistics maintained by the Korean Intellectual Property Office show that Korean nationals use utility 
models more heavily than foreigners: between 1947 and 2007, there were 941,972 utility model applications, and 
only 2.4% of those applying came from foreign countries.  Korean Intellectual Property Office Statistics, 
http://www.kipo.go.kr/en/ (last visited July 1, 2009).   
40
 See Maskus & McDaniel, supra note 22. 
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protection to protect their product innovations.  In addition, the substantive examination 
registration system under the utility model procedures is now considered unnecessary, to reduce 
the workload of patent examination and enable earlier commercialization of registered products 
with a short life cycle.  This change in the environment led the Japanese government to revise the 
utility model law in 1994 to allow early registration without substantive examination.
41
  In 
addition, as in Japan, Korea adopted a nonsubstantive examination registration system in 1998 
and implemented it until 2006.
42
   
However, the importance of the utility model as a means to protect innovation in Japan 
and Korea appears to have been different in recent years.  Indeed, the yearly number of 
applications for utility models—which can be used as a proxy for the effectiveness or importance 
of utility models in protecting innovations—shows different trends in the two countries.  Since 
the 1980s, the number of utility model applications in Japan has decreased steadily, and the rate 
of decrease has intensified since 1994, when the Japanese government introduced the new 
system without the substantive examination.  On the other hand, the number of utility model 
applications in Korea did not decrease dramatically until recently, regardless of the adoption of 
new procedures for obtaining utility model rights in 1996.   
 
                                                 
41
For an overview of current procedures for obtaining utility model rights in Japan, see Japan Patent Office, 
http://www.jpo.go.jp/cgi/linke.cgi?url=/tetuzuki_e/t_gaiyo_e/model.htm (last visited May 3, 2010).  
42
 The revised utility model law provided for the dual application system, where firms were allowed to file both 
patent applications and utility model applications using the same underlying invention.  Siryong sinan pŏp [Utility 
Model Act], Law No. 5577, 1998 (came into effect on July 1, 1999), art. 17 (S. Korea).    
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FIGURE 1 
UTILITY MODEL APPLICATIONS AND PATENT APPLICATIONS IN JAPAN AND KOREA
43
 
 
 
  In this context, we may assume that utility models in Japan have not played a significant 
role in substituting for trade secret protection in recent years.  On the other hand, utility models 
in Korea have played a relatively significant role in substituting for trade secret protection until 
recently.  In other words, in the case of trade secrets, as in the United States and Japan, trade 
secret law in Korea can supplement the patent system, but it is not likely to affect Korean firms 
significantly, at least not when they intend to protect their product innovations under the Korean 
patent and utility model system.  Thus, this may suggest that the different reliance of Japanese 
and Korean firms on trade secret protection for product innovations is attributable to differences 
in the effectiveness of utility model protection in the two countries.  However, the number of 
                                                 
43
 Source: Suthersanen, supra note 32, at 18, Statistics of the Japan Patent Office, and Statistics of the Korean 
Intellectual Property Office. 
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utility model applications has decreased rapidly since the Korean government revived the 
substantive examination under the utility model regime in 2006.
 44  
It is likely that the role of 
utility models as a substitute for trade secret protection in Korea will decrease in the future, as it 
has in Japan.   
 
 
1.3. Summary 
The assimilation of imported foreign technology and the diffusion of this technology in 
domestic industries have been critical to the rapid economic growth seen in Japan and Korea, 
which wanted to catch up to Western countries.  Patent systems with pregrant disclosure, a 
single-claim requirement, and first-to-file provisions in Japan and Korea played a significant role 
in diffusing domestic technical innovations and inventions.  During the period of rapid economic 
growth in particular, the utility model system as a supplement for the patent system also played 
an important role not only in allowing a domestic improver of an imported foreign technology an 
incentive to capture the economic value of that information, but also in diffusing these local 
innovations throughout the economies.  In addition, in cases in which the cost of patent 
protection was high compared with the value of the invention or when the invention was 
subpatentable, the utility model system provided the improver with a strong incentive to protect 
the inventions under a system conferring an exclusive right, and under those circumstances, the 
                                                 
44
 In 2006, the Korean government revived the substantive examination under the utility model regime, in part 
because the government recognized the above problems, and in part because the average period of patent 
examination was shortened to about ten months in 2006.  The current utility model law abolished the dual 
application system and revived the conversion system, in which ―[a] patent applicant may convert a patent 
application to an application for utility model registration within the scope of matters stated in the description or 
drawing initially attached to the patent application,‖ and vice versa.  Siryong sinan pŏp [Utility Model Act], Law No 
9371, 2009, art. 10 (S. Korea).  
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utility model system appears to have worked as a partial substitute for trade secret protection.  In 
this context, trade secret protection, which has a much more limited function in relation to 
technology disclosure compared with a patent system, was not an attractive intellectual property 
mechanism for the Japanese and Korean governments.  Although there were some differences 
between Japan and Korea as their industrial technological capabilities increased, the original role 
intended for the utility model system, that is, to supplement the standard patent system, has been 
drastically weakened.  On the other hand, as information-intensive industries with technologies 
with a short life cycle have gained importance in Japan and Korea, trade secret protection 
appears to have become a central mechanism for protecting the innovations of Japanese and 
Korean firms.  In addition, the Japanese and Korean governments have made these industries 
strategic to their continued economic growth.  Accordingly, legal policies on trade secret 
protection have become key industrial policies in the Japanese and Korean economies in recent 
years.   
 
 
2. Postemployment Restraints in Japan and Korea  
2.1. Use of Postemployment Contracts 
Regarding the practical use of covenants not to compete as supplements to trade secret 
law in Japan and Korea, despite the prominence of covenants not to compete in the United States, 
until recently, covenants not to compete have not been a prominent legal and social issue in 
Japan and Korea.
45
  In fact, several surveys conducted in Japan showed that, until recently, 
                                                 
45
 See Chapter III. 3 & IV. 3; Norman D. Bishara, Covenants Not to Compete in a Knowledge Economy: Balancing 
Innovation from Employee Mobility Against Legal Protection for Human Capital Investment, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. 
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Japanese employers did not rely much on postemployment contracts, including covenants not to 
compete, as a means of restraining postemployment relations.  For example, a survey conducted 
by the Japanese Institute of Intellectual Property revealed that only 6% of responding firms 
imposed ―some kind of obligation on the competition for their employees.‖46  Another survey, 
conducted by the Japan Institute for Labor Policy and Training in 2004, showed a similar 
reluctance to rely on covenants not to compete.
47
  Indeed, the survey revealed that only 3.7% of 
Japanese employers sought to protect valuable information through contractual measures that 
imposed a duty of noncompetition.
48
  These employers relied relatively more on the duty of 
confidentiality (33.7%).
49
  These duties were imposed mainly by work rules (shugyo kisoku; 
47.9%), which have primarily regulated employment relationships in Japan.
50
  Interestingly, 57% 
                                                                                                                                                             
& LAB. L. 287, 289 (2006); Peter J. Whitmore, A Statistical Analysis of Noncompetition Clauses in Employment 
Contracts, 15 J. CORP. L. 483, 489; Kwon-Chul Shin, Kŭlloja ŭi kyŏngŏp kŭmji ŭimu [Employee‘s Duty of Non-
Competition], 18 NODONGPŎP YŎN‘GU [LABOR LAW STUDIES] 221, 223 (2005) (S. Korea); Takashi Araki, Legal 
Issues of Employee Loyalty in Japan, 20 COMP. LAB. L. & POL‘Y J. 267, 267 (1999) [hereinafter Araki, Employee 
Loyalty]; Mikako Ogawa, Note, Noncompete Covenants in Japanese Employment Contracts: Recent Developments, 
22 HASTING INT‘L & COMP. L. REV. 341, 342 (1998-1999).  
46
 Hideo Nakoshi, New Japanese Trade Secret Act, 75 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC‘Y 631, 633 (1993) (citing a 
survey result conducted by the Institute of Intellectual Property in 1989).  
47
 THE JAPAN INSTITUTE FOR LABOR POLICY AND TRAINING, JŪGYŌIN KANKEI NO WAKUGUMI TO SAIYŌ TAISHOKU NI 
KANSURU JITTAI CHŌSA: RŌDŌ KEIYAKU WO MEGURU JITTAI NI KANSURU CHŌSA (1) [FACT-FINDING SURVEY ON 
EMPLOYMENT STRUCTURE, HIRING AND TERMINATION CONCERNING EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS] 95 (May 17, 2005) 
(2765 firms of 10,000 surveyed responded), available at 
http://www.jil.go.jp/institute/research/documents/004/research004_5_3.pdf (last visited Oct 12, 2010). 
48
 Id.  
49
 Id.  Although larger firms tend to rely more on covenants not to compete and nondisclosure agreements, only 
16.3% of large firms with more than 1000 employees responded that they impose a duty of noncompetition on 
departing employees.  The following results are based only on responses by firms reporting that they imposed a duty 
of confidentiality or a duty of noncompetition.   
No. of employees 
Fewer than 
50, % 50–99, % 100–299, % 300–999, % 
More than 
1000, % 
Duty of 
confidentiality 
30.6 42.9 45.5 57.8 72.1 
Duty of 
noncompetition 
3.0 5.7 5.9 9.6 16.3 
Id. at 96.   
50
 Id. at 98.  For general legal information regarding work rules in Japan, see KAZUO SUGENO, JAPANESE 
EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAW 110-28 (2002).  
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of responding companies did not impose any duties on departing employees.
51
  However, 
according to a recent survey, Japanese firms‘ reliance on postemployment contracts, which are 
intended to restrict competition from employees after their employment relationship has 
terminated, appears to have increased gradually in recent years.  The survey, which was 
conducted by the Japan Intellectual Property Association (JIPA) in 2008, demonstrated that 
Japanese firms‘ propensity for covenants not to compete had increased compared with results of 
a survey conducted by the JIPA in 1995.
52
  In responding to a question asking the firms surveyed 
whether they required departing employees to sign a nondisclosure agreement, 52.7% of the 
responding firms reported that they required all departing employees to sign a nondisclosure 
agreement.
53
  Interestingly, 56.2% of the firms requiring employees to sign a nondisclosure 
agreement reported that they imposed the duty of noncompetition on departing employees.
54
  The 
JIPA survey report noted that the response rate regarding covenants not to compete had increased 
dramatically compared with the response rate (9.2%) in the 1995 JIPA survey report.
55
  Likewise, 
Korean firms showed an increasing tendency to rely more on contractual measures to protect 
themselves from unauthorized disclosure of trade secrets or other valuable information by former 
employees.  In fact, surveys on the management of industrial secrets in enterprise laboratories 
demonstrated that the tendency for Korean firms to rely on postemployment contracts had 
increased from 37.8% in 2003 to 48.1% in 2006.
56
  Furthermore, even in SMEs, this tendency to 
                                                 
51
 THE JAPAN INSTITUTE FOR LABOR POLICY AND TRAINING, supra note 47, at 95.  
52
 JAPAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ASSOCIATION, EIGYŌHIMITSUKANRINI OKERU ANKETO CHOSAHOKOKUSHO 
[SURVEY REPORT ON TRADE SECRET MANAGEMENT] (2008).  
53
 Id. at 129. 
54
 Id. at 134. 
55
 Id. at 135.  The survey report also pointed out that given Japanese courts‘ strict interpretation of covenants not to 
compete, the increased rate of Japanese firms‘ reliance on covenants not to compete is surprising.  Id.   
56
 These surveys did not differentiate between confidentiality agreements and covenants not to compete:   
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rely on contractual measures appears to have increased in recent years.
57
   
 
 
2.2. Role of Lifetime Employment and Relation to Trade Secret Protection 
Regarding what has made Japanese and Korean firms resort increasingly more to 
contractual measures to protect their trade secrets or valuable information, until recently, 
postemployment covenants not to compete had not received much attention in Japanese and 
Korean society, allegedly because of the traditional practice of lifetime employment.
58
  As 
observed earlier, the Japanese and Korean governments have dramatically strengthened trade 
secret law, and they have attributed the enhancement of trade secret protection to social and 
economic changes.
59
  In particular, the demise of the practice of traditional lifetime employment 
since the economic slowdown in Japan and the financial crisis in the 1990s in Korea has been 
presented by Japanese and Korean legal scholars and commentators as one of the most important 
                                                                                                                                                             
Survey Total, % Large firms, % SMEs, % Venture firms, % 
2003 37.8 61.4 33.5 36.5 
2006 48.1 73.4 38.6 44.9 
 
KOREA INDUSTRIAL TECHNOLOGY ASSOCIATION, KIŎP YŎN‘GUSO SANŎPKIMIL KWALLI SILT‗AE [FACT-FINDING 
SURVEY ON THE MANAGEMENT OF INDUSTRIAL SECRETS OF ENTERPRISE LABORATORIES] 50 (June 2006).  KOREA 
INDUSTRIAL TECHNOLOGY ASSOCIATION, KIŎP YŎN‘GUSO SANŎPKIMIL KWALLI SILT‗AE [FACT-FINDING SURVEY ON 
THE MANAGEMENT OF INDUSTRIAL SECRETS OF ENTERPRISE LABORATORIES] 51 (Dec. 2003).   
57
 SMALL AND MEDIUM BUREAU ADMINISTRATION, CHUNGSO KIŎP SANŌP KIMIL GWALLI SILT‗AE CHOSA [A REPORT 
ON THE CURRENT STATUS OF SMES‘ MANAGEMENT OF INDUSTRIAL CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION] 48 (Dec. 2009) 
(showing the increasing reliance by Korean SMEs on contractual measures, from 48.0% in 2007 to 50.1% in 2009).  
58
 See Araki, Employee Loyalty, supar note 45, at 267; Seong-Ho Lee, Kǔlloja e taehan kyŏngŏp kǔmji yakchŏng ǔi 
hyoryŏk kwa chŏnjik kǔmji kachŏbun ǔi hyoryŏk yŏbu [Effects of Covenants Not to Compete and Injunctive Relief], 
62 JŎSǓTISǓ [JUSTICE] 84, 84 (2001) (S. Korea); Shin, supra note 45, at 223; Jae-Yong Lee, Yŏngŏpimil ǔi pohowa 
toejik kŭlloja ǔi kyŏngŏp kǔmji ǔimu [Protection of Trade Secrets and Covenants-Not-to-Compete of Retired 
Employees], 15 PŎPHAKYŎN‘GU [LAW REVIEW] 115, 116 (2005) (S. Korea).  
59
 See Chapter III. and IV.  
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reasons for the drastic changes in trade secret law in the two countries in recent years.
60
  The 
above statement appears to suggest that the lifetime employment system had, to some extent, 
worked as a substitute for trade secret law and postemployment contracts not to compete in 
Japan and Korea, and in recent years, the system has lost its function as a substitute for trade 
secret law and postemployment contracts as it has eroded in the two countries.   
In the United States, because of labor relations and practices in which employment was 
typically at will, an employer had an incentive to invest in human capital at an efficient level; 
thus, the employing firm had an incentive to reduce its cost of investment in human capital by 
dismissing employees during business downturns.  On the other hand, an employee with an 
increased marginal product of human capital had an incentive to move to another firm that was 
willing to pay higher wages, in part because of the active external labor market in the United 
States.
61
  In this vein, trade secret law and the law of postemployment contracts were said to play 
a significant role in encouraging an employer‘s incentive to invest in confidential information as 
well as human capital.
62
  However, Japan and Korea did not have trade secret laws until the early 
1990s, and until recently, firms in these countries had not relied routinely on postemployment 
contracts to protect confidential information and their investment in human capital.  Given the 
above scenario in the United States, one may wonder how the practice of lifetime employment 
and complementary factors worked to support firms‘ incentive to invest in confidential 
information and human capital in Japan and Korea.  In other words, one may wonder how it was 
possible for lifetime employment to work as a substitute for postemployment contracts in labor 
                                                 
60
 See Araki, Employee Loyalty, supar note 45. 
61
 See Paul H. Rubin & Peter Shedd, Human Capital and Covenants Not to Compete, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 93, 97 
(1981).   
62
 See Chapter V. 2.4. 
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practices in Japan and Korea, as well as how lifetime employment has changed in recent years 
and why.   
Because of the dramatic economic success of these countries after World War II, many 
scholars have developed various theories, such as cultural, control, economic, and motivational 
theories, on lifetime employment in these countries, especially Japan, to explain the origin and 
effects of the practice.
63
  Nevertheless, they generally agree on the common view that lifetime 
employment was recognized as an important concept in labor relations in the two Asian 
countries.
64
  Under the practice of lifetime employment in Japan and Korea, the typical 
relationship of a firm with its employees can be summarized briefly as follows.  Newly recruited 
graduates as regular employees ―[were] typically trained by experiencing different types of work 
                                                 
63
 See Jeremiah J. Sullivan and Richard B. Peterson, A Test of Theories Underlying the Japanese Lifetime 
Employment System, 22 J. INT‘L BUS. STUD. 79, 82-85 (1991) (summarizing cultural, control, economic, and 
motivational theories); JAMES C. ABGGLEN, THE JAPANESE FACTORY: ASPECTS OF ITS SOCIAL ORGANIZATION 11 
(1958); Geert Hofstede, The Cultural Relativity of Organizational Practices and Theories, 14 J. INT‘L BUS. STUD. 75, 
80 (1983) (showing and placing 50 countries examined including Korea, the United States, and Japan on 
individualist-collectivist scale); see also Hak-Chong Lee, Transformation of Employment Practices in Korean 
Business, 28 INT‘L. STUD. OF MGMT. ORG. 26, 27-28 (Winter 1998-1999) (explaining traditional Korean culture).   
64
 See MASAHIKO AOKI, INFORMATION, INCENTIVES, AND BARGAINING IN THE JAPANESE ECONOMY (1988); RONALD 
PHILIP DORE, BRITISH FACTORY, JAPANESE FACTORY: THE ORIGINS OF NATIONAL DIVERSITY IN INDUSTRIAL 
RELATIONS (1973).  In addition, there have been many recent studies on the origin and development of the lifetime 
employment system in Japan from diverse perspectives.  See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Mark J. Roe, Lifetime 
Employment: Labor Peace and the Evolution of Japanese Corporate Governance, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 508, 516-28 
(1999) (focusing on political deals in explaining the development of lifetime employment in Japan); Chiaki 
Moriguchi & Hiroshi Ono, Japanese Lifetime Employment: A Century‟s Perspective 1-22 (The Eur. Inst. of Japanese 
Stud., Working Paper No. 205, Sep 2004), available at http://swopec.hhs.se/eijswp/papers/eijswp0205.pdf (last 
visited April 2010) (explaining lifetime employment in Japan as a ―cluster of human resource management‖ 
interacting with ―macro-level legal, political, and social institutions‖); DAVID COATES, MODELS OF CAPITALISM: 
GROWTH AND STAGNATION IN THE MODERN ERA 127 (2001) (mentioning Japanese cultural factors).  For a brief 
examination of the development of lifetime employment in Korea, see Brett M. Kitt, Note, Downsizing Korea? The 
Difficult Demise of Lifetime Employment and the Prospects for Further Reform, 34 Law & Pol‘y Int‘l Bus. 537, 
539-44 (2003) (explaining several factors, including cultural, economic, and political factors, related to the 
development of lifetime employment in Korea).  However, it should be noted that lifetime employment was not 
widely used in entire firms in Japan and Korea.  Mostly male core employees in large firms worked under the 
practice.  See Leon Wolff, The Death of Lifetime Employment in Japan?, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE 21ST 
CENTURY: JAPAN‘S GRADUAL TRANSFORMATION (Luke Nottage, Leon Wolff, and Kent Anderson eds. 2008); June 
Park, The Political Origin of Employment Protection: A Comparative Study of the United States, Germany, and 
South Korea 163 (2007) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pittsburgh) [hereinafter Park, Employment 
Protection]. 
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in several departments[, especially within a large firm] or corporate group.‖ 65  The firm not only 
provided a compensation system based on seniority, but also refrained from laying off the 
employees, even during economic downturns, and instead used ―alternative ways to reduce labor 
costs‖ during the time period, such as a ―hiring freeze, intra- and inter-firm transfer, [or] 
voluntary retirement.‖66  Accordingly, the employees with corporate loyalty tended to remain 
with the same firms for many years, or until they reached the mandatory retirement age.
67
   
In short, employers guaranteed their employees lifetime employment, and the employees 
in turn promised not to leave for many years, or until their retirement.  Thus, under the practice 
of lifetime employment, because of the employees‘ promise not to leave, the firms may have had 
an incentive to invest in human capital (e.g., on-the-job training) and to maintain confidential 
information without worrying about a potential loss of return on their investment.  Similarly, 
because of the employers‘ promise of lifetime employment and the compensation system, 
including a ―seniority wage system, internal promotion, bonuses, [and] corporate pensions,‖ 
employees may have had an incentive to ―exert effort, acquire desirable human capital, and 
remain‖ with the same firm.68  This model seems to show the cooperation between employers 
and employees in the absence of trade secret law or postemployment covenants not to compete 
that encouraged cooperation among people.
69
  This raises the question of what factors supported 
                                                 
65
 Thomas Bredgaard & Flemming Larsen, Comparing Flexicurity in Denmark and Japan 20 (Japan Inst. for Labour 
Policy and Training, Research Report of the Foreign Researcher Invitation Program of the, 2007), available at 
http://www.jil.go.jp/profile/documents/Denmark_final.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2009); SUGENO, supra note 50, at 75. 
66
 Moriguchi & Ono, supra note 64, at 5.  See id. at 13 (―by the early 1960s, . . . it was common for Japanese 
employers to circumvent dismissals by using other means, such as reduction of working hours, relocation of regular 
employees, separation of non-regular employees, and the suspension of hiring new workers.‖).   
67
 SUGENO, supra note 50, at 75.  
68
 Moriguchi & Ono, supra note 64, at 5.  
69
 For a general economic theory of contracts, see ROBERT COOTER AND THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 195-
236 (4th ed. 2004).  See also ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORM 11-35 (2000) (stating ―a model of 
cooperation and the production of social norms‖); ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS 
SETTLE DISPUTES (1991) (demonstrating people‘s cooperation in the absence of law).  
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the lifetime employment practice in these countries.  Taking a closer look at the practice may 
allow us to discover internal and external factors that gave each party an incentive to support the 
practice.  This section briefly examines these factors and their changes in response to recent 
socioeconomic changes in Japan and Korea. 
 
 
2.2.1. Japan  
In Japan, in principle, an employment contract without a fixed period has been governed 
by section 1 of Article 627 of the Japanese Civil Code.  Under the Article, either party can 
terminate the contract at any time with two weeks‘ advance notice based on the freedom of 
contracts, which includes the freedom of dismissal.
70
  Based on the recognition of unequal 
bargaining power between the two parties in an employment contract, the Labor Standards Act of 
1947 included some provisions restricting the dismissal of employees under certain 
circumstances, and it extended the advance notice period to thirty days.
71
  Except for these 
provisions in the Labor Standards Act, as mentioned, the dismissal of employees in an 
employment contract was governed by the Japanese Civil Code.
72
  Thus, an employer had the 
                                                 
70
 Minpō [Civil Code], Law No. 89 of 1896, art. 627, para. 1 (Japan) (―If the parties have not specified the term of 
employment, either party may request to terminate at any time.  In such cases, employment shall terminate on the 
expiration of two weeks from the day of the request to terminate.‖); SUGENO, supra note 50, at 473. 
71
 See Rōdōkijunhō, Law No. 49 of 1947, art. 19, para. 1 (Japan) (―An employer shall not dismiss a worker during a 
period of absence from work for medical treatment with respect to injuries or illnesses suffered in the course of 
employment nor within 30 days thereafter, and shall not dismiss a woman during a period of absence from work 
before and after childbirth in accordance with the provisions of Article 65 nor within 30 days thereafter.‖); 
Rōdōkijunhō, Law No. 49 of 1947, art. 20, para. 1 (Japan) (―In the event that an employer wishes to dismiss a 
worker, the employer shall provide at least 30 days advance notice.‖); see also SUGENO, supra note 50, at 474-79. 
72
 However, there was the Trade Union Act under which ―dismissals of workers because they are union members or 
their having engaged in proper union activities are invalid as violations of the public policy contained in the 
guarantee of organizational and other rights in Article 28 of the Constitution.‖  Id. at 479. 
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right to terminate at any time unless the employer‘s dismissal violated work rules or the above 
statutory restrictions.   
In practice, however, several external factors had buttressed lifetime employment in 
Japan.  On the side of the employer, among other factors, such as the Japanese government-led 
employment stabilization measures, an important and relatively direct factor seemed to be the 
intervention of Japanese courts supporting the practice of lifetime employment.
73
  Japanese 
courts restricted the abusive exercise of an employer‘s right to dismiss an employee under ―the 
doctrine of abusive dismissal‖ developed through judicial precedents.74  In 1975, in a case 
involving an employee who was dismissed from employment because the employee was 
dismissed from membership of a labor union under the union shop agreement, a lower court did 
not consider whether or not the dismissal from membership of the labor union was invalid when 
it judged whether the dismissal from employment was valid or not.
75
   In the case, the Supreme 
Court of Japan stated that ―it is fair to say that as the case may be, depending on whether the said 
removal from the register (or dismissal from membership) is valid or not, the said dismissal from 
employment should be judged invalid,‖ and it further stated that ―even when an employer 
exercises its right of dismissal, it will be void as an abuse of the right if it is not based on 
objectively reasonable grounds so that it cannot receive general social approval as a proper 
act.‖76  Two years later, in 1977, the Court reaffirmed the doctrine with more clarity, stating 
even where there are objective reasons for a dismissal, an employer does not 
always have the right to dismiss.  If, under the specific circumstances of the case, 
                                                 
73
 See Gilson & Roe, supra note 64, at 524-28 (presenting three more factors that buttressed lifetime employment in 
Japan).   
74
 Ryo Kambayashi, Dismissal Regulation in Japan (Global COE Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series No. 119, Mar. 
2010), available at http://gcoe.ier.hit-u.ac.jp/research/discussion/2008/pdf/gd09-119.pdf (last visited April 26, 2010).  
75
 Supreme Court of Japan, Judgment of April 25, 1975, Case No. Shōwa 43 (O) 499, translated in SUGENO, supra 
note 50, at 479-80.   
76
 Id. 
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the dismissal is unduly unreasonable so that it cannot receive general social 
approval as a proper act, the dismissal will be void as an abuse of the right of 
dismissal.
77
 
 
Accordingly, even if an employer in Japan could terminate an employment contract at 
any time, in most cases in which there was grounds for dismissal, the dismissal was 
restricted by the courts, which assessed strictly whether it was ―objectively reasonable‖ 
and ―socially acceptable.‖  In general, these reasonable grounds for dismissal could be 
divided into four or five types.
78
  Among them, to assess the validity of a dismissal based 
on business necessity, which is a means of employment adjustment, the courts established 
four requirements:   
First, the employer must provide a reasonable explanation to the court of the need 
to reduce the number of workers.  Second, the dismissal must be the last resort to 
adjust labor input.  Third, the selection of the person to be discharged should be 
proper.  Fourth, the dismissal procedure should be reasonable.
79
   
 
The courts placed more restrictions on the dismissal by imposing a burden of proof on the 
employer, who had to prove the dismissal was not an abuse of the right.
80
  In this context, 
the courts in Japan appear to have developed the doctrine by focusing on labor security 
rather than labor flexibility, and as Japanese scholars have argued, this strict court 
                                                 
77
 This case involved an employee, a newscaster, who failed to deliver the morning news twice in two weeks.  The 
employer, a broadcasting company, dismissed the employee.  The Supreme Court of Japan nullified the dismissal, 
reasoning that ―the decision to dismiss [the employee] was somewhat overly severe, lacked reasonableness and was 
not without doubt as to its reasonableness.  There is room to believe that it would not necessarily be approved as 
socially acceptable.‖  Supreme Court of Japan, Judgment of Jan. 31, 1977, 268 Rōdō Hanrei 17, translated in 
SUGENO, supra note 50, at 481. 
78
 Sugeno explains these four types of reasonable grounds for dismissal: (1) ―worker‘s incompetence, or the 
worker‘s lack, or loss, of the skills or qualifications required for performance of the worker‘s job‖; (2) worker‘s 
engagement in ―an act that violates a disciplinary rule‖; (3) business necessity; (4) union demands based on a union-
shop agreement.  SUGENO, supra note 50, at 480.  
79
 Tokyo High Court of Japan, Judgment of Oct. 29, 1979, Case No. Shōwa 51 (Ne) 1028, translated in Kambayashi, 
supra note 74, at 9-10. 
80
 Kambayashi, supra note 74, at 10-14; SUGENO, supra note 50, at 486-89. 
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approach toward dismissal ―reinforced [the evolving lifetime employment practice] and 
transformed expectations into social norms‖ in Japanese society.81   
On the side of the employee, like the employer, no formal enforcement 
mechanism prohibited an employee from moving to another employer that offered a 
better paying job.  However, an informal enforcement mechanism existed that 
discouraged the employee from having an incentive to leave.  Because lifetime 
employment became a social norm in labor relations in Japanese society, firms, especially 
larger firms, had little incentive to dismiss their employees except in extremely difficult 
business situations.
82
  Thus, in the case of dismissal by the firm, the employee was 
regarded as a person who was ―disaffected‖ with the firm in the network of 
communication among firms.
83
  Even in a case of voluntary resignation, the employee 
was ―treated with suspicion by any subsequent employer, having proven that they could 
not be trusted.‖84  Based on empirical evidence, as Moriguchi and Ono pointed out, ―[t]he 
stigma attached to job changers hampered their chances of reemployment and resulted in 
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 Moriguchi & Ono, supra note 64, at 14; see also Gilson & Roe, supra note 64, at 525-26;  Takashi Araki, 
Changing Employment Practices, Corporate Governance, and the Role of Labor Law in Japan, 28 COMP. LAB. L. & 
POL‘Y J. 251, 253-54 (2007) [hereinafter Araki, Corporate Governance]; Wolff, supra note 64, at 75.  For 
interpretations of these requirements by courts and leading cases in Japan, see Kambayashi, supra note 74, at 10-14; 
SUGENO, supra note 50, at 486-89.  
82
 Sydney Crawcour, The Japanese Employment System, 4 J. JAPANESE STUD. 225, 240 (1978). 
83
 Id. (―Regular workers were seldom dismissed, and then usually only in cases of disaffection or ‗subversion,‘ but 
when dismissal did occur it was an industrial death sentence with consequences far more severe than they would be 
in many other industrial societies.‖).  
84
 Rosen & Usui, The Social Structure of Japanese Intellectual Property Law, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 32, 52-54 
(1994).  See also Jay Dratler, Jr., Trade Secrets in the United States and Japan: A Comparison and Prognosis, 14 
YALE J. INT‘L L. 68, 112 (1989) (―Due to these cultural factors, a Japanese contemplating misappropriation of trade 
secrets faces severe economic and social disincentives.  He would exchange a guarantee of life-time employment, as 
well as the comfort and security of an interlocking web of good personal relations and cross-loyalties with 
coworkers, for a very uncertain future.  Although there might be some immediate monetary advantage from the 
misappropriation, the employee would face suspicion and distrust even from his new coworkers and managers, both 
for the apostasy of leaving the womb of permanent employment and for the contemptible breach of former 
managers‘ trust and former coworkers‘ loyalty.‖).  
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their wage loss.‖85  This norm against job changers in the external labor market may have 
been a factor related to the inflexibility of the labor market in Japan.
86
   
However, the longest economic stagnation in Japanese history since the early 
1990s changed the role of these enforcement mechanisms that had supported the practice 
of lifetime employment.  On the one hand, in fact, the Japanese government and courts, 
to some extent, changed their traditional position on job security in the labor market 
based on the recognition of the importance of labor flexibility to economic development.  
Although the Japanese government has tried to maintain employment security,
87
 the 
Japanese government and courts have taken several measures to enhance labor flexibility 
in the external, as well as the internal, labor market.
88
  Nevertheless, the Japanese 
government and courts have not changed their position on the doctrine of abusive 
dismissal.  Although, in a case involving employees dismissed for economic reasons, the 
Tokyo District Court appeared to limit the doctrine of abusive dismissal by shifting the 
burden of proof from employers to employees,
89
 the original version of the doctrine 
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 Moriguchi & Ono, supra note 64, at 17, n15 (―Empirical studies of the Japanese labor market have found a 
negative correlation between the number of job changes and earnings,‖ citing Takao Kato & Mark Rockel, 
Experiences, Credentials, and Compensation in the Japanese and U.S. Managerial Labor Markets: Evidence from 
New Micro Data, 6 J. JAPANESE & INT‘L ECON. 30 (March 1992); Hiroshi Ono, College Quality and Earnings in the 
Japanese Labor Market, 43 INDUS. REL. 595 (2004). 
86
 See Gilson & Roe, supra note 64, at 516-28 (noting the inactive external labor market as an important factor 
supporting the practice of lifetime employment).   
87
 Moriguchi & Ono, supra note 64, at 21.  
88
 The Japanese government and courts allowed employers to exploit adjustments in working conditions in the 
internal labor market for the purpose of relieving employers‘ possible cost when they did not resort to economic 
dismissals.  At the same time, as a measure to deregulate labor market regulations, the government revised the 
―Worker Dispatching Act‖ in 2003, which ―was prohibited under the 1999 revision.‖  Araki, Corporate Governance, 
supra note 81, at 255-76.  
89
 The Tokyo district courts stated ―in principle, employers are free to dismiss employees.  In [this] case, employees 
are charged with the burden of proof establishing [the] existence of certain facts that give rise to abuse of employers‘ 
right of dismissal,‖ and held in favor of employers.  Tokyo District Court of Japan, Decision of November 29, 1999, 
Case No. Heisei (Yo) 21087.  A Japanese economist noted that the case ―may represent a rational response to recent 
labor market changes and the fact that the focus of cases has shifted from collective disputes to individual disputes 
revolving around questions of financial compensation.‖  Kambayashi, supra note 74, at 17.  
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established by the Supreme Court of Japan was incorporated in the Labor Standards Act 
in 2003 after heated debate during the drafting of the amendment bill, especially on the 
matter related to shifting the burden of proof.
90
   
On the other hand, although there has been disagreement about the downward 
trend in job security in Japan, recent surveys have supported the argument that Japanese 
firms have sustained less commitment to the lifetime employment of their employees 
compared with the period before the recent economic downturn.
91
  For example, 
Ahmadjian and Robinson reported that an increasing number of Japanese firms 
downsized during the 1990s.
92
  According to their research, ―over 20 percent of all firms 
had downsized by 10 percent or more‖ by 1997, which was a large-scale downsizing.93   
A more important change has been observed on the side of the employees.  The 
unprecedented economic downturns have caused, to some degree, a decline in job 
security in Japanese society.  As a logical result, this has also caused a decline in trusting 
relationships in the workplace.
94
  In fact, the decline in employees‘ trust in terms of their 
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 See Kambayashi, supra note 74, at 17-18 (―In the original government proposal, . . . the burden of proof lay with 
employees who need[ed] to show that a dismissal was abusive.‖). 
91
 See Wolff, supra note 64, at 66-74. 
92
 Christina L. Ahmadjian & Patricia Robinson, Safety in Numbers: Downsizing and the Deinstitutionalization of 
Permanent Employment in Japan, 46 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 622, 634 (2001).  
93
 In addition, their research findings showed the rising number of Japanese firms‘ downsizing:  
In 1990, 5.9 percent of the firms in the sample reduced employment by 5 percent or more, while in 
1997, 24 percent downsized by 5 percent or more. . . . In 1991, 10 percent of the firms in the 
sample reduced their employment by 5 percent or more.  By 1997, over 50 percent of the firms 
had downsized at least once. 
Id. at 634.  The downward trend in job security has been supported by several recent researches.  See Wolff, supra 
note 64, at 67-68; EeHwan Jung & Byung-you Cheon, Economic Crisis and Changes in Employment Relations in 
Japan and Korea, 46 ASIAN SURVEY 457, 461 (2006) (―the most representative survey on corporate restructuring 
conducted by Japan‘s Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare (MHLW), shows that the percentage of companies that 
implemented workforce reduction (such as ―honorary‖ retirement and layoffs) has increased since the late 1990s.  
From 1.3% in 1995 and 1.5% in 1996, this figure increased to 3.8% in 1999, 2.3% in 2000, 3.8% in 2001, and 4.5% 
in 2002.  The figures from 1999 and after are about three times as high as those in the mid-1990s.‖).  
94
 Hyeong-ki Kwon, Japanese Employment Relations in Transition, 25 ECON. & INDUS. DEMOCRACY 325, 337 
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commitment to firms has been confirmed by many recent studies.  For example, Kwon, 
relying on a comparative survey conducted in 1997, noted that ―in terms of affective 
commitments, loyalty of American employees to their firms is higher than that of the 
Japanese, although Japanese employees have higher expectations of job continuance than 
that of US employees.‖95  The decline in employees‘ loyalty to firms triggered by the 
decreased job security in Japan appears to have resulted in increasing mobility among 
midcareer employees.  In this vein, the informal sanction against a job changer in the 
external labor market no longer seems to function properly in the same way it had before 
the economic downturns.  Indeed, despite the existence of some barriers that made it 
difficult for midcareer job changers to seek new jobs, such as age limits on their 
recruitment and hiring,
96
 according to the METI, the percentage of job changers in new 
employment in a given year has become increasingly larger since the early 1990s.
97
  In 
addition, in a survey conducted by the METI in 2006, Japanese firms reported that 
technology leakage by persons related to business was the greatest potential risk factor 
associated with technology leakage, and former employees were specifically recognized 
as being the greatest risk factor among them.
98
   
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
(2004) (―Changes in the status of employees‘ trusting commitments and work ethics are not simply the result of the 
social effects of karoshi (death due to extreme hard work), but are, more importantly, due to a ‗sense of betrayal‘ that 
prevailed among workers during the process of industrial adjustments in the 1990s.‖).   
95
 Id. at 335-36. 
96
 See Hiroshi Ono, Japanese Labor Market Reform: Why Is It So Difficult? (The Eur. Inst. of Japanese Stud., 
Working Paper No. 146, Apr. 2002), available at http://swopec.hhs.se/eijswp/papers/eijswp0146.pdf (last visited 
April 29, 2010). 
97
 MINISTRY OF ECONOMY, INDUSTRY AND TRADE, WAGAKUNINIOKERU GIJUTSURYŪSHUTSU OYOBI KANRINO JITTAINI 
TSUITE [ACTUAL CONDITIONS OF TECHNOLOGY LEAKAGE AND MANAGEMENT IN JAPAN] 5 (June 2006) (Japan).  
98
 Id. at 9. 
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2.2.2. Korea   
In Korea, unlike in Japan, there has been a general provision restricting the right 
of employers to dismiss employees in the absence of just cause since the first enactment 
of the Labor Standards Act in 1953.
99
  Because of the problem of weak enforcement by 
the Korean government, however, the general provision did not play an important role in 
protecting employees from dismissal before the 1987 democratization.
100
  In that situation, 
in many cases, employees who worked at SMEs in labor-intensive and light industries did 
not have the benefit of lifetime employment.
101
  To make matters worse, there was little 
judicial role in restricting abusive dismissals by employers until 1989, in part because of 
a lack of judicial independence under dictatorships.  Unlike the employees at SMEs, 
employees working in large-sized firms, such as chaebols (a Korean form of business 
conglomerate), had been the primary beneficiaries of the lifetime employment practice.
102
  
Given the large share of Korean chaebols in the Korean economy, it may be fair to say 
that the practice of lifetime employment was an important feature of labor relations in 
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 See Kǔllokijunpŏp[Labor Standards Act], Law No. 286, 1953, art. 27 (S. Korea) (―An employer shall, without 
justifiable cause, not dismiss, lay off, suspend, transfer a worker, reduce wages, or take other punitive measures 
against a worker.‖).  In addition, some restrictive provisions also apply under certain circumstances pursuant to the 
Act.  For an overview of the history of Korean labor law, see Jennifer L. Porges, The Development of Korean Labor 
Law and the Impact of the American System, 12 COMP. LAB. L.J. 335 (1991). 
100
 Park explains as follows:  
the government did not enforce the law in the face of frequent violations on the employer‘s side.  
Combined with the problem of weak enforcement, the employment protection provided by the law 
was largely decorative because the definition of ―justifiable causes‖ for dismissal was left to 
administrative decrees but there were no government actions on this.  Employers fired or 
threatened to fire workers if they joined labor unions despite the ―justifiable causes‖ provision in 
the Labor Standards Act.  
Park, Employment Protection, supra note 64, at 163. 
101
 Id. at 163. 
102
 See Adam Lee Sarosh Kuruvilla, Changes in Employment Security in Asia, 2 GLOBAL BUS. REV. 259, 265 (2001) 
(―employment security has been a norm for workers in large Korean enterprises.‖); Park, Employment Protection, 
supra note 64, at 161.  
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Korea.
103
  An important reason for the relative success of lifetime employment in large-
sized firms may be due to the role of proactive government intervention in implementing 
the economic policy, in which the chaebols were intended to play a primary role in 
economic growth in Korea.  For example, the Korean government provided chaebols 
with extremely generous financial support, even during the severe economic downturns 
in the 1970s, which led to the continuing expansion of chaebols in the subsequent 
decades.
104
  Thus, chaebols did not have to be overly concerned about potential costs 
related to the inflexible use or adjustment of labor during business downturns and were 
able to develop the norm of lifetime employment, which induced a high level of 
employee commitment.
105
  Chaebols promoted lifetime employment through the 
enhancement of job security, which was achieved by means of compensation systems and 
a mandatory retirement system based on age.
106
  Under these circumstances, employees 
tended to show a greater loyalty to their company, and departing employees were 
considered losers because of their lack of sufficient job skills and expertise in their 
former work, or they were considered traitors who violated the presumptive social norm 
under which employees were expected to remain in a firm for many years, or until the 
mandatory retirement age.  In fact, according to a survey in 1990, in response to a 
question asking whether it was desirable for an employee to move to another firm that 
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 See Stephan Haggard & Chung-In Moon, Institutions and Economic Policy: Theory and a Korean Case Study, 42 
WORLD POLITICS 210, 218 (1990) (―In 1973, the top fifty chaebol accounted for 32 percent of GDP.  By 1980, the 
chaebol dominated the economy, accounting for 49 percent of GDP, 24 percent of total sales, 18 percent of 
manufacturing employment, and over half of Korea‘s total exports.‖).   
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 Park, Employment Protection, supra note 64, at 163.  
105
 Id. at 180. 
106
 See id. at 181 (―According to a survey conducted by the Korea Employers Federation, during 1987-1988, 93 
percent of 622 firms implemented mandatory retirement at age 55.  This survey also shows that 43.3 percent of the 
companies had a mandatory retirement system during the 1970s and 34.6 percent between 1980 and 1988.  This 
indicates that Korean employers might have adopted the mandatory retirement system.‖).   
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offered higher pay, 76.1% of the 796 employees surveyed reported that it was not 
desirable.
107
  Furthermore, white-collar workers, in particular, ―tended to be more loyal to 
their employers than blue-collar workers.‖108   
The political transition to democracy since 1987, which resulted in an active labor 
movement, was another important factor that led courts to reinforce the practice of 
lifetime employment.
109
  In 1989, in response to labor activism, the Supreme Court of 
Korea established four requirements for the validity of employee dismissal based on 
business necessity, such as because of employee adjustments during business downturns, 
which were similar to the requirements in Japan.  In cases involving employees who were 
being made redundant, the Court stated 
[i]n [the] case of dismissal by reason of redundancy, first, managerial urgency is 
required to the extent that business management would be in danger without 
dismissals of employees.  Second, all efforts, such as rationalization of 
management policy or style, freezing of new hiring, temporary suspension, or 
voluntary retirement were made to avoid such termination.  Third, [a] reasonable 
and fair standard is required to select employees for the dismissal.  In addition, 
prior to the dismissal, sincere consultation with [the] union or employees is 
required.
110
   
 
Nevertheless, the courts‘ application of these requirements, especially the scope of 
―managerial urgency,‖ was not consistent.111  In the 1990s, however, with concern 
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 Chang-Ui Kim, Urinara kiŏp ǔi chjongsin koyong e kwanhan yŏn‟gu [Lifetime Employment System in Korea], 
13 NODONG KYONGJE NONJIB [LABOR ECONOMY REVIEW] 115, 130 (1990) (S. Korea).  
108
 Park, Employment Protection, supra note 64, at 182. 
109
 For an overview of the impact of the 1987 democratization movement on Korean labor law, see Porges, supra 
note 101, at  335, 352-358.  See also Park, Employment Protection, supra note 64, at 193 (―union membership 
increased by more than 50 percent in two years after June 1987.  While there were 1,433 labor disputes between 
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 Supreme Court of Korea, Judgment of May 23, 1989, Case No. 87daka2132.   
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 With regard to the interpretation of the first requirement, in some cases, the Court held that if business 
management would be in danger without dismissals of employees, the requirement was met.  See, e.g., Supreme 
Court of Korea, Judgment of Jan. 12, 1990, Case No. 88daka34094.  However, in other cases, the Court recognized 
business necessities coming from technology innovation and structural changes in industry as justifiable reasons for 
economic dismissal.  See, e.g., Supreme Court of Korea, Judgment of Dec. 10, 1991, Case No. 91da8647.   
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regarding decreasing international competitiveness, in part because of the increasing 
industrial power of China and increased labor cost of Korean employees after the 1987 
democratization, the Korean government amended the Labor Standards Act in December 
1996 despite fierce opposition from workers.
112
  In response to the 1996 amendment, 
workers in Korea went on a general strike.
113
  The 1996 amendment was replaced by a 
subsequent amendment in March 1997 in a completely revised form.
114
  In the 
amendment, a redundancy dismissal provision with the four requirements, which was 
established in a Supreme Court case in 1989, was legislated under Article 31 of the 
Act.
115
   
The 1997 economic crisis, which was triggered by a financial crisis, affected the 
entire Korean society.
116
  The financial crisis led the Korean government to request the 
International Monetary Fund for financial support, conditional on economic structural 
reform, which included reforming monetary policy, opening capital markets, restructuring 
the financial sector, reforming the reserve management and exchange rate policy, 
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 The amendment bill was rushed through by the ruling party, Sinhankukdang, in December 26, 1996. The 
requirements for the validity of redundancy dismissal were incorporated into the Act, but the newly incorporated 
requirements were in favor of employers by clearly recognizing continuing managerial deterioration, corporate 
restructuring for productive improvement, technology innovation, and change of business type as examples for 
urgent managerial necessity.  Kǔllokijunpŏp [Labor Standards Act], Law No. 5245, 1996, art. 27 bis (S. Korea).  As 
the legal protection of employees from abusive dismissal was weakened, as Park pointed out, it ―threatened workers 
who had been accustomed to lifetime employment relationships as these workers were acutely concerned about their 
job security.‖  Park, Employment Protection, supra note 64, at 207.   
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 See 350,000 on Strike in South Korea as Unrest Spreads, NEW YORK TIMES, Dec. 28, 1996, at 3, available at 
1996 WLNR 4394977; Thousands of South Korean Protest Law Parliament‟s Secret Passage of a Bill That Reduces 
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 Id. art. 31.  
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 See generally DONG-MYEON SHIN, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC POLICIES IN KOREA 171-92 (2003); Won-duck Lee & 
Byung-you Cheon, Flexibility in the Korean Labor Market, in RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS 
AND LABOR MARKET IN KOREA  85-105 (Young-ki Choi ed. 2005).   
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restructuring the corporate sector, and reforming labor market and trade policy.
117
  The 
International Monetary Fund thought it was necessary to make the labor market more 
flexible for efficient corporate restructuring.
118
  In February 1998, the Korean 
government amended the Labor Standards Act to relieve employers of the cost associated 
with dismissals of employees.  The 1998 amendment clearly included ―transfer, merger, 
or acquisition of the business‖ as urgent managerial necessities and provided a legal basis 
for the corporate restructuring that occurred during the economic crisis.
119
  In the process 
of corporate restructuring, a large number of firms, including chaebols, went bankrupt, 
and mergers and acquisitions took place between firms to survive.
120
  During that time, 
collective dismissals and workforce reductions took place in the corporate, financial, 
public, and labor sectors.
121
  Chaebols were not able to avoid such large-scale employee 
adjustments by means of collective dismissal, honorary retirement, or early retirement.
122
  
Lee and Cheon noted that ―during the four years following the financial crisis, 28% of 
employees underwent involuntary job terminations generated by aggressive employment 
adjustment by employers.‖ 123  As a result, employees in Korea, especially those in large-
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 See A Letter of Intent of the government of Korea and Memorandum on the Economic Program of Korea (Dec. 3, 
1997), at http://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/120397.htm#memo (last visited Oct. 12, 2010) (describing the policies 
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306 (Stephan Haggard et al. eds., 2003).  
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 Lee & Cheon, supra note 116, at 86-87.  
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 Id. at 86. 
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sized firms, may have felt serious job insecurity unlike anything they had experienced in 
the past.
124
 
Under the harsh labor market environment that has evolved since the economic 
crisis, employees have inevitably changed their attitude toward, or perception of, work.  
On this point, research by two Korean sociologists provides insight:  
[I]n reaction to all of these uncertainties and [the] harsher corporate environment, 
workers have become more realistic about their career and more self-centered: the 
thought of lifetime employment and blind loyalty has changed to one of ―I work 
only as much as I am paid‖ or ―the only things I can trust are myself and money.‖  
Indeed, the fear of being laid off has inspired many Korean workers to be more 
concerned with making a lot of money in a short time.
125
  
   
Under this circumstance, departing employees are no longer considered losers or traitors.  
In addition, Korean firms‘ hiring methods show a ―decrease in the number of recently 
graduating students taken on annually‖ and an ―increase in the number of experienced 
workers engaged.‖126  For example, in chaebols, the ratio of graduate student hiring to 
total hiring after the 1997 financial crisis decreased from 65.1% during the period 
between October 1995 and November 1996 to 32.8% during the period between October 
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 Jung and Cheon summarize well Korean workers‘ feeling about the large-scale layoffs:  
It has not become socially understood that if a company is in difficulty, it has to let go some of its 
employees.  In particular, middle-aged workers are facing greater employment instability because 
they get higher wages than younger workers under seniority-based pay systems.  A recent survey 
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oryukdo (literally, 56 thief) became common expressions.  
Jung & Cheon, supra note 93, at 466. 
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 Gil-Sung Park & Andrew Eungi Kim, Changes in Attitude Toward Work and Workers‟ Identity in Korea, 45 
KOREA J. 36, 42 (Fall 2005).  Park and Kim also describe Korean employees‘ lower commitment to their work 
compared with that in other countries, citing TAYLOR NELSON SOFRES, GOLBAL EMPLOYEE COMMITMENT REPORT 
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 Lee & Cheon, supra note 116, at 91. 
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2000 and October 2001.
127
  This indicates that, to some extent, Korean firms have 
changed their business strategy toward human resource management, in which they 
―shifted their focus to the ‗external‘ labor market hiring method, taking on experienced 
people only when they needed them.‖128   
In the external labor market, where labor mobility increased, departing employees 
became a great risk factor that could result in the loss of return on employers‘ investment 
in human capital and confidential information.  Indeed, recent surveys have demonstrated 
the great risk posed by former employees in cases involving technology leakage.  In a 
2006 survey by the Korean Industrial Technology Association, the firms surveyed 
reported that cases involving former employees accounted for 63.5% of all technology 
leakage cases.
129
  Likewise, according to the Small and Medium Business Administration, 
67% of industrial technology leakage cases were related to former employees.
130
 
 
 
2.3. Summary 
Despite the different origins of lifetime employment and developments in the 
practice of lifetime employment in Japan and Korea, the practice as a social norm played 
a role in substituting for postemployment covenants not to compete in labor relations in 
these two Asian countries before the recent economic downturns.  The practice was 
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supported by external factors surrounding the employment relationship, including active 
intervention by courts and governments on the side of employers and an informal 
enforcement mechanism on the side of employees.  Thus, unlike the employees‘ 
counterparts in the United States, they had less incentive to move to competing firms for 
more highly valued use of their human capital.  As a result, during the period of rapid 
economic growth in Japan and Korea, the practice permitted employers to assume a better 
position by investing efficiently in human capital and valuable information without 
paying the transaction and enforcement costs incurred by separate postemployment 
contracts, and without spending their resources inefficiently to protect valuable 
information against loss by employees.  However, the recent economic downturns in 
Japan and the financial crisis in Korea resulted in weakening the role of lifetime 
employment as a partial substitute for postemployment covenants not to compete.  More 
important, in the context of covenants not to compete, on the side of employees, the role 
of the informal enforcement mechanism supporting the practice of lifetime employment 
appears to have decreased substantially in recent years.  This implies that the law of 
covenants not to compete is gaining importance as a new legal mechanism in the context 
of human capital management and trade secret protection in Japan and Korea.   
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3.  Firms’ Resorting to Trade Secret Law 
3.1. Trends in Trade Secret Misappropriation and Countermeasures by Firms 
The adoption of trade secret law may have affected not only the intellectual property 
strategies of firms in Japan and Korea, but also their countermeasure strategies against trade 
secret misappropriation or industrial espionage.  In particular, as observed, the initial adoption of 
trade secret law enabled firms to seek injunctive relief that was not available in cases of 
misappropriation of trade secrets before adoption of the law.  Given the effectiveness of 
injunctive relief in trade secret-related cases, the enhancement of civil remedies may also have 
affected the litigation strategies of firms in these countries.  Indeed, in the United States, civil 
remedies appeared to serve the interests of firms in responding to incidents associated with the 
loss of proprietary information better than criminal remedies.
131
  Regarding the impact of the law 
on countermeasures used by firms, the law has affected the litigation activities of firms in Japan 
and Korea when they experience the loss of trade secrets.  Despite the fact that the enhancement 
of civil remedies was presumed to have a relatively strong impact on firms‘ countermeasure 
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 Based on a recent survey of 138 Fortune 1000 and other small- and mid-sized companies in the United States, 
40% of the companies had experienced the loss of proprietary information during the survey period.  ASIS 
FOUNDATION, TRENDS IN PROPRIETARY INFORMATION LOSS SURVEY REPORT 9 (Sep. 2002) [hereinafter 2002 ASIS 
REPORT].  The survey revealed that, of the 69 companies responding by mail in the survey, 58% ―engaged in IP 
licensing negotiations,‖ 48% ―examined a competitor‘s product to determine potential infringement,‖ and 42% 
―engaged in IP litigation (as plaintiff or defendant).‖  Id. at 17-18.  In another recent survey by the ASIS Foundation 
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FOUNDATION, TRENDS IN PROPRIETARY INFORMATION LOSS SURVEY REPORT 1 (Aug. 2007) (emphasis added) 
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responses,‖ along with ―withdrawal from the business transaction‖ and ―filing a trade complaint.‖  Id. at 9.  See also 
Bruce P. Smith, Hacking, Poaching, and Counterattacking: Digital Counterstrikes and the Contours of Self-Help, 1 
J.L. ECON. & POL‘Y 171, 173 (2005) (pointing out ―[o]ne in five stated that they had determined that civil—rather 
than criminal—remedies would best serve their interests‖ as a possible response when the respondents have 
computer security incidents); LAWRENCE A. GORDON ET AL., COMPUTER SECURITY INSTITUTE, 2004 CSI/FBI 
COMPUTER CRIME AND SECURITY SURVEY 14 (2004), at http://i.cmpnet.com/gocsi/db_area/pdfs/fbi/FBI2004.pdf 
(last visited April 4, 2010). 
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strategies in Japan and Korea, survey-based empirical works have demonstrated that the 
enhancement of civil remedies through the adoption of trade secret law has not had a great effect 
on firms‘ countermeasure strategies.   
Recent surveys have shown that the risk associated with the loss of proprietary 
information has become a greater threat to firms in Japan and Korea in recent years.  According 
to a survey conducted in 2001 by the JIPA and the Association of Corporate Legal Departments 
(ACLD), about 20% of respondents had encountered problems involving the misappropriation of 
trade secrets.
132
  The rate of incidents reported in the survey had increased significantly 
compared with the low rate (6%) of trade secret-related incidents in a survey conducted by the 
Institute of Intellectual Property of Japan in 1989.
133
  Data from Korea have also shown that 
firms are suffering from a loss of proprietary information.  The survey by the Korean Industrial 
Technology Association in 2006 showed that 20.9% of respondents had suffered damage from 
unauthorized leaks of industrial secrets.
134
  Likewise, in a survey by the Korean Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry (KCCI) in 2006, 20.5% of 400 respondents reported that they had 
suffered from unauthorized dissemination of industrial technology.
135
  Notably, 55.0% of large 
enterprises that were rated the top 20 R & D investing corporations in Korea have suffered from 
technology leakage.
136
  Despite the increased threat to information assets, however, firms do not 
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 Id.  In a recent report by the Korean Small and Medium Business Administration, small and medium-sized 
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appear to be responding actively to trade secret-related incidents.  For example, the survey by the 
KCCI demonstrated that only 43.9% of respondents took active measures in the wake of such 
incidents.
137
  The victimized companies rarely resorted to any public countermeasures after the 
fact.  The KCCI identified two main reasons for this inactivity: (1) enterprises had difficulties 
finding the actual offender; (2) and enterprises preferred to deal with these incidents within their 
enterprises because they did not want to lose their image and reputation, which could result in a 
drop in stock prices caused by the disclosure of the accidents.
138
 
One interesting feature revealed by recent surveys may be that firms in Japan and Korea 
have mainly resorted to criminal rather than civil remedies.  In fact, according to the 2001 survey 
by the JIPA and ACLD in Japan, despite the possible civil remedies for trade secret 
misappropriation since 1992, about 68% of the responding firms complained about the 
inefficiency of civil remedies under the Japanese Unfair Competition Prevention Act (UCPA).
139
  
Furthermore, about 80% of the respondents wanted to adopt criminal protections against the 
misappropriation of trade secrets.
140
  Another survey by the METI, which examined the effect of 
the amendment to the Japanese UCPA in 2005, in which criminal sanctions were adopted against 
former officers or employees who offered to disclose trade secrets in breach of the duty of 
confidence or who received a request to use or disclose trade secrets while in office, also showed 
Japanese firms‘ propensity for criminal remedies.141  The survey reported that 77% of responding 
                                                                                                                                                             
enterprises reported a relatively low rate of unauthorized leaks of industrial secrets (15.3%).  SMALL & MEDIUM 
BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, 2008NYŎN SANŎP KIMIL KWALLI SILT‗AE CHOSA [FACT-FINDING SURVEY ON 
MANAGEMENT OF INDUSTRIAL SECRETS] 1 (Aug. 2008).  
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firms in Japan expressed their willingness to resort to the new criminal provision in cases 
involving former employees who misappropriated trade secrets.
142
  By contrast, only 14% of the 
responding firms reported their willingness to rely on civil remedies.
143
 
Survey results have shown a similar trend in the litigation activities of Korean firms.  
The 2006 KCCI survey revealed that the respondents‘ measures after such incidents included 
criminal complaints (26.8%), claims for damages (9.8%), and requests that law enforcement 
authorities investigate (7.3%).
144
  Another recent survey by the Korean Small and Medium 
Business Administration showed a similar propensity for Korean firms to use criminal remedies.  
The firms reported that they requested law enforcement authorities to investigate (10.9%), filed 
criminal complaints (12.7%), and claimed damages (6.6%).
145
  Furthermore, several survey 
findings have revealed that Korean firms want the Korean government to enhance criminal 
penalties for trade secret misappropriations and industrial espionage.  For example, in a survey 
                                                                                                                                                             
2005), art. 21, para. 8 (Japan).  
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Electronics Industries‖], NIKKEI BP JIZAI AWARENESS, July 28, 2006, 
http://chizai.nikkeibp.co.jp/chizai/gov/20060728.html (last visited April 5, 2010) (citing Study on Trade Secret 
Protection in Electric and Electronics Industries by Japan Electronics and Information Technology Industries 
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 The survey also revealed a low rate of no countermeasures by the responding SMEs:  
Response 
Noninnovative 
SMEs, % 
Innovative 
SMEs, % Total 
Requested law enforcement authorities to 
investigate 
8.2 12.2 10.9 
Filed criminal complaints 9.6 14.1 12.7 
Claimed damages 8.2 5.8 6.6 
Enhanced their security management system 27.4 29.5 28.8 
Took no particular measures 45.2 42.9 43.7 
Other 11.0 9.0 9.6 
 
SMALL & MEDIUM BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, 2008YŎN SANŎP KIMIL KWALLI SILT‗AE CHOSA [FACT-FINDING 
SURVEY ON MANAGEMENT OF INDUSTRIAL SECRETS] 6 (August 2008) (S. Korea). 
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by the Korea Industrial Technology Association in 2000, 37.6% of the responding firms 
requested the Korean government to enact or amend a law increasing criminal penalties for trade 
secret misappropriations.
146
   
This raises the question of why firms in both Asian countries appear more willing than 
their counterparts in the United States to refer matters to criminal authorities.  Various possible 
reasons may be affecting the decisions to file a lawsuit, such as cultural factors in the reluctance 
of firms to bring litigation to court, civil litigation costs, ―the lack of attorneys who specialize in 
intellectual property cases,‖147 the active involvement of law enforcement authorities in trade 
secret cases,
148
 and the structure of the system for civil litigation.
149
  In the context of Japanese 
and Korean society, in fact, a considerable number of studies have explored the reasons these 
societies have traditionally relied less on formal litigation compared with Western countries.
 150
  
Many researchers, especially in Japan and Korea, have focused on cultural factors unique to 
Japanese and Korean society.  For example, they have argued that ―a cultural preference for 
informal mechanisms of dispute resolution‖ in Japan and a ―lack of modern legal consciousness‖ 
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in Korea might explain the lower level of litigation in these two Asian societies.
151
  However, 
recent empirical evidence examining Japanese and Korean litigation activities has shown that the 
litigation rate, especially the rate of civil litigation in these countries, has increased rapidly, and 
cultural factors do not appear to play a major role in explaining the reluctance of firms to engage 
in litigation activities.
152
 
Given the increasing importance of intangible assets to Japanese and Korean firms and 
their increasing awareness of the importance of protecting intellectual property rights through 
their business strategies,
153
 different institutional environments, which vary widely from country 
to country, may answer the questions here.
154
  Among them, as mentioned briefly, procedural 
differences between the two Asian countries and the United States, which are related to firms‘ 
incentive to bring cases to court, play a more pivotal role.  In other words, it may be a signal that 
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CHANGING COCIETY 41-72 (Arthur von Mehren ed. 1963); Richard B. Parker, Law, Language, and the Individual in 
Japan and the United States, 7 WIS. INT‘L L.J. 179, 179-80 (1988) (―Ordinary Japanese citizens regard a resort to 
law to settle private disputes as a general disgrace to all concerned.  The distaste of the Japanese for law has been 
widely noted.  The most common explanation given for the phenomenon is that Western legal traditions conflict 
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HAHM, THE KOREAN POLITICAL TRADITION AND LAW: ESSAYS IN KOREAN LAW AND LEGAL HISTORY (1967); Jeong-
Oh Kim, The Changing Landscape of Civil Litigation, in RECENT TRANSFORMATIONS IN KOREAN LAW AND SOCIETY 
323 (Dae-Kyu Yoon ed., 2000) (―[The traditional view of disputes] sees disputes as social evils which destroy 
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152
 Ginsburg & Hoetker, supra note 152, at 31 (―From 1986 to 2001, the Japanese civil litigation rate increased by 29 
percent.‖); Carl F. Goodman, The Somewhat Less Reluctant Litigant: Japan‟s Changing View Toward Civil 
Litigation, 32 LAW & POL‘Y INT‘L BUS. 769, 797 (2001) (―There are signs that a ‗less reluctant litigant‘ may be 
emerging in Japan.‖); Jeong-Oh Kim, The Changing Landscape of Civil Litigation, in RECENT TRANSFORMATIONS 
IN KOREAN LAW AND SOCIETY 322-33 (Dae-Kyu Yoon ed., 2000) (explaining the changing trend in civil litigation 
from 1960 to 1995 and arguing ―Koreans are no longer reluctant or feel shameful in bringing their disputes to the 
courts‖).  In addition, in Korea, trends in the ratio of civil cases to criminal cases indicated that ―the number of 
disputes in the private sector is increasing at a much faster rate than cases in which criminal laws are violated or 
other parties are injured.‖  Id. at 322-33. 
153
 For example, according to a survey by the Korea International Trade Association et al. in 2009, 86.8% of 1049 
responding Korean firms reported that the protection of intellectual property was ―very important‖ or ―important‖ in 
their business strategies.  KOREA INTERNATIONAL TRADE ASSOCIATION ET AL., CHICHŎK CHAESANKWŎN CHIM HAE 
CHOSA MIT CHEDOGAESŎN YŎN‘GU [FACT-FINDING SURVEY ON INFRINGEMENTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
AND POLICY SUGGESTIONS] 18 (2009).  
154
 See John Owen Haley, The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant, 4 J. JAPANESE STUD. 359 (1978) (arguing that a lack of 
personnel in Japanese institutions, such as few lawyers and judges, led to the low litigation rates in Japan).  
 211 
 
procedural laws have not effectively supported substantive trade secret law in Japan and Korea.  
In the following section, I briefly explore the defects of procedural law in the context of trade 
secret protection and recent enhancements of the law in the two Asian countries.   
 
 
3.2. Lack of Procedural Law Supporting Effective Civil Remedies 
A trade secret holder in Japan and Korea can seek civil and criminal remedies in a case 
involving the misappropriation of trade secrets.  Civil remedies further include provisional 
injunctions, injunctions, and damages.  In a typical trade secret case, enabling the holder to have 
the trade secret restored intact may be the most effective legal remedy.  In this sense, injunctive 
relief is a vital legal remedy for trade secret misappropriation in a trade secret case because of 
the nature of trade secrets, in which exclusivity coming from secrecy offers practical value.  This 
is in part because damage relief requires a plaintiff to identify and measure damages, which is 
often difficult for the plaintiff.  In fact, for example, in the 2001 survey by the JIPA and ACLD, 
79 out of 179 Japanese companies that reported seeking a limited number of civil remedies also 
complained of difficulties in proving actual economic loss in civil cases under the Japanese 
UCPA.
155
  In addition, in the two Asian countries, the courts have been criticized by foreign 
intellectual property owners for relatively small pecuniary damage awards, which may not 
provide a sufficient incentive for damage relief.
156
  These factors, as observed before, have led 
the Japanese and Korean governments to adopt various supporting devices for measuring 
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 2003 JAPANESE UCPA AMENDMENT REPORT, supra note 134, at 3.  
156
 See, e.g., Toshiko Takenaka, Patent Infringement Damages in Japan and the United States: Will Increased Patent 
Infringement Damage Awards Revive the Japanese Economy?, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL‘Y 309 (2000) (explaining the 
new Japanese legislation on patent infringement damages in 1998).  See also William C. Revelos, Note, Patent 
Enforcement Difficulties in Japan: Are There Any Satisfactory Solutions for the United States?, 29 GW J. INT‘L L. & 
ECON. (1995).   
 212 
 
pecuniary relief under the Japanese and Korean UCPA in recent years.  Nonetheless, given the 
nature of trade secrets, ―immediate injunctive relief is a highly powerful and effective response 
to misappropriation‖ because ―securing an injunction early in a case often leads to prompt 
resolution of the entire matter.‖157  However, in the typical situation, it may take at least one year 
to seek a perpetual injunction at a trial.  Given the increasingly shorter life cycle of recent 
technologies in the information age, provisional injunctive remedies may play a critical role in 
limiting damage to the plaintiff and preventing further disclosure of the trade secrets to the public.   
In fact, in the United States, for provisional remedies, a trade secret holder has various 
weapons by which trade secrets can be restored intact, for example, through ―the established 
remedy of replevin‖ in cases in which the trade secrets are embodied in tangible property.158  In 
addition, immediate injunctive relief is available at the pretrial stage.  For example, the 
temporary restraining order (TRO), which is an ex parte order that usually lasts until a motion 
for a preliminary injunction is being decided, and the preliminary injunctions, which impose 
more substantive restrictions on the adversary, are available provisional injunctive remedies.  
Courts in the United States frequently ―will issue a TRO if the requested restriction appears 
minimally intrusive, such as in the case of an order that evidence not be tampered with.‖159  The 
TRO can be issued by courts ―without even the several hours‘ notice provided under most 
statutes and rules‖ in cases in which the plaintiff shows that immediate and irreparable injury 
will result.
160
  Once the TRO is granted by a court, it can prevent the adversary from engaging in 
                                                 
157
 JAMES POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS, § 7.02 [2] [a] (West 2009). 
158
 Id. § 7.02 [1].  
159
 However, ―[TRO] is granted only on a strong showing, both on the merits and on the risk of irreparable harm if 
the plaintiff had to wait the several weeks necessary for a hearing.‖  Id. § 7.02 [2]. 
160
 Id. § 7.02 [2] [a].  See Statera, Inc. v. Henrickson, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68891 (2009) (―A party seeking a 
temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction must show: (1) a substantial likelihood that the movant 
eventually will prevail on the merits; (2) that the movant will suffer imminent and irreparable injury unless the 
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certain acts that may frustrate the purpose of the action, for example, by ―taking any action to 
delete, destroy, damage, shred, erase, wipe, or otherwise alter any computer hard drive or other 
computer storage media containing [the plaintiff‘s] business information or other evidence within 
the scope of discovery.‖ 161  By contrast, unlike in the United States, no provisional injunctive 
relief, such as a TRO, exists in Japan and Korea.  Thus, a trade secret holder must rely on a 
common type of provisional injunction.  A more problematic issue is that the provisional 
injunction does not seem to allow the holder to have the trade secret restored intact because the 
procedure for the provisional injunction takes a long time in light of the role of the provisional 
injunction in the context of trade secret protection.
162
   
On the contrary, as observed, the Japanese and Korean governments in recent years have 
realized the importance of trade secret protection for economic growth and have invested many 
governmental resources in deterring and responding to trade secret misappropriations and 
industrial espionage in situations in which not only cross-border industrial espionage, but also 
domestic technology leakage between competitors has been increasing.  In these situations, 
criminal prosecution may give a definite advantage, and thus may provide the holder with a 
greater incentive to refer a trade secret case to government authorities.  In the first place, as 
                                                                                                                                                             
injunction issues; (3) that the threatened injury to the movant outweighs whatever damage the proposed injunction 
may cause the opposing party; (4) that the injunction, if issued, would not be adverse to the public interest.‖).  
161
 Statera, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at 13.  In addition, ―[a]lthough a TRO of more than ten to twenty days‘ duration 
normally cannot be granted, the defendant often will agree to postpone the hearing and extend the temporary order 
to permit discovery and to provide more time to prepare a defense.‖  JAMES POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS, § 7.02 [2] [a] 
(West 2009).  
162
 Sang-Hyun Song & Seong-Ki Kim, The Impact of Multilateral Trade Negotiations on Intellectual Property Laws 
in Korea, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 118, 133 (1994) (―The procedure for obtaining a preliminary injunction is time-
consuming, usually taking a few months.‖).  Although Song and Kim focus on the difficulty of enforcing patent, 
trademark, and copyright violations in Korea, the situation in trade secret cases appears similar.  It usually takes two 
to three months to obtain a preliminary injunction in trade secret cases.  See also Toshiko Takenaka, Patent 
Infringement Damages in Japan and the United States: Will Increased Patent Infringement Damage Awards Revive 
the Japanese Economy?, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL‘Y 309 (2000) (―Japanese courts have become a target of criticism 
from Japanese industry for its inability to grant quick, effective relief for IP infringement.‖).  
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known in general, criminal prosecution relieves the trade secret holder of the burden of cost 
associated with civil litigation, which the holder would otherwise have to pay.  More important 
in the context of trade secret protection is that criminal prosecution may prevent further trade 
secret misappropriations, such as disclosure to a third party by the misappropriator, from the 
early stages of a criminal investigation.  For example, it has been reported that in recent high-
profile industrial espionage cases in Korea, government authorities, such as the prosecutors‘ 
office or the Industrial Secrets Protection Center at the National Intelligence Service, are actively 
involved in these cases from the early stage and prevent technology leakage.
163
  Furthermore, 
criminal prosecution helps the holder collect relevant evidence through search and seizure in the 
process of a criminal investigation.  This perhaps offers firms in Japan and Korea, where an 
American type of ―discovery‖ does not exist, a greater incentive.164   
 
 
3.3. Protecting Trade Secrets During Litigation 
In addition to a lack of procedural law supporting effective civil remedies, in the context 
of trade secret protection, a lack of adequate measures for preserving trade secrets in secrecy 
during litigation may be another important factor affecting firms‘ incentive to bring trade secret 
cases to court in both civil and criminal litigation.  Given the nature of trade secrets, which lose 
their status or competitive advantage by disclosure to the public or competitors, the loss of 
confidentiality in litigation may pose a serious threat to a trade secret holder, and worthwhile 
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 See Tech Theft, THE KOREA TIMES, Feb. 4, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 2439156; Chip Technology Leaked to 
Taiwan, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 3, 1998, at A5, available at 1998 WLNR 1500558.  
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 See Yasuhei Taniguchi, The 1996 Code of Civil Procedure of Japan—A Procedure for the Coming Century?, 45 
AM. J. COMP. L. 767 (1997).  
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litigation may be hindered.
165
  Accordingly, the confidentiality of discoverable trade secrets 
should be protected before, during, and after a trial through some safeguarding procedures.
166
  In 
this sense, trade secret law, as substantive law, should be supported by appropriate procedural 
rules.
167
  In fact, in the United States, although court records and judicial proceedings are 
generally open to the public under the presumption of public access to judicial records, such 
safeguarding procedures that prevent public disclosure of trade secrets have been recognized in 
cases involving trade secrets.
168
  For example, at the discovery process, the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure allow a district court, ―for good cause,‖ to ―require that a trade secret or other 
confidential research, development, or commercial information not be revealed or be revealed 
only in a specified way‖ to prevent potential harm to the trade secret holder.169  State statutes or 
rules provide similar means of preventing harm.
170
  The Uniform Trade Secrets Act also 
illustrates these procedures, requiring courts to take ―reasonable means,‖ including ―granting 
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 See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1011 (1984) (―With respect to a trade secret, the right to exclude 
others is central to the very definition of the property interest.  Once the data that constitute a trade secret are 
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 See Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the Courts, 105 HARV. L. Rev. 428 
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 Id. at 464. 
168
 See Nixon v. Warner Commc‘n, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978) (―It is uncontested, however, that the right to 
inspect and copy judicial records is not absolute.  Every court has supervisory power over its own records and files, 
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Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 600 n.5 (1980) (―This is not to say that only constitutional 
considerations can justify such restrictions. The preservation of trade secrets, for example, might justify the 
exclusion of the public from at least some segments of a civil trial.‖) (Stewart, J., concurring); State ex rel. Ampco 
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 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)(g). 
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 See, e.g., TEXAS R. CIV. P. 192.6 (Protective orders) & TEXAS R. EVID. 507 (―A person has a privilege, which may 
be claimed by the person or the person‘s agent or employee, to refuse to disclose and to prevent other persons from 
disclosing a trade secret owned by the person, if the allowance of the privilege will not tend to conceal fraud or 
otherwise work injustice.  When disclosure is directed, the judge shall take such protective measures as the interests 
of the holder of the privilege and of the parties and the furtherance of justice may require.‖).  
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protective orders in connection with discovery proceedings, holding in-camera hearings, sealing 
the records of the action, and ordering any person involved in the litigation not to disclose an 
alleged trade secret without prior court approval.‖171  In criminal cases, in which the defendant‘s 
right to a public trial is protected under the Sixth Amendment, courts also may limit the 
disclosure of trade secrets because the right to a public trial is not considered absolute, and 
preservation of the secrecy of trade secrets is constitutional under certain limited circumstances 
in which other important interests override the defendant‘s right to a public trial.172  Accordingly, 
for example, the Economic Espionage Act requires a court to issue orders and take the necessary 
measures to preserve the confidentiality of trade secrets while ―strik[ing] a balance between the 
protection of proprietary information and the unique considerations inherent in criminal 
prosecutions.‖173 
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 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 5, 14 U.L.A. 647 (2005).  In addition, the UTSA comment provides more protective 
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must make findings adequate to support the closure‖); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California, 478 U.S. 
1, 106 S.Ct. 2735 (1986) (preliminary hearing).  For a trade secret case, see Stamicarbon N.V. v. American 
Cyanamid Co., 506 F.2d 532, 540 (2nd Cir. 1974) (―We think that this case would present an equally convincing 
justification for limited in camera procedures if, in the course of the contempt trial, the district judge should find that 
[the plaintiff] was likely to suffer irreparable injury, and that protection of its secrets could be achieved with minimal 
disruption of the criminal proceedings.‖).   
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 United States v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189, 197 (3d Cir. 1998).  Section 1835 of 18 U.S.C. reads as follows:  
In any prosecution or other proceeding under this chapter, the court shall enter such orders and 
take such other action as may be necessary and appropriate to preserve the confidentiality of trade 
secrets, consistent with the requirements of the Federal Rules of Criminal and Civil Procedure, the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, and all other applicable laws.  An interlocutory appeal by the United 
States shall lie from a decision or order of a district court authorizing or directing the disclosure of 
any trade secret. 
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This raises the question of how Japanese and Korean procedural laws have worked to 
preserve trade secrets in secret during litigation.  In Japan, even after the adoption of a 
substantive trade secret law in 1990, the Japanese UCPA has been criticized because procedural 
rules have not effectively supported substantive law due to the lack of safeguarding procedures 
preventing unintended disclosure of trade secrets in litigation.
174
  This criticism has arisen from 
the fact that Article 82 of the Japanese Constitution provides for the principle of a public trial.
175
  
Although the principle of a public trial is not absolute, there are few exceptions; for example, 
where ―a court unanimously determines publicity to be dangerous to public order or morals, a 
trial may be conducted privately.‖176  However, a case involving trade secrets did not fall within 
these exceptions.
177
  Hence, under the Japanese Code of Civil Procedure, trade secret cases were 
held in public.  In addition, anyone was able to access the relevant records of the proceedings, 
including the complaint, answer, and other documents, such as records of witnesses‘ 
testimony.
178
  In practice, to seek a legal remedy for trade secret misappropriation, the trade 
                                                                                                                                                             
18 U.S.C.A. § 1835 (West 2009).  See James H.A. Pooley et al., Understanding the Economic Espionage Act of 
1996, 5 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 177, 206-10 (1997) (explaining practical considerations of preservation of secrecy 
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ENGLISH AND GERMAN 172-86 (2003).  For academic debate on the disclosure of trade secrets in litigation, see  
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Protection], 962 JURISUTO [JURIST] 14 (1990) (Japan); Kobashi Kaoru, Eigyouhimitsuno hogoto saibankoukaino 
gensoku [Trade Secret Protection and the Principle of Public Trial], 962 JURISUTO [JURIST] 38 (1990) (Japan); Ito 
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 Article 82 of the Japanese Constitution states that ―[t]rials shall be conducted and judgment declared publicly.‖  
Kenpō [the Constitution], art. 82 (Japan).  
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 Id.  
177
 Kazuko Matsuo, Recent Amendment to the Unfair Competition Prevention Law for the Protection of Trade 
Secrets, 9 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 78, 95 (1991) (―Notwithstanding the possible different interpretations, unless the 
present Civil Procedure Law is partially amended, trade secret litigation will not be free from danger . . . .‖).   
178
 Id. at 94 (―any person is allowed to inspect the records of proceedings, and the parties involved in the suit and 
interested third parties may take a copy or obtain an original copy, certified copy or summary thereof . . . .‖).   
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secret holder has to specify the alleged trade secret and prove the misappropriation.  As observed 
in Miyakoshi Kikou Ltd. v. Guurudo Inc,
179
 this may make the holder fear that the status of the 
trade secret will be lost in the proceedings unless measures are taken to protect it in litigation, 
and this substantially limits the rights of the trade secret holder.  Indeed, the 2001 JIPA survey 
showed that the possibility of disclosing trade secrets during a trial was one of the most 
important reasons why civil remedies under the Japanese UCPA were not sufficient.
180
   
In response to these criticisms and to voices from industry, the Japanese government has 
adopted some safeguarding procedures as part of measures to strengthen trade secret protection 
by referring to foreign procedures, for example, secrecy-preserving measures in trade secret-
related cases in the United States.
181
  Unlike in the United States, because the Japanese Code of 
Civil Procedure does not have an American type of discovery process, these protective measures 
are focused on the preservation of secrecy during and after a trial.  First, the Japanese UCPA 
adopted ―protective orders‖ to prevent the disclosure of trade secrets.182  In addition, to enhance 
the enforcement of the protective order, the Japanese UCPA criminalized violations of the 
protective order.
183
  Nonetheless, unlike in the United States, the protective order can be issued 
only in civil cases.  In criminal cases involving trade secrets, the defendant‘s right to a public 
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 Tokyo District Court of Japan, Judgment of Sep. 24, 1991, Case No. Shōwa 60 (Wa) 15593.   
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 Under Article 10, a court may, upon a motion of the party, order a party, a counsel, or an assistant ―not to use the 
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received the order with regard to said trade secret‖ in cases in which (1) trade secrets are written or included in a 
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the use of said trade secret for purposes other than pursuing the lawsuit or its disclosure, and it is necessary to 
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Prevention Act], Law No. 47 of 1993 (as amended by Law No. 55 of 2006), art 10 (1) (Japan). 
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 Fusei kyōsō bōshihō [Unfair Competition Prevention Act], Law No. 47 of 1993 (as amended by Law No. 55 of 
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trial is protected under Article 37 (1) of the Japanese Constitution, which provides that ―[i]n all 
criminal cases the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial 
tribunal.‖184  Article 37 (1) is interpreted strictly, and the issuance of the protective order is not 
available.
185
  Second, although Article 92 of the Japanese Code of Civil Procedure allows a court 
to issue orders to restrict public access to court records in which trade secrets are stated or 
recorded, this applies only to third parties.
186
  Thus, Article 12 of the Japanese UCPA further 
provides that when the protective order has been issued, if anyone who has not been issued a 
protective order requests inspection of that portion of the sealed record, the court that took the 
request must notify the party who filed the motion of this fact under Article 92 (1) of the 
Japanese Code of Civil Procedure.
187
  This enables the party notified to move for a protective 
order against the person within two weeks so that unintended disclosure by the other party can be 
prevented.  Third, the Japanese UCPA adopted in camera examination.  Under this procedure, 
when parties, legal representatives, or witnesses are examined regarding the existence of a trade 
secret, and when a court, by the unanimous consent of the judges, finds (1) that ―they are unable 
to give sufficient statements regarding the matter because it is clear that giving statements 
regarding the matter in open court will significantly hinder the party‘s business activities that are 
based on the trade secret,‖ and (2) ―that, without said statements by the party, the court is unable 
to make an appropriate decision on the presence or absence of infringement on business interests 
by unfair competition which should be made based on the determination of said matter, it may 
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 Kenpō [the Constitution], art. 37(1) (Japan). 
185
 METI, UNFAIR COMPETITION PREVENTION ACT, supra note 183, at121-22. 
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 Minji soshōhō [Code of Civil Procedure], Law No. 109 of 1996, art. 37. para. 1 (Japan). 
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 Fusei kyōsō bōshihō [Unfair Competition Prevention Act], Law No. 47 of 1993 (as amended by Law No. 55 of 
2006), art. 12 (1) (Japan).  See Shozo Ota, Reform of Civil Procedure in Japan, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 561 (2001).  
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conduct the examination on the matter in camera by means of a ruling.‖188  
Article 109 of the Constitution of Korea also articulates the principle of the public court, 
stating that trials and decisions of the courts are open to the public.
 189  
As in Japan, Article 109 
recognized a few exceptions to the principle, only where ―there is a danger that such trials may 
undermine the national security or disturb public safety and order, or be harmful to public 
morals.‖190  Even in this case, the exceptions apply not to courts‘ decisions, but only to trials.191  
However, in practice, the preservation of trade secrets is not sufficient to justify excluding the 
public from a trial in Korean courts because of constitutional considerations.
192
  Nonetheless, the 
opinions of scholars and commentators are not agreed on the issue of whether trade secret cases 
can be closed to the public.  On the one hand, scholars have argued that because the principle of 
a public trial in a trade secret case may deprive a trade secret holder of his or her right to a trial, 
as stipulated in Article 27 of the Korean Constitution, the disclosure of the trade secret during or 
after a trial may disturb public safety and order.
193
  For the basis of the argument, they point out 
the purpose of the Korean UCPA, which not only protects the private interests of a trade secret 
holder, but also maintains the order of sound transactions by preventing unfair competitive 
acts.
194
  On the other hand, scholars have contended that because the primary purpose of trade 
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190
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of Disclosure of Trade Secrets under the Principle of the Public Trial], 21 BALMYEONGTEUKHEO [INVENTIONS & 
PATENTS] 22, 25 (1996).   
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secret protection is to protect the private interests of a trade secret holder, nondisclosure in a trial 
should not be allowed in cases involving trade secrets.
195
  In part because of this problem, as in 
Article 92 of the Japanese Code of Civil Procedure, in 2002 the Korean government adopted a 
provision in Article 163 of the Korean Code of Civil Procedure regarding the restriction of trade 
secrets in court records with public access that applies only to third parties.
196
  No other 
safeguarding procedures exist that prevent public disclosure of trade secrets in cases involving 
trade secrets in Korea, and this lack of safeguarding procedures has been criticized by Korean 
scholars.
197
  In this context in Korea, compared with its counterparts in the United States and 
Japan, litigation involving trade secrets may present a great risk to the integrity of the trade 
secret, and relevant procedural laws do not provide a sufficient means of preventing potential 
harm from disclosing trade secrets during litigation or of vigorously claiming a trade secret 
holder‘s right through the formal legal process.  In addition, the lack of adequate safeguarding 
measures may be an important institutional reason why Korean firms may not to rely much on 
formal litigation in trade secret cases.  
 
 
                                                 
195
See, e.g., Kyong Jik Gwak, Yŏngŏppimil ǔi chimhaewa kuje mit sosongsang ǔi che munje [Problems on  
Trade Secret Misappropriations, Remedies, and Procedures], 250 INKWŎN KWA JŎNGǓI  [HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
JUSTICE] 42, 62 (1997).  
196
 See Minsasosongpŏp [Code of Civil Procedure], Law No. 9171, 2008, art. 163 (S. Korea) (―In cases where there 
exists a vindication that it falls under any of the following subparagraphs, the court may limit the parties by its ruling 
upon their motion, to the persons eligible to file a request for perusual or copying of the portions containing any 
secrets from among the litigation records, or for delivery of the authentic copy, a certified copy or an abridged copy 
of the portions containing any secrets from among the judicial documents or protocol: . . .  2. When any trade secrets 
of the party (referring to the trade secrets as stipulated in subparagraph 2 of Article 2 of the Korean UCPA) are 
entered in the litigation records.‖). 
197
 SANGJO JONG & JUNSEOK PARK, YŎNGŎPPIMIL ǓI SAPŎPJŎK POHO E KWANHAN PIGYOPŎPJŎK YŎN‘GU 
[COMPARATIVE STUDY ON JUDICIAL PROTECTION OF TRADE SECRETS] 84 (Seoul Nat‘l Univ. Ctr. for Law and Tech. 
2009) (Korea).  In response to these criticisms, however, in recent years, the Supreme Court of Korea appears to 
have begun preparing the enhancement of these safeguarding procedures.   
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3.4. Summary 
Although Japan and Korea adopted substantive trade secret laws in the early 1990s, 
procedural laws that existed at the adoption did not effectively support the substantive laws at the 
early stage of implementation.  In particular, defects in procedural law in the context of trade 
secret protection, including the unavailability of a quick and effective provisional injunction at 
the pretrial stage and a perpetual injunction, and the lack of procedural devices supporting 
effective damage relief, appear to have led firms in Japan and Korea to rely more on criminal 
remedies.  In addition, the lack of adequate procedural measures to protect trade secrets during 
litigation may have decreased trade secret holders‘ incentive to resort to trade secret law.  In 
response to these issues, the two Asian counties have improved procedural rules to support 
substantive trade secret law effectively in recent years.  The Japanese government has recognized 
the defects in procedural law and has actively addressed these defects by adopting relevant 
measures for effective damage relief and for protecting trade secrets during litigation.  By 
contrast, although the Korean government has adopted some procedural devices for effective 
damage relief, it has not been actively involved in improving procedural law, especially 
measures for preserving the secrecy of trade secrets during litigation, which is a critical 
procedural rule for effective legal remedies in the context of trade secret protection.   
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CHAPTER VII. CONCLUSION 
In the early 1990s, trade secret law was adopted in Japan and Korea following the U.S. 
model, based on the strategic judgment of the two governments regarding economic and trade 
policy in response to trade pressures from foreign countries.  In this respect, trade secret law is a 
―legal transplant‖ adopted because of the extrinsic motivation of the Japanese and Korean 
governments.  At the early stage of implementation, despite the fact that, in Japanese and Korean 
society, this imported law played a role in avoiding further trade pressure from foreign countries, 
the law did not have a significant role in corporate control of valuable information and the 
management of human capital, in which trade secret law plays a critical role in the United States.  
The weak impact of trade secret law in the early stages of implementation can be attributed to the 
fact that the imported law did not fit the environment of the two host countries well.   
First, the role of substitutes for a transplanted law may be vital in explaining the initial 
weak impact of the imported law on Japanese and Korean society.
1
  As observed earlier, utility 
models, as supplements to the patent system, had played a partial role in substituting for trade 
secret law in certain circumstances from the early stages of industrialization in Japan and Korea.  
During this period of rapid economic growth, these substitutes gained prominence because they 
were a better fit with Japanese and Korean society than trade secret law.  To facilitate firm-level 
technology learning for rapid economic growth, Japan and Korea needed a patent system that 
permitted domestic enterprises to exploit imported technology and its improvements to the fullest 
extent.  In this context, the utility model system, which had a more powerful and effective 
function in terms of disclosure of subpatentable or incremental innovations through reverse 
                                                 
1
 See Hideki Kanda & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Re-examining Legal Transplants: The Director‟s Fiduciary Duty in 
Japanese Corporate Law, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 887 (2003).  
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engineering or duplicative imitation of a foreign technology than trade secret law, was likely a 
better option for the Japanese and Korean governments.  In addition, because the utility model 
system gave exclusive rights, which were stronger than the legal rights offered by trade secret 
protection, domestic enterprises could have had a strong incentive to rely on the utility model 
system to protect their incremental innovations.   
As an important social norm in labor practice in Japan and Korea, lifetime employment 
also played a partial role in substituting for trade secret protection and postemployment 
covenants not to compete until recently, when the two Asian countries experienced economic 
downturns.  The practice of lifetime employment, as an established social norm in a substantial 
number of industry fields, has been often considered one of the most important and positive 
institutional factors in the rapid economic growth that took place in Japan and Korea.  Apart 
from the origin and effect on economic growth of the lifetime employment system (e.g., through 
an increase in employee productivity), it was a more efficient institution in the context of 
protecting valuable information and investing in human capital compared with separate trade 
secret laws and postemployment covenants not to compete.  From  the perspective of employers, 
under the preestablished practice of lifetime employment, they did not have to pay any extra 
costs associated with separate contracts.  From the point of view of the governments, trade secret 
law appeared to be an unnecessary legal device that could also have undermined the established 
social norms in labor relationships.  
Second, in addition to the positive role of substitutes for trade secrets, the extrinsic 
motivation of the governments at the adoption of trade secret law hindered the formation of an 
adequate legal infrastructure to support this imported law.  As observed, although in the process 
of adopting the substantive law of trade secrets in Japan and Korea, it was recognized that 
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procedural law had an inherent limitation in supporting the imported trade secret law, the defects 
of procedural law were not resolved with the adoption of trade secret law in these countries, and 
adequate enforcement of the imported law was hindered by a lack of legal institutions in the 
context of trade secret protection.  As a result, the fact that the inherent limitations of procedural 
law were left unresolved at the time trade secret law was adopted may also have affected the fact 
that the imported substantive law did not fit Japanese and Korean society well in the early stages 
of implementation.  
However, the recent technological and economic environments in the two Asian 
countries have changed the role of substitutes for trade secret protection and government 
incentives.  First, as the capability for technological innovation has improved, the second-tier 
patent system has been losing its role in the Japanese and Korean economies, which are pursuing 
continued economic growth under new innovation models that focus on state-of-the-art 
technologies, such as information technology.  Second, the recent economic downturns in Japan 
and the financial crisis in Korea resulted in substantially weakening the role of lifetime 
employment as a partial substitute for trade secret protection and postemployment covenants not 
to compete.  Under this changing technological and economic situation, Japan and Korea have 
suffered from new social problems: the misappropriation of trade secrets and industrial 
espionage.  Accordingly, trade secret law and postemployment covenants not to compete have 
gained prominence because they are now a better fit with Japanese and Korean society.  Based 
on this recognition, the Japanese and Korean governments have been internally motivated to 
enhance trade secret protection in recent years by borrowing existing U.S. procedural rules to 
find the right fit with the imported law in this changing environment.  In other words, trade 
secret law (including covenants not to compete) has been recognized as an important mechanism 
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for dealing with corporate control of valuable information and the management of human capital 
in Japanese and Korean society.   
On the other hand, although the theoretical justification for trade secret protection in 
Japan and Korea (where trade secret law has mainly been treated as a legislative policy) has not 
been hotly debated as the United States, the development of the imported law has experienced 
difficult progress, which has given rise to difficult policy problems in these nations.  One of the 
most important issues is that the changing environment has led the governments and courts in 
Japan and Korea to accept trade-offs between the perceived demands of continuing economic 
growth and the Constitutional rights of employees, reminiscent of the history of struggles that 
created the modern trade secret laws and covenants not to compete in the United States.
2
  
Although the governments and courts in Japan and Korea have struggled to reconcile these 
conflicting interests, Japan and Korea have adopted somewhat different approaches to this issue, 
and the government and courts in Korea appear to favor employers more than employees.  The 
recent enactment of the ITPA in Korea illustrates this approach well.  In addition, the 
traditionally strong role of government in Japanese and Korean economic development and the 
lack of adequate enforcement procedures have affected the different mechanisms for enforcing 
the imported law in the receiving countries compared with those in the donor country.   
In this context, the trade secret law transplanted in Japan and Korea is also a good 
example of the role of legal transplants based on extrinsic motivation in the area of intellectual 
property law.  Since Alan Watson coined the term ―legal transplant,‖ the metaphor of legal 
transplants has held immense appeal for legal scholars for analyzing legal transfer, specifically in 
                                                 
2
 See Catherine L. Fisk, Working Knowledge: Trade Secrets, Restrictive Covenants in Employment, and the Rise of 
Corporate Intellectual Property, 1800-1920, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 441 (2001). 
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the field of comparative law.
3
  However, Watson‘s thesis has been hotly debated and attacked in 
recent years.  The central platform of these criticisms or attacks, as mentioned above, concerns 
Watson‘s general understanding of the relationship between law and society.  For example, 
Kahn-Freund disagrees with Watson‘s proposition that there is no particular relationship between 
law and society, and argues that ―there are degrees of transferability‖ of legal rules or 
institutions.
4
  He claims that law and its external environment, in their sociological, economic, 
and, most important, political interrelations, are closely related, so any legal transplantation is 
neither direct nor immediate and carries a significant ―risk of rejection‖ if legislators do not pay 
attention to these interrelations in the process of legislative transplantation.
5
  Many other scholars 
                                                 
3
 Alan Watson, a pioneer of legal transplant theory, provided several pieces of historical evidence in his 1974 book 
showing that, as a result of legal borrowings, similar rules that developed from Roman civil law and English 
common law exist in Western worlds with different systems.  ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH 
TO COMPARATIVE LAW 44-56 (2d ed. 1993).  Drawing on these findings, he concludes that legal transplantation is 
―the most fertile source of [legal] development‖ in most societies and is ―socially easy,‖ irrespective of geographical, 
social, economic, and political differences between donor societies and receiving societies.  Id. at 95-96.  Watson 
develops his theory in terms of the relationship between law and society, the essence of which appears to be that 
legal rules in a given society are usually not a reflection of the endemic economy, politics, or culture of a society, but 
rather are the result of legal borrowings from other societies or other eras, made by legal authorities such as 
legislators, legal scholars, or judges, in the process of lawmaking.  Id. at 95-118 (―usually legal rules are not 
peculiarly devised for the particular society in which they now operate . . . .‖).  Watson later reaffirmed his thesis 
concerning the relationship between law and society in his subsequent writings.  See ALAN WATSON, SOCIETY AND 
LEGAL CHANGE 111 (1977) (―The connection of a legal rule with any one environment is less intimate than may be 
supposed.‖); Alan Watson, Comparative Law and Legal Change, 37 CAMBRIDGE L. J. 313, 314-15 (1978) (―To a 
large extent law possesses a life and vitality of its own; that is, no extremely close, natural or inevitable relationship 
exists between law, legal structures, institutions and rules on the one hand and the needs and desires and political 
economy of the ruling elite or of the members of the particular society on the other hand.‖).  With respect to the 
metaphor of legal transplants, for instance, Ewald, the legal philosopher and comparatist, reformulates Watson‘s 
theory and suggests that, despite the limitations and weaknesses of his thesis as a general theory about the 
relationship between law and society, Watson‘s work has significance in the development of scholarship on that 
relationship.  For a more detailed discussion of Watson‘s theory of legal change, see William Ewald, Comparative 
Jurisprudence (II): The Logic of Legal Transplants, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 489 (1995) (reformulating Watson‘s theory 
of legal transplants in his numerous writings in five theses, and explaining his contribution to scholarship on law and 
society).  For a comment on Ewald‘s reinterpretation and rereading of Watson‘ theses, see Roger Cotterrel, Is There 
a Logic of Legal Transplants?, in ADAPTING LEGAL CULTURES 71 (David Nelken & Johannes Feest eds., 2001) 
[hereinafter LEGAL CULTURES]. 
4
 Otto Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37 MOD. L. REV. 1 (1974).  See Alan Watson, Legal 
Transplants and Law Reform, 92 L. Q. REV. 79 (1976) (challenging the principles on which Kahn-Freund‘s theory is 
based); Eric Stein, Uses, Misuses, and Nonuses of Comparative Law, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 198 (1977-1978) (examining 
the arguments of Watson and Kahn-Freund and arguing for the importance of comparative law in American legal 
scholarship).   
5
 Kahn-Freund, supra note 4.  Teubner agrees with Kahn-Freund‘s argument regarding the difficulty of legal 
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have also criticized Watson for his thesis that law is insulated from outside influences.
6
  
Criticisms of Watson‘s legal transplant theory emphasize the importance of the context of legal 
transfer in a given society.  On the other hand, even if the metaphor of ―legal transplant‖ seems 
to have dominated scholarly discussions regarding legal transfer since Alan Watson coined the 
term in his 1974 book, some scholars have criticized the metaphor and suggested alternatives.  In 
particular, as economic globalization expands, scholars are more likely to focus on legal 
harmonization—the convergent or divergent effects of globalization—so this might seem to lead 
them to emphasize the diffusion of law.
7
  However, none of the different theories on the nature of 
law seems to be satisfactory for explaining or predicting how transferred legal rules and 
institutions work in a given society, especially in the context of Northeast Asia, in part because 
most scholars have developed their theses based on the experiences of the Western world.  As a 
logical result of these different understandings of legal transplants and the relationship between 
law and society, no meaningful progress has been made on the question of the meaning of 
successful legal transplants and the conditions surrounding them.   
                                                                                                                                                             
transplantation.  However, he sees a foreign legal rule transferred from other cultures as an ―irritant‖ and argues that 
the transplanted rule ―irritates law‘s ‗binding arrangements.‘‖  Gunther Teubner, Legal Irritants: Good Faith in 
British Law or How Unifying Law Ends Up in New Differences, 61 MODERN L. REV. 11, 12 (1998). 
6
 For example, Friedman criticizes Watson‘s thesis that law is insulated from outside influences by contending that 
―the influence of society [on a legal system] seems at all times to be immense, overwhelming.‖  Lawrence Friedman, 
Some Comments on Cotterrel and Legal Transplants, in LEGAL CULTURES 93.  He argues that legal change can take 
on different forms as laws adjust to a given society already pursuing its particular objective, such as ―modernization 
or industrialization,‖ and a legal transfer from one country to another is one way among them.  Id. at 94.  In 
particular, Legrand has an extreme view on legal transplantation across jurisdictions.  He claims that legal 
transplantation is impossible, and his reasoning centers on the meaning of a rule, which he calls the ―crucial element 
of the ruleness of the rule.‖  Pierre Legrand, The Impossibility of „Legal Transplants‟, 4 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. COMP. 
L. 111, 116 (1997).  He criticizes Watson‘s thesis as the result of misapprehension of the nature of legal rules.  The 
key to Legrand‘s argument is that the meaning of a rule in a given country is ―culture specific,‖ and the meaning of 
the rule cannot survive the travel from one country to another.  Id. at 116-17. 
7
 See, e.g., Teubner, supra note 5, at 11-13 (arguing that ―legal irritants‖ is a superior metaphor for the transfer of 
legal rules because a foreign legal rule ―works as a fundamental irritation which triggers a whole series of new and 
unexpected events‖); Máximo Langer, From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The Globalization of Plea 
Bargaining and the Americanization Thesis in Criminal Procedures, 45 HARV. INT‘L L.J. 1, 29-35 (2004) (criticizing 
the limitation of the metaphors of ―legal transplant‖ and ―legal irritants,‖ and proposing the metaphor of ―legal transl
ation‖); William Twining, Diffusion and Globalization Discourse . 47 HARV. INT‘L L.J. 507, 510-12 (2006) 
(preferring the metaphor of ―diffusion of law‖). 
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In light of the current controversy over the theory of legal transplants, the above analysis 
of trade secret law in Japan and Korea suggests some implications for future development of the 
legal transplant theory.  First, it refutes Watson‘s contention regarding ―socially easy‖ legal 
transplantation and the relationship between law and society, whereby legal rules in a given 
society are usually not a reflection of the society‘s endemic economy, politics, or culture.  Rather, 
this analysis reaffirms the importance of context in a given society for successful legal 
transplantation.  However, as examined briefly, one theory of legal transplantation that focuses 
on the experience of Western nations, with different views on the nature of law, does not explain 
or predict how transferred laws and institutions will work in a given host country.  First, as 
Kanda and Milhaupt noted, the ―motivation‖ of legal actors, such as government officials, is one 
of the most important factors for successful legal transplantation.  In addition, the ―availability of 
substitutes‖ plays a critical role in predicting how a specific legal rule will work in a host country.  
Second, as Mattei contended, the case of trade secret law implies that the most efficient legal rule 
is the one that will survive among different legal sources in the host country.  However, the result 
of this competitive process may often depend on whether these substitutes are viable for a 
specific economic policy established by the government, in light of the strong role of 
government in economic development in East Asia.  Third, this case also implies that in the 
context of legal transplants in the area of intellectual property law, the technological capability of 
the host country is an important factor that may determine the success or failure of a 
transplantation.   
Finally, the criteria mentioned above for a successful legal transplant, as well as an 
understanding of the impact of the law on the economic behavior of the relevant parties, also 
have critical and practical importance to those who attempt intentional legal transplants, such as 
 230 
 
governments that intend to borrow foreign legal rules for certain purposes and development 
agencies that seek to change legal rules and institutions via transnational legal transfer, especially 
in the area of intellectual property law applied in developing countries. 
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